view. Thus, then, has every State, besides its particular interests, also interests which are common to it with other States, whether in their totality or in separate groups. The great axioms of political science are deduced from the knowledge of the true political interests of all States: in these general interests rests the security for their existence, whilst the individual interests,--to which the daily or transitory political movements occasionally lend a great importance, and the promotion of which constitutes political wisdom in the eyes of a restless and shortsighted policy,-possess only a relative and secondary worth.'

It is new to us that there is or ever was a science commonly known by the name of Politics and Diplomacy, nor does it simplify a branch of knowledge which from its very nature is incapable of scientific treatment, to be told that 'the great axioms of political science are deduced from the knowledge of the true political interests of all States.' Then what are these

great axioms? According to the Prince, they are that each State has two interests-its individual or separate interest, and the general interest which it has in common with the great family of States :

'History teaches us that whenever the separate come into conflict with the general interests of a state, and the latter are neglected or mistaken in the zealous and exclusive prosecution of the former, this is to be regarded as an exceptional or unhealthy state of things, whose development or speedy amendment ultimately decides the destiny of the State, that is, its impending decline or its recuperative prosperity.'

In the ancient world, he continues, the separate interest was paramount, the selfish policy prevailed. In the modern, the comity of nations and regard for the general interest are the rule:

The establishment of international relations upon the basis of reciprocity, under the guarantee of respect for acquired rights, and the conscientious observance of plighted faith, constitute, at the present day, the essence of politics, of which diplomacy is only the daily application. Between the two there exists, in my opinion, the same difference as between science and art. Just as men daily transgress the laws of civil society, nations only too often act in opposition to the eternal precepts which govern their connection. The faults of men and the faults of states are subject to the same punishments; their whole difference lies in the gravity of the offence, which is proportionate to the individual importance of the offenders.

When we master these truths, what becomes of the self-seeking policy, of the policy of fantasy or of miserable greed, and especially of that which seeks profit apart from the simplest rules of right; which mocks at the plighted word, and, in short, rests solely on the usurpations of force or craft?'

This doctrine has been familiar enough to speculative politicians at all times, whatever may become of it when it has to be put in practice. Mr. Gladstone reverted to it as of long standing more than once in his recent speeches. Why, then, should Prince Metternich claim a monopoly of it, or set up as the Pharisee statesman on the strength of it :

*

'After this confession of faith, it may be conceived what I have always thought of politicians of the stamp or, if you will, of the value of a Richelieu, a Mazarin, a Talleyrand, a Canning, a Capo d'Istria, or a Haugwitz, and so many more or less famous names. Resolved not to walk in their steps, and despairing of opening a path in harmony with my own conscience, I naturally preferred not to throw myself into those great political affairs, in which I had far more prospect of succumbing materially than of succeeding: I say materially, for I have never been afraid of failing morally. The man of public life has always at command a sure resource against this danger, that is-retirement.'

As he held office for nearly half a century, and did not retire till Vienna was too hot to hold him (in 1848), the inevitable inference is that during the whole time he was conscientiously carrying out his principles, abiding by the broad rules of right and wrong—of justice between man and man, and rigidly subordinating the separate interests of Austria to the general interests of Europe, of mankind. How far he was under a most extraordinary self-delusion, or carried away by a confirmed habit of self-laudation, will appear as we proceed. Let him tell his own story, and it will then be for an impartial posterity to judge whether he uniformly abided by the moral laws which were systematically set aside by the Richelieus, Mazarins, Talleyrands, and Cannings.

He remained at Dresden as ambassador till 1803, when he was transferred to Berlin, where the important duty devolved upon him of persuading Prussia to co-operate with Austria and Russia, instead of waiting to fight Napoleon singlehanded. The fatuity which then ruled the Prussian counsels is well known. It was not till after the victory of Austerlitz that she came into the field to be well-nigh annihilated at Jena, when, Metternich thinks, Napoleon reached the summit

Public policy should be conducted on those principles which constitute virtue in private life. Do not listen to those who set up doctrines which are dangerous to the peace of the world; be sure that no man can rely upon any permanent security for his own rights unless he respects the rights of his neighbours; and no nation can ever be safe in the position it holds among nations, however great and however imposing, unless it recognizes those principles of justice and equality which bind together the nations of the world.'-'Times,' December 10, 1879.

of

of his power. Two months before this battle (October 1806) Metternich, when about to exchange Berlin for Petersburg, had been installed at Paris as ambassador, his appointment to this post having been suggested by Napoleon. As usual he protested his insufficiency, and reluctantly gave way when his imperial master set before him the necessity of accommodating himself to his destiny:

This was, in fact, the beginning of my public life. All that had gone before might have shown the independence of my character. As a man of principles, I could not and I would not bend when it came to the point of defending them. Within a short space of time destiny had placed me face to face with the man who at this epoch ruled the affairs of the world; I felt it my duty and I had the courage never to offer to mere circumstances a sacrifice for which I could not answer to my conscience both as a statesman and as a private individual. This voice of conscience I followed; and I do not think it was a good inspiration of Napoleon's, when his wish called me to functions which enabled me to appreciate his good qualities but also to become acquainted with his defects, which at last led him to ruin and freed Europe from the oppression under which it languished.'

Here he does himself no more than justice. He was undoubtedly a fine observer, gifted with keen insight into character, and he made the best of his opportunities for studying Napoleon, so as to divine with tolerable certainty what his conduct under given circumstances would be. He had need of the utmost circumspection; for Austria, weakened and humiliated by the campaign ending with the Treaty of Presburg (December 1805), was in no condition to risk a renewal of the war, which, on the slightest betrayal of hostile feeling, might be forced upon her. Metternich felt and knew that it must come sooner or later, and his object was to gain time for the empire he represented to gather strength. There were circumstances in his favour of which he adroitly availed himself. There was the war in Spain, which turned out a much more serious drain on Napoleon's military resources than he calculated when he engaged in it. There was also the growing feeling in France against wars of conquest, the exhaustion of the country by the successive calls made upon it, and the longing for repose manifested even by the great dignitaries, military and civil, who wished to enjoy their recently acquired wealth and honours. Napoleon, on the other hand, was convinced that 'glory which advances not, recedes:' that he could only retain the support of the French people by dazzling them, of the army by leading it to fresh victories; and, amidst all his preoccupations, he was fully alive to the Austrian

Austrian preparations which were silently going on, whilst the Austrian ambassador preserved his usual attitude of calmness and unconcern.

His fête day, August 15th, was commonly chosen for the explosions or surprises which his nephew and successor reserved for the first day of the year. On the 15th of August, 1808, after the usual formalities of reception, he advanced towards Metternich, who headed the diplomatic body, and, stopping two feet in front of him, exclaimed in a loud voice and pompous tone: 'Well, Monsieur Ambassador, what does the Emperor, your master, want? Does he intend to call me back to Vienna?' The ambassador, not the least disconcerted, answered calmly with the same elevation of voice :

'I did not alter my tone, and turned aside his worthless arguments with the weapon of irony; from time to time Napoleon appealed to Count Tolstoy as a witness; but when he observed that the Count preserved an unbroken silence, he turned round, breaking off in the midst of a sentence, and strode to the chapel without completing the round of the circle. This scene lasted more than half an hour.'*

As soon as Napoleon left the audience chamber, Metternich was warmly congratulated by his colleagues on having given the Emperor a lesson, and in the course of the evening he was assured by the Foreign Secretary, on the part of his imperial master, that nothing personal was meant, the only object being to come to an understanding on the position. This is the account given in the Memoirs. In a despatch to Count Stadion, August 17, two days after the occurrence, the scene is described as having lasted an hour and a quarter, and as having been begun by Napoleon with an air which did not usually announce the approach of a storm.' It is also stated that 'the Emperor did not raise his voice a single moment: he never quitted the tone and expression of the most astonishing moderation.' Then it must be admitted that the manner ill corresponded with the matter, for (according to this despatch) he angrily threw all the blame of the threatened resumption of hostilities on Austria's eagerness to arm :—

'Do you want to attack any one, or are you afraid of some one? Has any one ever seen such haste? If you had put it at a year, or eighteen months, it would have been nothing; but to order everything to be ready on July 16, as if on that day you were to be attacked!

According to a current version, Napoleon walked up to Metternich, took hold of the collar of his coat, and said: Mais enfin que veut votre empereur?' Il veut,' was the reply, 'que vous respectiez son ambassadeur.'-(Nouvelle Biographie Universelle, art. 'Metternich.')

You

You have by that act given an impulse to the public mind which you will find it very difficult to set at rest?

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'I am frank. You are ruining yourselves, you are ruining me. England can give you money, but not enough; and she gives me none. The States of the Confederation, already very unfortunate, are being ruined; and when all the masculine population of Europe are under arms, (it will be necessary to raise the women! Can this state of things last? It must bring us to war against our will. Are you in agreement with Russia?'

What do you hope for? The division of Europe into Powers of which the strongest should not have more than three or four millions of population, to create a vast empire, to become chief and protector of twenty or thirty small states, such, Metternich thought, was what Napoleon had been aiming at since the Treaty of Presburg. The reduction of Austria to the condition of a dependent State formed an essential part of this project, and if Spain had not lain heavy on his hands, he would hardly have allowed the Austrian preparations to proceed till the chances of the contest had been pretty nearly equalized. On April 3rd, 1809, a few days before war was declared, Metternich writes to Stadion :

Napoleon, by his passionate disposition and by his excessive ambition, has provoked these present complications. He believes in his chances of success; on the other hand, he is not deceived about the nature of the contest in which he engages with us and our real means of resistance. He founds his hope of success on his military genius, on the spirit which animates his generals and soldiers. For the first time he begins an immense contest with inferior resources; he hopes to double these by the excess of mobility. He founds his hope on the slowness of our movements, on the repose that we might take after the first success, on our discouragement and on the annihilation of our moral forces, as well as on the paralysis of our physical forces after the first defeat. The Emperor said lately to some one : "The Austrians are making a devil of a levy; I may have the disadvantage at first: I shall overtake them.'

He turned out right, but he incurred a terrible risk. He sustained a defeat at Essling; and at Wagram the Archduke John might well have played the part of Desaix at Marengo instead of (as things fell out) that of Grouchy at Waterloo. Metternich was with his Emperor at Wagram, and in the grey of the early morning of the second day (July 6th) witnessed with the imperial staff the apparently decisive success of the Austrian right wing. The news that reached them, at one o'clock in the afternoon, of the retreat of the army, came upon them by surprise :

'Without