weapons taken away from him, and his posi- ally. He wants to discover "what is" as tion lost. "The original dowry of universal it must be-leaving it to the students of the man," says Mr. Ferrier, "is inadvertency various physical sciences to observe and and error." The principles now universally generalize the contingent phenomena of the received as ultimate, under the name of universe. Existence is studied by him, not common sense, have, he thinks, perplexed in any of its variable manifestations, mateknowledge, rendering it incoherent and con- rial or mental, but only in those which are tradictory. The multitude have therein in- essential, and apart from which it could not advertently worshipped illusions, and the be existence, but absurdity and contradiction. psychologists-those sham metaphysicians, We may, perhaps, be tempted to ask whether have pandered to the vulgar taste, and con- there is any atmosphere of necessary firmed the people in their idolatry. They truth," in which existence, as such, must be have "reconciled" Philosophy with the Faith thus enveloped? The method of constructof common sense, by making it the servant ing knowledge anew, on the foundation of a of absurd prejudices; instead of taking the single abstract proposition rescued as & manlier course of exploding, by the applica- "necessary truth" from the ruins created tion of thorough-going reasoning, traditional by philosophic doubt, has already been sevbeliefs that are really void of consistent eral times tried with indifferent success-as meaning. Metaphysic, in its genuine aspect, Des Cartes, Spinoza, and their recent sucis, he would say, a continual struggle with cessors can prove. But we need not perthe common sense of mankind. Its aim is plex ourselves about this question at the to take the place of common sense. But outset. Let us wait the issue of this fresh Faith, we reply, is the soul of work. We cannot carry on even this work of warring against the original beliefs of mankind, without retaining some of them to give us life and strength. The Theory, indeed, does not wholly overlook this. It tries to retain a part of the common sense, as the basis of its operations, in the war which it declares his predecessors and contemporaries, espeagainst the whole. But we must examine the position which Mr. Ferrier thus reserves for his metaphysician. Perhaps the principle which reserves it may either secure a broader basis, or else hinder any. cially in Scotland, for abandoning the "necessary truths," or for confounding truths that are "necessary," with others void of that distinguished mark. In his hands, at all events, no truth can be admitted into Through "the compulsory reason" alone, Metaphysics that is not either an axiom or we are told, can we conquer for ourselves a a deduction from axioms. All through the deliverance from our original dowry of structure he promises to rear, we are to live inadvertency and error." The "ordinary in an uninterrupted blaze of demonstration, opinions of mankind" are contradictory; like that of Euclid. The work is to be a and Psychology is their proclaimed guarmass of demonstrations," "a chain of clear dian. Metaphysic, as polemical, must ex- demonstration carried through from the first plore Psychology. But it is too modest to word to the last," " one large demonstration make the attempt, unless it can bring a from the beginning to the end." It is not a stronger force than mere "probability" system of mathematics, and does not include against it. It must, therefore, according to that department; but it thus far resembles Mr. Ferrier, be an a priori science. We it, that when we relapse from a rigour of can address ourselves to the problem of reasoning equal to that in pure mathematics, Being, only in what may be called the demonstrative, as distinguished from the observational, state of mind. The necessary part or essence of Being, is what the speculative reformer must define and display scientific we may take this as a sign that we are wandering out of the metaphysical province. It is indeed true that all the vulgar, and the great majority of professed thinkers, have hitherto thus gone astray. But this is not to be wondered at. The real wonder would tually polemical, i. e., meant to correct human reason have been, had the case been different. The as it is, and to bring it nearer to its ideal. Who actual case only illustrates the necessary more clearly illustrates this than our own John Locke, laws of human progress and of the history whose Essay is a polemic against prejudices? His ardour in this cause has produced a bluntness in his of opinion. The deepest truths must come weapon, which has exposed him to the keen-edged last. Men must traverse the surface of speculation of less practical and earnest combatants. knowledge, before they recognise those But the fact that the metaphysician is a polemic axioms which yield trains of demonstration does not determine his mode of warfare; and it is about the essence of Being. Hence, in these here that we separate from Mr. Ferrier. years of" progress," they have created phy-ed. And the "necessity," which is the orsical sciences, while they have hardly made a gan of discovery in Metaphysics, appertains commencement in Metaphysics. But now, to knowledge. It is felt in the act of knowin this modern Theory of our ingenious ing. Reflection must, therefore, in the first countryman, speculation hopes to return to place, be applied to Knowledge. We must the point from which originally she set out, try to find the essence of knowledge-some and to travel thence with a clearer vision element whose presence creates knowledge, and a firmer tread. We may now, at last, while its absence implies a contradiction; breathe, we are told, only the atmosphere and which thus limits knowledge, as such, by of "necessary" truth, from the beginning to the infallible logical law. The first part of the end of our metaphysical enterprise. every system of metaphysics must, therefore, But how are we to know when we are be an EPISTEMOLOGY or theory of knowdoing this? how distinguish that pure air ledge. But is this theory co-extensive with from the denser atmosphere of probability Metaphysics? Knowing is, indeed, a maniand vulgar knowledge? What kind of ne- festation of Being. But, perhaps, it is not cessity is referred to, when it is said, that the only one-and so the definition of Being the truths about Being we are to search for slips through our hands. Our theory of exare only the necessary truths? An illustra- istence as known cannot perhaps be transfertion may convey the reply. That I am writ- red to existence absolutely. Accordingly, ing at this table is not a necessary truth we must try to direct our scientific resources about Being. It is only one among many against the vaunted region of Ignorance. other possible forms or phenomena. I can We must have an AGNOIOLOGY or theory of fancy myself walking in my garden or travel- ignorance, as well as an Epistemology. If ling to the moon. I can, in short, know we are successful in our assaults on knowBeing in innumerable other forms. I can ledge and on ignorance, then at last we have conceive every object to be different from the theory of Being, for that theory must what it is. In all this experienced fluctua- express the essence of Being either as known tion or contingency, I have sufficient proof by us, or as unknown to us. No third asthat, at least, phenomena which may thus be changed at will are not necessary. They may be conceived to be different from what they are. But that a thing is and is not at the same time-that A is not A-is a contradiction in terms. A contradiction cannot possibly be true. No volition, human or divine, can make it true. An invincible necessity forces us to reject a contradiction. Now, if we can find any propositions concerning "what is," which cannot be rejected without a contradiction in terms, these surely are necessary. In them we may find the definition which limits Being. The logical axioms of Identity and Contradiction, as they are technically called, are the most general expressions of that necessity. The opposites of all metaphysical truths must contradict these axioms; they must affirm that Being at once is and is not. Now, can we thus develop Metaphysics from Formal Logic? Are there any truths about existence that are fenced in by this purely logical necessity? If so, in what quarter can we find them? Mr. Ferrier answers these questions by evolving his system, and in an order which he says is, like all else in metaphysics, "necessitated not chosen." What is that order? common sense pect of Being is logically possible. It would Can we then, in following this order, find anything we are obliged to affirm of Being, as such, on pain of contradicting ourselves, i.e., implying that what is said to exist at once is and is not? (If we can, that is Metaphysics.) Let us try to condense Mr. Ferrier's very confident reply, diffused as it is through forty-one demonstrations, which, with their comments, are spread over more than four hundred pages of his Institutes. All KNOWLEDGE must be a relation. It must be a something known. The "something," defined in knowledge, is technically The nature of the necessity explained in called its object; and the "known," by the last paragraph implies the answer. which it is defined, represents the subject, i.e., What is, is at least what is known. Know- the element variously named " ledge thus far contains existence-even "intelligence," &c. Both these elements though the question of the possibility of un- are essential in knowledge; but one of them known existence should remain undetermin-is variable or contingent in its forms, the ego, ""self" old application of these favourite metaphy- much as it may conceal indefinite modificasical terms, "substance," and "absolute," tions of the variable element in knowledge. "phenomenon," and "relative"-at least, if It cannot conceal what is not a modification we are to preserve our traditional respect of known-existence (i.e., of object+subject.) for the two former, and to retain the latter Here, then, we may at last display in in the new system, in a place of inferiority triumph a definition of Being-the want of corresponding to the one they have been which has so long confused human reason. wont to occupy in the old. With this deliv- We cannot, except at the expense of a conerance of the region of Epistemology from tradiction in terms, suppose that Being is its barbarous possessors, and introduction of neither contained in our knowledge nor conorder and intelligence into the language of cealed in our ignorance. Whatever is must the conquered territory, Mr. Ferrier triumph- be either known or not known by us. But antly closes his first campaign. In truth, both what we know and what we are ignothe arduous part of his work was either rant of must be known-existence. There previously accomplished, or it is still before may be various kinds of known-existence, him. but unknown existence is not existence at all, But to proceed. While it is clearer than but only an absurdity or contradiction. the sun at noon that we cannot know what | Whatever is must be an object-known. It flatly contradicts the essence of knowledge, need not, of course, be known by me, nor by may "unknown" existence not still be con- any human intelligence; but it must be the cealed in our IGNORANCE? May it not be object of an intelligence, in order to escape that there is something which transcends contradiction. In short, known-existence is the objects of sense and self-consciousness; the only real existence; and any belief or and also those reached through the inductive proposition which implies the reality of what reasonings for which they supply the mate- is not an object of any intelligence, must be rial? May we not believe, accordingly, virtually a contradictory belief or proposithat what is known by us in sense is (onto- tion. At the best, it conceals a contradiclogically) something more than even the tion in terms. In this conclusion Ontology necessary elements of our knowledge; and triumphs over Philosophy. The "insoluble that what is known by us in self-conscious- problem" of Reason has been solved. Abness is (ontologically) something more than solute Being is measured in a definition even the necessary elements of our transient wrought out by human intelligence, and consciousness? Does it follow, on pain of expressive of a human theory. And, con tradiction, that, because a thing cannot through this conclusion of Reason, a series be known out of the relation of knowledge, of propositions, long venerable in the Faith it may not exist irrespective of knowledge of mankind, seems about to disappear for and definitions? There is proof enough that there may be unknown objects of which we are ignorant. A man born blind is ignorant of colour; and, nevertheless, men not born blind know that colour exists. And we, with our five senses here on earth, may be ignorant of what is revealed to the inhabitant of Saturn, with his fifty senses; while he in turn is perhaps ignorant of the pecu- desire to abate the praise. Only we may liar revelations made through our five. for a moment place the good Bishop's Thus far all is clear. But can intelligence theory beside Mr. Ferrier's, developed as it be ignorant of what is CONTRADICTORY? is with less scholastic formality. We quote Can A is B" find refuge in any region of the following from among many other pas ignorance? An indefinite number of known- sages in Berkeley, relating to the nature of objects, which are not objects in our know- Being:ledge, may find refuge there. But ignorance cannot contain objects which are not objects. "That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor Now, whatever (so-called) object is not a ideas, formed by the imagination, exist without known-object is already demonstrated to be the mind, is what everybody will allow. And it a contradiction. All behind or beyond seems no less evident that the various sensations known-existence most be the contradictory; or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended and we cannot, without absurdity, be said to or combined together, (that is, whatever objects be "ignorant" of that. The sphere of know- mind perceiving them. I think an intuitive knowthey compose,) cannot exist otherwise than in a ledge, and the sphere of ignorance, must ledge may be obtained of this, by any one that thus far coincide. The latter sphere is in- shall attend to what is meant by the term EXIST, deed wider than the former,-but only inas- when applied to sensible things. The table I ever. The germ of this curious Theory may be found in the works of an author of popular celebrity in British literature. The system of Bishop Berkeley at any rate resembles the new doctrine, and Berkeley alone, of all British metaphysicians, receives Mr. Ferrier's enthusiastic praise. Nor have we any write on, Ι say, exists, i.e., I see and feel it; and sentence of extermination on unknown matif I were out of my study I should say it existed, ter, very different thing from Mr. Fermeaning thereby, that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit acturien ontological sentence of extermination ally does perceive it. There was an odour, i.e., on whatever is not known as an object in it was smelled; there wa was a sound, i.e., it was relation to a subject. heard; a colour or figure, ie., it was perceived by sight or touch. That is all that I can understand by these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthink Must mankind henceforward join Mr. Ferrier in this sentence, if they are to preserve the dignity of rational beings? ing things, without any relation to their being an absolute or ontological truth, the psychoOnly when they are ready to accept, as perceived, (known,) that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is percipi, nor is it possible they logical necessity on which the theory rests. should have any existence out of the minds of If we may assume, without proof, and withthinking beings which perceive them. It is, in- out explaining the facts which seem to forbid deed, an opinion strangely prevailing amongst the assumption, that the essence of our knowmen, that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a ledge is absolute-complete-perfect, then word, all sensible objects have an existence, natu- no extraordinary strength of reasoning is reral or real, distinct from their being perceived by quired to reach Mr. Ferrier's conclusion,the understanding. But with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may that there cannot be " an unknown," i. e., an be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find object divorced from a subject, or a subject in his heart to call it in question, may, if I mistake divorced from an object. But the Theory not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradic- must presume that it is already on ontoloSome truths there are so near gical ground in its very first proposition, if and obvious to the mind, that a man need only it is really on that hitherto inaccessible terriopen his eyes to see them. Such I take this im- tory in its last. Now, what if we allege that portant one to be, viz., that all the choir of heaven, the real difficulty it has to meet is the diffi and furniture of the earth,-in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the culty of defending the absolute meaning, world, have not any subsistence without a mind, which the first proposition in the Epistemothat their Being is to be perceived or known. To logy requires to have, in order that it may be convinced of which, the reader need only reflect carry the conclusion contained in the tenth and try to separate in his own thoughts the being demonstration of the Ontology? The Theof a sensible thing, from its being perceived. ory rests on a single necessary truth. In tion. From what has been said, it follows that there is not any other substance than spirit, or that which perceives."-Principles of Human Knowledge, iii.-vii, this respect it resembles the systems of Des Cartes and Spinoza. These speculative systems are blind to all that is not expressed or implied in their favourite axioms; and they Berkeley's theory differs from Mr. Fer- are thus enabled to boast of their "demonrier's, in being, at least, more cautiously strative" character. The method used by vague. He does not define known existence theorists of this class tempts them to turn as Mr. Ferrier does-in distinguishing its the blind eye to all beyond the narrow founnecessary and invariable element from its dation on which alone the demonstration contingent and variable one. He says that can be made to stand. This Theory has matter must be known. But he does not taken no precautions against such tempta define the knowledge. His theory, accord- tion. Perhaps there are other truths, equally ingly, is only indefinitely, if at all, an onto- necessary and axiomatic, which we cannot logical one. Berkeley absorbs the material reconcile with the selected one. Are we, for world in knowledge. These Institutes ab- instance, obliged to believe propositions sorb Absolute Being in a definite kind of whose meaning, taken collectively, cannot knowledge, thereby excluding from belief be known or conceived as an "object" at every proposition which cannot be reconciled all? Does not our knowledge, even in its with that definition. Berkeley, trained in necessary or essential elements, thus bear an earlier school, evades a demonstrative Ontology. Mr. Ferrier, carried with a later generation on the strong tide of German speculation, has developed the Psycho- Mr. Ferrier, in his horror of Psychology, logy of Berkeley into a kind of Scottish has not encountered these questions. In a Hegelianism. The theory of Berkeley may book which proclaims itself the "Institutes" be criticised as a theory of human reason in of Metaphysic, the reader is astonished to its relation to the material world; this find no direct allusion to the phenomena in Theory of Knowing and Being must be our knowledge which alone, we may almost criticised with reference to its boasted defi- say, have raised metaphysical curiosity; and nition of absolute existence. The Idealism of which have hitherto foiled every attempt to Berkeley, regarded only as a psychological resolve Existence into the only kind of know upon it the marks of imperfection, and explode in a series of contradictions when it is dogmatically assumed to be absolute? |