from Leghorn and placed at the head of the division of Sauret, who was stationed at Brescia, in command of the reserve. This brave officer whose activity in the late operations was lessened by a painful contusion on the leg received in a charge of cavalry, felt, it appears, some repugnance at resigning a light division to take command of the reserve; and it was in order to allay this natural sensibility that Bonaparte addressed to him the following letter.

"Considerations connected with your health alone, induced me to give you command of the reserve, and to place another officer at the head of the division under your orders. This division is again destined for service too active to be compatible with the infirm state of your health. But you will nevertheless render yourself useful in the post I assign you, which is not less important than the one you leave; although the service which it will require is less severe, and better adapted to your situation. The reserve will see the enemy, but is intended to reach him by less difficult routes. The services which you have already rendered ought to convince you that this change of position is not designed to affect your reputation. Were it to indicate the slightest diminution of my confidence in your courage and patriotism, it would convey a meaning altogether foreign to my real sentiments."

Sauret's surprise and indecision at Salo no doubt convinced Bonaparte that, notwithstanding his zeal and intrepidity, he was incapable of conducting a light division with sufficient vigour and activity. The cautious inference which he drew from the conduct of Despinois to the capacity of Vaubois and Sahuguet, turned out to be but too well founded.

The colours, nine in number, which were taken in the actions with Wurmser's columns, Bonaparte sent to Paris in charge of Berthier's aide de camp, Dutaillis; by whom they were presented to the directory, with the usual ceremonies, on the 27th of August. In his address on the occasion, Dutaillis thus spoke of the commander in chief. "These successes which will be for ever glorious, are due to the bravery of our soldiers, as well as to the skilful dispositions and indefatigable activity of their young general. Night and day at their head, sharing their dangers, their fatigues, and their privations, he conducts their attacks, directs their courage, and opens to them the road to victory." The reply of the directors, though full of general applause for the army is

remarkable for containing not a single allusion to Bonaparte; although in their despatch twelve days earlier, they had loaded him with praise.

The armies of Jourdan and Moreau had been more successful in their second invasion of Germany than in their first; and with a decided superiority of force, in consequence of the victories of Bonaparte in Italy, had advanced rapidly towards Vienna; the former penetrating as far as the Rednitz, the latter to the banks of the Lech: tributaries, the first of the Necker and the second of the Danube. Notwithstanding this pressure near the heart of the empire, the Austrian cabinet, slow but persevering in their councils, and not unobservant of the negligence of the French government towards Italy, determined to persist in their efforts for the recovery of Lombardy, and to give Wurmser an opportunity to vindicate his fame. With the reserve which had been left in the Tyrol, detachments which had been drawn from the lower Danube, draughts from various garrisons, and recruits from the hardy population of the Alps, who, inured to toil and inclined to war, were readily incorporated with the veterans of his army, Wurmser found little difficulty in repairing in a great measure his losses at Lonato and Castiglione, and raising his active force, exclusive of the garrison of Mantua, to fifty five thousand men. So that by the last of August, he was prepared to venture a second descent into the valley of the Po.

As Bonaparte had also received reenforcements sufficient to compensate his losses in action, the two generals were to begin a second contest, as far as numbers were concerned, on terms less unfavorable to the French than the first. Apprized of Wurmser's strength and intentions, Bonaparte resolved, by assuming the offensive, to counteract them, and at the same time to prevent his sending assistance to the army opposed to Moreau.

After a short visit to Milan he returned to Brescia on the 30th of August, as appears from a letter to Josephine, whom he had just parted with; "My first thought on arriving here, my dear Josephine, is to write to you. Your health and your image were not absent from my mind an instant during the whole journey; nor shall I be tranquil until I receive letters from you. You cannot conceive my anxiety; for I left you sad, distressed, and half sick. If the most devoted and the tenderest love can console you, you ought to be happy. I am overwhelmed with affairs. Adieu my

302

THE LIFE OF THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.

[CHAP. XV.] dear Josephine, preserve your health, love me, and think of me often, often."

Determined, as he had written to Salicetti, no longer "to halt in the marshes around Mantua," and in confident preparation for the offensive operations which he meditated, he dictated on the same day a proclamation, addressed to the Tyrolians, and destined for distribution at a suitable moment. The next day, having communicated in a despatch to Moreau his intention of penetrating to Trent, and effecting the conquest of the Italian Tyrol, and invited him to come into combination with this movement by advancing from Bavaria upon Inspruck, he proceeded to Verona; where his arrival in the midst of Augereau's division, was the signal for the army to advance.

CHAPTER XVI.

From the 1st of September to the 1st of October 1796.

Wurmser resolves on a second invasion—His plan of operations-That of Bonaparte-He moves against Davidowich-His precautions-Combat of the Sarca, of Serravalle, of Mori and Marco-Death of general DuboisBattle of Roveredo-Defeat and loss of the Austrians-The French enter Trent-Bonaparte advances to the Lavis-Forces the passage of that river, and defeats Davidowich-Consternation of the Austrians—Bonaparte returns to Trent-His proclamation to the Tyrolians—Its effect-His prophetic letter to Josephine-Movement and views of Wurmser-Bonaparte leaves Trent, and pursues him down the Brenta-Combat of Primolano, of Covolo, of Solagno-Battle of Bassano-Defeat and flight of Wurmser— Affecting night scene Mezaros attacks Verona-Repulsed Critical situation of Wurmser-He reaches the Adige-Gets possession of the bridge of Porto Legnano-Bonaparte endeavours to intercept him-Combat of Cerea-Narrow escape of Bonaparte-Wurmser passes the MolinellaEffects his retreat to Mantua—Augereau retakes Porto Legnano-Combat of Due Castelli-Battle of Saint George-Wurmser defeated and driven into Mantua―The blockade reestablished-Bonaparte goes to Milan— Comparative loss of the contending armies—The trophies of the campaign presented to the directory-Letter of Carnot to Bonaparte.

Marshal Wurmser, unaccustomed to defeat and burning with shame at the disastrous issue of his attempt to retrieve the reprobated misfortunes of his predecessor, lost no time in endeavouring to justify the original preference and continued confidence of his government, by making a second effort for the relief of Mantua. His plan on this occasion, which there is reason to believe was

prescribed by the cabinet of Vienna, differed from the former one, both in the distribution of his force and the direction of his march. Instead of dividing his army into three columns, and invading Lombardy by as many routes, he was to separate his force into two divisions, and to act offensively with one only; which instead of operating on either side of the lake of Guarda was to direct its course down the valley of the Brenta and across the plains of the lower Adige (1).

While the marshal, taking this route at the head of thirty thousand men, was to pass the Adige at Verona, and push forward to the relief of Mantua, general Davidowich with a corps, consisting of twenty five thousand, was to occupy the passes of the Tyrol. Should the French attempt to penetrate these defiles, either for the purpose of recalling Wurmser from his march down the Brenta, or of forming a connection with the right wing of Moreau in Bavaria, Davidowich was to remain on the defensive. But should Bonaparte attempt to withdraw his troops from the upper Adige in order to oppose Wurmser on the Brenta, Davidowich was to assume the offensive, and prevent the project by attacking Massena, or take advantage of it, by moving on directly to Mantua.

As soon as Bonaparte discovered the nature of his adversary's plan, he formed his own, and determined to throw himself first on one division of the Austrians, and then on the other, trusting by the vigour and celerity of his movements, to disable both before either could gain a decisive advantage. Having first routed Davidowich, he was to fall swiftly on Wurmser; the destruction of whose army he hoped in this manner to accomplish, and after effecting his proposed combination with Moreau, to complete what he had left unfinished at Lonato and Castiglione. Leaving at Verona general Kilmaine, who had recovered strength sufficient to return to duty, with three thousand men, composed of cavalry, artillery and infantry, to defend the passage of the lower Adige, and by doing so to cover the blockade of Mantua, he caused the fortifications of Verona on the left bank of the river to be strengthened, so as to be capable of resisting a sudden as sault. The duty thus confided to Kilmaine, who stationed advanced parties in the plain of Verona, and had a garrison at Porto Legnano, was thought to be of such great importance, in comparison with the small force placed at his disposal, that Bonaparte gave him minute written instructions, pointing out the