abandoned her nefarious designs. Without pel except by the menace or the actuality of this, all her assurances are not worth one war? moment's attention. The Crimea, then, must never again be in Russian hands. But what are we to do with it? Only one thing can be done. It must not be given to Turkey, for we can have no security that she would be able to keep it against Russian arms, or diplomacy, or gold. Moreover, she governs so ill, that it would be questionable morality to give one additional square mile over to her imbecile rule. It must not be assigned either to France or England, or to any first-rate power, because this would be a danger to Turkey only second to that arising from Russian occupa tion, and because its possession would give an inadmissible predominance in those seas to any great nation. It must be in the hands of some power which cannot use it amisswhich no one fears-which has and can have no sinister or dangerous designs. Sardinia is such a power. She has deserved well of the Allies. She has a gallant army-for its size about the best in Europe. She is essentially a commercial nation, and will develop and protect the commerce of the Black Sea. In her hands, Sebastopol may become a vast emporium of industry and enterprise. She has an excellent constitution and a liberal tariff. And, above all, she can have no hopes or wishes of aggrandisement in that quarter. She will hold the Crimea in trust for the peace and interest of Europe. Assign it to her under the guarantee of a general European treaty; fortify for her the two great roads which connect it with Russia; assist her for a term of years with a subsidy equal to the expenses in which the possession will involve her, and the "Eastern Question" will be settled in the most effective, enduring, and economical mode possible. Sardinia would be able to maintain the Crimea against a coup-de-main; against a deliberate and prolonged war, she would be backed by the common forces of all the parties to the general treaty of pacification. The idea entertained by some inconsiderate politicians of restoring it to her under certain conditions, scarcely needs discussion. A man, whose passions are known to be violent, and whose disposition is known to be aggressive, insists upon carrying about with him a deadly weapon, with which he has already menaced or struck more than one unoffending neighbour. After a hard strug. gle you wrench it from his grasp; what should you think of the sense of the bystander who advised you to give it back to him on his promise that he would not use it? Would you not say he was either a fool or an accomplice? What is the object of the weapon to him if he is not to use it? What security can he give you that he will not use it? Why should he insist upon having it except because he intends to use it? In like manner, if you give back to Russia a mighty arsenal within forty-eight hours sail of Constantinople of the inheritance of her "sick man"-do you not surrender the whole purpose and consecration of the war? Was not that purpose "to secure the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire ?" And do you dream that either can be secure for one year, with "the standing menace" (as Lord John Russell well called it) in the hands of their standing foe? And what would be the worth of any security Russia could offer in the way of promises or conditions? Suppose she undertook only to keep four ships of war there. How can you prevent her building numbers at Nicolaief, and sending them one by one, unarmed and uncommissioned, to Sebastopol, there to receive their armament when needed? How prevent her gradually and secretly accumulating there military and naval stores to any amount? When these are ready, and her day is come, she arms her ships, prepares her transports, stores away her materiel of war: your consul sends you word; you remonstrate; she makes futile excuses to obtain delay; and the whole work is completed before you can even begin to act. Suppose, in the same way, she engaged not to rebuild the fortifications: could you pre-of the Caucasus, and can have no good object vent her throwing up earth-works on one pretence or another, and proceeding with them so fast that by the time your correspondence on the subject had led you to prepare for action, they would be finished, and bristling with cannon, and ready to set you at defiance? Do not let us deceive our selves. Russia will keep no self-restraining promise that we extort from her, except under compulsion;-and how can we com Nearly the same remarks will apply to the necessity of driving Russia out of Georgia and Armenia-a task which we hope to see performed next summer by the English and Turks. Russia has no business south in being there. That vast chain of mountains, inhabited by untamable and warlike tribes of Mahometans, forms her natural boundary. She passed it, and desires to retain her acquisitions south of it, solely for purposes of further territorial aggrandizement or political influence. She has two objects in clinging to her Trans-Caucasian possessions, the first to have a road to Constantinople from the east as well as from the north; the second, to get Persia into her would, we incline to believe, give us a secure power, or under her influence, and through peace-a peace which would justify and rePersia to act upon and stir up the nations compense the war. That it would be a lastthat lie between her and our Indian Empire. ing peace we can scarcely anticipate; for it For years, almost for generations, the court would leave the deepest internal questions of Teheran has been one of the silent battle-as unsettled as ever, and the great battle of fields between Russia and Great Britain; and according as the one or the other power prevailed, has our north-western frontier in Hindostan been tranquil or disturbed. To Russian intrigue, and the necessity, imminent or supposed, to counteracting it, we owe the Affghanistan war. As long as our inveterate rival remains in a position whence she can harass and command Persia, our Asiatic possessions can expect little repose. The interests of Great Britain and of Turkey alike require that Russia should be driven back across the Caucasian range. These two modifications of the status quo |