ર. Véron's objects in publishing his Memoirs is, The relationship of M. Véron to M. Thiers into what intricate details it descends, and let it be in his duties or his pleasures, how unavoidable for a Frenchman are those gigantic leading-strings whence he never escapes from his cradle to his grave. It may sometimes have the effect of ennobling certain institutions, as, for example, it may give a degree of pomposity to a Sociétaire du Théâtre Français whereof the actors of other boards and other countries remain ignorant; it may transform the dancer of the corps de ballet at the grand opera into a sort of public functionary; it may also contribute to the vainglorious delight of a Parisian to reflect as he sits in his box or stall, that the Elsslers, Taglionis, Ceritos, or Carlotta Grisis of his day are not independent of the grave politicians, whose task it is to govern France, to make peace or war, vote loans and subsidies, and, if necessary, even to lead a revolution to victory, and become themselves the executive power, the sovereigns of the land. If M. Véron's six volumes help to confirm us in our idea of the injustice of the charges of pecuniary corruption, idly brought against Louis Philippe at one time, and (we are pleased to observe) quite obsolete now, there are in them some curious chapters substantiating in full, and perhaps more *A portion of our readers will perhaps remember less to say that public opinion did not hesitate an the sensation produced last winter throughout the instant as to the degree of credence to be awarded European press, by an incident connected with the to the two opponents, but decided in favour of the Memoirs of the Bourgeois de Paris. When the sixth exiled General's statement. Still the affair was a and last volume appeared, a page and a half was re- strange one, and only explicable for those who know peated and commented on by nearly every paper in it in its real bearings, which are these:-Very long France, for in this page and a half was an anecdote, before the coup d'état of December, the President of of which the following is the substance: "M. Thiers, the Republic sent for M. Thiers, and without revealM. de Morny, and General Changarnier being to-ing to him the minute details of his scheme, sounded gether one day, at the house of M. Thiers, a coup him upon it, giving Louis Philippe's ex-minister the d'état was proposed, whereby the Deputies Cavaig-opportunity of protesting so decidedly against any nac, Lamoricière, and Charras were to be arrested thing of the kind, that when he left the Elysée he and imprisoned. Thiers, (according to M. Véron) was marked in the President's mind as one of the declared for the arrest of Lamoricière, Changarnier men upon whom he must not count. M. Thiers, on for Cavaignac, and De Morny for that of all three. the other hand, was so exceedingly impressed with The argument based upon this story by the author what had passed, that on his return home he wrote is one which it is easy to foresee, it is this: 'Louis down (which is his habit only on very remarkable Napoleon, by his coup d'état of the 2d December occasions) the whole conversation from first to last. 1851, merely put into execution what those who so This he communicated the next morning to only one bitterly, abuse him for it had over and over planned person, and in this person's hands, if we are rightly against other persons themselves,' and as one posi-informed, is still lying the written proof of M. tive proof the preceding anecdote is given. At the first moment a great sensation was really produced, but then came a flat denial in all the papers, signed by M. Thiers. To this, M. Véron replies by a note to M. de Morny, asking the latter, if he did or did not certify to him the exact truth of the conversation between himself, Messrs. Thiers, and Changarnier ?ing: The story of Thiers and Chaugarnier (who then M. de Morny tells the story over again, confirm was added to it for the sake of greater effect) was ing the truth of all M. Véron had said. Next comes told to M. de Morny by a person whose word he was a second letter from M. Thiers, flatly denying M. de not at liberty to doubt, but who wished to avoid Morny's statement; and this is followed by a short being an actor in the comedy where he put his own note from Brussels, signed Changarnier, opposing the words into his adversaries' mouths; for this reason M. most unequivocal denial in the plainest terms to de Morny took upon himself the office of listener to a what had been related, and saying, 'I attest the scene at which in fact he had never been present, entire truth of the assertions of the honourable M. and when the real truth came out, he was hand. Thiers, and formally give the lie to the two person- tied and tongue-tied, and forced to accept the unages, inventors of the calumny.' It would be need-qualified démenti of General Changarnier. Thiers' indignation at the overtures made to him. But then how explain the interference of M. de Morny in a matter in which he had in no way been mixed up? This is difficult, and the solution of the mystery most generally accepted by the public mind, but for which we do not vouch, is the follow categorically than has yet been done anywhere else, the thievish rapacity of what was long (under the influence of fear) termed the "sublime people" of the revolution' of February. Never was reputation less deserved than that which the émeutiers of perhaps the most incomprehensible catastrophe chronicled in history attributed to themselves for honesty. We will follow the details given by M. Méron, and confirmed by M. Montalivet, upon the pillaging of the various royal residences. Close upon £100,000 sterling. We now come to the work of pillage and destruction carried on in the royal cellars, and this is far from being the least curious part of the whole. Value of wine pillaged in the different cellars,― Tuileries, Total, Francs. 7,300 18,541 220,500 80,080 326,421 "Everything of any intrinsic value was stolen," observes M. Véron, and he adds a curious remark as a further proof of this assertion. At the Palais Royal and at Neuilly, the pictures and books which were too voluminous to be carried away, were cut up, torn or burnt in the most savage manner, as also large glasses broken, and pieces of furniture (the larger ones especially) destroyed. This the heroes of February themselves did not deny. They said it was the consequence of their patriotic indignation at finding themWe believe that to this day may be found selves face to face with the "accumulated "respectable tradesmen" in Paris, a part of riches" of the “dishonest tyrant" they had whose gains are based upon the sale of these swpt away from the soil of France. One thing, however, struck the persons who had has been little or nothing. If we recapitu wines, the " cost price" whereof to them to verify the losses sustained by the royal late the losses sustained by the Royal Famfamily, namely, that the destructive rage in-ily, whether from absolute thievery or the spired by "honest indignation" found vent Vandal fury of the mob, we shall not be a exclusively in those parts of the royal resi- little surprised at the amount. dences where nothing could be laid hands on and carried off. Where portable treasures of any kind were to be found, pictures, furniture, glasses, and precious volumes were left untouched; and the presence of plate, jewels, money, or any other easily transportable article of value was invariably recognised to have served as a conductor to the lightning of popular wrath, and to have saved mere works of art from destruction. Take as an example the medal-room of the Palais Royal,-everything of any price was stolen. In the sack of the Palais Royal and Neuilly, between the libraries and medal rooms alone, things amounting in value to upwards of 85,000 francs were stolen and destroyed; and the commission named by the Republic itself in 1850, was forced to admit, that in the "private" furniture of Louis Philippe at the Tuileries, (in that not belonging to the Crown,) a loss had been sustained by the privy purse of 203,000 francs. This was at the Tuileries, where only a part of the furniture belonged to the domaine privé, the rest being Crown property. But at the Palais Royal, at Neuilly, and at the little summer palace of the Raincy the whole was the exclusive property of the Orleans family, Edifices destroyed or degraded, Libraries destroyed or stolen, Franca 3,065,246 768,780 85,100 2,460,750 Carriages burnt, 231,757 Wine stolen and thrown away, and 326,421 About seven millions of francs! a value of nearly £300,000 sterling! in which are not counted the private losses (entirely ascriba ble to pillage alone) of the queen and princesses in dress, linen, jewels, and money, nor those of the same nature suffered by the occupants of the Hotel de Ville and of the different ministries. It is impossible to touch upon the last extraordinary scene of Louis Philippe's career as a sovereign, without being led into considerations which bear upon what preceded and what has followed his reign. You can as little separate the eighteen years of the Orleans' dynassty from the faults of Charles X., as you can prevent the despotic rule of Louis Napoleon from justifying (in Frenchmen's eyes) and holding up to regret the firmness and sincere constitutionalism of the first ten years of the Restoration. The three epochs are inextricably linked together, and you cannot take any one of them and study it in itself; it is nothing alone, but is the product or producer of the others, and in conjunction with them only has a meaning, sive ordonnances de Juillet, if they had felt themselves backed by a power strong enough' to support them in so doing. The mere love of freedom, therefore, in France, is by no means to be compared to the corresponding feeling with us, nor was the revolt caused by its violation in 1830 at all the unanimous movement we in England have supposed. When we, in England, reflect on Louis Philippe's reign, we are apt to do so from an English point of view; so we do when Again, as to the government inaugurated we think of the old Bourbon rule; and so in July. We saw two houses of Parlia also when we attempt to analyze the weak-ment and a king, and we thought a constiness or strength of the present government. Thus it is that we are so often taken aback by what passes in France, and are so perpetually obliged to declare that the French are to us an incomprehensible people. But so is every people, unless judged from its own point of view. We are not going to attempt the absurd and thankless task of explaining dogmatically why the French nation has for the last forty years done so many things which to us appear incoherent, to lay down one principle or one theory to which all that has occurred in France for half a century may be referred. We merely propose to touch here and there on a few points which are as it were connecting links in the national character, and which take off in some degree the aspect of incoherency we have alluded to. repu Viewing the French from the solid heights of our own freedom, from the eminence of Our "British Constitution," and the victories of 1688, we thought nothing in the world so easy to understand as the Revolution of July 1830. We believed it to be the reasonable resistance of a whole nation, anxious for and worthy of political liberty to an order of things which, to our minds, seemed insupportable. We believed, first, that the whole country was unanimous in its diation of the Bourbon rule, and next, that the liberal element newly promoted to power contained the amount of statesmanship needed for the solid establishment of any political constitution or system, whatever its name. We were mistaken in both respects; and were Louis Philippe alive now, we suspect that no one would corroborate our assertion more entirely than he. The "whole country" was not only far from condemning the measures which deprived Charles X. of his crown, but, on the contrary, was partly composed of men who highly approved them, and who manifested as much on the 2d December 1851. All those who adhered to the coup d'etat, and to Napoleon's policy of compression, were not mere cringing slaves, or cowards, or men void of principle or honour; but all of them were men who would have approved of the far less oppres tutional monarchy was formed in France. Here lay another great mistake. When the 24th of February threw down the existing order of things, the general outery was,"How wonderful that so well established an edifice should crumble to pieces in an hour!" No well established edifice does fall into ruins at a touch. The July monarchy was, in fact, not established at all. In February 1848, all was as much in the imperfect progress of development as in August 1830. "The monarchy of July had no consecration, no right. It was a government of circumstance, compelled to live by expedients alone. The men chosen, the measures adopted, the tendencies declared, the doctrines proclaimed, all were but momentary expedients to meet the embarrassments and necessities of the hour; everywhere was some remedy sought for against the dangers of party spirit. The memory of the Empire was evoked to throw into shade republican ideas and the hopes of the Legitimists; Bonapartism was the expedient against these two. An emeute even Thiers' parliamentarism. was sometimes hailed as as expedient against M. It was living from hand to mouth; and more thar once Louis Philippe, discouraged, would sadly gainsay M. Guizot's fine predictions of the future, saying, No! no! you and I are using in vain, you, your courage and eloquence, I, my perseverance and experience of men and things; we shall never found anything in France, and a day will come when my children may want for bread.'"* book, because it is he, a bourgeois de Paris, We quote this passage from M. Véron's imbued with all the prejudices of his order, who admits these truths. We could, of course, have found the same opinion upon the monarchy of July a hundred times over in M. Néttement's volumes; but we are bound to say it is more cautiously and more gently expressed by the Royalist writer than by the man who represents the juste milieu, and whom, because he does represent it, we quote. We are accustomed to fancy in England, that the hardest time for the head of the House of Orleans was that which imme * Mémoires d'un Bourgeois, de Paris, vol. iv. pp. 42, 43, Philippe's Government, denominated "rep resentative;" was wholly false to its pretended principle, for the very reason that it rep resented nothing at all. The crown was actively and intensely individualised instead of being an abstraction; the deputies did not represent the mass of the people, but merely their own interests. The peers did not, represent the higher classes, whether in wealth, splendour, or talent; the aristocracy, natural or constituted, without which (in its proper sense of the best) no nation is great, represented nothing, scarcely even them selves. The governing elements failed in the hands of the Orleans dynasty, there was not the material to form a prosperous con stitutional monarchy. No "solid edifice" fell to the ground in February 1848, no house was overthrown from cellar to roofno house was in reality ever built. diately followed his accession to the throne'; and that the period of his reign where he most tended towards a consolidation of his power was that which h intervened between the marriage of the Duc d'Orleans in 1838, and the Revolution of 1848. The very reverse is the truth. Whilst, between the years 1830 and 1839, Louis Philippe had in a manner to fight for his throne, his throne was more or less identified with the notions of peace and stability conceived by the greater portion of the French people; every emeute brought him adherents, and so long as the country was agitated his dynasty was tolerably safe. The real difficulties of Louis Philippe began on the day when open-handed resistance to him ceased. From 1839 to 1848, the weakness, the hollowness, the falseness of the whole system became more and more visible; and during those nine years, under an outward aspect of ever increasing A very curious lesson might be learned prosperity, the country was gradually de- by those who live out of France, if they taching itself more and more from its Gov- were to study appreciation by Louis ernment. Nothing real lived or breathed Philippe himself of the events of February of under the mask of Constitutionalism in and of July. We in England fancy we dis France. The peers were not a third power cover in the Duke of Orleans a truly con in the realm; they had no action, no in- stitutional prince, a man who, from the sad fluence, either to guard the rights of the examples of the last half century, had crown against the encroachments of the peo- learned to cast off the faults and follies of ple, or the rights of the people against the his race, and who, because he partook in ambition of the crown. The commons nothing of these family follies and faults, were, with few exceptions, lazy, ignorant, was fit to be the sovereign of a free and incorrupt, noisy, and timid, incapable of the telligent people. In reality the very contransaction of business, and most of all trary was in more than one sense the case. careless of the freedom to which we, with Louis Philippe was every inch of him a our British notions, believed them devoted. Bourbon, was prouder of being so than we The Crown was placed in the most fatal po- can conceive, and only did not feel himself sition of all; for, recognising the insuffi- easily and securely a king, because he felt ciency of the other two powers, it could it himself so narrowmindedly, if you will, but self be nothing but by a double usurpation. so intensely a Bourbon. Had the Duc de That Louis Philippe should be a king at all Bordeaux died, the whole position and atti was, as we know, a grave offence in the eyes tude of Louis Philippe would have been of a very large portion (and a more influen- suddenly changed, and he would have gained tial portion than we fancy) of the nation; a strength in his own mind and conscience and, on the other hand, that he should act as a quite inexplicable to us, but which if we king, that he should interfere in the work of will not admit, we must perpetually misun Government, was declared by those who derstand the man. He was, in his own called him to the head of that Government, to private appreciation, sovereign of France, be an outrage on the country, a usurpation because a Bourbon, and to render this soveof the nation's prerogative.* In fact, Louis reignty secure too much was wanting. *In 1832, M. de Montalivet, in his Report upon the question of the Liste Civile, had the misfortune to speak of the king's "subjects." Never was such a tumult witnessed, and the result was a protest, signed by 64 Deputies, against the possible idea, that any man in France could be the "subject" of another! The close of the séance, however, was remarkable, as being so essentially French. The Minister of Justice, M. Barthe, got up and asked permission to read a petition from the Municipal Council of Paris to the King, signed by names as little tainted by royalism, as "pure" as those of Mauguin, Schonen, Andry de Puyraveau, &c. He read it, and at d fentire. The proof how all-important is some sup- the prophet's own apprehensions or desires. posed rightful claim to any one who seeks We will, therefore, simply enumerate a few to rule over the French nation, is evident of the causes of the present Emperor's in the conduet of Louis Napoleon also. Two weakness and strength. Strength in a gov, species of right are admitted, the historical ernment, as in an individual, is of two or traditional, and the elective. Of the kinds, physical and moral. The former, first, the Count de Chambord remains pos- Louis Napoleon wields as yet whole and sessed; but of the second, the present The compression exercised by peror of the French declares himself the myriads of policemen, gendarmes, sergeants representative. We might think in Eng-de ville, and minor functionaries of all kinds, land that if by the workings of universal all acknowledging the action of the army suffrage eight millions of men really did against the people as its ultima ratio, this elect Louis Napoleon for their Emperor, force is formidable and unimpaired. But that was right enough in all conscience; Napoleon III. has also two sources of moral but such does not seem to be his opinion, strength. One consists in the hereditary, for he styles himself Napoleon III., legitimate successor to his uncle and cousin, and Emperor in virtue of hereditary right; le droit héréditaire! that which Louis Philippe had not and would have given anything to possess. right he invokes, and which many people are glad to admit, in order to escape from the charge of supporting a revolutionary government; the other lies in the difficulty of deciding what political form or system would be better calculated to endure than the present, and in the mutual hatred Revolutionists and Royalists, who, rather than see their rivals attain to power, would put up with any other mezzo termine. N From this point of view the death of the Duc d'Orleans was a severer blow than has been supposed out of France. This prince, to whom royalty would have come transmitted, was already one remove from usurp A third cause of moral strength might ation and the insecure tenure of a merely have existed for Louis Napoleon-success personal power, and one move nearer to in uniting the nation cordially with himself. the possible assumption of a right of which but as yet this is wanting. He has commit he had begun to talk, and in which he be- ted the fault of attempting to conciliate two lieved. He was the strength and hope of incompatible principles. He has felt him the men of July; and when he was gone self condemned to be absolute-and he has they one and all felt the precariousness of a tried to be popular. Herein he has failed. monarchy which would have to struggle Every important measure he has proposed through the dislocation of its forces conse- has had for its aim to ingratiate himself quent on the death of its original founder, with the lower classes, to whom he has perand the weakening anxieties of a long min-petually promised what neither he nor any ority. Few saw that the chief danger to other Sovereign could insure. His laws the State lay in the determined obstinacy of the King, and that his old age was likely to be more fatal to the existing order of things than his death, which would have left the regency in the hands of the Duc de Nemours. and enactments have had a socialist tendency, and have hitherto been framed more or less in defiance of the rules of political economy. The French people, who are ignorant beyond belief of that science, and therefore more easily deceived than ours would be, have not un We are unwilling to be drawn into spec-derstood precisely where or how they have ulations upon the actual position of affairs been misled, and have merely supposed in France, and yet all that occurs there or they were indulged and cared for because is in course of preparation, has now a vital interest for us. The question, " Will Louis Napoleon's authority endure?" is one we cannot ask with indifference. a All prophecies of the duration or fall of government are mostly interpretations of they were feared. This has, in a great measure, prevented Louis Napoleon from gaining the popularity he has aimed at; and little by little, as the accomplishment of his impossible promises fails, which it has already done on more than one occasion, on that of the price of bread for instance,-the *The following anecdoto is interesting in this anger of the people will rise in proportion rospect. When Louis Napoleon had at length de- to the disappointment of their expectations, termined to re-inhabit the Tuileries, he, a few weeks before, invited some of his private friends to visit and, far more than for having tyrannized with him the newly arranged palace. One of these, over, they will abuse him for having fooled a lady, and wife to a son of one of the first Napo- them. The popularity he was not in the leon's Marshals, came up to the Emperor, saying, requisite condition to obtain thus failing "I congratulate your Majesty on being returned at last chez vous." The answer was, with a calm smile, him, as it probably will, and Louis Napo"Je n'y reviens pas, j'y ai toujours été." leon being reduced to the part of a despot, |