vice of her minister at Paris, and the instigation of the cabinets of London and Vienna, he deemed it prudent to forbear resenting or even noticing her offensive demonstrations; opposing dissimulation to duplicity, and arguing that the ultimate policy of this state would be determined by the fate of Mantua, and the issue of the contest with Austria (4).

With the duke of Parma, whose fidelity in conforming to the specific terms of the armistice and the general obligations of neutrality, was admitted, the French commander was careful to cultivate a friendly understanding. That prince, having occasion to complain of the misconduct of certain agents of the army who exercised their functions in his dominions, addressed a letter to Bonaparte, desiring that the abuses of which he complained, should be remedied. This letter, the object of which was immediately complied with by an order to the commanding officer at Placentia, received on the 1st of November an answer couched in terms that must have calmed the duke's anxiety, and were dictated doubtless by a desire to dispose him to an alliance with France, which Bonaparte had recommended to the directory. "I have received the letter of your royal highness, dated the 24th of October, and I have hastened to comply with your request. It is the intention of the French government to do every thing that is agreeable to your royal highness; and you will find me ready under all circumstances, to furnish whatever assistance or force you may stand in need of. If the agents of the army misbehave themselves, I invite your royal highness to have them arrested. While they sojourn in your dominions, they must conduct themselves with that propriety which respect for the authority of the prince requires. Whenever your royal highness shall advise me of their delinquencies, I will cause them to be severely punished.

"The good understanding which reigns between the two countries, and the good conduct observed by your royal highness under all circumstances, ought to assure you of the friendship of the French republic, and of its protection against all those who may violate your authority and transgress the laws established in your state."

The grand duke of Tuscany, moderate in his character, and mild in his sway over peaceful subjects, with the French garrison at Leghorn on one side, and the republican congress at Modena on

the other, although on one or two occasions he showed a disposition to increase his military power, had no influence beyond his own contracted limits, and with regard to the war in Italy, was considered a cipher (5)..

Meantime, in Corsica, the fame of Bonaparte's victories, had excited the national pride of the inhabitants, and brought into action their aversion to the English. They first refused to pay taxes to the government, and when the viceroy Elliot marched with a party of troops against the refractory district, surrounded him with superior numbers, and suffered him to return unmolested, only upon condition that he should withdraw to the seaports the garrisons he had placed in the towns of the interior, and dismiss from his service his two Corsican favorites, Pozzo di Borgo his secretary, and the younger Colonna his aide de camp. About this time the viceroy had taken possession of Porto Ferrajo in the island of Elba, as an offset against the occupation of Leghorn by Bonaparte; and finding that it would be impracticable with his small force, to put down the insurrection and retain military possession of Corsica, he determined to evacuate the island altogether, and to convey his troops, stores, and property to Elba. General Gentili, who had completed his preparations for a descent on Corsica, and was waiting at Leghorn for a favorable wind, received intelligence of the successful insurrection, and on the 15th, communicated the details to Bonaparte, in a letter beginning with words cheering to the heart of a patriot, "The liberty of our country is restored." On the 17th, this letter was answered by an order to pass over immediately to Corsica, and assume the command of that division. The military instructions contained in this order discover an intimate knowledge of the people and the country, which Bonaparte's short residence in Corsica could not alone have supplied, but for which no doubt, he was principally indebted, to the study he had given to the history of his native island.

By those of a political nature, which were designed to confine the reaction of the insurrection within the narrowest practicable limits, Gentili is directed "to grant a general pardon to all persons who have only been misled; but to cause to be arrested and tried by a military commission the four deputies who conveyed the crown to the king of England, the members of the late government, and the contrivers of this infamous treason; among the

rest Pozzo di Borgo, Bartholani, Peraldi, Stefanopoli, Tartaroli, Filipi," and "that one of the chiefs of battalion who may be convicted of having borne arms against the troops of the republic. So that the national vengeance will fall only upon about thirty individuals, who probably will make their escape with the English. You will likewise have the emigrants arrested, should any of them be bold enough to remain in a territory occupied by the republican troops.

"But above all things, I recommend it to you to execute speedy justice on any one who, actuated by lawless resentment, shall go to the excess of murdering his enemy."

It may here be remarked that his sentence against the principal Corsican traitors, whose number, in a subsequent letter to the directors, he reduced to twelve or fifteen, was in his own opinion likely to be what it actually proved to be, ineffectual, except in so far as it carried out the principles of national justice; and that his order respecting such emigrants as might persist in remaining in Corsica, was intended to be, and so it turned out, nothing more than a nominal compliance with the laws of France, and the disposition of her rulers (6).

The civil administration of Corsica, comprehending the measures necessary to reestablish the sovereignty of France in the island, was confided to the commissary Salicetti, who, like general Gentili, was by birth a Corsican, and who sailed from Leghorn with the expedition. But neither in Leghorn nor in Corsica, was this deputy or his colleague, allowed to exercise any military authority. In a letter of the 1st of November to general Serrurier, Bonaparte, founding himself on the despatch of the directory of the 21st of May, said, "I do not recognize the right of the executive commissaries, to make requisitions on the generals of division. I therefore return to you their decree. When general Gentili who is charged with the expedition, shall apply to you for anything, you are at liberty to grant it; if you think it will be productive of no inconvenience to the service. But never allege as a reason for your conduct, a decree of the commissaries, which in my estimation, is perfectly insignificant. This method of proceeding is too liable to abuse, for you not to perceive the importance of forbidding it. When the commissaries send you one of their decrees, send it back with the remark, that you acknowledge no orders except those issued from my headquarters." At the same time

he wrote to general Gentili who had landed in Corsica. “You should maintain a good understanding with the executive commissary, without however feeling yourself bound to obey his decrees touching the military service, which depends on you alone."'

In a despatch of the 25th of October, treating on the subject of Corsica, Bonaparte expressed this opinion to the directors: "R will be necessary to send twelve hundred troops into Corsica. When you do send them, I think it will be well to choose for that service no general nor commander of a garrison, who is a Corsican by birth." In conformity with this opinion, which was founded on the apprehension that personal favour, or private resentment, might disturb the course of policy and justice in the new government, general Gentili, though an excellent officer to promote the revolution, was soon superseded by general Vaubois; and Salicetti, a man of admitted ability, zeal, and experience, was succeeded in the course of a month, by Miot the French minister at Florence. To this functionary, when he was upon the point of sailing for Corsica, Bonaparte wrote, "The Corsicans are a people extremely difficult to comprehend; their imaginations are excessively lively, and their passions most violent." And further, to assist Miot in the discharge of this delicate mission, he induced his brother Joseph, whose influence, both from his personal qualities and his connection with the commander in chief, was very great in the island, to accompany him. Under their prudent and patriotic management, the revolution was consummated, and Corsica reunited to France, without difficulty, or the pain of shedding a single drop of blood (7).

On the 11th of October, Spain from being a neutral power under the treaty of July 1795, became an ally of France in the war against Great Britain. This event, together with the alliance with Genoa, the peace with Naples, and the recovery of Corsica, overthrew the project of naval ascendancy in the Mediterranean, with which the seisure of Toulon had inspired the British cabinet, and gave for a season the mastery of that sea to the combined French and Spanish fleets. In consequence, the opposition against which Bonaparte would have to contend, was limited to the forces of Austria, and such adherents as she might make or preserve in Italy. This change in the situation of maritime affairs, was a source of much satisfaction to him. In a letter of the 17th of October he thus announced it to the minister at Rome. "I have

this moment received intelligence that the English are evacuating the Mediterranean; they have already evacuated Corsica, which has hoisted the tricolored flag, and sent deputies to me to take the oath of allegiance." On the same day he wrote to Josephine, "The English are evacuating the Mediterranean; Corsica is ours; good news for France and for the army." And in a letter of the same date to the directory before he had heard of their treaty of peace with Naples, after enlarging upon the value of Corsica to France, he observed: "The expulsion of England from the Mediterranean, has a great influence on our military operations in Italy. You ought to exact severe conditions from Naples, for this event exerts an important moral effect upon the minds of the Italians, and will make Naples tremble to the remotest parts of Sicily." The severe tone of this suggestion, so different from the habitual mildness of his counsels to the government, and so opposite to the moderation of the terms upon which he concluded and recommended the armistice of Brescia, was inspired no doubt by his indignation at the perfidious boldness of the king of Naples in taking advantage of Wurmser's first irruption, and marching a column of troops across the Roman frontier.

Besides these various intricate and weighty affairs of what may be termed diplomatic interest, and foreign policy, which he had to sustain or conduct during the short breathing time allowed him by the Austrians after the battle of St. George, his attention was given, during the same interval and with his accustomed energy, to the interior condition of his army; its health, its finances, and its reenforcements.

Lingering under the obstinacy of autumnal fevers, and crowded painfully in loathsome hospitals, the invalids became so feeble in body and dejected in mind, that they refused the remedies prescribed for them, and were reduced to a state, in which it may be said, that "despair tended the sick." Bonaparte, himself afflicted with the same fever under which his men suffered, visited the hospitals, and at one of them, throwing a quantity of jesuit's bark into a vessel of water, drank copiously of the infusion before the eyes of the patients. His presence, his example, the words of courage and consolation which he addressed to them; their remembrance of his indefatigable labours, and glorious deeds, revived the soldiers to hopes of health and a relish for life. The draughts prepared by the surgeons, they no longer refused, and

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