assertion he is borne out by Pearson (Vind. Ign., pt. ii. c. 16)—that Presbyters always sat with Bishops in Provincial Synods, and indeed, sometimes even the deacons also. (Bingh. B. II. c. xx. § 13.)

"3rdly. It appears that Provincial Councils were not superior to the Canons, but were constituted to assist in maintaining their observance. They were to judge whether or not the Bishop had acted canonically in censuring any of his Clergy. (Bingh. B. II. c. iii. § 9.)”

No

From these considerations it is plain, that, 1st. The Episcopal Synod is neither a Provincial Synod, nor a National one; and therefore cannot act as such. 2ndly. By acting upon an assumption of powers which it does not possess, all its proceedings were, as the Bishop of Brechin asserts, "null, void, and inept; a direct contradiction of the Canons, and a violation of the recognized constitution and acknowledged practice of the Church."" wonder that the Bishops found themselves compelled to fall back upon the assumption of a "right essentially inherent in a Provincial Episcopate!" But this is not all; they perpetrated another act of arbitrary power, which in itself, surely, nullified their claim to be a Provincial Synod; they refused to receive an address from a large portion of the Presbyters of the Church, properly signed and duly presented. So that in this Provincial Synod, Presbyters were not only not allowed to sit, nor to be even present (for this conclave holds its deliberations with closed doors), but actually they are not allowed to present an address, and are summarily snubbed for so doing! The Bishops say, "We are not aware of any rule or practice which would authorise the Synod in receiving such a petition from a mixed body of individual Presbyters:" yet they themselves knowingly acting contrary to their own Canons, and obliged to fall back on certain (assumed) inherent rights, refuse to receive an address from the Presbyters because such is not authorized by any Canon! What, then, have Presbyters no inherent rights in a Provincial Synod? Are Bishops the only persons who may presume to exercise such?

As the Bishops however do appeal to antiquity, it will be as well to examine their claim. They appeal to three Canons to establish their position: 1st, the 36th of the Apostolical Canons, which stands thus: "Let a Synod of Bishops be held twice every year, and let them determine all doctrines of Religion among themselves, and put an end to all ecclesiastical controversies." Here at first sight the Bishops seem to have all on their side, their rights distinctly acknowledged: from it taken nakedly and by itself, what powers could they not assume? What articles of faith could they not determine ? We see at once that it would prove too much, it would place the whole doctrine and discipline in the hands of seven Bishops, and ignore the rights of Presbyters altogether. To understand it, then, we must appeal to two sources of information 1st, similar Canons of other Councils; and, 2ndly, the

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regular practice of the Church. Singularly enough, the Bishops supply us with the first: for 1st, they quote Nicene Canon V., and XX. of Antioch. Now the former of these provides for hearing appeals from sentence of excommunication, the latter deals with controversies connected with appeals from those who suppose themselves wronged. Of a like nature doubtless is that of the Apostolical Canons; for, 2ndly, as Bingham shows (see ref. given above), Presbyters always sat with Bishops in Provincial Synods. Are these Canons relevant? Is there in the present case any appeal against an unjust judgment? Nay, do not the Bishops say that they have no formal presentment lodged before them ?" Yet these are the Canons that the Bishops refer to as justifying their proceedings! They decline a formal trial, and then quote Canons which regulate trials, to justify their irregular proceedings. This very 36th (or 37th) Apostolical Canon is placed by Bingham among others which refer simply to cases of appeal; including another Apostolic Canon, the 73rd (or 74th), which the Bishops have not quoted, and which most manifestly contemplates a formal trial. (See Bingham, B. II. c. 16. s. 16.) Did the Bishops really think that the ancient Synods would proceed to "abate controversies" by censuring a Prelate without the process mentioned in Canon 73, of accusation, citation, conviction, &c.?

But this is not all the unfairness of which the Bishops were guilty. Bishop Forbes prayed to be heard by counsel.

"The Synod having considered the request, felt that they could not properly accede to it, for the following reasons:

"1st. That even in the extreme case of a formal appeal from a decision in a Diocesan Synod to the College of Bishops, Canon XXXV. enjoins that 'the Appellant or Appellants may be heard personally in their own defence, but not by counsel.'

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2ndly. That though instances have occurred in which this Canon has been relaxed, by special indulgence of the Synod, in cases of judicial action, yet, inasmuch as the present proceeding does not partake of a judicial character, they see no reason for allowing the indulgence."

Certainly they were not judicially trying the Bishop, but they were going to censure him without examination of his doctrines, or hearing his defence: in other words, they were far exceeding their powers, and they would not allow an advocate to come in and tell them so. No doubt they acted wisely to save themselves, and preserve their own position, which a learned advocate well prepared would very easily have overthrown. But the most unfair part of the whole is the appeal to the Canon XXXV., which is simply nihil ad rem, having no reference to the peculiar position in which the Synod placed itself by declining a trial. The title of the Canon is "Prescribing the Conditions of Appeal :" it was drawn up with special reference to the peculiar position of the Church in Scotland,

where the established religion is Presbyterian, to hinder Presbyters or Deacons taking ecclesiastical cases and appeals from the decision of Bishops into the Civil Law Courts, and to secure obedience to the final decision of the Ecclesiastical Court. Thus, if a dispute takes place between a pastor and his flock, they shall go in the first instance before the ordinary, then either may appeal to the Episcopal Synod, which decision is to be final; in this final appeal "the Appellant or Appellants may be heard personally in his or their own defence, but not by counsel." But in the case of the Bishop of Brechin there was no appeal, nay, no trial! In the next Canon (XXXVI.), "Respecting accusations against Bishops," there is not a word about being heard or not by counsel: how then could the Bishops quote this Canon as applicable to the present case?

But this is not all; when Bishop Forbes read a Protest showing the incompetency of the Synod to act as it had done, and appealing to a General Synod, the Primus coolly "observed, that the paper which had been read by the Bishop of Brechin was not relevant to the motion before the Synod. The Pastoral Letter he had proposed had nothing in it of the character of a judicial process. Moreover, he maintained that the Bishops were bound by an obligation antecedent to all Canons, to take the steps which seemed to them most expedient to drive away erroneous and strange doctrines. Last, he contended that the general Synod, as constituted by the Canons, was a Legislative assembly, and could not properly be regarded as a court of appeal."

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The Bishop of S. Andrew's, confessing the imperfection of the Canons with regard to the Constitution of Synods said "it seemed to him, in the meantime, the obvious course to make the best they could of the machinery [that is the power of might] at present existing." In other words, that by hook or by crook they were to get the Bishop of Brechin censured, and prevent his appeal to a General Synod. Here again comes in the obligation "antecedent to all canons" which these six Bishops felt so useful in gaining their end but they took extreme care to tie and bind the Bishop of Brechin by every ligature which these Canons afforded: they were above all canons by their special power "antecedent to all Canons," and a "right essentially inherent" in them; but they carefully denied any such obligation and right to the seventh Bishop: he could not appeal to a General Synod because, as the Primus argued, the "General Synod, as constituted by the Canons, was a Legislative assembly, and could not properly be regarded as a court of appeal," and Bishop Wordsworth, starting up, "candidly confessed" (the Bishop seems to have a knack of getting into scrapes by candid confession) that the Canons did not sanction their present proceedings, but that in so important a matter as censuring Bishop Forbes "the obvious course was to make the best they could of the machinery at present existing!" Then, as if to make

his case still worse, and his candid confession of having exceeded all proper and canonical power more glaring, he excuses the present proceedings by an allusion to the Gorham case, "a proceeding in which the Bishop of Brechin cordially joined, and it could not therefore be justly urged as a cause of complaint against them, if many precedents had occurred, and a course of practice grown up, which could only be justified by a reference to the first principles of Church government, and not merely to the scanty and imperfect provisions of our own Canons." Then why deny all this latitude to the accused? But the Gorham case really makes against Bishop Wordsworth, and not for him. First, there was no one accused in that case, no trial, no censure; nay, more, no new interpretation of any point of doctrine. Secondly, the matter came fitly and regularly before the Episcopal Synod, having been originated in the Diocesan; the Bishops simply affirmed that Baptismal Regeneration had always been, and still was the doctrine of the Scottish Church, a thing that the Diocesan Synods had already expressed their assent to.1

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We now come to the Pastoral itself. After a preamble setting forth the circumstances of the case, the Bishops proceed to censure most strongly the Bishop of Brechin's teaching; he has fallen "into fundamental error;" "He has pleaded for what has recently been called the Real Objective Presence' in such a manner, that the inference he draws from it, however doctrinally unsound, becomes, as he represents, logically inevitable." "Convinced, as we are, that these conclusions are not to be found in Holy Scripture, or have been declared therefrom by the Church, &c." (The Italics are ours.) After due consideration we do not hesitate to say that the reasoning by which they are maintained, is, in our opinion, fallacious; and that the testimony of authorities produced in their support, when fully and carefully examined, will generally be found not to justify the use to which it has been applied." Yet in the teeth of all this, they declare "The case may not amount to a direct call for a formal presentment of the Bishop!" What? does not the teaching of "fundamental error," of statements "doctrinally unsound," conclusions "not to be found in Holy Scripture," nor "deduced therefrom by the Church" call for a formal presentment? What

1 We add in a note a remarkable circumstance connected with that Declaration. There was one sentence in it which implied that the Bishops by a canonical enactment of their own could add to the Church's definitions of doctrine. Two Bishops objected to that sentence, and "adhered" to another resolution in its place: those two were Bishop Forbes and Bishop Trower. The Scottish Magazine also objected, observing, 1. that the declaration of the Bishops, however valuable it might be as a record of their individual orthodoxy, had no legal weight, nor any authority beyond its moral influence. 2. That according to the constitution of the Scotch Church, no "canonical enactment" could be made by the Bishops. "We presume the expression has been an oversight, but at a time when some prelates seem disposed to claim despotic and absolute powers, the oversight is an unfortunate one." (See Mr. Irons's work on the Judgments on Bapt. Regen. p. 96.)

amount of heresy do the six Bishops allow to be taught before a presentment is to be made? either these six Bishops are wofully forgetful of their vows to drive away false doctrine, or else they are applying stronger terms to the Bishop of Brechin's teaching than they really mean. Either they are wilfully lax in exercising the extraordinary powers they claim "essentially inherent in a Provincial Episcopate," or else they are describing the Bishop's teaching in terms of censure stronger than they believe to be really due. Are the Bishops quite sure that there lurk no secondary motives beneath all their declarations, so that they satisfy the public by strong words, while they shrink themselves from acts in accordance with them? Again, what can possibly be more unfair to the Bishops, or more perplexing to the Presbyters whom they address than to say, without venturing upon one word of proof, not only that the reasoning of the Bishop of Brechin is "fallacious," but that the testimony of authorities produced in its support, when fully and carefully examined, will generally be found not to justify the use to which it has been applied. In other words, they charge the Bishop of Brechin with falsifying authorities, and bringing impeachable testimony to support his position, and yet they neither point out the one, nor refute the other! Will they really maintain that the Fathers did not teach that for which Bishop Forbes has quoted them?

After casting all this foul abuse upon the Bishop, and his teaching, and his character for truthfulness and honesty, they next proceed to issue certain instructions to the Clergy as to how they are to teach the doctrine of the Holy Eucharist :

"Instructed by Scripture and the Formularies of the Church, you will continue to teach that the consecrated elements of Bread and Wine become, in mystery, the Body and Blood of CHRIST; for purposes of grace to all who receive them worthily, and for condemnation to those who receive them unworthily. But you will not, we trust, attempt to define more nearly the mode of this Mysterious Presence. You will remember, that as our Church has repudiated the doctrine of Transubstantiation, so she has given us no authority whereby we can require it to be believed that the substance of CHRIST'S Body and Blood, still less His entire Person, as GOD and Man, now glorified in the heavens, is made to exist with, in, or under the material substance of Bread and Wine."

Now we submit to any mind of ordinary capacity, that it is utterly impossible to teach the two assertions contained in this paragraph together without palpable contradiction. Can we say that the consecrated Bread and Wine become the Body and Blood of CHRIST, and at the same time that the substance of CHRIST'S Body and Blood do not exist with, in, or under the material substance of Bread and Wine ?