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THE LIFE OF THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. [CHAP. XVII.] But while he was suffering from the negligence of the government, the knavery of contractors, and the pestilence of the climate, the last of these causes, aggravated by want of food, was operating severely in Mantua. On the 16th of October, this having been ascertained from the confession of prisoners and the reports of spies, Bonaparte directed Berthier to send a flag of truce to marshal Wurmser, and to offer, in his name, if the Austrian commander would give up Mantua, to allow him to march out with all his troops, artillery, and stores, and retire freely into Germany. On this occasion the offer was refused.

As the succours which Bonaparte required, if furnished at all, were likely to be slow in their progress and inadequate in their numbers, he determined to strengthen his position in Italy by works of defence. With this view he fortified Pizzighitone, Tresso, and other eligible points on the Adda, his two bridges across the Po, one near Mantua and the other near Pavia, the forts of Urbino and Ferrara, and the undefended positions on the Adige. His purpose was to cover the siege of Mantua as long as possible, to protect his flank against annoyance from Rome, and in case the weight of the approaching Austrian irruption should compel him to abandon the line of the Adige and the works around Mantua, to retire behind the Adda, and there, with the republican population of Milan at his back and such reenforcements from France as might have time to join him, to dispute the mastery of Italy in a great battle.

CHAPTER XIX.

November 1796.

Impression made at Vienna, by the victories of Bonaparte-Effect in Italy of the reverses of Jourdan and Moreau-Perverse conduct, and probable motives, of the directory-Disquietude of Bonaparte-Strength and position of his force-Marshal Alvinzi-His numbers and his plans-Advances to the Piave-Massena retires-Bonaparte supports his lieutenant-Battle of Fontenvia-The Austrians driven across the Brenta-Disasters of Vaubois -Bonaparte marches back to Verona-Reviews the division of VauboisRebukes the 39th and 85th-Their grief and mortification-Alvinzi approaches Verona-Takes post at Caldiero-Bonaparte resolves to attack him-Action of Caldiero-Bonaparte repulsed-Retires to Verona-Chagrin and murmurs of the troops-His effort to encourage them-Noble conduct of the sick and wounded-Desperate position and distress of Bonaparte-His letter to the directory-His greatness of soul-Sagacity and secresy of his resolution-- He marches for Ronco- Dejection of the troops -He passes the Adige, and enters the marshes of Arcola-The confidence of the army revived-Movement of Massena and Augereau-The former clears the left hand causeway; the latter repulsed at the bridge of Arcola— Bonaparte renews the attack in person-Fails-Gallantry and devotion of Lannes-Heroism and death of Muiron-Danger and rescue of BonaparteAlvinzi disconcerted by the first day's action-Bonaparte withdraws across the Adige for the night to Ronco-The second day-Massena defeats one column of the Austrians and Augereau another-The action of the second day successful-Bonaparte again retires to Ronco-Throws a bridge across the mouth of the Alpon-The third day-Forward movement of AlvinziDispositions of Bonaparte-Repulse of general Robert on the centre causeway-Bonaparte attacks with the 32nd-Rescues Robert, and destroys the Austrian column-Massena on the left hand repulses Alvinzi with great slaughter-Augereau passes the mouth of the Alpon-Death of the aide de camp Elliot-Bonaparte resolves to give battle on the plain-His stratagems-Defeats Alvinzi in a pitched battle-Marches to Villa Nova

Enters a convent-Saves two of his wounded men-Returns in triumph to Verona-Rescues Vaubois who had been surprised and beaten-Comparative loss of the two armies-Bonaparte's report to the directoryLetters to Josephine, Madame Muiron, general Clarke, and Carnot-He attacks Davidowich, and drives him into the Tyrol-Places Joubert in command of Vaubois's division-Returns to Verona-Abortive movements of Alvinzi-He retreats behind the Brenta-Presentation of the colours to the directory-Merit of Bonaparte in this contest.

"The couriers who bore to Vienna the news of Prince Charles' successes, were followed by messengers with accounts of Wurmser's disasters. The imperial court passed the whole month of September in vicissitudes of joy and grief. Yet the satisfaction of triumph, did not make up for the consternation produced by defeat. Germany was safe, but Italy was lost, and the army which was to maintain this frontier, had disappeared. Its numerous staff, its veteran marshal, with the wrecks of several broken regiments, had saved themselves only by taking refuge in Mantua; which reduced to extremities, in want of food, and a prey to pestilence, was on the point of opening its gates to the victor. The Aulic council felt the necessity of making extraordinary efforts. It assembled two armies, one in the Frioul, and the other in the Tyrol, and placing them under the command of Marshal Alvinzi, ordered him to march to the relief of Mantua, and the rescue of Wurmser (1)."

Such is the well-drawn picture that Bonaparte himself sketched, of the impressions under which the Austrian cabinet was now preparing to contest with him a fourth time, the possession of Lombardy.

On the other hand, the miscarriage and retreat of the French armies on the Rhine, were felt in Italy, not only as an offset against the victories of Bonaparte in the general result of the campaign, but as leaving a balance, to be carried to the credit of Austria, in the yet unsettled dispute. It could not be doubted that the Emperor's good fortune on the principal frontier, would dispose and enable him to redouble his exertions on the secondary one; and it was soon ascertained that detachments from the army of the archduke, recruits from the Illyrian provinces, draughts from Austrian Poland and the remotest garrisons on the Danube, were pressing forward on the various routes leading

into Italy. In the Frioul, the division of Quasdonowich which had escaped from the field of Bassano, was the nucleus on which these reenforcements collected; as that of Davidowich, who remained at Newmark in front of Vaubois, was their rallying point in the Tyrol.

This state of things coinciding with the earnest representations and reiterated appeals of Bonaparte, opened the eyes of the directory to the importance of assisting their general in Italy with something more substantial and efficacious than promises and despatches. But even in this corrected stage of their councils, their acts when compared with the abundance of their assurances, were better calculated to disappoint his expectations, than to satisfy his wants. As late as the middle of November, the whole amount of reenforcements he received, were not sufficient to repair his losses by death, wounds, and disease; and he and his brave army were doomed to engage in a fourth contest, with the odds of two to one against them, and against an enemy whose perseverance was stimulated by the obvious neglect of their own government (2).

When his great services, important position, and perilous exposure, are taken into view, it is difficult to account for this determined neglect on the part of the government. No suspicion was entertained of his integrity or his patriotism; for when certain journalists in Paris accused him of a design of making himself king of Italy, and affirmed that he was to be superseded by general Hoche, the directory not only wrote to him, abjuring and reprobating the calumny, but published their letter in the Moniteur as soon as it was written. In this document they say, "The directory view with indignation the perfidy with which a certain coalition of pamphleteers have allowed themselves to attack the loyalty and constant fidelity of your services, and they owe it to themselves to contradict formally the absurd calumnies, which a necessity of ministering to the malignant taste of their readers, has caused these writers to hazard." Nor were they insensible to the value of their conquests in Italy, or to the importance of maintaining them; for from Italy they had derived funds for supporting the armies of Jourdan and Moreau, and equipping the squadrons in Toulon; and they acknowledged that their only chance of establishing by treaty, the constitutional limits of France on the Rhine, depended on the equivalents which they

would have to offer in Italy. Yet although Bonaparte, from the beginning of the campaign, had been soliciting reenforcements, they had never enabled him to bring into the field more than half the numerical force of his enemy. He had gained battle after battle, destroyed army after army, humbled foe after foe, reduced to peace or subjection state after state; and had repeatedly offered, if but moderately reenforced, to pass the Alps, and finish the war in the heart of Germany. All was in vain; the directory not only refused to provide for this adventurous march, but diverting their resources to less feasible projects, failed even to supply the void which the waste of war had occasioned in his ranks; although the Italian Tyrol was added to the extent of country to be covered by his arms, and the retreat of their generals on the Rhine, left Austria free to make her greatest efforts on the side of Italy. With the twenty two thousand men assembled at Brest under general Hoche, added to the army of Italy, Bonaparte, while the archduke Charles was before Kehl and Huninguen, would have reopened that frontier to the advance of the armies on the Rhine, or taken Vienna; and in either case would have forced the Emperor to peace. Still, the directors confined him to Italy; and with a perverseness arising partly from jealousy of the effects of his glory, partly from their own intestine disagreements, and partly perhaps from resentment at the futility, with which the force of his judgment and the rapidity of his successes, had attainted their most elaborate and positive instructions, condemned him to undergo herculean labours. But supported by his own genius and the devotion of his army, he performed more than herculean exploits (3).

Though few in number, his troops were animated by the highest spirit, and under his conduct, were ready to meet any force or brave any danger; and with the exception of a momentary want occasioned by fraudulent irregularities in the service, were well supplied with food, clothes, and pay. His artillery was numerous and efficient; his cavalry, though the regiments were not full, was expert and well mounted. Besides, it will be remembered that by a fortunate contrariety to the intentions of the government, he had established on both sides of the Po, under institutions favourable to liberty and an alliance with France, a state of popular feeling, highly advantageous to his military operations. The inhabitants of Lombardy, Bologna, Fer