upon the most sceptical principles one can argue upon : (for I am writing to persons who entertain these principles :) and upon such consideration it will be obvious, that immorality, as little excuse as it admits of in itself, is greatly aggravated in persons who have been made acquainted with Christianity, whether they believe it or not; because the moral system of nature, or natural religion, which Christianity lays before us, approves itself, almost intuitively, to a reasonable mind, upon seeing it proposed. In the next place, with regard to Christianity, it will be observed that there is a middle, between a full satisfaction of the truth of it, and a satisfaction of the contrary. The middle state of mind between these two consists in a serious apprehension that it may be true, joined with doubt whether it be so. And this, upon the best judgment I am able to make, is as far towards speculative infidelity as any sceptic can at all be supposed to go, who has had true Christianity, with the proper evidence of it, laid before him, and has in any tole

rable measure considered them. For I would not be mistaken to comprehend all who have ever heard of it; bęcause it seems evident, that in many countries called Christian, neither Christianity, nor its evidence, are fairly laid before men. And in places where both are, there appear to be some who have very little attended to either, and whe reject Christianity with a scorn proportionate to their inattention; and yet are by no means without understanding in other matters. Now it has been shown, that a serious apprehension that Christianity may be true, lays persons under the strictest obligations of a serious regard to it, throughout the whole of their life; a regard not the same exactly, but in many respects nearly the same, with what a full conviction of its truth would lay them under. Lastly, it will appear, that blasphemy and profaneness, I mean with regard to Christianity, are absolutely without excuse. For there is no temptation to it, but from the wantonness of vanity or mirth; and these, considering the infinite importance of the subject, are no such temptations as to afford

any excuse for it. If this be a just account of things, and yet men can go on to vilify or disregard Christianity, which is to talk and act as if they had a demonstration of its falsehood; there is no reason to think they would alter their behaviour to any purpose, though there were a demonstration of its truth.

TWO DISSERTATIONS:

OP

PERSONAL IDENTITY, AND OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.

OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.

WHETHER we are to live in a future state, as it is the most important question which can possibly be asked, so it is the most intelligible one which can be expressed in language. Yet strange perplexities have been raised about the meaning of that identity, or sameness of person, which is implied in the notion of our living now and hereafter, or in any two successive moments. And the solution of these difficulties hath been stranger than the difficulties themselves. For personal identity has been explained so by some, as to render the inquiry concerning a future life of no consequence at all to us, the persons who are making it. And though few men can be misled by such subtleties, yet it may be proper a little to consider them.

Now, when it is asked wherein personal identity consists, the answer should be the same as if it were asked, wherein consists similitude or equality-that all attempts to define would but perplex it. Yet there is no difficulty at all in ascertaining the idea. For, as, upon two triangles being compared or viewed together, there arises to the mind the idea of similitude; or upon twice two and four, the idea of equality; so likewise, upon comparing the consciousness of one's self, or one's own existence in any two moments, there as immediately arises to the mind the idea of personal identity. And as the two former compari

sons not only give us the ideas of similitude and equality, but also show us that two triangles are alike, and twice two and four are equal; so the latter comparison not only gives us the idea of personal identity, but also shows us the identity of ourselves in those two moments; the present suppose, and that immediately past; or the present, and that a month, a year, or twenty years past. Or, in other words, by reflecting upon that which is myself now, and that which was myself twenty years ago, I discern they are not two, but one and the same self.

But though consciousness of what is past does thus ascertain our personal identity to ourselves, yet to say that it makes personal identity, or is necessary to our being the same persons, is to say, that a person has not existed a single moment, nor done one action, but what he can remember; indeed none but what he reflects upon. And one should really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal identity pre-supposes, and therefore cannot constitute personal identity, any more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth, which it pre-supposes.

This wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen from hence, that to be endued with consciousness is inseparable from the idea of a person or intelligent being. For this might be expressed inaccurately thus,-that consciousness makes personality; and from hence it might be concluded to make personal identity. But though present consciousness of what we at present do and feel, is necessary to our being the persons we now are; yet present consciousness of past actions, or feelings, is not necessary to our being the same persons who performed those actions, or had those feelings.

The inquiry what makes vegetables the same, in the common acceptation of the word, does not appear to have any relation to this of personal identity; because the word same, when applied to them and to person, is not only applied to different subjects, but it is also used in different senses. For, when a man swears to the same tree as having stood fifty years in the same place, he means only the same as

to all the purposes of property and uses of common life, and not that the tree has been all that time the same in the strict philosophical sense of the word. For he does not know whether any one particle of the presént tree be the same with any one particle of the tree which stood in the same place fifty years ago. And if they have not one common particle of matter, they cannot be the same tree in the proper philosophic sense of the word same; it being evidently a contradiction in terms to say they are, when no part of their substance, and no one of their properties, is the same: no part of their substance by the supposition; no one of their properties, because it is allowed that the same property cannot be transferred from one substance to another. And, therefore, when we say the identity, or sameness, of a plant, consists in a continuation of the same life, communicated under the same organization, to a number of particles of matter, whether the same or not, the word same, when applied to life and to organization, cannot possibly be understood to signify what it signifies in this very sentence when applied to matter. In a loose and popular sense, then, the life, and the organization, and the plant, are justly said to be the same, notwithstanding the perpetual change of the parts. But in a strict and philosophical manner of speech, no man, no being, no mode of being, no anything, can be the same with that with which it hath indeed nothing the same. Now, sameness is used in this latter sense when applied to persons. The identity of these, therefore, cannot subsist with diversity of sub

stance.

The thing here considered, and demonstratively, as I think determined, is proposed by Mr. Locke in these words, Whether it, i. e. the same self or person, be the same identical substance? And he has suggested what is a much better answer to the question than that which he gives it in form: For he defines person, a thinking, intelligent being, &c., and personal identity, the sameness of a rational being.* The question then is, whether the same rational being is the

* Locke's Works, vol. i. p. 146.