ness and ability in separating and defeating the Austrians and Sardinians, in the campaign of Montenotte; his boldness and sagacity in passing the Po and the Adige, in that of Lodi; his decision and foresight in raising the siege of Mantua, rushing upon Quasdonowich at Brescia, and returning upon Wurmser at Castiglione; the daring swiftness and consecutive fury of his attacks at Roveredo, Calliano, Lavisio, Primolano, Bassano, and St. George; and his invention, fortitude, and heroism, in the struggles of Arcola, were all admirable, all far excelling the exploits of of any other modern commander. Yet they appear to sink into secondary merit when compared with the celerity, perseverance, audacity and precision, of the operations which have just been described. Before Provera thought he had left Verona, he had met and overthrown Alvinzi at Rivoli; and while Alvinzi supposed he was pursuing him along the base of Montebaldo, he had repulsed Wurmser and captured Provera under the walls of Mantua. The vigour of his attacks, though crashing and irresistible, was not superior to the accuracy with which they were planned. He joined Joubert just in time by a personal order, to prevent his being enveloped; and he reached the Favorita thirty six miles distant, the very moment it was necessary to interpose between the garrison of Mantua and the army of relief. At Rivoli he saved the victory on his left, by the timely display of the 32nd; gained it on his right, by a seasonable combination of his artillery and cavalry; and completed it in the rear, by leading his reserve against Lusignan, before that general could either attack or retire; and then, after a forced night march and twelve hours fighting, refrained from pursuit, not by reason of exhausted energy or slumbering zeal, but that he might undertake a new enterprise, to which the spirit and resources of any other general of the age, would hardly have proved adequate, with fresh troops and at the opening of a campaign. So rapid, various, and ceaseless, were his exertions; so prompt and exact each particular evolution; and so just and extensive the whole combination; that it might almost be imagined the manœuvres of the two armies had been concerted beforehand, and that the French general, instead of inventing movements in the whirlwind and uproar of contention and danger, was calmly executing a series of predetermined evolutions, and filling up a plan, every part of which had been agreed upon and studied.

VOL. I.

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466

THE LIFE OF THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.

[CHAP. XX.] The number of the Austrians, including Wurmser's force in Mantua, was at least double that of the French. The courage and experience of their generals, and the valour and discipline of the troops, were unquestionable. But of what avail were numbers, valour, discipline, and experience, against the divinity of genius? The power of Bonaparte was almost independent of physical means, while that of Alvinzi was chiefly composed of them. The energy of the French general, like the force of lightning, was to be measured only by the extent of its devastation; while the strength of the Austrian, like that of the stubborn oak, was best seen in the fragments of his ruin,

CHAPTER XXI.

The last of January, and February, 1797.

War with the Pope-Intercepted despatches of cardinal Busca-Bonaparte recalls Cacault from Rome-Assembles a column of troops at BolognaLeaves Verona for that place, and stops before Mantua-His interview with general Klenau-His generosity to Wurmser-Gratitude of the latter -Surrender of Mantua-Strength of the garrison-Bonaparte vindicates Wurmser's character-Arrives at Bologna-His proclamation and manifesto-General Victor invades the Roman territory-Bonaparte joins him at Imola-Marches to Castel Bolognese-Affair of the Senio-Capture of Faenza-Clemency and prudence of Bonaparte-Converts the inhabitants into friends-Takes Ancona and Loretto-Enters Macerata-Progress of Victor-Consternation of the Pope-Sues for peace-Bonaparte's compassion for the emigrant French priests-Conferences at Tolentino-Terms of the treaty-Bonaparte's culpable weakness in not insisting on the abolition of the inquisition-His moderation compared with the wishes of the directory-His letter to the Pope, sent by his aide de camp Junot-Victor and Lannes visit Rome-Bonaparte devotes himself to the public service-Ilis letter to general Joubert-His remarkable conference with the Neapolitan envoy-Infamy of the latter-The republic of San Marino-Augereau presents the colours of Mantua to the directory-The character of that ceremony-Bonaparte returns to Mantua-Reviews the divisions of Bernadotte and Delmas-Prepares for invading Germany-Repairs and undermines the fortifications of Mantua-The frescos of Titian-Complimentary letters from the directory to the generals-Their invidious neglect of Serrurier-Their motives-Bonaparte's portraits of his principal generals.

As soon as the army of observation had cleared the Italian Tyrol, and all the country between the Adige and the Piave, of the remnants of Alvinzi's force; and through the gorges of the

Brenta, had established a communication between Massena in the centre and Joubert on the left, Bonaparte prepared with his habitual promptitude, for resuming the suspended expedition against Rome. His desire to terminate this inveterate quarrel, was in no degree diminished by the contents of an intercepted despatch from cardinal Busca, the Roman secretary of state, to cardinal Albani, the special envoy of the Pope at Vienna. It was dated the 7th of January, and on the 10th fell into the hands of a French patrol. Being transmitted to the commander in chief, it convinced him that nothing less impressive than military force, would inspire the papal government with a sincere desire for peace with France; but he was then making ready to receive on the Adige, the second attack of Alvinzi. Thus circumstanced he naturally deferred for the moment, all attention to the affair of Rome.

Cardinal Busca, after assuring the envoy at Vienna, that he was determined to reject or evade all proposals for an accommodation, observed; "It is nevertheless true, that the French have a great desire to make peace with us, of which I have a fresh proof in the enclosed letter from the Nuncio at Florence." In addition, cardinal Albani was informed that the terms of the armistice of Bologna would remain unfulfilled, notwithstanding the demands of the French government; that the Pope would accept the services of the Austrian general Colli, as commander in chief of his army, and hoped he would be accompanied by some officers of engineers and artillery; that instructions were issued for receiving him with distinction upon his landing at Ancona; and that in case the Emperor chose to supend his pay and allowances, during his command of the papal troops, his holiness would willingly furnish them. In aggravation of all this, it was stated in the despatch, that measures for exciting throughout Europe, a religious war against France, were postponed only until the alliance with Austria, which Albani was instructed to press to a conclusion, was definitively settled (1).

The first thing Bonaparte did, upon turning his mind to this matter, was to despatch a courier to Rome, with instructions to the French minister to quit that capital immediately. Cacault, who had often requested to be recalled, upon receiving this order, announced his intention to obey it in a note to cardinal Busca, who with a readiness and courtesy indicative neither of regret nor alarm, reciprocated his complimentary expressions without making

the slightest effort to detain him. In this the cardinal disappointed the expectations of the French general, who in his letter of the 22nd of January, directing Cacault to take his departure from Rome, had said; "For several months they have heaped insults upon you, and used all sorts of pretexts to make you quit Rome. Now, whatever instances they may employ to induce you to stay, resist them, and set off the moment you receive this letter." This direction was strictly obeyed, and Cacault arrived at Bologna on the evening of the 29th (2).

To overawe the cabinet, or reduce the capital of Pius the VI, Bonaparte directed general Victor to assemble at Bologna, a corps composed of three thousand infantry, six hundred horse, a few field pieces, and, under the immediate command of General Lannes, a thousand grenadiers. This force was to be supported in the first instance, by the Italian legion, under the orders of general Lahoz, which was already posted on the frontier of the Church; and subsequently, by a detachment from the garrison of Leghorn, which, upon evacuating that seaport, according to the convention concluded with Manfredini, was to take the route leading up the Arno toward Rome. But general Victorwas not to commence hostilities, before he was joined by the commander in chief, whose arrival he was to wait for at Bologna. Having communicated his intentions in a despatch to the directory, as well as in a separate letter to Carnot, Bonaparte set out from Verona before day break on the 29th, and visiting the works around Mantua in his way, alighted at the headquarters of Serrurier, early in the forenoon (3).

Wurmser, whose numerous garrison had long been a prey to sickness and scarcity, whose expectations of succour had been uniformly disappointed, and whose efforts to escape had been constantly repelled, having witnessed the capture of Provera and learned the defeat of Alvinzi, found himself deprived of means of subsistence and hopes of relief; and compelled, in spite of all his pride and resolution, to look the sad necessity of a surrender in the face. Immediately after the battle of the Favorita, a summons had been sent into Mantua by order of Bonaparte, the bearer of which was accompanied by an Austrian officer, a prisoner of war, who was instructed to make known to the marshal, the result of the battle of Rivoli. To this communication Wurmser answered proudly, that he was determined to hold out, and had provisions sufficient for a year. But this answer, suiting

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