CHAPTER XVIII.

August, September, and October, 1796.

Political situation of the Italian states-Genoa forms an alliance with France -Bonaparte opens negotiations with Sardinia for the same object-His letter to the Sardinian minister of state-Its good effect-The king of Naples marches across the Roman frontier-Intimidated by Bonaparte's victories and menaces, he retires-Negotiations with Rome-Broken off at Florence-The Pope suspends formally the execution of the armistice of Bologna-Vexation of Bonaparte-Intimates a wish to be relieved-Correspondence with the directory-They give him full powers to treat with Rome-The indiscreet diplomacy of the French government-Venice secretly arms-Bonaparte prudently dissembles-His good understanding with the duke of Parma-The Grand Duke of Tuscany-Insurrection in Corsica-The English evacuate that island—It is reannexed to FranceBonaparte's satisfaction-His instructions to general Gentili-His advice to the directory-Sickness of the troops-Despair of the sick-Bonaparte encourages them-Makes war on the thievish commissaries, contractors, and paymasters-His remarkable letter on that subject-His strenuous application for reenforcements-His discontent with general Willot.—His opinions on military government-Strengthens his position by fortifications on various points.

Since the observation of Bonaparte was as perfectly true as it was often repeated, that the face of political affairs in Italy, affected by the state and prospects of the war, changed at least every fortnight, it is time, after beholding two republics rise up in the centre of that still contested country, and under the patronage of France, to consider, somewhat retrospectively, the attitude of the other Italian states.

Genoa, vibrating in her domestic councils between the incli

nation of the people to a fraternity with France, and the disposition of the nobles and their immediate vassals, to side with the coalition; and fluctuating in her external policy, according to the degree in which her fear or her resentment was excited, by this or by that belligerent, had, on more than one occasion, roused the indignation of the French general and provoked the menaces of the French government. At length, on the 11th of September, commodore Nelson, sailing from the harbour of Genoa, cut out a French vessel from under the guns of a Genoese fort in the vicinity, and by that act of violence, excited among all classes, an irritation, which gave a preponderance to the friends of France in the senate, and threw the republic, from her position of neutrality, into an alliance with France. This treaty, which was signed at Paris on the 9th of October, had been repeatedly advised, and was warmly approved by Bonaparte: whose sage and steady policy it was, in opposition to the grasping and impraticable views of his government, to endeavour to reduce belligerents to peace, and to convert neutrals into allies (1).

The treaty with Sardinia, which was concluded in May, by detaching that state from the coalition, and placing in possession of the French army all the great fortresses of Piedmont, had left the king at the mercy of the directory; with little power for external defence, as little authority for internal government, and with no other fruits of the war in which he was one of the first potentates to engage, than an empty treasury, a heavy debt, and discontented subjects. It was the opinion of some among French statesmen at the time, that advantage of this state of things should be taken, to effect a revolution in Piedmont, which would remove all apprehension of disturbance from that quarter, and add to the military means of France, the resources of the dethroned king. Against this harsh and unjust operation Bonaparte protested, alleging that he had not troops to spare for its execution; that it would lead to a civil war in Piedmont, which it would be dangerous to tolerate and difficult to extinguish; and that it would be offensive to their allies the kings of Spain and Prussia; who could not see without alarm, the French government dethrone with their own hands, a prince with whom they had just signed a treaty of peace and friendship. Instead of depriving the king of Sardinia of his crown, Bonaparte counselled the formation of an alliance offensive and defensive

with that prince, a measure which he affirmed was recommended by the following considerations. It would suppress the designs of the malcontents in Piedmont, and the country being consequently quieted, a division of ten thousand fine old troops might be procured to reenforce his army. The example of the court of Turin in coming into the alliance, would influence the senate of Venice to seek a guarantee for the integrity of their dominions, in a similar connection with France. The Piedmontese troops, united to the army of Italy, would catch its bold spirit, and become devoted to the general who led them to victory; while they would be so many hostages for the good feeling of the people, and the good faith of the king.

His advice in favour of this alliance, Bonaparte had repeatedly offered to the directory in the course of the campaign. At length, having found himself authorised by a despatch of the 20th of September, to open a negotiation in relation to it, he despatched the secretary of legation at Genoa, with instructions to sound the disposition of the court of Turin. His anxiety to conclude a treaty of the kind was so much increased by the outrages of the Barbets, who again infested the maritime Alps with a renewal of robberies and murder, that he was inclined to procure a personal interview with the Sardinian minister for foreign affairs; a wish which, from the importance and multiplicity of other engagements, it was not in his power to gratify.

The king of Sardinia, under the terror of the campaign of Cherasco, having made unmeasured concessions in the treaty of peace, determined to stand up for high terms as the price of his alliance. Pouissielgue the French agent, after a negotiation of several weeks, transmitted to headquarters the project of a treaty, by which, in consideration of an alliance offensive and defensive, and a contingent of eight thousand men, the king was to receive the whole of Lombardy; a cession which would have doubled the extent and power of his kingdom. This exorbitant demand Bonaparte the more peremptorily rejected, that before it was submitted to him, he was apprized that peace with Naples, and an alliance with Genoa, had been concluded at Paris. His letter to Pouissielgue referring to these facts is dated the 25th of October. "I have received your letter of the 21st. The propositions are not acceptable. The whole of Lombardy, for a succour of eight thousand men, or rather five, for they will never exceed that number,

is asking too much, now that peace is made with Naples and Genoa. Piedmont will gain a great deal by an alliance with us. The king by means of it, will be able to efface from the minds of his subjects, the contempt which the former treaty inspired."

The negotiations, which in this letter Pouissielgue was instructed to renew, although they were not concluded by a treaty until several months had elapsed, and a great alteration been effected in the state of the war, by their existence and notoriety, suppressed that encouragement which the Barbets derived from the sufferance or instigation of the court of Turin. It may be incidentally mentioned, in relation to these brigands, that on the 21th of September Bonaparte addressed a letter of complaint to the king of Sardinia, and enclosed it in one of remonstrance to his minister, which for spirited frankness and logical force, is a masterpiece.

"I am no diplomatist Sir, but simply a soldier; you will therefore excuse my frankness. On different points of his majesty's states, French citizens are robbed and assassinated. By the treaty of peace the king, who is bound to allow us a passage through his territory, ought to give us a safe passage; and it was only on this account, that contrary to the tenor of the treaty, I took upon myself to restore to his majesty, not only the civil government in that part of his states given up to him by the republic, but the military government also. At Viné, at Limon, under the eyes of the garrison of Demont, and under those of the troops commanded by M. Franchar at Borgo san Dalmazzor, outrages are perpetrated every day, which seem to be not only tolerated, but encouraged by the government. I will therefore ask of you a simple explanation;-first, ought not the King to indemnify us, and to repair the losses sustained in consequence of crimes committed against French citizens in his territory, when those crimes are committed in public, and by bands of men in regular pay, and two or three hundred in number?-Second, has the king, with twenty five thousand men under arms, sufficient force to repress these outrages in his territory, and to compel the banditti who commit them, to respect the obligations of justice, humanity, and treaties?

"Men, Sir, are to be judged only by their actions. The honour of the king is generally acknowledged. Nevertheless one is

forced to believe that political reasons induce the government to incite, or at least to tolerate, these revolting atrocities.

"I have written to his majesty himself, and I beg you to present my letter to him. The French government will do nothing either openly or secretly to abolish, or to weaken, the authority of the king over his people. You are aware however, that it would be as easy to do that, as it would be to strengthen it.

"The day Sir, that you shall feel a sincere desire to destroy the banditti who infest our routes from Coni to Barcelonetta, they will cease to exist."

This energetic and pungent letter was not without effect; for in a few days after it was received, Bonaparte wrote to the directory," The king of Sardinia has decided on an alliance with France, and the Barbets are dispersed and exterminated."

The grand irruption of Wurmser into Lombardy in the beginning of August, had been the signal for all the latent hostilities cherished against the French by the intimidated governments of Italy, to rise up, like elastic bodies from which a controlling pressure is removed. That of Naples, influenced by the passions of a violent woman, burst forth like the blaze of a volcano. The king, with an army of twenty four thousand men, marched across the confines of the Pope, threatening, in violation of the armistice of Brescia and in contempt of that of Bologna, to occupy Rome, drive the French out of Leghorn, and join the army of Wurmser on the Po. At this brisk movement, and haughty menace, the sacred college, however unfriendly to France, was thrown into great alarm. But Bonaparte, who had already completed the defeat and expulsion of Wurmser, announced to the Vatican and to the court of the Two Sicilies, that if the King persisted in violating the territory of the Pope, and disregarding his own convention with France, he undertook, in the face of Europe, to march against his pretended seventy thousand men, with no more than six thousand grenadiers, four thousand cavalry, and fifty fieldpieces (2). This threat reenforced by the renown of the victories of Lonato and Castiglione, dissipated the hopes and projects of the Neapolitan monarch, who, by the flattery of British agents had been induced to overrate his importance. Still, in consequence of a demand on the part of the directory of a contribution of several millions, which the Neapolitan minister was instructed to refuse, the treaty of peace, con