spirit, and the commanding influence of this tendency, I would mention two facts peculiarly striking in this connection. I do not know, nor have I heard, during my stay at the German Universities, of a Professor of Philosophy at any one of them who taught philosophical Materialism. Again, the most vivid illustration of the complete downfall of the Hegelian Philosophy, as a system, was the weekly scene at Michelet's lecture on Hegel during the Spring Semester of 1874, at the University of Berlin. Nine out of nearly three thousand students attended this course, delivered by the eloquent Michelet, the life-long friend and disciple of Hegel, the most earnest and brilliant advocate and expounder of the Hegelian Philosophy. And this, too, on the very spot where it had its birth, and which was the scene of its domination! Out of the window of the lecture-room I could see across the campus the great bronze bust of Hegel, the single monument within the walls of German reverence to German genius. So much for the attitude of Philosophy toward Science.

On the other hand, Science is recognizing how much it owes to Philosophy; how closely its very existence and progress are bound up with philosophic thought. It is beginning to realize with how many metaphysical notions and hypotheses it is working as with first principles. The atomic and dynamic theories of matter-the one specially serviceable in chemistry, the other singularly adapted to mathematical physics are altogether philosophical. Science is calling to mind that she was bound as a captive in her own chains, until the father of the Inductive Philosophy struck the fetters from her limbs, raised her to her feet, pointed out her path and lofty goal. Philosophy gave to her her method-the wand of her magic power in the material world. Scientists are finding out that they cannot rest in their science. By an irrepressible impulse they go irresistibly beyond it; if not in harmony with the soberer thought of the age, then most surely in a materialistic direction. These results of Natural Science surely have some meaning beyond their being a mere collection of facts, and that meaning scientists are as eager for as philosophers. They must be made the whole or a part of some comprehensive view of the world. That they are not altogether interpreted as if they were all the facts of the world, the position of Helmholtz, in Berlin, the first scientist in Europe, and Du Bois Reymond, whom I have referred to above, and many others, fully confirm. Helmholtz has come out through physiology and mathematical physics, to speculative thought and abstract conclusions; and, strange to say, in his theory of knowledge, and in his metaphysical position, he holds views analogous to those of Kant.

But one of the most striking instances of science, speaking through

one of her leaders, is that of Wundt, the eminent physiologist of Heidelberg. From physiology he went over to psychology, and after many years of profound study of those phenomena in that realm where physiology and psychology meet-the inter-relation of mind and body-he propounds, as a scientist, and not as a philosopher, a theory of Knowledge to which the results of his scientific study bring him. Materialism he rejects, because it is unable to explain psychological experience, and is in conflict with the surest established truths of cognition. It cannot account for the notions of causality, substance, etc., which are of psychological origin. He holds that Idealism is in harmony with all that psychology demands, and remains victorious so long as it is combatting the claims of Materialism. But when it proceeds to interpret Nature, the inflexible reality is ever at war with the subjective conception, and finally the confession is forced from it that the ideas of causality, substance, etc., are themselves only possible through the experience of the objective world. He finally proclaims Realism as his philosophical creed, which seeks to regard and combine all these different sources of Knowledge-granting, however, the priority of the inner experience.

These, then, briefly, are the evidences of a spirit and effort in Germany to reconcile these two antagonistic features of their historical development. That such a reconciliation is the key-note of present, as it will be of future, philosophical movements, there can be no doubt. This recognition of the supplemental factors of Knowledge, the poles of human thought, and complementary substances, will have a most wholesome effect upon future speculation. The spirit that will prevail will be conciliative, and cautious of extremes. There will be a conjoint use of the two great logical methods indisputably established, and equally useful in their respective spheres. Their aims will be more in accord with the limits of the human mind; neither despairing of its powers, nor proclaiming it omniscient or omnipotent. Their goal will be more reasonable and attainable, even if it be not so exalted. Indeed, the leading features of present attained Knowledge and of future thought are of no uncertain nature. Sure it is, that in the last instance the formal laws of our thought have a priori certainty, while, on the other hand, all definite content of our thought is possible only through experience, or judgments founded upon experience. Deduction cannot reach all the real, or be confident that it has compassed the Universe. If such a system as that of Plato, Fichte, or Hegel, were possible, Induction would be necessary to prove that all the real had been included. As a deductive knowledge of the Universe and its a priori construction is impossible, it remains only to go out from that

which Induction has established, and combine the two methods, using Induction for observation and proof of results, and Deduction, in manifold ways, in the derivation of laws and causes. They must be mutually complementary. The method of each real science is compounded out of Induction and Deduction; still, every science is, in its whole tendency, either synthetic or analytic. Both methods are present, but

one is always subordinate to the other.

And finally, philosophy itself must be regarded as a science, scientia scientiarum, a necessary result of the existence and advance of the other sciences, bound intimately with them, and realizing its aim only when working with them and through them; a science necessary for the existence and progress of all other sciences; a science which deals with the common basis and common content of all the sciences, examines the general laws of knowledge and scientific method, and all the notions of whatever kind used in the several fields of science; reduces the real to its ultimate ground, and brings all the realms of knowledge into organic connection and union. In thus uniting the single sciences, it should combine the results of these sciences in a total view of the

universe and its last ground and cause. The methods of philosophy must be those of every other science, Induction and Deduction. If it were possible from one point, in a dialectic way, by the logical development of a notion, to determine the whole possible realm, and the content of the realm, of human knowledge, this would be undoubtedly best for philosophy, because the appropriate place and significance of each part could not be made so readily apparent by any other method, nor could any other method furnish such a clear picture of the connection and relation of all existence. But since such an a priori construction of the Universe is impossible, philosophy, as every other science, must proceed from the inner and outer perceptions, by analyzing, testing, and combining psychological experience, to establish the laws of cognition, the scientific method, and the notions in regard to the essential reality and ground of things. And to this end it must employ both Induction and Deduction.

Moreover, philosophy cannot reach that absolute knowledge, the ideal of which it has so often confounded with the reality. By the very laws and nature of our faculties all human knowledge is necessarily finite, imperfect, and in its quality more or less adulterated. Yet if it is not given to attain immediately the ideal of absolute knowledge, it is most surely given to be ever approaching the same, and, in this ever continuing advance toward perfection, to possess so much as has been possible to the individual in every age and in every land. Still, great as is its possession, greater far is its goal. This is an infinite universe

that we enter with our finite faculties; its problem is endless. There is not only the whole realm of the outer world, and its operations and its laws; there is also the profounder and more mysterious realm of the inner world, with its phenomena and its laws. The existence, relation, and harmony of the outer laws among themselves; the existence, relation, and harmony of the inner laws; and, moreover, the adaptation, interdependence, and harmony of the laws of the inner and outer worlds; these constitute the vast problem. And when we remember that all these laws of nature and of mind which we now know, were for centuries unknown, when man had his present faculties for knowledge, what infinite possibility is opened for future advance? And if it has taken so long to open the way to that world that lies at the very door of our senses, what infinite progress in coming time may there not still be in the knowledge of that inner world of consciousness--the laws and nature of mind? What revelation may there not still be awaiting the eager and devout seeker after truth?

CHURCH UNITY.-If we do not share the enthusiastic hopes of the speedy ecclesiastical unification of all evangelical Christians, so forcibly advocated and predicted in the able article on that subject in this number of the REVIEW, we welcome such a presentation of the grounds of encouragement to these hopes. The recent great unions of disrupted churches are certainly cheering. Besides that of the Reformed and Free Presbyterian Churches of Scotland, elsewhere noticed by us, that lately effected between the Methodist Churches, North and South, is a welcome movement in the same direction. It does not yet go the length of organic union, but gives promise of it in the not distant future. It has been effected on terms of "perfect equality and reciprocity." We have no doubt that fraternal relations will soon be established between Northern and Southern Presbyterians on a like basis. Both Assemblies having reached the point of expressing their construction of their previous votes excepted to on either side, in precisely the same language, the interchange of delegates on this basis cannot long be delayed. While it is, in our judgment, true, that the Northern Assembly has always been ready to enter into fraternal re

lations on such a basis, it does not follow, as some have urged, that no progress has been made since 1870 toward this consummation. Certainly, as discussion has proved that neither side could claim to be immaculate in the matters complained of, the demands which have prevented their coming together have been much abated; and, at all events, both Assemblies have succeeded in making their respective attitudes better understood, and narrowing apparent grounds of difference. Much less does it warrant the inference we have seen made, and held up ad invidiam, that the Northern church continues to affirm the language used in the former Old School and New School Assemblies which offends our Southern brethren. It has simply and clearly from the outset declared the acts containing it "null and void," as respects our present re-united church; thus disclaiming all responsibility for them.

We desire the speedy restoration of fraternal relations, letting bygones be by-gones, because we believe these churches, thus united, might be in many ways helpful to each other; and that neither can say to the other, "I have no need of thee."

Art. XI.-CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE.
THEOLOGY AND RELIGION.

The Preaching of the Cross and other Sermons, by THOMAS J. CRAWFORD, D.D. Wm. Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London. Dr. Crawford, late Professor of Divinity in the University of Edinburgh, was formerly one of the ministers of St. Andrew's church in that city He was a sound and able divine, and is well known in this country by his works on the "Fatherhood of God," the "Mysteries of Christianity," and the "Atonement." He was also an impressive and instructive preacher; clear and forcible in the presentation of his subjects, and earnest in his address. The first sermon in this posthumous collection gives the title and key-note to the volume, in fact, to the preacher's whole system of theology and to his religious life. It is the "Preaching of the Cross," as containing the sum and substance of all religious and saving truth for the human race, so that it cannot be superseded by any scheme of man's devising. For however times may change, there ever is and will be the same sinfulness and the same need of redemption, met and satisfied only by the Cross of Christ. The whole number of sermons here given is nineteen.

Among the