dividuals of the same species, but between species widely differing from one another. From this struggle for existence he deduces that the fittest will survive-that is of individuals and races in whom advantageous variations have occurred.

He then discusses the difficulties of his theory-admits the absence or rarity of transitional varieties-admits the difficulty of accounting for the formation by modification of one animal from another having widely different habits and structure; or of accounting for the production of organs such as the tail or the eye; or of the acquisition of instincts such as that by which the hive bee forms its cells; and of accounting for the sterility of hybrids while the produce of varieties remains fertile. From the imperfection of the Geological record he argues that transitional varieties may have been lost which would account for the gaps found in the line of descent by natural selection, but claims the element of prolonged time as allowing the possibility that in that element such changes as he admits are necessary to the stability of his argument may have taken place, and concludes that, as we know variations do take place within certain limits, it is possible to conceive them as permitting the derivation of species from species; and affirms that in his belief animals are descended from at most only four or five progenitors, and plants from an equal or lesser number. He adds " Analogy would lead me one step further, namely, to the belief that all animals and plants are descended from some one prototype. But analogy may be a deceitful guide."

And here I must remark that if there be one form of expression more common than another throughout his book-it is that" analogy leads him" to think, to believe, or to conclude such and such a thing.

Now, I shall yield to none in my admiration of Mr. Darwin as one of the most accurate and painstaking observers and collectors of facts relating to the phenomena of Physical Science. Nor would I for one moment question the evident sincerity and honesty of purpose which is exhibited in his writings. But, admiration of him as a scientist, and belief in his sincerity and

honesty of purpose, must not blind us to the inconsistencies and want of consequentiality which appear in his arguments. One of the great services that Darwin has rendered to Physical Science has been in checking the propensity to invent new Species, and in reducing the number of so-called Species by showing that many of them are only Varieties which may fairly come within the limits of Variation.

But, to discuss his position, one of the first necessities in the argument is a clear definition of the terms. This Mr. Darwin himself recognises; for he says:— "To discuss whether such forms are rightly called species or varieties before any definition of those terms has been accepted, is vainly to beat the air." But this is exactly what Mr. Darwin has failed to do. We look in vain in his book "The Origin of Species," for any definition of "Species." Indeed we

cannot be quite sure from some passages whether such things as Species exist. "Hereafter," he says (at the close of his book), "we shall have to treat Species in the same manner as those naturalists treat Genera, who admit that Genera are merely artificial combinations made for convenience. This may not be a cheering prospect, but we shall at least be freed from the vain search for the undiscovered and undiscoverable essence of the term Species." Now, "essence" means being, and, in a limited sense, the qualities of a thing. We may well ask, then,-What can be thought of an endeavour to enquire into the origin of a thing, or of the reasonableness of giving it to the world, the being of which, on the author's own showing, is "undiscovered and undiscoverable," or, in the more limited sense, the qualities of which (which he has been discussing through no less than some 400 pages), are in the same condition. But we shall, as we go on, see that Mr. Darwin himself admits that there is such a thing as a "good and distinct Species."

Mr. Darwin tells us that he "looks upon the term Species as one arbitrarily given for the sake of convenience to a set of individuals closely resembling each other, and that it does not essentially differ from the term Variety, which is given

to less distinct and more fluctuating form." Now, I would say, surely "distinctness" and "permanency" are elements which may well justify the distinction given by naturalists to Variety and Species. But it is quite clear that Mr. Darwin himself, though repudiating the distinction, holds it to be a true one; though, by an interchanging and confusion of terms, he still desires to lead the mind to the belief that no distinction exists between these terms. For we find him saying :—“I look upon Varieties which are in any degree more distinct and permanent as steps leading to more strongly marked and more permanent Varieties, and these latter leading to a Sub-Species, and so to Species. Hence, I believe a well-marked Variety may be considered an incipient Species." Again, he says :"It may be asked, how is it that Varieties, which I have called incipient Species, become ultimately converted into good and distinct species, which in most cases obviously differ from each other far more than do the Varieties of the same Species.'

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Now, if there is no "essential difference" between Variety and Species, what is the meaning of such language as that "Varieties become ultimately converted into good and distinct Species"? It is evident, therefore, that, after all, there is in Mr. Darwin's mind such a thing as a good and distinct Species, and that before Varieties can be recognised as such it is necessary to "convert," that is, change them from what they are into something else, which conversion, I venture to think, most of us would think constituted an "essential difference." But no such difficulty seems to have struck Mr. Darwin's mind, and I must leave it to him and to his disciples to reconcile his language. It seems to me plain that, in spite of his disclaimers, Mr. Darwin feels the reality of the difference which he attempts to disprove.

Now, the question arises, Is there no fixed boundary by which naturalists may distinguish Species ? It is true that, when considering resemblance of form, many naturalists differ as to its importance as distinguishing Species. But there is one fixed natural boundary which all great naturalists have agreed to consider as constituting a plain mark, as distinguish

say,

ing Species from Varieties. I refer to the law by which the hybrid offspring of two races is invariably sterile among themselves. If this be found universally true (and Mr. Darwin admits it, for he says, "I doubt whether any case of a perfectly fertile hybrid animal can be considered as thoroughly well authenticated;" and further, "it is, perhaps, impossible to bring forward one case of the hybrid offspring of two animals, clearly distinct, being itself perfectly fertile." "I do not know of any well authenticated case of a perfectly fertile hybrid animal.") I if this be found universally true, what must we think of the theory which, professing itself unable to produce even one case to disprove it, assumes, giving it the element of indefinitely prolonged time, the possibility of that overstepping of the boundary of species, without which the further progress of the argument is stopped; and then, reasoning from that as a fact which it has merely assumed as a possibility, goes on to further lengths in the same dircction. Science, as we have seen, investigates that which we know, and cannot deal with the unknown, and allows only inductive reasoning from facts, rejecting any theory that is unsupported by them, much more one which is at variance with them; and yet here we find one of our best scientists deliberately admitting that the facts are against him, and yet going on to argue as if they were in his favour. We may well ask for one single instance to be shown us of the development by natural selection of any one species from any other species; but Mr. Darwin, while admitting that he cannot point to one such mutation, thinks his assertion that it is a possibility is sufficient to settle its probability; and then, arguing from its probability, asserts that it is. From Analogy in the variability within the limits of species (which is admitted, but which we say, is confined by bounds which cannot be passed), he assumes the probability of variability beyoud the limits of species-but we may well answer him. with his own declaration that " Analogy may be an uncertain guide." In fact, as has been pointed out by one writer, his whole argument is one of the best commentaries on his own warning, in his "Naturalist's Journal of Researches," that

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"he has found, to his cost, a constant tendency to fill up the gaps of knowledge by inaccurate and superficial hypotheses."

Again, as to the term "Natural Selection," which he puts forward as the means by which the presumed mutation of species into other species is produced, there are two difficulties in regard to it. In the first place, what is "Natural Selection ?" what clear image or idea does it convey to the mind? and, in the next, assuming that there is such a thing, what evidence have we that such a power is either capable of, or does exert the influence he professes to find it able to exert. Now, as to the term itself, it implies that Nature (an Impersonality used to cover all being, animate or inanimate) has a power to choose how one plant may be fructified by another, or one animal may mate with another. If this be not the meaning, what is it? And I say, if this be the meaning, that the facts we see around us belie the truth of the assertion. Has the insect that carries the pollen from one flower to another the power of knowing exactly which flower produces the pollen which carried to another particular selected flower shall produce a variety with characteristics which shall beneficially raise it in the scale of being, so as as to enable it to weather the storm which shall destroy its fellows. Do we find, in fact, the most perfect males of a species "select" the most perfect females with which to mate. And if not, as we know it is not, then the terms employed are such as convey to the mind no definite conception. This leads me to the remark, that one of the great difficulties we have to encounter in comprehending Mr. Darwin's exposition of his theory, is the use of terms which constantly falsify each other. Thus he says." If Natural Selection be a true principle, it will banish the belief of the continued creation of new organic beings, or of any great and sudden modification of their structure." In other words, Creation is a dream, if Mr. Darwin's theory be true, and Natural Selection is the marvellous power that supersedes it. And yet Mr. Darwin himself tells us in his argument as to the supposed formation of the eye, that "we may believe that a living optical instrument was thus formed as superior to one of glass as the works