to repair the ravages of intemperance-to say nothing of the abstraction of many other millions from what, but for our drinking customs, would be the valuation of the Commonwealth, helping to pay the taxes that would remain.

Dr. Nathan Allen, of Lowell, Chairman of the Board of State Charities, speaking of the use of liquors as beverages, distinctly declares that, in the social relation, it is within the domain of law. And he was writing with regard to the material interests of the State.

Hon. Emory Washburn, Law Professor in Harvard College, said he would "sustain the present law and prohibit the sale of liquor, if he could;" and "if it should be carried out, he would go the whole length of the matter." He cannot, therefore, be troubled about the constitutionality of the law.

But, if this point is an assailable one, why has it not been carried up to the Supreme Court of the United States? Why have not the Judges of that Court decided that it is an unwarrantable trenching upon the rights of the people?

Besides, we must assume that these petitioners are asking for a license law to restrain the liquor traffic, and consequently the drinking of liquor as a

beverage. Now, in just so far as such a law shall be stringent and a restraint, in just so far it will be open to all the objections, as regards human rights, which can be urged against the prohibitory law itself. Some law there must be; and the true foundation of all legislation in this respect, must be the public good.

But, passing many things which I have not time to present, I come to the objection that the law cannot be executed, because public opinion is against it. We began our hearing six weeks ago with that declaration. Presently the fact was forced upon the Committee, and upon the counsel even, that it is executed; and latterly we have heard very little about its non-execution.

But, in regard to its execution or its non-execution in Boston,-and, until the State Constabulary came to the work, it was non-execution-I have something to say. I have three answers to make.

I. In the first place, the responsibility of the non-execution of the law in Boston, rests upon the authorities of Boston, who stand in a grave position in this respect. I am touching on nothing questionable. (1.) They have largely made, in connection with those classes of respectable men who have

testified here, that very public opinion which they adduce against this law. They have, therefore, no right to testify upon this question. Noble as the city is in some respects, it comes here in the worst position, in this regard, that it could possibly hold. (2.) In the second place, the authorities steadily opposed originally the enactment of a prohibitory law. (3.) In the third place, in 1852, before the prohibitory law then just enacted went into operation, they granted several hundred licenses under the old license system, which had not been done for a number of years. (4.) In the fourth place, the mayors in their annual addresses, with scarcely an exception, (I think there was one exception,) have opposed the law, declaring in distinct terms that it could not be executed, at the same time that they deplored the number of places where liquor was kept for sale, and the amount of liquor which was drank. (5.) In the fifth place, the police of the city, at some times; have been forbidden to enter places of sale. At these times some seeming steps towards the execution of the law were taken, but the officers were shut out of the shops and could not give testimony. I will not say that this was the motive; but it was the practical result. (6.) In the sixth place, the police

have never had unqualified orders to execute the law. (7.) In the seventh place, some from among the liquor-sellers have been uniformly, by the Board of Aldermen, selected for the jury lists; so that practically there have been one or more liquorsellers on each of the respective traverse juries. These men have been selected, by those who knew that they were liquor-sellers; I will not say because they were liquor-sellers. Aldermen themselves have testified to the fact, that these men were selected while they were known to be liquor-sellers, and that the aldermen themselves see nothing wrong in it. (8.) In the eighth place, various efforts have been made by the authorities of the city to get the law repealed. (9.) In the ninth place, the city government has never used the seizure clause, which Judge Sanger says is the most efficient instrumentality of the law, and with which there is no difficulty whatever in the execution of the law. Whether the jury agree or disagree, the liquors are held, in which case they are practically confiscated; and if the dealer lays in another stock, that stock may also be seized. (10.) In the tenth place, the city of Boston has rarely appointed an agent according to law, though expressly commanded by the law to do so, for the sale of liquors

for medicinal uses. (11.) In the eleventh place, when appointed, as in one or two instances they have been, it is very well settled that the agents have not conformed to the legal restraints of the law. (12.) In the twelfth place, Boston has never called upon the violators of the law to cease their violations of it. (13.) In the thirteenth place, Boston has never called upon good citizens to aid in executing the law. (14.) In the fourteenth place, when urged to official duty by citizens, the government has reasoned unreasonably against the execution of the law. (15.) In the fifteenth place, the city government of Boston has resisted bills at different times before the legislature, intended to aid in enforcing the law, such as the Jury Bills and the Metropolitan Police Bill. (16.) In the sixteenth place, its police have not generally aided the State Constabulary, though commanded by the law to do so. And the Constable of the Commonwealth reports that, in some instances, they have opposed them, and opposed them even by their testimony for defendants in criminal suits. (17.) In the seventeenth place, the authorities have used office to perpetuate their own occupancy of office, rather than to discharge their official obligations by the execution of the laws. (18.) In the eight