In the same manner was the whole authority of the crown transferred afterwards to the princess who succeeded king William the third, and who had no other claim to it, but what was conferred on her by parliament. And in the same manner again it was settled, a long time beforehand, on the princes of Hanover who have since succeeded her."

Nay, there is one most extraordinary fact, and to which I desire the reader to give his attention. Notwithstanding all the revolutions we mention, and though parliament has sat every year since the beginning of this century, and though they have constantly enjoyed the most unlimited freedom, both as to the subjects and the manner of their deliberations, and numberless proposals have in consequence been made; yet such has been the efficiency of each house, in destroying, preventing, or qualifying, the views of the other, that the crown has not been obliged during all that time to make use, even once, of its negative voice; and the last bill, rejected by a king of England, has been that rejected by king William the third in the year 1692, for triennial parliaments.h

council: but this is only a precaution taken in the view that the most important affairs of a great nation may be transacted with proper solemnity, and to prevent, for instance, all objections that might, in process of time, be drawn from the uncertainty whether the king had assented, or not, to certain particular transactions.

g If the reader wanted a farther confirmation as to the peculiarity of the conduct of the English parliament, in preserving the authority of the crown undivided, though the latter lay, as it were, at their disposal, he need only compare the acts by which they settled it on the house of Hanover with that framed for the same purpose by the Scotch parliament, a few years before the union. By this latter act the power of the crown in Scotland was to be dismembered, in much the same manner as we have seen it was in Sweden.-See Parliamentary Debates, vol. iii,

h He assented a few years afterwards to that bill, after several amendments had been made in it.

The observation above made on the constant tenour of the proceedings of the English parliament, with relation to the crown, is rendered still more remarkable when we consider the events which have of late years taken place in France; and when we see the late king to have at last taken a most serious alarm at the proceedings of his parliament of Paris, (an assembly which is far from having the same importance in the kingdom of France, as the English parliament has in England) and to have in the end applied to his army in order to disperse it. And though the pre

And this peculiar security of the executive authority of the crown in England, has not only freed the state from those disturbances to which other monarchies were unavoidably exposed before the use of standing armies, and enabled it to produce all those advantageous effects to public liberty, which we have mentioned in the course of this work; but this same security has also procured to England, considered as a free state, other advantages which would really have been totally unattainable in the other free states before mentioned, whatever degree of public virtue we might even suppose to have belonged to those who acted in them as the leaders of the people.

The one is the extraordinary freedom which the people of England enjoy at the expence of the governing authority. In the Roman commonwealth, for instance, we see the senate to have been vested with a number of powers totally destructive of the liberty of the citizens; and the continuance of these powers was, no doubt, in a great measure owing to the treacherous remissness of those men in whom the people trusted for repressing them, or even to their determined resolution not to abridge those prerogatives. Yet, if we attentively consider the constant situation of affairs in that republic, we shall find, that though we might suppose these persons to have been ever so truly attached to the cause of the people, it would not really have been possible for them to procure to the peo

sent king of France has thought proper to re-establish that parliament, a measure which was highly prudent in the beginning of his reign, yet every precaution has at the same time been taken to render it dumb for ever.

To these observations on the security of the power of the crown, another of great importance is to be added, which is also founded upon facts, and which theory would equally justify: this is, that the crown cannot depend upon the security we mention any longer than it continnes to fulfil its engagments with the parliament, and with the nation; of this the misfortunes of Charles the first, and the revolution of the year 1689, are convincing as well as awful proofs. And in general the imminent dangers and perplexities in which the kings of England have constantly involved themselves whenever they have attempted to step beyond the limits of the law, manifestly shows that all that can be said of the greatness and security of their power is to be understood, not of the capricious power of the man, but of the lawful authority of the head of the state.

ple an entire security. The right enjoyed by the senate, of suddenly naming a dictator, with a power unrestrained by any law, or of investing the consuls with an authority of much the same kind, and the power it assumed of making at times formidable examples of arbitrary justice, were resources of which the republic could not, perhaps, with safety have been totally deprived; and though these were for the most part used to destroy the just liberty of the people, yet they were also very often the means of preserving the commonwealth.

Upon the same principle we should possibly find that the ostracism, that arbitrary method of banishing citizens, was a necessary resource in the republic of Athens. A Venetian noble would perhaps also confess, that how. ever terrible the state inquisition established in his repub lic may be, even to the nobles themselves, yet it would not be prudent entirely to abolish it. And we do not know but a minister of state in France, though we might suppose him ever so virtuous and moderate a man, would say the same with regard to the secret imprisonments, the lettres de cachet, and other arbitrary deviations from the settled course of law, which often take place in that kingdom, and in the other monarchies of Europe. No doubt, if he was the man we suppose, he would confess the expedients we mention that have in numberless instances been most horribly prostituted to gratify the wantouness and private revenge of ministers, or of those who had any interest with them; but still perhaps he would continue to give it as his opinion, that the crown, notwithstanding its apparently immense strength, cannot avoid recurring at times to expedients of this kind; much less could it pub licly and absolutely renounce them.

It is therefore a most advantageous circumstance in the English government, that its security renders all such expedients unnecessary; and that the representatives of the people have not only been constantly willing to promote the public liberty, but that the general situation of affairs has also enabled them to carry their precautions so far as they have done. And indeed, when we consider what prerogatives the crown, in England, has sincerely renounced; that in consequence of the independence conferred on the judges, aud of the method of trial by jury, it is deprived of all means of influencing the settled course

of the law both in civil and criminal matters; that it has renounced all power of seizing the property of individuals, and even of restraining in any manner whatsoever, and for the shortest time, the liberty of their persons, we do not know what we ought most to admire, whether the public virtue of those who have deprived the supreme executive power of all those dangerous prerogatives, or the nature of that same power, which has enabled it to give them up without ruin to itself; whether the happy frame of the English government, which makes those in whom the people trust, continue so faithful in the discharge of their duty, or the solidity of that same government, which really can afford to leave to the people such an extensive degree of freedom.

Again, the liberty of the press, that great advantage enjoyed by the English nation, does not exist in any of the other monarchies of Europe, however well established their power may at first seem to be; and it might even be demonstrated that it cannot exist in them. The most watchful eye, we see, is constantly kept in those monarchies upon every kind of publication; and a jealous attention is paid even to the loose and idle speeches of individuals. Much unnecessary trouble, we may be apt at first to think, is taken upon this subject; but yet, if we consider how uniform the conduct of all those governments is, how constant and unremitted their cares are in those respects, we shall become convinced, without looking farther, that there must be some necessity for their precautions.

In republican states, for reasons which are at bottom the same as in the before-mentioned governments, the people are also kept under the greatest restraints by those who are at the head of the state. In the Roman commonwealth, for instance, the liberty of writing was curbed by the severest laws: with regard to the freedom of speech, things were but little better, as we may conclude

The law of the twelve tables had established the punishment of death against the author of a libel: nor was it by a trial by jury that they determined what was to be called a libel. Si quis carmen occentassit, actitassit, condidissit, quod alteri flagitium faxit, capital esto.

from several facts; and many instances may even be produced of the dread with which the private citizens, upon certain occasions, communicated their political opinions to the consuls, or to the senate. In the Venetian republic, the press is most strictly watched : nay, to forbear to speak in any manner whatsoever, on the conduct of the government, is the fundamental maxim which they inculcate on the minds of the people throughout their dominions.*

With respect therefore to this point, it may again be looked upon as a most advantageous circumstance in the English government, that those who have been at the head of the people, have not only been constantly disposed to procure the liberty of the people, but also that they have found it possible for them to do so; and that the stability of the government has admitted of that extensive freedom of speaking and writing which the people of England enjoy. A most advantageous privilege, this; which affording to every man a means of laying his complaints before the public, procures him almost a certainty of redress against any act of oppression that he may have been exposed to: and which leaving, moreover, to every subject a right to give his opinion on all public matters, and by

Of this I have myself seen a proof somewhat singular, which I beg leave of the reader to relate. Being, in the year 1768, at Bergamo, the first town of the Venetian state, as you come into it from the state of Milan, I took a walk in the evening in the neighbourhood of the town; and wanting to know the name of several places which I saw at a distance, I stopped a young countryman to ask him information. Finding him to be a sensible young man, I entered into some farther conversation with him; and as he had himself a great inclination to see Venicc, he asked me, whether I proposed to go there? I answered, that I did: on which he immediately warned me when I was at Venice not to speak of the prince (del principe) an appellation assumed by the Venetian government, in order, as I suppose, to couvey to the people a greater idea of their union among themselves. As I wanted to hear him talk farther on the subject, I pretended to be entirely ignorant in that respect, and asked for what reason I must not speak of the prince? But he, (after the manner of the common people in Italy, who, when strongly affected by any thing, rather chuse to express themselves by some vehement gesture, than by words) ran the edge of his hand, with great quickness, along his neck, meaning thereby to express, that being strangled, or having one's throat cut, was the instant consequence of taking such a liberty.