prevented they will never combine together with any degree of vehemence, but when they really have cause to think themselves in danger; and by having made them indisputably great men, we shall have a chance of often seeing them behave like modest and virtuous citizens.

"In fine, by being united in a regular assembly, they will form an intermediate body in the state, that is to say, a very useful part of the government.

"It is also necessary," our lawgiver would farther add, "that we, the people, should have an influence upon the government: it is necessary for our own security; it is no less necessary for the security of the government itself. But experience must have taught you, at the same time, that a great body of men cannot act, without being, though they are not aware of it, the instruments of the designs of a small number of persons; and that the power of the people is never any thing but the power of a few leaders, who (though it may be impossible to tell when, or how) have found means to secure to themselves the direction of its exercise.

"Let us, therefore, be also beforehand with this other inconvenience. Let us effect openly what would, otherwise, take place in secret. Let us intrust our power, before it be taken from us by address. Those whom we shall have expressly made the depositaries of it, being freed from any anxious care about supporting themselves, will have no object but to render it useful. They will stand in awe of us the more, because they will know that they have not imposed upon us; and instead of a small number of leaders, who would imagine they derive their whole importance from their own dexterity, we shall have express and acknowledged representatives, who will be accountable to us for the evils of the state.

"But above all, by forming our government of a small number of persons, we shall prevent any disorder that may take place in it, from ever becoming dangerously extensive. Nay more, we shall render it capable of inestimable combinations and resources, which would be utterly impossible in that government of all, which never can be any thing but uproar and confusion.

"In short, by expressly divesting ourselves of a power of which we should, at best, have only an apparent enjoyment, we shall be entitled to make conditions for our

selves: we will insist that our liberty be augmented; we will, above all, reserve to ourselves the right of watching and censuring that administration which will have been established only by our own consent. We shall the better see its defects, because we shall be only spectators of it; we shall correct them the better, because we shall be independent of it."d

The English constitution being founded upon such principles as those we have just described, no true comparison can be made between it and the governments of any other states; and since it evidently insures not only the liberty, but the general satisfaction in all respects of those who are subject to it, in a much greater degree than any other government ever did; this consideration alone affords sufficient ground to conclude, without looking farther, that it is also much more likely to be preserved from ruin.

And indeed we may observe the remarkable manner in which it has been maintained in the midst of such general commotions as seemed unavoidably to prepare its destruction. It rose again, we see, after the wars between Henry the third and his barons; after the usurpation of Henry the fourth; and after the long and bloody contentions between the houses of York and Lancaster. Nay, though totally destroyed in appearance after the fall of Charles the first, and though the greatest efforts had been made to establish another form of government in its stead, yet, no sooner was Charles the second called over, than the constitution was re-established upon all its ancient foundations.

However, as what has not happened at one time, may happen at another, future revolutions (events which no form of government can totally prevent) may perhaps end in a different manner from that in which past ones have been terminated. New combinations may possibly take place among the then ruling powers of the state, of such a nature as to prevent the constitution, when peace shall be restored to

He might have added, "As we will not seek to counteract nature, but rather to follow it, we shall be able to procure ourselves a mild legislation. Let us not be without cause afraid of the power of one man: we shall have no need either of a Tarpeian rock, or of a council of ten. Having expressly allowed to the people a liberty to inquire into the conduct of government, and to endeavour to correct it, we shall need neither state-prisons nor secret informers.??

the nation, from settling again upon its ancient and genuine foundations; and it would certainly be a very bold assertion to decide, that both the outward form, and the true spirit of the English government, would again be preserved from destruction, if the same dangers to which they have in former times been exposed, should again happen to take place.

Nay, such fatal changes as those we mention, may be introduced even in quiet times, or, at least, by means in appearance peaceable and constitutional. Advantages, for instance, may be taken by particular factions, either of the feeble temper, or of the misconduct, of some future king. Temporary prepossessions of the people may be made use of, to make them concur in doing what will prove afterwards the ruin of their own liberty. Plans of apparent improvement in the constitution, forwarded by men who shall proceed without a due knowledge of the true principles and foundations of government, may produce effects quite contrary to those which were intended, and in reality prepare its ruin. The crown, on the other hand, may, by the acquisition of foreign dominions, acquire a fatal independency on the people: and if, without entering into any farther particulars on this subject, I were required

e Instead of looking for the principles of politics in their true sources, that is to say, in the nature of the affections of mankind, and of those secret ties by which they are united together in a state of society,men have treated that science in the same manner as they did natural philosophy in the time of Aristotle, continually recurring to occult causes and principles, from which no useful consequence could he drawn. Thus, in order to ground parti cular assertions, they have much used the word constitution, in a personal sense, the constitution loves, the constitution forbids, and the like. At other times, they have had recourse to luxury, in order to explain certain events; and at others, to a still more occult cause, which they have called corruption: and abundance of comparisons, drawn from the human body, have been also used for the same purposes. Nor is it only the obscurity of the writings of politicians, and the impossibilty of applying their speculative doctrines to practical uses, that proves that some peculiar and uncommon difficulties attend the investigation of political truths; but the singular perplexity which men in general, even the ablest, labour under when they attempt to discuss abstract questions in politics, also justifies this observation, and proves that the true first principles of this science, whatever they are, lie deep in both the human heart and understanding.

to point out the principal events which would, if they were ever to happen, prove immediately the ruin of the English government,-I would answer, the English government will be no more, either when the crown shall become independent on the nation for its supplies, or when the representatives of the people shall begin to share in the executive authority.

CHAP. XIX.

A FEW THOUGHTS ON THE ATTEMPTS THAT MAY AT PARTICULAR TIMES BE MADE TO ABRIDGE THE POWER OF THE CROWN, AND ON SOME OF THE DANGERS by WHICH SUCH ATTEMPTS MAY BE ATTENDED.

THE power of the crown is supported by deeper roots than the generality of people are aware of, as has been observed in a former chapter; and there is little fear that the taking away any capital branch of its prerogative, may be effected, in common peaceable times, by the mere theoretical speculations of politicians. However, it is not equally impracticable, that some event of the kind we mention, may be brought about by advantage being taken, in the first place, of the minority, or even the inexperience of the person invested with the kingly authority. Of this, a remarkable instance happened under the reign of king George the first, while that bill, by which the number of peers was in future to be limited to a certain number, was in agitation in the house of commons, to whom it had been sent from that of the lords, where it had been passed. So unacquainted was the king at that time with his own interest, and with the constitution of that government over which he was come to preside, that having been persuaded by that party who wished for success to

And if, at any time, any dangerous changes were to take place in the English constitution, the pernicious tendency of which the people were not able at first to discover, restrictions on the liberty of the press, and on the power of juries, will give them the first information.

a Mention is made of this bill in page 215 of this work.

the bill, that the objection made against it by the house of commons, was only owing to an opinion they entertained of the bill being disagreeable to him, that he was prevailed upon to send a message to them, to let them know that such an opinion was ill-grounded, and that should the bill pass in their house, it would meet with his assent." Considering the prodigious importance of the consequences of such a bill, the fact is certainly very remarkable.

With those personal disadvantages under which the sovereign may lie for defending his authority, other important circumstances may concur, such as popular discontents of long continuance in regard to certain particular abuses of influence or authority. The generality of the public, bent, at that time, both upon remedying the abuses that are complained of, and preventing the like from taking place in future, will perhaps wish to see that branch of the prerogative which gave rise to them, taken from the crown: a general disposition to applaud such a measure, if effected, will be manifested on all quarters; and at the same time people may not be aware that the only material consequence of depriving the crown of that branch of power which caused their complaints, will perhaps be the having transposed that branch of power from its former seat to another, and having trusted it to new hands, which will be still more likely to abuse it, than those in which it was formerly lodged.

In general, it may be laid down as a maxim, that power, under any form of government, must exist and be trusted somewhere. If the constitution does not admit of a king, the governing authority is lodged in the hands of magistrates. If the government, at the same time it is a limited one, bears a monarchical form, those shares of power that are retrenched from the king's prerogative, most likely continue to subsist, and are vested in a senate or assembly of great men, under some other name of the like kind.

Thus in the kingdom of Sweden, which, having been a limited monarchy, may supply examples very applicable to the government of this country, we find that the power

See the collection of Parliamentary Debates, &c. I do not remember exactly what volume.