a

We grant this, will it be said; but the Roman people never allowed their tribunes to conclude any thing definitively; they, on the contrary, reserved to themselves the right of ratifying any resolutions the latter should take. This, I answer, was the very circumstance that rendered the institution of tribunes totally ineffectual in the event. The people thus wanting to interfere with their own opinions, in the resolutions of those on whom they had, in their wisdom, determined entirely to rely, and endeavouring to settle with an hundred thousand votes, things which would have been settled equally well by the votes of their advisers, defeated in the issue every beneficial end of their former provisions; and while they meant to preserve an appearance of their sovereignty (a chimerical appearance, since it was under the direction of others that they intended to vote) they fell back into all those incon veniences which we have before mentioned.

鹫

The senators, the consuls, the dictators, and the other great men in the republic, whom the people were prudent enough to fear, and simple enough to believe, continued still to mix with them, and play off their political artifices. They continued to make speeches to them, and still availed themselves of their privilege of changing at their pleasure the place and form of the public meetings. When they did not find it possible by such means to direct the resolutions of the assemblies, they pretended that the omens were not favourable, and under this pretext, or others of the same kind, they dissolved them. And the tribunes,

a See Rousseau's Social Contract.

b Valerius Maximus relates, that the tribunes of the people having offered to propose some regulations in regard to the price of corn, in a time of great scarcity, Scipio Nasica over-ruled the assembly merely by saying, "Silence, Romans; I know better than you what is expedient for the republic. Which words were no sooner heard by the people, than they shewed by a silence full of veneration, that they were more affected by his authority, than by the necessity of providing for their own subsistence."-Tacete, quæso, quirites. Plus enim ego quam vos quid reipublice expediat intelligo. Qua voce auditâ, omnes pleno venerationis silentio, majorem ejus autoritatis quam alimentorum suorum curam egerunt.

Quid enim majus est, si de jure augurum quærimus, says Tully, who himself was an augur, and a senator into the bargain, quàm posse a summis imperiis et summis potestatibus comitatus et

when they had succeeded so far as to effect an union among themselves, thus were obliged to submit to the mortification of seeing those projects which they had pursued with infinite labour, and even through the greatest dangers, irrecoverably defeated by the most despicable artifices.

When, at other times, they saw that a confederacy was carrying on with uncommon warmth against them, and despaired of succeeding by employing expedients of the above kind, or were afraid of diminishing their efficacy by a too frequent use of them, they betook themselves to other stratagems. They then conferred on the consuls, by the means of a short form of words for the occasion, an absolute power over the lives of the citizens, or even appointed a dictator. The people, at the sight of the state masquerade which was displayed before them, were sure to sink into a state of consternation; and the tribunes, however clearly they might see through the artifice, also trembled in their turn, when they thus beheld themselves left without defenders.

At other times, they brought false accusations against the tribunes before the assembly itself; or, by privately slandering them with the people, they totally deprived them of their confidence. It was through artifices of this kind, that the people were brought to behold, without concern, the murder of Tiberius Gracchus, the only Roman that was really virtuous, the only one who truly loved the people. It was also in the same manner that Caius, who was not deterred by his brother's fate, from pursuing the same plan of conduct, was in the end so entirely forsaken by the people, that nobody could be found among them who would even lend him a horse to fly from the fury of the nobles; and he was at last compelled to lay violent

concilia, vel instituta dimittere, vel habita rescindere! Quid gravius, quam rem susceptam dirimi, si unus augur alium (id est, alium diem) dixerit !-See De Legib. lib. ii. § 12.

Videat consul ne quid detrimenti respublica capiat.

eThe tribunes of the people," says Livy, who was a great admirer of the aristocratical power, "and the people themselves, durst neither lift up their eyes, nor even mutter, in the presence of the dictator." Nec adversus dictatoriam vim, aut tribuni plebis, aut ipsa plebs, attollere oculos, aut hiscere, audebant.-See Tit. Liv. lib. vi. § 16.

hands upon himself, while he invoked the wrath of the gods on his inconstant fellow-citizens.

At other times, they raised divisions among the people Formidable combinations manifested themselves, on a sudden, on the eve of important transactions; and all moderate men avoided attending assemblies, where they saw that all was to be tumult and confusion.

In fine, that nothing might be wanting to the insolence with which they treated the assemblies of the people, they sometimes falsified the declarations of the number of the votes; they even once went so far as to carry off the urns into which the citizens were to throw their suffrages.

CHAP. VIII.

THE SUBJECT CONCLUDED. EFFECTS THAT HAVE RESULTED, IN THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT, FROM THE PEOPLE'S POWER BEING COMPLETELY DELEGATED TO THEIR REPRESENTATIVES.

BUT when the people have entirely trusted their power to a moderate number of persons, affairs immediately take a widely different turn. Those who govern are from that moment obliged to leave off all those stratagems which had hitherto ensured their success. Instead of those assemblies which they affected to despise, and were perpetually comparing to storms, or to the current of the Euripus, and in regard to which they accordingly

The reader, with respect to all the above observations, may see Plutarch's Lives, particularly the lives of the two Gracchi. I must add, that I have avoided drawing any instance from those assemblies in which one half of the people were made to arm themselves against the other. I have here only alluded to those times which immediately either preceded or followed the third punic war, that is, to those which are commonly called the best period of the republic.

a

Tully makes no end of his similes on this subject. Quod enim fretum, quem Euripum, tot motus, tantas et tam varias habere putatis agitationes fluctuum, quantas perturbationes et quantos æstus habet ratio comitiorum? 1 See Orat. pro Murand. Concio, says he in another place, quæ ex imperitissimis constat, &c.—Dé ́Amicitiâ, § 25.

thought themselves at liberty to pass over the rules of justice, they now find that they have to deal with men who are their equals in point of education and knowledge, and their inferiors only in point of rank and form. They, in consequence, soon find it necessary to adopt quite different methods; and, above all, become very careful not to talk to them any more about the sacred chickens, the white or black days, and the Sibylline books. As they see their new adversaries expect to have a proper regard paid to them, that single circumstance inspires them with it:as they see them act in a regular manner, observe constant rules, in a word, proceed with form, they come to look upon them with respect, from the very same reason which makes them themselves to be reverenced by the people.

The representatives of the people, on the other hand, do not fail soon to procure for themselves every advantage that may enable them effectually to use the powers with which they have been intrusted, and to adopt every rule of proceeding that may make their resolutions to be truly the result of reflection and deliberation. Thus it was that the representatives of the English nation, soon after their first establishment, became formed into a separate assembly; they afterwards obtained the liberty of appointing a president: soon after, they insisted upon their being consulted on the last form of the acts to which they had given rise: lastly, they insisted on thenceforth framing them themselves.

In order to prevent any possibility of surprise in the course of their proceedings, it is a settled rule with them, that every proposition, or bill, must be read three times, at different prefixed days, before it can receive a final sanction and before each reading of the bill, as well as at its first introduction, an express resolution must be taken to continue it under consideration. If the bill be rejected, in any one of those several operations, it must be dropped, and cannot be proposed again during the same session.b

b It is moreover a settled rule in the house of commons, that no member is to speak more than once in the same day. "When the number and nature of the clauses of a bill require that it should be discussed in a freer manner, a committee is appointed for that purpose, who are to make their report afterwards to the house.

The commons have been, above all, jealous of the freedom of speech in their assembly. They have expressly stipulated, as we have above mentioned, that none of their words or speeches should be questioned in any place out of their house. In fine, in order to keep their deliberations free from every kind of influence, they have not allowed their president to give his vote, or even his opinion: they moreover have settled it as a rule, not only that the king could not send to them any express propo sals about laws, or other subjects, but even that his name should never be mentioned in the deliberations.c

But the circumstance which, of all others, constitutes the superior excellence of a government in which the people act only through their representatives, that is, by means of an assembly formed of a moderate number of persons, and in which every member has it in his power to propose new subjects, and to argue and canvass the questions that arise, is that such a constitution is the only one that is capable of the immense advantage, and of which I do not know if I have been able to convey an adequate idea to my readers when I mentioned it before,d I mean that of putting into the hands of the people the moving springs of the legislative authority.

In a constitution where the people at large exercise the function of enacting the laws, as it is only to those persons towards whom the citizens are accustomed to turn their eyes, that is, to the very men who govern, that the assembly have either time or inclination to listen, they acquire, at length, as has constantly been the case in all republics, the exclusive right of proposing, if they please, when they please, in what manner they please. A prerogative this, of such extent, that it would suffice to put an assembly formed of men of the greatest parts, at the

When the subject is of importance, this committee is formed of the whole house, which still continues to sit in the same place, but in a less solemn manner, and under another president, who is called the chairman of the committee. In order to form the house again, the mace is replaced on the table, and the speaker goes again into his chair.

If any person were to mention in his speech, what the king "wishes should be, would be glad to see," &c. he would be immediately called to order, for attempting to influence the debate. See Chap. IV. of this book."