contain, according to Mr. Ferrier, both the The Theory of these Institutes, when transone necessary element, and also one contin- lated out of Ontology into Psychology, is a gent element. In the second place, Locke lucid and interesting exposition of one of the carefully guards against the assumption "necessary truths" of human intelligence. which is the boast of the Institutes. He It is a general recognition and partial applidoes not take for granted that our intellect-cation of the essential relation in our knowual world-our world of ideas or cognitions ledge-that in which, as Pascal says, "we -contains any perfect or absolute element strike a tincture of our own compound being at all. He says, indeed, that our knowledge on all the objects we contemplate"-a relais limited to our ideas; but he does not tion which seems inevitable in all finite infer from this that Substance* is nonsens- knowledge. But there are other relations, ical, and Matter a contradiction. Locke not less implied in finite intelligence than the does not pretend to fathom the ocean of law of knowledge as objective, of which Being; he only endeavours to measure the it takes no account;-and, therefore, even length of our intellectual line. viewed as a system of Psychology, it is which defective. The axiom of the Theory, includes more than enough when it is represented as only a form of non-contradiction, includes less than enough when it is regarded as an expression of all the elements that are necessary, in our finite knowledge. When interpreted as a logical system it errs by excess; when it is read as a theory of psychology it errs through defect.

But if Mr. Ferrier is the first to draw the inference which Locke has not drawn, he neither is, nor professes to be, the first who has discovered the two elements essential to human knowledge. The Essay of Locke has long been modified, or rather supplemented, by the Critick of Kant; and the supplement develops the theory of knowledge which the earlier system had failed fully to unfold. Amid all his scholastic pedantry, which conceals from the unscientific reader the virtues of his system, Kant has ably interpreted certain hieroglypics in our knowledge that had previously been imperfectly understood. No sound speculative system can now overlook the elements which he has compared and contrasted as "formal" and "material"-" necessary" and "contingent"-a priori and a posteriori, &c. They give a common basis and limit to the indefinite varieties in the experience of individuals. They help to amend that comprehensive formula, which describes human knowledge in its most comprehensive aspect, and the gradual amendment of which is the best scientific reward of metaphysical labour. But Kant does not profess to imply a definition of Absolute Being in his contribution to the definition of knowledge. He expressly excludes from his theory all knowledge except our own.

Take a single illustration. We cannot, according to the Theory, strip existence of "knowing," and yet continue to know it. To us it must, as an object, be always known existence, i. e., our knowledge. But if it is true that we cannot divorce an object from the subject, it is equally true that we cannot divorce cognitions from one another, or, at least, that we are inevitably dissatisfied with any isolated cognition. A finite intelligence cannot know without converting Being into an object-his knowledge; but a finite intelligence can as little detach a present known-existence from the mystery of Eternal existence. It seems as impossible to deny that something has always been, if something now is, as it is to deny that an object must be known in order to be an object at all. We find the knowledge of an absolute "object" as impracticable as the knowledge of existence out of relation to a subject. At least, if Mr. Ferrier has repThus while, with Locke and Kant, the resented the latter impossibility as a logical chief modern systems of Psychology contain contradiction, other metaphysicians have the new theory expressly or by implication, done the same by the former. The basis the Kantian system formally develops that of Dr. Clarke's "Demonstration," for exanalysis of knowledge, which Mr. Ferrier ample, involves the asumption, that to has been the first to apply also to absolute separate a present "object" (i. e., subject existence. The fact may abate the discou-+ object) from Eternal existence is a conragement that is apt to rise, when the tradiction in terms:metaphysical labours of the past are contemplated in the lurid light which Mr. Ferrier is apt to throw upon them.

* For Locke's somewhat vacillating theory of Being or Substance, the reader may refer to his Letters to the Bishop of Worcester, contained in his Collected Works, Vol. IV. See also the Bishop's Answer, (London, 1697.)

"It is absolutely and undeniably certain," he

*We of course here use the term object according to the definition in the Theory, . e., subject object.

An "assumption" open to objections partly similar to those already referred to, in connexion with Mr. Ferrier's identification of his fundamental "necessary truth" with the logical law of contradiction.

says, "that something has existed from all eterni-psychologists are said to have sinned most ty. This is so evident and undeniable a proposi- grievously. They assert, it is said, that tion, that no Atheist in any age has ever presumed Matter, or, at least, some of its qualities, to assert the contrary; and, therefore, there is little need of being particular in the proof of it. may be known per se, i. e., out of relation to For, since something now is, 'tis manifest that any intelligence. "Natural thinking," says something always was. Otherwise the things that Mr. Ferrier, "advocates our knowledge of now are, must have risen out of nothing, abso- material things per se, and psychology, if it lutely and without cause which is a flat contra- abandons this position, contends at any rate diction in terms. Whatever exists has for our knowledge of certain material quali a cause of its existence, either in the necessity of ties per se." its own nature, and then it must have been of itself eternal; or, in the will of some other Being, and then that other Being must at least in the order of nature and causality, have existed before it. That something, therefore, has really existed from eternity is one of the certainest and most evident truths in the world."-(Demonstration, pp. 14, 15.)

Now let us turn to the expressed opinions of Dr. Reid and his associates:

"What is body?" asks Dr. Reid. "It is, say philosophers, that which is extended, solid, and divisible. Says the querist, I do not ask what the properties of body are, but what is the thing itself; let me first know directly what body is, and then consider its properties. To this demand I am afraid the querist will meet with no is not direct, but relative to its qualities. We know satisfactory answer; because our notion of body that it is something extended, solid, and divisible, but we know no more. Again, if it should be asked, What is mind? It is that which thinks. I ask not what it does, or what its operations are, To this I can find no answer; but what it is. our notion of mind being not direct, but relative to its qualities."* to its operations, as our notion of body is relative

In a word, the "necessary truth" of causality, like the "necessary truth" of objective knowledge, becomes, in the last analysis of it, unintelligible. And besides these two, there are several other truths, equally necessary in finite knowledge, and equally mysterious, which these Institutes neither describe nor explain.* They thus virtually omit one of the two phases of human Reason. They analyze Reason as Intelligence, while they overlook Reason in Faithstruggling as it there is with the imperfect In short, matter is known by us only and apparently contradictory beliefs which through the relations which it bears in our alone illustrate our Ignorance philosophic- knowledge, i. e., its qualities. And mind, ally, and which have taught wise men from too, is only known to us through its relaage to age that what is must transcend what tions in experience, i. e., its operations or is known to be-that, in short, no finite in-states. In other words, the "qualities" of telligence can escape from the cave of matter, and the "operations" of mind are Plato.

dependent on being known; and we cannot But where, we must ask in conclusion, tell what either matter or mind are, except has Mr. Ferrier found the illogical theory as thus contained in knowledge. Nevertheof knowledge and existence, which he draws less, we believe in the mysterious independ up alongside his own, in the "counter pro- ence, both of that which is known as expositions" of these Institutes? His own tended, and of that which is known as opetheory is offered as a development of rating an independence of the perception Logic; the system presented in psycholo- in the former case, and of self-consciousness gical books is, it seems, a development of in the latter. We cannot accept the mere Anti-logic. It is replete with contradictions. knowledge as also the absolute existence. But we are not conducted by any notes of It may, perhaps, be said that as unknown reference to the concrete counterparts of -we cannot decide that the unknown exthis contradictory system. We have no tended substance, and the unknown subclew to the works in our philosophical libra- stance which feels and wills are mutually ries which illustrate or vindicate the charges. independent, and that thus mind and matter They are, it is true, pointed. especially at may be absolutely the same. But as Mr. our Scotch philosophers, who are singled Stewart remarks, this is "only an hypotheout as the chief culprits. We cannot, of sis, which amounts to nothing more than a course, in this brief review, compare each mere possibility," and even if it were true, counter proposition with the literature of "it would no more be proper to say of philosophy, nor even with the Scotch de- mind, that it is material, than to say of partment of that literature, in order to test body that it is spiritual." + the representation. But let us take as a specimen that article in which Scottish

*An approach to some of the truths in question is perhaps made in the "Observations" on the last Proposition in the "Institutes."

* Essays on the Active Powers of Man, I. ch. 1.— See also Essays on the Intellectual Powers, II. ch. 17, 19, &c.

Elements, Vol. I. p. 48, (Sir William Hamilton's

Edition.)

It is true, that our Scottish psychologists and to the common sense of mankind Berkelay stress upon the distinction between the ley did appeal not less confidently, and perPrimary and the Secondary qualities of haps more logically, than Reid. Natural matter; and Dr. Reid even says, that we Realism and Absolute Idealism are the only have a direct knowledge of the former, and systems worthy of a philosopher; for as only a relative knowledge of the latter. they alone have any foundation in consciousHence a verbal ambiguity. When we ex-ness, so they alone have any consistency in amine the statement more closely, we find themselves."* We unite with Idealism in the meaning to be that some qualities of regarding states of mind and qualities of matter, i. e., the Primary, are known as di- matter as alike immediately known, in the rectly as the operations or states of our own fundamental relation which constitutes finite minds are known, whereas others, i. e., the knowledge. But we recede from Idealism Secondary, are known only through the me- when, with Mr. Ferrier, it becomes ontolodium of a species of mental states, viz., of gical, and, in its oversight of the imperfect our sensations. Reid seems to refer, in knowledge of Faith, fails to analyze the short, not to the original relation which con- philosophic ignorance which is implied in a stitutes knowledge as knowledge, but to the finite intelligence both of mind and matter. secondary relations through which know- The attempt to confine the universe to the ledge is increased. We know the qualities limits that are necessary in human knowof matter, partly through their relation to ledge, reacts on that knowledge itself, and, certain mental states, and partly immedi- by involving them in contradiction, paraately in the direct relation of consciousness. lyzes the mysterious beliefs which are its In this sense we may be said to be con- life. scious of objects" as extended, as we are "conscious" of mental feelings that are not extended. But, out of knowledge (i. e., out of consciousness) both are alike unknown, -unless we apply the term knowledge to the Faith, that neither existence known as extended, nor existence known as sensation, volition, &c., is absolute Being.

Self-consciousness and world-consciousness are two co-ordinate phases of our re lative knowledge. They constitute its starting-points. But the knowledge to which they are the starting-points is not self-contained. The one phase seems to be ultimately lost in the mystery of personal identity, and the other in the mystery of parts infiHere the philosophy of Scotland may nitely divisible. Both phases, in these and seem to embrace the philosophy of Berke- other forms, sink beneath the horizon of ley. We are alike conscious of the extend- our knowledge in clouds of mystery. The ed world of matter, and of our own feelings. ultimate propositions regarding Mind and We live in our perceptions of matter, as Matter are only imperfectly intelligible, and we live in our mental states. But, apart thus, though seemingly contradictory, canfrom the perceptions and the mental states, not be known to contradict one another. we are ignorant of the Existence revealed Perception and self-consciousness are both, in these opposite forms. Being-as known so to speak, charged with the Faith that such in perception, is the antithesis of Being-as knowledge is not absolute Being, and canknown in self-consciousness. But of their not yield materials for an Ontology-that transcendent relations we can say nothing all our descriptions and definitions of the absolutely, and are ready to believe anything mental and material systems must be rela that is sufficiently attested in consciousness, tive to our knowledge of these systemsand that is not known to be contradictory. that neither mind nor matter can be perThis affinity between Scottish "Realism" fectly known until God is perfectly known. and the Idealism which is commonly count- An exhaustive or absolute knowledge can ed its opposite, has not escaped the notice alone either reconcile or else conclusively of the philosopher who has modified and de- expel the beliefs, irreconcilable by us, which veloped the principles of Reid with the are lodged in the heart of every human most signal success. "The general approxi- cognition. The fundamental Faith that mation of thorough-going Realism, and contains them, and to which all propositions thorough-going Idealism," says Sir William not known to be contradictory are possible, Hamilton, "may at first sight be startling. is the only real antagonist Mr. Ferrier has On reflection, however, their radical affinity to meet when he goes in quest of a definiwill prove well founded. Both build upon tion of Being. He may therefore overlook the same fundamental fact that the extend- the antagonists he has conjured up, in the ed object immediately perceived is indenti- counter-propositions and counter-demonstracal with the extended object actually exist- tions of the contradictory system which he ing. For the truth of this fact both can appeal to the common sense of mankind;

*Hamilton's Collected Works of Reid, p. 817.

Despotism inseparable from the Mahometan faith Ireland, religious state of, in the beginning of the

In a portion of the edition the first thirty-two pages were inadvertently numbered 815-346, instead of 1-33. In referring
to these pages both the correct and incorrect paging have been used; the former being represented by the numbers placed in
parentheses, and the latter being distinguished by an asterisk from similar paging at the end of the volume.