abuses as his inclination does not lead him to imitate; but he would be very careful not to touch any points which might materially affect his authority.

Besides, as all his concessions would be made, or appear to be made, of his own motion, and would in some measure seem to spring from the activity of his zeal for the public welfare, all that he might offer, though in fact ever so inconsiderable, would be represented by him as grants of the most important nature, and for which he expects the highest gratitude. Lastly, it would also be his province to make restrictions and exceptions to laws thus proposed by himself; he would also be the person who was to chuse the words to express them, and it would not be reasonable to expect that he would give himself any great trouble to avoid all ambiguity.b

But the parliament of England is not, as we said before, bound down to wait passively and in silence for such laws as the executive power may condescend to propose to them. At the opening of every session, they of themselves take into their hands the great book of the state; they open all the pages, and examine every article.

When they have discovered abuses, they proceed to enquire into their causes: when these abuses arise from au open disregard of the laws, they endeavour to strengthen them; when they proceed from their insufficiency, they remedy the evil by additional provisions.c

In the beginning of the existence of the house of commons, bills were presented to the king under the form of petitions.Those to which the king assented, were registered among the rolls of parliament, with his answer to them; and at the end of each parliament, the judges formed them into statutes. Several abuses having crept into that method of proceeding, it was ordained that the judges should in future make the statute before the end of every session. Lastly, as even that became, in process of time, insufficient, the present method of framing bills was established; that is to say, both houses now frame the statutes in the very form and words in which they are to stand when they have received the royal assent.

No popular assembly ever enjoyed the privilege of starting, canvassing, and proposing new matter to such a degree as the English commons. In France, when their general estates were allowed to sit, their remonstrances were little regarded, and the particular estates of the provinces dare now hardly present any. In Sweden, the power of proposing new subjects was lately lodged in an assembly, called the secret committee, composed of nobles,

Nor do they proceed with less regularity and freedom, in regard to that important object subsidies. They are to be the sole judges of the quantity of them, as well as of the ways and means of raising them; and they need not come to any resolution with regard to them, till they see the safety of the subject completely provided for. In a word, the making of laws is not, in such an arrangement of things, a gratuitous contract, in which the people are to take just what is given them, and as it is given them: it is a contract in which they buy and pay, and in which they themselves settle the different conditions, and furnish the words to express them.

The English parliament have given a still greater extent to their advantages on so important a subject. They have not only secured to themselves a right of proposing laws and remedies, but they have also prevailed on the executive power to renounce all claim to do the same. It is even a constant rule, that neither the king, nor his privy council, can make any amendments to the bills preferred by the two houses; but the king is merely to ac cept or reject them: a provision this, which, if we pay a little attention to the subject, we shall find to have been also necessary for completely securing the freedom and regularity of their deliberations.d

and a few of the clergy; and is now possessed by the king. In Scotland, until the union, all propositions laid before the parliament, were made by the persons called the lords of the articles. With regard to Ireland, all bills must be prepared by the king in his privy council, and to be laid before their parliament by the lord lieutenant, for their assent or dissent: only they are allowed to discuss, among them, what they call heads of a bill, which the lord lieutenant is desired afterwards to transmit to the king, who selects out of them what clauses he thinks proper, or sets the whole aside; and is not expected to give, at any time, any precise answer to them. And in republican governments, magistrates never are at rest till they have entirely secured to themselves the important privilege of proposing; nor does this follow merely from their ambition; it is also a consequence of the situation they are in, from the principles of that mode of govern

ment.

a The king indeed at times sends messages to either house; and nobody, I think, can wish that no means of intercourse should exist between him and his parliament. But these messages are always expressed in very general words; they are only made to desire the house to take certain subjects into their consideration; no particular articles or clauses are expressed; the commons are

I indeed confess that it seems very natural, in the modelling of a state, to intrust this very important office of framing laws, to those persons who may be supposed to have before acquired experience and wisdom in the management of public affairs. But events have unfortunately demonstrated, that public employments and power improve the understanding of men in a less degree than they pervert their views; and it has been found in the issue, that the effect of a regulation which, at first sight, seems so perfectly consonant with prudence, is to confine the people to a mere passive and defensive share in legislation, and to deliver them up to the continual enterprises of those who, at the same time that they are under the greatest temptations to deceive them, possess the most powerful means of effecting it.

If we cast our eyes on the history of the ancient governments, in those times when the persons entrusted with the executive power were still in a state of dependence on the legislature, and consequently frequently obliged to have recourse to it, we shall see almost continual instances of selfish and insidious laws proposed by them to the assemblies of the people.

And those men in whose wisdom the law had at first placed so much confidence, became, in the issue, so lost to all sense of shame and duty, that when arguments were found to be no longer sufficient, they had recourse to force; the legislative assemblies became so many fields of battle, and their power, a real calamity.

I know very well, however, that there are other important circumstances besides those I have just mentioned, which would prevent disorders of this kind from taking place in England. But, on the other hand, let us

not to declare, at any settled time, any solemn acceptation or rejection of the proposition made by the king; and, in short, the house follows the same mode of proceeding, with respect to such messages, as they usually do in regard to petitions presented by private individuals. Some member makes a motion upon the subject expressed in the king's message; a bill is framed in the usual way; it may be dropt at every stage of it; and it is neverthe proposal of the crown, but the motion of some of their own members, which the house discuss, and finally accept or reject.

e I particularly mean here, the circumstance of the people having entirely delegated their power to their representatives; the consequences of which institution will be discussed in the next chapter.

call to mind, that the person who, in England, is invested with the executive authority, unites in himself the whole public power and majesty. Let us represent to ourselves the great and sole magistrate of the nation, pressing the acceptance of those laws which, he had proposed, with a vehemence suited to the usual importance of his designs, with the warmth of monarchical pride, which must meet with no refusal, and exerting for that purpose all his im

mense resources.

It was therefore a matter of indispensable necessity, that things should be settled in England in the manner that they are. As the moving springs of the executive power are, in the hands of the king, a kind of sacred depositum, so are likewise those of the legislative power, in the hands of the two houses. The king must abstain from touching them, in the same manner as all the subjects of the kingdom are bound religiously to submit to his prerogatives. When he sits in parliament, he has left, we may say, his executive power without doors, and can only assent or dissent. If the crown had been allowed to take an active part in the business of making laws, it would soon have rendered useless the other branches of the legislature.

CHAP. V.

IN WHICH AN INQUIRY IS MADE, WHETHER IT WOULD BE AN ADVANTAGE TO PUBLIC LIBERTY THAT THE LAWS SHOULD BE ENACTED BY THE VOTES OF THE PEOPLE AT LARGE.

BUT it will be said, whatever may be the wisdom of the English laws, how great soever their precautions may be with regard to the safety of the individual, the people, as they do not expressly enact them, cannot be looked upon as a free people. The author of the Social Contract carries this opinion even farther: he says, that, "though the people of England think they are free, they are much mistaken; they are so only during the election of members for parliament: as soon as these are elected, the people are slaves-they are nothing."

a

a See M. Rousseau's Social Contract, chap. xv.

Before 1 answer this objection, I shall observe that the word liberty is one of those which have been most misunderstood or misapplied.

Thus, at Rome, where that class of citizens who were really the masters of the state, were sensible that a lawful regular authority, once trusted to a single ruler, would put an end to their tyranny, they taught the people to believe, that, provided those who exercised a military power over them, and overwhelmed them with insults, went by the names of consules, dictatores, patricii, nobiles, in a word, by any other appellation than that horrid one of rex, they were free, and that such a valuable situation must be preserved at the price of every calamity.

In the same manner, certain writers of the present age, misled by their inconsiderate admiration of the govern ments of ancient times, and perhaps also by a desire of presenting lively contrasts to what they call the degene rate manners of our modern times, have cried up the governments of Sparta and Rome, as the only ones fit for us to imitate. In their opinions, the only proper employ ment of a free citizen is, to be either incessantly assembled in the forum, or preparing for war. Being valiant, inured to hardships, inflamed with an ardent love of one's country, which is, after all, nothing more than an ar dent desire of injuring all mankind for the sake of the society of which we are members; and with an ardent love of glory, which is likewise nothing more than an ardent desire of committing slaughter, in order to make afterwards a boast of it, have appeared to these writers to be the only social qualifications worthy of our esteem, and of the encouragement of law-givers. And while, in order to support such opinions, they have used a profusion of exaggerated expressions without any distinct meaning, and perpetually repeated, though without defining them, the words dastardliness, corruption, greatness of soul and virtue, they have never once thought of telling us the only thing that was worth our knowing, which is, whether men were happy under those governments which they so much exhorted us to imitate.

And while they thus misapprehended the only rational

b I have used the above expressions in the same sense in which they were used in the ancient commonwealths, and they still are by most of the writers who describe their governments.