ORIGIN OF MORAL FEELING. 397 ganisation: just as I believe that this intuition, requiring only to be made definite and complete by personal ' experiences, has practically become a form of thought 'apparently quite independent of experience; so do I 'believe that the experiences of utility, organised and 'consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been producing corresponding nervous mo'difications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition-certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility.' 6 I cannot entirely subscribe to either of these views. The moral feelings are now, no doubt, intuitive; but if the lower races of savages have none, they evidently cannot have been so originally, nor can they be regarded as natural to man. Neither can I accept the opposite theory. While entirely agreeing with Mr. Spencer that 'there have been, and still are, developing in the race, 'certain fundamental moral intuitions,' I feel, with Mr. Hutton, much difficulty in conceiving that, in Mr. Spencer's words, these moral intuitions are the results ' of the accumulated experiences of Utility;' that is to say, of Utility to the individual. When it is once realised that a given line of conduct would invariably be useful to the individual, it is at once regarded as 'saga'cious' rather than 'virtuous.' Virtue implies temptation; temptation indicates a feeling that a given action may benefit the individual at the expense of others, or in defiance of authority. It is evident, indeed, that feelings acting on generation after generation might produce a continually deepening conviction, but I fail 398 ORIGIN OF MORAL FEELING. to perceive how this explains the difference between 'right' and 'utility.' Yet utility in one sense has, I think, been naturally and yet unconsciously selected as the basis of morals. Mr. Hutton, if I understand him correctly, doubts this. Honesty, for instance, he says, 'must certainly have ⚫ been associated by our ancestors with many unhappy 'as well as many happy consequences, and we know 'that in ancient Greece dishonesty was openly and actually associated with happy consequences, in the 'admiration for the guile and craft of Ulysses.' This seems to me a good crucial case. Honesty, on their own part, may, indeed, have been, and no doubt was, 'associated by our ancestors with many unhappy 'as well as many happy consequences;' but honesty on the part of others could surely have nothing but happy results. Thus, while the perception that 'Honesty 'is the best policy' was, no doubt, as Mr. Hutton observes, long subsequent to the most imperious enun'ciation of its sacredness as a duty,' honesty would be recognised as a virtue so soon as men perceived the sacredness of any duty. As soon as contracts were entered into between individuals or states, it became manifestly the interest of each that the other should be honest. Any failure in this respect would naturally be condemned by the sufferer. It is precisely because honesty is sometimes associated with unhappy consequences, that it is regarded as a virtue. If it had always been directly advantageous to all parties, it would have been classed as useful, not as right; it would have lacked the essential element which entitles it to rank as a virtue. 1 Macmillan's Magazine, 1869, p. 271. ORIGIN OF MORAL FEELING. 399 Or take respect for Age. We find, even in Australia, laws, if I may so term them, appropriating the best of everything to the old men. Naturally the old men lose no opportunity of impressing these injunctions on the young; they praise those who conform, and condemn those who resist. Hence the custom is strictly adhered to. I do not say, that to the Australian mind this presents itself as a sacred duty; but it would, I think, in the course of time have come to be so considered. For when a race had made some progress in intellectual development, a difference would certainly be felt between those acts which a man was taught to do as conducive to his own direct advantage, and those which were not so, and yet which were enjoined for any other reason. Hence would arise the idea of right and duty, as distinct from mere utility. How much more our notions of right depend on the lessons we receive when young than on hereditary ideas, becomes evident, if we consider the different moral codes existing in our own country. Nay, even in the very same individual, two contradictory systems may often be seen side by side in incongruous associa tion. Lastly, it may be observed that in our own case religion and morality are closely connected together. Yet the sacred character, which forms an integral part in our conception of duty, could not arise until Religion became moral. Nor would this take place until the deities were conceived to be beneficent beings. As soon, however, as this was the case, they would naturally be supposed to regard with approbation all that 400 ORIGIN OF MORAL FEELING. tended to benefit their worshippers, and to condemn all actions of the opposite character. This step was an immense benefit to mankind, since that dread of the unseen powers which had previously been wasted on the production of mere ceremonies and sacrifices, at once invested the moral feelings with a sacredness, and consequently with a force, which they had not until then possessed. Authority, then, seems to me the origin, and utility, though not in the manner suggested by Mr. Spencer, the criterion, of virtue. Mr. Hutton, however, in the concluding paragraph of his interesting paper, urges that surely, if this were the case, by this time 'some one 'elementary moral law should be as deeply ingrained in human practice as the geometrical law that a straight line is the shortest way between two points.' I see no such necessity. A child whose parents belong to different nations, with different moral codes, would, I suppose, have the moral feeling deep, and yet might be without any settled ideas as to particular moral duties. And this is in reality our own case. Our ancestors have now for many generations had a feeling that some actions were right and some were wrong, but at different times they have had very different codes of morality. Hence we have a deeply-seated moral feeling, and yet, as any one who has children may satisfy himself, no such decided moral code. Children have a deep feeling of right and wrong, but no such decided or intuitive conviction as to which actions are right and which are wrong. CHAPTER IX. LANGUAGE. ALTHOUGH it has been at various times stated that certain savage tribes are entirely without language, none of these accounts appear to be well authenticated, and they are à priori extremely improb able. At any rate, even the lowest races of which we have any satisfactory account possess a language, imperfect though it may be, and eked out to a great extent by signs. I do not suppose, however, that this custom has arisen from the absence of words to represent their ideas, but rather because in all countries inhabited by savages the number of languages is very great, and hence there is a great advantage in being able to communicate by signs. Thus James, in his expedition to the Rocky Mountains, speaking of the Kiawa-Kaskaia Indians, says, These nations, although constantly associating toge'ther and united under the influence of the Bear-Tooth, are yet totally ignorant of each other's language, inso'much that it was no uncommon occurrence to see two ' individuals of different nations sitting upon the ground and conversing freely by means of the language of signs. In the art of thus conveying their ideas they 'were thorough adepts; and their manual display was D D |