resolutions, yet no real division has been made of the forces of the state. Only, a greater proportional share of all those distinctions which are calculated to gain the reverence of the people, has been allotted to those parts of the legislature, which could not possess their confidence, in so high a degree as the others; and inequalities in point of real strength between them, have been made up by the magic of dignity.

Thus the king, who alone forms one part of the legis lature, has on his side the majesty of the kingly title: the two houses are, in appearance, no more than councils entirely dependent on him; they are bound to follow his person; they only meet, as it seems, to advise him; and never address him but in the most solemn and respectful

manner.

As the nobles, who form the second order of the legislature, bear, in point of both real weight and numbers, no proportion to the body of the people, they have received as a compensation, the advantage of personal honours, and of an hereditary title.

Besides, the established ceremonial gives to their assembly a great pre-eminence over that of the representatives of the people. They are the upper house, and the others are the lower house. They are in a more special manner considered as the king's council, and it is in the place where they assemble that his throne is placed.

When the king comes to the parliament, the commons are sent for, and make their appearance at the bar of the house of lords. It is moreover before the lords, as before their judges, that the commons bring their impeachments. When, after passing a bill in their own house, they send it to the lords, to desire their concurrence, they always

It is for want of having duly considered this subject, that M. Rousseau exclaims, somewhere, against those who, when they speak of general estates of France, " dare call the people, the third estate.' "" At Rome, where all the order we mention was inverted, where the fasces were laid down at the feet of the people, and where the tribunes, whose function, like that of the king of England, was to oppose the establishment of the new laws, were only subordinate kind of magistracy, many disorders followed. In Sweden, and in Scotland before the union, faults of another kind prevailed: in the former kingdom, for instance, an overgrown body of two thousand nobles frequently overruled both king and people.

order a number of their own members to accompany it; whereas the lords send down their bills to them, only by some of the assistants of their house. When the nature of the alterations which one of the two houses desires to make in a bill sent to it by the other, renders a conference between them necessary, the deputies of the commons to the committee which is then formed of members of both houses, are to remain uncovered. Lastly, those bills which, in whichever of the two houses they have originated, have been agreed to by both, must be deposited in the house of lords, there to remain till the royal pleasure is signified.

Besides, the lords are members of the legislature by virtue of a right inherent in their persons, and they are supposed to sit in parliament on their own account, and for the support of their own interests. In consequence of this they have the privilege of giving their votes by proxies; and, when any of them dissent from the resolutions of their house, they may enter a protest against them, containing the reasons of their dissent. In a word, as this part of the legislature is destined frequently to balance the power of the people, what it could not receive in real strength, it has received in outward splendor and greatness; so that, when it cannot resist by its weight, it overawes by its apparent magnitude.

In fine, as these various prerogatives by which the component parts of the legislature are thus made to balance each other, are all intimately connected with the fortune of state, and flourish and decay according to the vicissitudes of public prosperity and adversity, it will follow that, though particular oppositions may at particular times take place among those parts, there scarcely can arise any, when the general welfare is really in question. And when, to resolve the doubts that may arise in politi

The speaker of the house of lords must come down from his woolpack to receive the bills which the members of the commons bring to their house.

8 The twelve judges and the masters in chancery. There is also a ceremonial established with regard to the manner, and marks of respect, with which those two of them, who are sent with a bill to the commons, are to deliver it.

The commons have not that privilege, because they are themselves proxies for the people. See Coke's Inst. iv. p. 41.

cal speculations of this kind, we cast our eyes on the debates of the two houses for a long succession of years, and see the nature of the laws which have been proposed, of those which have passed, and of those which have been rejected, as well as of the arguments that have been urged on both sides, we shall remain convinced of the goodness of the principles on which the English legislature is formed.

CHAP. IV.

A THIRD ADVANTAGE PECULIAR TO THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT. THE BUSINESS OF PROPOSING LAWS, LODGED IN THE HANDS OF THE PEOPLE.

A THIRD circumstance which I propose to show to be peculiar to the English government, is the manner in which the offices of the three component parts of the legislature have been divided among them, and reguJated.

If the reader will be pleased to observe, he will find that, in most of the ancient free states, the share of the people in the business of legislation, was to approve, or reject, the propositions which were made to them, and to give the final sanction to the laws. The function of those persons, or in general those bodies, who were in⚫ trusted with the executive power, was to prepare and frame the laws, and then to propose them to the people; and, in a word, they possessed that branch of the legislative power which may be called the initiative, that is, the prerogative of putting that power in action.a

a This power of previously considering and approving such laws as were afterwards to be propounded to the people, was, in the first times of the Roman republic, constantly exercised by the senate laws were made, populi jussu, ex auctoritate senatûs. Even in cases of elections, the previous approbation and auctoritas of the senate, with regard to those persons who were offered to the suffrages of the people, was required. Tum enim non gerebat is magistratum qui ceperat, si patres auctores non erant facti. Cic. pro Plancio. 3.

At Venice the senate also exercises powers of the same kind,

This initiative, or exclusive right of proposing, in legislative assemblies, attributed to the magistrates, is indeed very useful, and perhaps even necessary, in states of a republican form, for giving a permanence to the laws, as well as for preventing the disorders and struggles for power which have been mentioned before; but upon examination we shall find that this expedient is attended with inconveniences of little less magnitude than the evils it is meant to remedy.

When

These magistrates, or bodies, at first indeed apply fre quently to the legislature for a grant of such branches of power as they dare not of themselves assume, or for the removal of such obstacles to their growing authority as they do not yet think it safe for them peremptorily to set aside. But when their authority has at last gained a sufficient degree of extent and stability, as farther manifestations of the will of the legislature could then only create obstructions to the exercise of their power, they begin to consider the legislature as an enemy whom they must take great care never to rouse. They consequently convene the assembly of the people as seldom as they can. they do it, they carefully avoid proposing any thing favourable to public liberty. Soon they even entirely cease to convene the assembly at all; and the people, after thus losing the power of legally asserting their rights, are exposed to that which is the highest degree of political ruin, the loss of even the remembrance of them; unless some indirect means are found, by which they may from time to time give life to their dormant privileges; means which may be found, and succeed pretty well in small states, where provisions can more easily be made to answer their intended ends, but in states of considerable extent, have always been found, in the event, to give rise to disorders

with regard to the grand council or assembly of the nobles. In the canton of Bern, all propositions must be discussed in the little council, which is composed of twenty-seven members, before they are laid before the council of the two hundred, in whom resides the sovereignty of the whole canton. And in Geneva the law is, "that nothing shall be treated in the general council, or assembly of the citizens, which has not been previously treated and approved in the council of the two hundred; and that nothing shall be treated in the two hundred, which has not been previously treated and approved in the council of the twentyfive."

of the same kind with those which were at first intended to be prevented.

But as the capital principle of the English constitution totally differs from that which forms the basis of republican governments, so is it capable of procuring to the people advantages that are found to be unattainable in the latter. It is the people in England, or at least those who represent them, who possess the initiative in legislation, that is to say, who perform the office of framing laws, and proposing them. And among the many circumstances in the English government, which would appear entirely new to the politicians of antiquity, that of seeing the person intrusted with the executive power bear that share in legislation which they looked upon as being necessarily the lot of the people, and the people that which they thought the indispensable office of its magistrates, would not certainly be the least occasion of their surprize.

I foresee that it will be objected, that, as the king of England has the power of dissolving, and even of not calling parliaments, he is hereby possessed of a prerogative which in fact is the same with that which I have just now represented as being so dangerous.

To this I answer, that all circumstances ought to combine together. Doubtless, if the crown had been under no kind of dependence whatever on the people, it would long since have exempted itself from the obligation of calling their representatives together; and the British parliament, like the national assemblies of several other kingdoms, would have no existence but in history.

But, as we have above seen, the necessities of the state, and the wants of the sovereign himself, put him under a necessity of having frequently recourse to his parliament; and then the difference may be seen between the prerogative of not calling an assembly, when powerful causes nevertheless render such a measure necessary, and the exclusive right, when an assembly is convened, of proposing laws to it.

In the latter case, though a prince, let us even suppose, in order to save appearances, might condescend to mention any thing besides his own wants, it would be at most to propose the giving up of some branch of his prerogative upon which he set no value, or to reform such