CHAPTER IV.

From March 1794, to October 1795.

Bonaparte joins the army of Italy as general of artillery-His first aides-decamp-General Dumerbion― Position of the two armies - Strong camp of the Sardinians- Bonaparte's plan for dislodging them-Adopted by a council of war-Massena-Bonaparte's active operations-Their rapidity and success-Beats the Austrians-Takes Oneille, Ormea, and GaressioThe Sardinians dislodged and Saorgio taken by Massena, who drives them from the Col de Tende-Positions occupied by the French army-Their sufferings-Bonaparte's plan for uniting the armies of Italy and the Alps— Prevented by the events of the 9th Thermidor-Preparations of the alliesPlan proposed by Bonaparte for counteracting them-Carries it into execution—Its effects-End of the campaign— His chief occupations in autumn and winter-Madame Thurreau-Bonaparte's infatuation - Its probable effect on his fortune-Robespierre the younger-Anecdote-Bonaparte put under arrest-Released without trial-Zeal and fidelity of Junot-Bonaparte summoned to the bar of the convention, on a charge which is withdrawn-Attached to the armament prepared for an attack upon Rome-By his advice that project abandoned-Mob at ToulonSaves two deputies of the assembly-Rescues the Chabrillants - Rejoins the army of Italy-Ordered to take a command in the infantry—Is dis*satisfied and proceeds to Paris-Visits his mother on his way and stops at Châtillon-sur-Seine-Anecdote-His interview with Aubry, the minister of war-His retort-Tenders his resignation-It is not accepted-Appointed to command the artillery of the army of the West-Kellermann's disasters -Danger of the Italian frontier-The committee of public safety consults Bonaparte-He draws up instructions which are sent to Kellermann-Is employed in the war office in directing the operations of the armies - His reputed idea of obtaining orders to seek a command in the army of the Grand Signior-Independent in his circumstances, though not rich-His disposal of his time while at Paris-His impression in society.

Having digested the order, arranged the position, and prescribed the structure of suitable fortifications along the coast of France, from the Rhône to the Var, general Bonaparte proceeded in March, 1794, to the head quarters of the army of Italy, which

were established at Nice. He was preceded by the reputation he had acquired at Toulon, and accompanied by his first aides-decamp, Muiron and Junot. The commander in chief, general Dumerbion, was a veteran, who by hard service had gained high rank. He was intrepid, upright, and well informed; and having served the two previous campaigns on this frontier, was acquainted with its positions. He was severely afflicted with the gout, but as he discovered the merit and relied on the counsels of the young general of artillery, his efficiency was by no means impaired by his infirmities. Macquart, d'Allemagne, and Massena, were his generals of division.

The French army was stationed in the county of Nice, which is situated on the Mediterranean side of the maritime Alps, and between the rivers the Var and the Roya. On the declivities of the Alps overhanging this territory, the Sardinian army, of twenty thousand men, occupied the camp of Fourches; a formidable position resting on the strong fort of Saorgio, which commanded the principal route from Nice to Turin. Fixed on this height, unassailable on his flanks from the nature of the ground, inexpugnable in his front as experience had demonstrated, and fortified both by nature and art in his rear, the Sardinian commander menaced the French frontier, communicated by his left whith that of Genoa, and with the line of Austrian posts which were extended across the mountains from the valley of the Bormida to the harbour of Oneille; and with the English cruisers and privateers, which, intercepting from that port the commerce between Genoa and Marseilles, interrupted the alleviation and supply afforded by it, to the French army and to the famine of Provence. The importance of dislodging the enemy from this effective position had been felt so sensibly by general Brunet that, on the 8th and 12th of the previous June, he had assailed it with a superiority of force and with persevering vigour. His efforts were vain and his loss considerable. With the government which he served, as suspicion and proof were equivalent, failure and guilt were identical. General Brunet, unfortunate in battle, was charged with treason and punished with death. General Dumerbion who was to contend with equal difficulties, was subject to similar misfortune, and exposed to the same fate, for neither the interest of the nation nor the temper of the convention would tolerate an inactive campaign. Thus circumstanced, he must have regarded

his antagonist, with feelings akin to those of the shepherd who sees the eagle that preys upon his lambs, perched upon an inaccessible rock, where neither his shouts can alarm nor his missiles reach her. But a hunter approached, from whose daring footsteps and unerring eye, the only security was in instant flight.

The first care of the general of artillery after his arrival, was to make himself acquainted with the station and force of the several divisions of the army. The performance of this duty gave him an opportunity of studying the ground, of observing the enemy's position, and of tracing on the spot the unfortunate operations of general Brunet. He perceived that the camp of Fourches was too strong to be carried by a direct attack, however skilfully or gallantly conducted, and felt convinced that, if general Dumerbion repeated the attempt of his predecessor, he would meet with no better success. The same military penetration which had revealed to him the mode of expelling the English from Toulon, now suggested to him the method of dislodging the Sardinians from Saorgio.

His plan was projected on a scale of sagacity and enterprise, which was as yet new and unattempted in this army, whose head quarters during two campaigns had been stationary at Nice. It proposed extending the right wing divided into two columns, along the precipitous and narrow slope, between the sea and the Alps, as far as Oneille and Loano; separating the Austrian and Sardinian armies from communication with the British squadron; passing with the further column across the crest of the mountains and seizing Ormea and Garessio, two Sardinian forts on the sources of the Tanaro; ascending with the nearer column to the heights of Tanardo and Tanarello, and occupying the route from Nice to Turin at a point in the rear of Saorgio. This movement, if successfully executed, would expel the English cruisers and privateers from Oneille and Loano, protect the French coasting trade, cut off the enemy's communication with the sea; by endangering his retreat, compel him to abandon the camp of Fourches, from which, after sanguinary efforts it had been found impracticable to force him; and would place the French army on the summits of the Alps, where, while their posts could neither be turned nor commanded, they would disquiet one member of the coalition for the safety of his country, and the security of his capital. If the Sardinian general should attempt to counteract this ope

ration by assuming the offensive and attacking the French in their positions on the Var, besides that these positions were in themselves strong and capable of being maintained against a superior force, his advance would place the French right more completely on his flank and rear, and render the movement proposed by Bonaparte still more efficacious and successful. Or, should he, which was not probable, detach a corps from his left in time and strength sufficient to arrest the progress of the French column, he must thereby expose his main position at Fourches, to a direct and victorious assault. So that whether the enemy remained quiet or moved forward, his eventual retreat was equally certain; he would lose all the advantages of superiority of ground, which, independently of other favourable consequences, would result in their full force to the French (1).

In forming this plan, Bonaparte appears to have reasoned on principles deduced from the nature of mountain warfare; in which strength of ground becomes a consideration so preponderating, that, even in the conduct of an offensive campaign, an able general endeavours to conquer his enemy by positions. By these he forces him to fight to disadvantage or to retreat without fighting, losing in the first case the moral impulse and physical momentum of attack; in the second, relinquishing the command of territory which otherwise he might have held (2).

To this mode of commencing the campaign there was no serious military objection, while it was easy to remove the political one which was suggested. It involved the necessity of violating, or to use an equivalent for the softer French term, of borrowing the neutral territory of Genoa. But in the previous campaign, a detachment of Sardinian troops two thousand strong, that been permitted to pass in martial array, with drums beating and colours flying, through the territory of the republic, and to embark at Oneille as a reenforcement to the allied armament in Toulon. About the same time, so domineering was the influence of England on that coast, while she held possession of Toulon, that a British squadron had been suffered to attack and take, with circumstances of outrage and cruelty, the French frigate La Modeste while at her moorings in the harbour of Genoa (3). The neutral rights of this once proud republic, thus prostituted, were entitled on principle to no respect from France. It was true that the importance of the commerce, which, under the Genoese flag, was maintained with the

south of France, had impressed on the policy of the convention a character of unusual forbearance, from which it was not expected, that the commander would deviate. But the operation in question would free that commerce from obstruction, would establish a French force on the Genoese frontier, and be more likely to overawe than to irritate, so small and so mercantile a state.

General Dumerbion yielded full attention and a ready assent to the plan proposed by the general of artillery, and submitted it to a council of war, composed of his principal officers and the deputies of the convention. It was no sooner explained than it was adopted; its intrinsic advantages concurring with the fresh and rising reputation of its author, to obviate unreasonable doubt and pertinacious discussion.

To carry this bold plan into execution, Massena, on the 6th of April, crossed the Roya at the head of fourteen thousand men, with the first division of which, after taking the small castle of Vingtimilia, he turned to his left, penetrated into his native mountains, and took post on Mont Tanardo and Monte Grande, inferior elevations of the Alps; thus beginning his career of glory in the rough cradle of his infant sports. Bonaparte, who conducted the second division, taking a wider range between the English fleet on his right, and the Austro-Sardinian posts on his left, passed rapidly the Nervia and the Taggia, routed a strong body of Austrians at St. Agata, and taking possession of Oneille, put that seaport in a condition of repelling hostile cruisers, and sheltering French trading vessels. Ardently prosecuting his movement, he ascended from Oneille to the pass of Ponte di Nave, where an Austrian force waited to oppose him. This he defeated on the 15th of April, and driving it over the mountains before him, compelled the neighbouring garrison of Ormea, consisting of four hundred men, to surrender. Twenty pieces of artillery, several thousand muskets, and a quantity of military clothing, of which the troops were in want, fell into his hands (4). His next object was Garessio which, being instantly attacked, fell an easy conquest. From Garessio, the ultimate point of his invasion, while he threatened the plains and capital of Piedmont, he secured his communication with the sea at Loano, by occupying, on the 18th of April, Monts St. Bernard and Rocca Barbena.

Thus, in the short space of twelve days, Bonaparte had advanced the position of the French army a distance of about eighty