Hence, though good men may not think themselves obliged to concur implicitly in the tumultuary resolutions of a people whom their orators take pains to agitate, yet, on the other hand, when this same people, left to itself, perseveres in opinions which have for a long time been discussed in public writings, and from which, it is es sential to add, all errors concerning facts have been re moved, such perseverance appears to me a very respectable decision; and then it is, though only then, that we may safely say, "the voice of the people is the voice of God."

How, therefore, can the people of England act, when, having formed opinions which may really be called their own, they think they have just cause to complain against the administration? It is, as has been said above, by means of the right they have of electing their representatives; and the same method of general intercourse that has informed them with regard to the objects of their complaints, will likewise enable them to apply the remedy to them.

Through this means they are acquainted with the nature of the subjects that have been deliberated upon in the assembly of their representatives; they are informed by whom the different motions were made, by whom they were supported; and the manner in which the suffrages are delivered, is such, that they always can know the names of those who would vote constantly for the advance. ment of pernicious measures.

And the people not only know the particular disposi tions of every member of the house of commons; but the general notoriety of all things gives them also a knowledge of the political sentiments of the greatest part of those whom their situation in life renders fit to fill a place in that house. And availing themselves of the

delivered at first by only forty citizens, were afterwards often accompanied by about nine hundred. This circumstance, toge ther with the ceremony with which those remonstrances, or repre sentations, as they more commonly call them, are delivered, has rendered them a great check on the conduct of the magistrates: they even have been still more useful to the citizens of Geneva, as a preventive than as a remedy; and nothing is more likely to deter the magistrates from taking a step of any kind than the thought that it will give rise to a representation.

several vacancies that happen, and still more of the op portunity of a general election, they purify either successively, or at once, the legislative assembly; and thus, without any commotion or danger to the state, they effect a material reformation in the views of the government.

I am aware that some persons will doubt of these patriotic and systematic views, which I attribute to the people of England, and will object to me the disorders that sometimes happen at elections. But this reproach, which, by the way, comes with but little propriety from writers who would have the people transact every thing in their own persons,-this reproach, I say, though true to a certain degree, is not however so much so as is thought by certain persons, who have taken only a superficial survey of the state of things.

Without doubt, in a constitution in which all important causes of uneasiness are so effectually prevented, it is impossible but that the people will have long intervals of inattention. Being then called upon, on a sudden, from this state of inactivity, to elect representatives, they have not examined, beforehand, the merits of those who ask them their votes; and the latter have not had, amidst the general tranquillity, any opportunity to make themselves known to them.

The elector, persuaded, at the same time, that the person whom he will elect, will be equally interested with himself in the support of public liberty, does not enter into laborious disquisitions, and from which he sees he may exempt himself. Obliged, however, to give the preference to somebody, he forms his choice on motives which would not be excusable, if it were not that some motives are necessary to make a choice, and that, at this instant, he is not influenced by any other and indeed it must be confessed, that, in the ordinary course of things, and with electors of a certain rank in life, that candidate who gives the best entertainment, has a great chance to get the better of his competitors.

But if the measures of government, and the reception of those measures in parliament, by means of a too complying house of commons, should ever be such as to spread a serious alarm among the people, the same causes which have concurred to establish public liberty, would,

no doubt, operate again, and likewise concur in its support. A general combination would then be formed, both of those members of parliament who have remained true to the public cause, and of persons of every order among the people. Public meetings, in such circumstances, would be appointed, general subscriptions would be entered into, to support the expences, whatever they might be, of such a necessary opposition; and all private and unworthy purposes being suppressed by the sense of the national danger, the choice of the electors would then be wholly determined by the consideration of the public spirit of the candidates, and the tokens given by them of such spirit.

Thus were those parliaments formed, which suppressed arbitrary taxes and imprisonments. Thus was it, that, under Charles the second, the people, when recovered from that enthusiasm of affection with which they received a king so long persecuted, at last returned to him no par liaments but such as were composed of a majority of men attached to public liberty. Thus it was, that, persevering in a conduct which the circumstances of the times rendered necessary, the people baffled the arts of the government; and Charles dissolved three successive parliaments, without any other effect but that of having those same men re-chosen, and set again in opposition to him, of whom he hoped he had rid himself for ever.

Nor was James the second happier in his attempts than Charles had been. This prince soon experienced that his parliament was actuated by the same spirit as those which had opposed the designs of his late brother; and having suffered himself to be led into measures of violence, instead of being better taught by the discovery he made of the sentiments of the people, his reign was terminated by that catastrophe with which every one is acquainted.

Indeed, if we combine the right enjoyed by the people of England, of electing their representatives, with the whole of the English government, we shall become continually more and more sensible of the excellent effects that may result from that right. All men in the state are, as has been before observed, really interested in the support of public liberty; nothing but temporary motives, and such as are peculiar to themselves, can possibly in

duce the members of any house of commons to connive at measures destructive of this liberty: the people, therefore, under such circumstances, need only change these members, in order effectually to reform the conduct of that house: and it may safely be pronounced beforehand, that a house of commons, composed of a new set of persons, will, from this circumstance alone, be in the interests of the people.

Hence, though the complaints of the people do not always meet with a speedy and immediate redress (a celerity which would be the symptom of a fatal unsteadiness in the constitution, and would sooner or later bring on its ruin), yet, when we attentively consider the nature and the resources of this constitution, we shall not think it too bold an assertion to say, that it is impossible but that complaints in which the people persevere, that is, to repeat it once more, well-grounded complaints, will sooner or later be redressed.

CHAP. XIV.

RIGHT OF RESISTANCE.

Bur all these privileges of the people, considered in themselves, are but feeble defences against the real strength of those who govern. All those provisions, all those reciprocal rights, necessarily suppose that things remain in their legal and settled course: what would then be the resource of the people, if ever the prince, suddenly freeing himself from all restraint, and throwing himself as it were out of the constitution, should no longer respect either the person or the property of the subject, and either should make no account of his conventions with his parliament, or attempt to force it implicitly to submit to his will-It would be resistance.

Without entering here into the discussion of a doctrine which would lead us to enquire into the first principles of civil government, consequently engage us in a long disquisition, and with regard to which, besides, persons free from prejudices agree pretty much in their opinions, I

shall only observe here, and it will be sufficient for my purpose, that the question has been decided in favour of this doctrine by the laws of England, and that resistance. is looked upon by them as the ultimate and lawful resource against the violences of power.

It was resistance that gave birth to the great charter, that lasting foundation of English liberty; and the excesses of a power established by force, were also restrained by force. It has been by the same means that, at different times, the people have procured the confirmation of the same charter. Lastly, it has also been the resistance to a king who made no account of his own engagements, that has, in the issue, placed on the throne the family which is now in the possession of it.

This is not all; this resource, which, till then, had only been an act of force, opposed to other acts of force, was, at that æra, expressly recognized by the law itself. The lords and commons, solemnly assembled, declared, that "king James the second, having endeavoured to subvert the constitution of the kingdom, by breaking the original contract between king and people, and having violated the fundamental laws, and withdrawn himself, had abdicated the government; and that the throne was thereby vacant."

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And lest those principles to which the revolution thus gave a sanction, should, in process of time, become mere arcana of state, exclusively appropriated, and only known, to a certain class of subjects, the same act, we have just mentioned, expressly insured to individuals the right of publicly preferring complaints against the abuses of government, and moreover, of being provided with arms for their own defence. Judge Blackstone expresses himself in the following terms, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England :-(B. I. ch. i. p. 140.)

a Lord Lyttelton says extremely well in his Persian Letters, "If the privileges of the people of England be concessions from the crown, is not the power of the crown itself, a concession from the people?" It might be said with equal truth, and somewhat more in point to the subject of this chapter,-If the privileges of the people were an encroachment on the power of kings, the power itself of kings was, at first, an encroachment (no matter whether effected by surprise) on the natural liberty of the people. The bill of rights has since given a new sanction to all these principles.