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and placed a garrison in Porto Ferrajo. Foreseeing this operation, Miot the French minister at Florence, had urged the grand duke to provide against it, by augmenting his force in that island, a measure which the grand duke declined. Bonaparte, although he expressed great regret at the event, instructed Miot to refrain from menaces or even complaints, as they would merely excite the grand duke's resentment, and as he hoped, after recovering Corsica, to be able to drive the English from Elba. In a letter announcing this affair to the directory, he makes the following suggestions.

"In the actual situation of Italy we must avoid making new enemies, and must wait until the decision of the campaign, in order to take a resolution conformable to the true interests of the republic. You will then be sensible, no doubt, that it will never suit us to leave Tuscany in possession of a brother of the emperor."

It is probable that discontent at the English being permitted to occupy Porto Ferrajo, entered into the motives which dictated this advice in regard to the ultimate destination of Tuscany; although, as the grand duke was heir presumptive to the emperor, and the expulsion of Austria from Italy was the main object of the campaign, the measure Bonaparte recommended was one of obvious and almost necessary policy. So much was this the case that, before the directors received his despatch, being informed that the emperor was dangerously ill, they ordered Bonaparte to intercept the grand duke on his way to Vienna, in the event of his brother's demise, and to take military possession of Tuscany (12).

Thus this short pause in his active military duties, Bonaparte employed in communicating intelligence and advice to the directory, counteracting the blunders of their commissaries and ministers, and adjusting their relations with the different powers of Italy, some subdued into reluctant peace, others retained in restless neutrality. His promptness and versatility in conducting together these various affairs, and making them all concur to the success of his arms, may be compared to the skill and agility of an equestrian performer, riding several horses at once, vaulting from one to another, applying to this the curb, to that the lash, regulating the pace of each, and to the same goal, urging the swift course of all.

Since his return from Leghorn and Bologna, one subject connected with the army had given him great dissatisfaction; and this was that, during his absence, many acts of plunder and extortion had been committed in the country around Mantua. With his efforts, from the commencement of the campaign, to repress by example, precept, and punishment, disorders of this kind, the reader is already acquainted. His proclamation at Cherasco, his rejection of Salicetti's overture at Milan, his declaration to the directory that their contribution counteracted the effects of his victories, his orders, and those of his generals on several occasions, place this virtue of his military character beyond question or controversy. The views of his government in relation to this subject, generally coincided with his own. In their original instructions of the 6th of March, the directors said, "The general will exert himself to maintain a severe discipline, and to save the inhabitants from the vexations and disasters which so often attend upon the scourge of war, and which good order and a vigilant administration can alone prevent."

In a despatch of the 28th of April they observe-“But in praising the courage and intrepidity of the army under your command, the directory is filled with bitter regret at seeing the laurels they have gathered stained by the disorders and pillage in which the troops have indulged. This disastrous situation of affairs, the excesses which sully the glory of the defenders of the republic, will probably have been repressed by the severe order which you issued, and which the imperious necessity under which you were placed, cannot fail to justify. And the directory hopes that henceforward the good conduct of the army will enable you, not only to report it to the government, but to revoke speedily the extraordinary powers which you have been obliged to confer on your generals of division."

When general Beaumont received the surrender of Cremona, he published an order, of which the following is an extract :"The government of France enjoins that the rights of person and property be respected. Any soldier who violates either shall suffer death." About the same time, general Dallemagne issued an order authorizing the inhabitants to arrest and conduct to his headquarters for punishment all French soldiers who might be found committing any trespass whatever. In concurrence with these measures a notification was made to the people of the Cre

mona district, by the municipal council of the town and the French general commanding there in concert, by which the inhabitants were directed to sell nothing to the French troops but for cash, and to refuse in their dealings assignats or other paper money. As a French officer and historian justly observes, "It was impossible to shew more respect for the rights and property of the inhabitants, or to be more careful in removing all occasions for complaint and discontent on their part" (13).

Upon Bonaparte's return to the camp of Serrurier, the people of the Mantuan district lost no time in appealing to his well known sense of justice and solicitude for good order, against the vexations and extortions to which, during his absence, they had been subjected. Their confidence in his integrity was not deceived, for he forthwith issued the following order, dated the 6th of July.

"The general in chief having been informed that various abuses have been committed, and that the good people of the dutchy of Mantua have been oppressed by infamous exactions, commands as follows:

"1st. There shall be held three assemblies, composed of one deputy from each commune in the dutchy; which assemblies shall meet on the 12th of this month. The first shall meet at Roverbello, and shall consist of deputies from the country between the Mincio, the Po, and the states of Venice; the second shall meet at Gouraque, and shall be composed of deputies from the other side of the Po; the third shall meet at Castiglione, and consist of deputies from the country between the Mincio, the Po, the district of Brescia, and Lombardy.

"2nd. Each deputy shall bring with him, 1st. The certificate of his appointment; 2nd. A list of the complaints which the inhabitants have to make against any individual of the army; 3d. A statement of the contributions in money which his commune has furnished, with the names of the persons to whom they have been paid; 4th. A statement of the contributions in provisions, and the names of the persons receiving them; 5th. A statement of the amount found in their public treasury; 6th. A statement of the impositions, direct and indirect, which have been laid on his commune, and of the balance thereof which remains due.

"3d. Each assembly shall have for president its oldest member, and shall meet in a place to be fixed upon by the municipal

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THE LIFE OF THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. [CHAP. XIII.] authorities of the town in which it is directed to convene.

"4th. Each assembly shall commission three of its members to repair to the general in chief, with the lists and statements above mentioned; immediately upon which the assemblies are to be dissolved. Their existence is not to last more than twelve hours.

"The general in chief forbids, under the severest penalties, the agents of the army, military commissaries, and the officers generally, from making any requisitions whatever, unless the same be signed by the intendant general."

The practical efficacy of this order, in bringing to light every abuse, and exposing to censure or punishment its author, no matter what might be his rank, is very remarkable, when it is considered that in most cases measures of this kind have the effect of concealing the abuses, and sheltering the culprits complained of. The prompt dissolution which he decreed to assemblies created by himself, is worthy of particular attention, as evincing the extreme apprehension under which this wonderful man always laboured at seeing power exercised by popular bodies.

By means of this just and energetic measure, he not only guarded the resources of the country, and maintained the discipline of the army, but must have laid a deep foundation of respect and influence in the hearts of the Italian people.

About this time, the Aulic council not having gained any real victories in Italy, circulated through the German journals, the account of a pretended one. The sorry fiction was thus alluded to by Bonaparte, in a letter to Carnot of the 6th of July ;— "General Berthier is furious at the imaginary victory which the German gazetteers have made Beaulieu gain over us. For my part, I think these gentlemen have a right to comfort themselves in the only manner they can. Dreams have always been the consolation of the unfortunate."

CHAPTER XIV.

From the 21st of July to the 21st of August 1796.

The French armies on the Rhine-Influence of Bonaparte on their operations-Efforts of Austria, to form a new army in Italy-Strength of Wurmser's army-Comparative weakness of that of Bonaparte-Wurmser opens the campaign-His plan-Forces Joubert-Falls upon MassenaProgress of Quasdonowich-Plan of Bonaparte-He raises the siege of Mantua - Withdraws Massena and Augereau from the Adige - Moves against Quasdonowich-Combat of Lonato-Brescia retaken-Salo retaken-Battle of Lonato-Of Castiglione-Defeat and retreat of Wurmser -Activity and exposure of Bonaparte- Combat of Peschiera-Verona retaken-The Austrians driven back into the Tyrol-Reflections.

As early as the month of July the vigour and skill of Bonaparte, not only held in quiet or subjection the whole of Italy (the single fortress of Mantua excepted), but extended their influence to the distant theatre of the Rhine; where the interests of France, confided to older generals and numerous armies, were upheld and promoted by his exploits alone.

Upon leaving Paris to take command of his army, he was given to understand by the directory, that Jourdan and Moreau, at the head of one hundred and fifty thousand men, would open the campaign in the course of the month of April; and that consequently the enemy against whom he was to contend in Italy, if not weakened by draughts to repair the ravages of war on the Rhine, would at least receive no reenforcements from that quarter. But so different was the actual progress from the preconcerted course of the campaign, that Jourdan and Moreau

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