In an earlier Lecture Mr. Mansel had grappled with the confession of Schelling, in his theory of Intellectual Intuition, and of Hegel in his principle of the Identity of Contradictions, that a knowledge of the Infinite is really beyond the attainment of man as he now is. We shall give an extract from this part of his argument.

"There remains but one subterfuge to which philosophy can have recourse, before she is driven to confess that the Absolute and the Infinite are beyond her grasp. If consciousness is against her she must endeavour to get rid of consciousness itself. And secondly the most distinguished representatives of this philosophy in recent times, however widely differing upon other questions, agree in maintaining that the foundation for a knowledge of the Infinite, must be laid in a point beyond consciousness. But a system which starts from this assumption postulates its own failure at the outset. It attempts to prove that consciousness is a delusion, and consciousness itself is made the instrument of proof; for by consciousness its reasonings must be framed and apprehended. It is by reasonings conducted in conformity to the ordinary laws of thought, that the philosopher attempts to show that the highest manifestations of reason are above these laws. It is by representations exhibited under the conditions of time and difference, that the philosopher endeavours to prove the existence, and deliver the results of an intuition in which time and difference were annihilated. They thus assume at the same moment the truth and the falsehood of the normal consciousness; they divide the human mind against itself; and by that division prove no more than that two supposed faculties of thought mutually invalidate each other's evidence. Thus by an act of reason, philosophy destroys reason itself: it passes at once from rationalism to mysticism, and makes inconceivability the criterion of truth. In dealing with religious truths, the theory which repudiates with scorn the notion of believing a doctrine, although it is incomprehensible, springs at one desperate bound clean over faith into credulity, and proclaims that its own principles must be believed, because they are incomprehensible. The rhetorical paradox of the fervid African is adopted in cold blood as an axiom of metaphysical speculation. It is certain because it is impossible.' Such a theory is open to two fatal objections; it cannot be communicated, and it cannot be verified. It cannot be communicated; for the communication must be made in words; and the meaning of those words must be understood; and the understanding is a state of the normal consciousness. It cannot be verified; for to verify we must compare the author's experience with our own. And such a comparison is again a state of consciousness. Let it be granted for a moment, though the concession refutes itself, that a man may have a cognizance of the Infinity of some mode of knowledge which is above consciousness. He can never say that the idea thus acquired, is like or unlike that possessed by any other man; for likeness implies comparison; and comparison is only possible as a mode of consciousness, and between objects regarded as limited and related to each other-that which is out of consciousness cannot be pronounced true; for truth is the cor

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respondence between a conscious representation, and the object which it represents. Neither can it be pronounced false; for falsehood consists in the disagreement between a similar representation and its object. Here then is the very suicide of Rationalism. To prove its own truth, and the falsehood of antagonistic systems, it postulates a condition under which neither truth nor falsehood is possible."-Pp. 92-94.

This passage, so lucid and so powerful in laying bare the impossibility of Rationalism, illustrates what we have said respecting the want of a positive assertion of Christianity, upon the ground which is cleared. The quotation from Tertullian is, to say the least, unfortunate. His expression is absurd, when laid down as a law of natural opinion. Mr. Mansel, if he quoted it at all, should have shown why upon the assumption of a revelation such an expression is allowed not only to the fervid rhetoric of the African, but to the calm judgment of Christian faith in all times and countries. It were indeed folly to suppose that impossibility were a test of truth ; but it is a necessary mark, a logical property, of all supernatural truth. A Revelation which ran easily upon the level of nature, could be no revelation of GOD. A mind which humbly accepts its present position in the world, must expect that a Revelation of the incomprehensible GOD will baffle its present powers. Naturally, indeed, the gulf between the Infinite and the Finite is impassable. GOD must overstep it before we can. A revelation of GOD in His infinity, could not be communicated. Here, it seems to us, is another weakness in this passage. If incomprehensible truth

"cannot be communicated, for the communication must be made in words, and the meaning of those words must be understood," how is revelation itself possible? Does not Mr. Mansel seem to overthrow Revelation at the same time that he rejects philosophy? Where do we find a solution of the difficulty? In the fact of the Incarnation. The fact of the Incarnation is the necessary postulate of a Revelation. GOD must be made flesh, before He can be the object of human apprehension. The Person of CHRIST is the Truth. He reveals the FATHER. Our knowledge of GOD gathers its definiteness from the Person of GOD the SON, Who is the Image of the FATHER. GOD is become man, that He may be revealed to men. The abyss of Deity is unfathomable. The positive knowledge of GOD for which men crave, could not be attained conceivably by any other process than by GOD condescending to assume to Himself the nature of man. Now we can speak of GOD, inadequately indeed, and yet truly, for "that which was in the beginning we have seen with our eyes, and our hands have handled even the Word of Truth." Mr. Mansel himself says:

"If Revelation is a communication from the Infinite to a finite intelligence, the conditions of a criticism of Revelation on philosophical grounds must be identical with those which are required for construct

ing a philosophy of the Infinite. For Revelation can make known the Infinite Being only in one of two ways; by presenting Him as He is, or by representing Him under symbols more or less adequate. A presentative Revelation implies faculties in man which can receive the representation . . . If on the other hand Revelation is merely representation, the accuracy of the representation can only be ascertained by a knowledge of the object represented.”—P. 27.

Now, what is this but an acknowledgment that a representative revelation is no revelation at all? GOD must reveal Himself, present Himself before us, come within the sphere of our accidents, if we are to know Him at all. This He has done, in that the SON of God became man. Without the Incarnation, Christianity would be no revelation. Truth is not a mere talking about GOD under absurd idolatrous hieroglyphics: it is the manifestation of GOD in the energetic reality of His Personal Being. And then again, if this Revelation is to profit us, it must raise us to a perception of the Divine Nature, as a result of the assumption of our human nature. Hence is the necessity of the gift of the HOLY GHOST, making us partakers of the Divine Nature, if the primary revelation is to be available to us. Mr. Mansel has hinted at this. We could wish he had drawn out more at length the way in which the operations of grace coincide here again with the demands of philosophy.

"We know in part, and we prophesy in part. But when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away. For now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face now I know in part, but then I shall know even as also I am known.' Such is the Apostle's declaration of the limits of human knowledge. The logical conception is the absolute Divine conception itself: and the logical process is the immediate exhibition of GOD's self-determinative Being.' Such is the philosopher's declaration of the extent of human knowledge. 'Ye shall be as gods,' was the earliest suggestion of the Tempter to the parents of the human race; 'Ye are gods' is the latest assurance of philosophy to the human race itself. Revelation represents the infinite GOD under finite symbols in condescension to the finite capacity of man [and we may add, gives continual reality to those symbols by the fact of the Infinite GOD condescending to assume man's finite nature and be present within his grasp;] indicating at the same time the existence of a further reality beyond the symbol, [and we may again add, the existence also of hidden relations in His Infinite Being which transcend our contemplation, although indicated to our faith,] and bidding us look forward in faith to the promise of a more perfect knowledge hereafter. Rationalism in the hands of these expositors adopts an opposite view of man's powers and duties. It claims to behold GoD as He is now it finds a common object for religion and philosophy in the explanation of God. It declares Religion to be the Divine Spirit's knowledge of Himself through the mediation of the finite spirit.'

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Beloved, now are we the sons of GOD, and it doth not yet appear

what we shall be; but we know that when He shall appear we shall be like Him; for we shall see Him as He is. And every man that hath this hope in Him purifieth himself even as He is pure.' Philosophy, too, confesses that like must be known by like; but reversing the hope of the Apostle, it finds God in the forms of human thought."-Pp. 30

-31.

We have pointed out in what respect Mr. Mansel's work seems to us to require amplification. That it will be of great service in the cause of truth we cannot doubt. A life so long devoted as his has been to this branch of investigation will, of itself, be the best argument in favour of his mature conviction. Those who read his book will often feel their own incapacity to enter into the controversies at which he glances. They will feel at least that his calm and clear enunciation of difficulties, and of the way of meeting them, gathers a dignity from his profound knowledge even greater than the beauty of those religious transports of utterance with which, from time to time, he expounds his deliberate sentiments.

ELLICOTT'S SERMONS.

The Destiny of the Creature, and other Sermons. Preached before the University of Cambridge. By CHARLES J. ELLICOTT; Select Preacher for March, 1858. London: J. W. Parker.

WHILE We look upon the publication of such a volume as this as a proof, if such a proof is needed, of the utter falsity of the popular assertion that there is no good preaching in the Church of England, we may be allowed to doubt whether it is a judicious plan to publish such sermons, as sermons, i. e. as they were preached, when they are on one subject and consecutive. Far better would it be to throw the matter into the form of a treatise, and investigate each part fully, irrespective of length. This can never be done properly in a sermon; the sermon takes a particular form, is of a certain length, must have its practical observations at the end; from all which a treatise is free. We wish Mr. Ellicott had adopted this plan his work would have lost none of its power, it would have gained in clearness and in fulness; the treatise is as much fitted for the reader, as the sermon is to the hearer. This is peculiarly the case with a University preacher; for the class that he addresses in his sermons is not that which studies them when printed.

Bearing in mind, then, the position of the preacher, the place, the audience, there is something very fitting in his subject. He has chosen the ancient seat of learning, with all its associations, the

crowd of persons who have gone before him, great and burning lights in the Church of CHRIST, who have lived their life, and done their part, exercised their influence on those who have been called to the highest position in the Church and Government of the first nation in the world; who themselves had received, perhaps almost unconsciously, the impress of the mind of former generations, forming again the mind and habits of a new one: then the thought, appalling in its vastness, that there sits before him, listening to his words, and receiving impress from them, the mind and intellect of that new generation, who in their turn are to guide and rule the millions that form that colossal fabric which we call the British Empire -all these should be realized by him who speaks from the University pulpit-and far more, when every one of these is an immortal soul whose eternal lot depends on his life and actions here. Fitting indeed is the subject-the destiny of the creature; fitted for such a place and such an audience. And the sermons are worthy of both.

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If, as S. Paul says, 'great is the mystery of godliness,' we may add to it, great also is the mystery of sin; and in the midst of these two mysteries is the creature placed. A humble, devout mind accepts the facts of these two mysteries without inquiry: they are facts, they appear on all sides, they meet us at every point. 'If I climb up into Heaven Thou art there, if I go down into Hell Thou art there also . . . . darkness and light to Thee are both alike.' Then, again, there is the mystery of sin that gloomy prison, that cold churchyard, tell of its power: deeper still, there are movings and heavings of sin in my own innost soul. These are facts; arguments fail here. The mind looking back loses itself in the labyrinth of mystery; it cannot tell whence it came, or how it became thus involved in that tremendous mystery of its being. "The creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of Him, Who hath subjected the same in hope, because the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of GOD.”—(Text of Mr. Ellicott's first sermon.)

"The creation made subject to vanity! Who can resist pausing on so startling a revelation? Who, as he turns his eyes on the wide realms of creation, does not feel strange queries forcing themselves on his attention, and demanding of him an answer? Who, as he gazes on the fairer features of nature, the sunny landscape, the sheltering woods, the clustered mountains, does not feel the force of the inscrutable antithesis? All so fair, yet all subject to such a destiny: so beautiful, yet so doomed. Is there one grave thinker among us who has not craved for the solution of a mystery so seemingly inexplicable? What!' we sometimes say, in our deep perplexity, what can be the meaning of this law of vanity in reference to creation generally? I can understand the ruin of my own soul, I am forced to acknowledge its corrupting