his Parliament had reached a climax.
left the Prince-Regent of Prussia deter-
mined on bringing about a radical reform
of his army, and concentrating his entire
activity on this object and that of the re-
form of the Federal army. The death of
his brother and his own accession to the
throne had not tended to diminish his con-
viction that the army and all that affected it
was wholly within the province of his pre-
rogative, and wholly outside the sphere of
the Constitution. The Liberal majority of
the Lower Chamber, on the other hand,
backed up by the country, were determined
to assert the constitutional right of voting
the blood-tax, as well as the money taxes
imposed on the people. They, no less than
the King, desired a reform of the army, and
insisted upon a large increase of the mili-
tary power of Prussia by the bona fide en-
forcement of the tax of universal service;
but in return they claimed a curtailment of
the term of service.

Weternal political situation. The phase in which Prussia found herself was one inseparable from all Parliamentary systems recently introduced, and where sufficient time has not elapsed to reconcile and harmonize the old absolutist traditions with the new popular franchises. A school of Parlia mentary orators and debaters had started up into precocious life, but as yet there had been neither time nor opportunity to form a school of Parliamentary statesmen. The Crown had no choice but to surround itself with professional Ministers, who, even when they professed Liberal opinions, were not of Parliamentary growth-were not flesh of its flesh, or bone of its bone. Throughout the conflict it was clear that the Parliamentary ability, and even the legislative capacity, resided in the Liberal majority; but it was equally clear that that majority, had it succeeded in carrying its point, could not have accepted the logical consequence of its victory by installing a Ministry of its own in power. Consequently, throughout the entire contest there runs a thread of unreality. We feel that in the ablest speeches and in the most consistent votes the majority are not acting with the Damocles-sword of responsibility over their heads, and that the regulating force of Parliamentary life-the having on the morrow to give practical effect to the vote of yesterday-is wanting. We are involuntarily reminded of the Chorus in the Greek play. There is much excellent talking, and a clear insight into the situation, but a barrier, not the less impassable that it is invisible, absolutely precludes the grave and venerable citizens in front of the stage from joining in the action of the piece.

It may safely be asserted that there were no insuperable difficulties in the way of a compromise between the views of the King and those of the Chamber. The real contest was whether such organic changes could be made in virtue of the prerogative, or whether the Parliament had come to years of discretion, and acquired in practice as well as in theory the right to legislate on such matters. It was a contest for power. That from the constitutional point of view the Chamber was in the right and the Crown in the wrong, no one who recollects the incidents of the conflict will deny. Certain fundamental constitutional principles were at stake, which were asserted and defended with an ability, a determination, and a perseverance plainly denoting how the Liberal party in Prussia had ripened in Parliamentary training, and how sound it was in constitutional doctrine.

We are not minded here to make a postmortem examination of the Auerswald Ministry, or to consider the immediate causes which led to its fall. It was a well-meaning, but a weak Government, at a time when a strong Government was a question of vital importance to the existence of the Prussian State-and it fell; and this is a sufficient epitaph.

There were two real forces alive in Prussia,-the party of Progress, who had now got the monopoly of the Lower House, and the Conservative, or, as it is more correctly called, the Feudal party, who had got the monopoly of the Upper House.

Nevertheless, viewing the conflict in its connection with the external position which Prussia occupied at the tme, and the work which the Würzburg Coalition had cut out for her, it may be doubted whether, as a question of political opportunity, the Chamber was wise in pushing the constitutional doctrine to its logical consequences. The safety of Prussia as a State was at stake, and imperatively demanded that she should be at one with herself; and, above all, pointed to the absolute necessity of a strong Government. But the necessary consequence of the conflict was to shake the political fabric of Prussia to its foundation. We do not, however, lay the blame of the The former designated itself the German conflict so much to the account of the Li-party of Progress, to express its solidarity beral party as to the vis major of the in- with the National party, and to proclaim

The former was strong, as representing the people and the future; the latter as identified with the Crown, and representing the traditions of the past.

It is so difficult at the present day to realize the fact that such dreams could at so recent a period have been entertained as serious realities, that it is necessary specially to note the fact, and to bear in mind, that up to this period the Coalition is the aggressor, and that Prussia's attitude is a defensive one.

to with the apparent fervour of religious | brought about in opposition to the will of devotion. With the exception, we believe, Prussia. of one contributor to the Kreuz Zeitung, no Prussian Peels, Cranbournes, or Carnarvons turned away and veiled their faces when the last relics of the ancient faith were taken from their shrines and sacrilegiously cast forth upon the dunghill. Having had on our side of the Channel some experience in this school of neo-Conservatism, it is not so much this phase of M. de Bismarck's political activity that strikes us, as the sure instinct by which he detected and appropriated the Prussianism latent under the German outside of his political opponents. He felt he could strain the internal conflict to any length which suited his purpose without fear of an ultimate collapse, because the sense of Prussian self-preservation would make the most ardent of the National party recoil before a catastrophe which might endanger the safety of the Prussian State. He felt, on the other hand, that he could push his external policy to a crisis, because in the hour of danger and extremity the "Prussian people in arms" would rally to

his rescue.

*

In giving his vote as member of the committee, the Prussian Plenipotentiary had contented himself with recording a protest against the competency of the Diet to take the initiative in an organic change of this kind otherwise than is provided by the Act of Confederation, viz., by an unanimous vote of the Plenum,* and had reiterated the objections already formulated to the plan as such.

M. de Bismarck chose other ground than that of Frankfort to parry the blow aimed at Prussia's position in Germany, and addressed himself directly to Austria. In a celebrated conversation held on the 13th of December with the Austrian Minister at Berlin, he put the case with a plainness and bluntness of speech very unusual in diplo

The conflict with the Würzburg Coalition had by this time assumed the follow-matic intercourse. ing aspect-Prussia having declined all further discussion of the plans for Federal reform proposed by the Allies, had, like Achilles, retired to her tents. The Coalition, on the other hand, had held conferences at Vienna, at which it was determined that the Diet should be the scene of future operations, and that the trial of strength should be made there. On the 14th of August, 1862, the Governments of Austria, Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, Würtemberg, Electoral and Grand-Ducal Hesse, and Nassau, moved that a committee be appointed to take into consideration a proposal for the convening of an Assembly of Delegates, to which should be submitted certain projects of law as further specified.

On the 14th of December the committee delivered its report. The majority recommended the convocation of the Assembly; the minority, consisting of Prussia and Baden, voted against it.

The dilatory forms in use at Frankfort required that some weeks should elapse before the Diet itself pronounced its verdict upon the committee's report, but the Coalition now felt assured that they would obtain a majority, and that by this simple expedient the reconstruction of Germany according to their programme could be

*The 20th of September, 1862, was the day on which the Bismarck Cabinet took office.

The relations, he said, between Austria and Prussia must get either very much better or very much worse; the Prussian Government desired they should get better, and it lay in the power of Austria that they should do so. She had but to withdraw her support from the Würzburg Coalition, and return to the status quo of the relations which existed between the two Governments previously to 1848. Up to that date there had been a tacit understanding between the two great German Powers, to the effect that Prussia should support Austria's foreign policy, and that Austria should, in return, not interfere with Prussia in Germany. It was owing to this happy understanding that for many years Austria had never had an anxious thought in regard to her external relations, and that Prussia had been able to call such institutions into life as the Zollverein. Since the reconstruction of the Diet in 1851, this policy had been departed from, and Austria had placed herself at the head of all the influences hostile to Prussia in Germany. The climax of this policy was reached when she identified herself with a Coalition the avowed purpose of which was to "majorize" Prussia at the

*By a shallow device the Coalition had sought to circumvent this provision of the Constitution by proposing merely to summon the delegates ad hoc, and for the discussion of a certain limited number of laws, and therefore not as a permanent institution.

The language of M. de Bismarck could not be plainer. An eventual alliance of Prussia with Italy, if the Imperial Cabinet did not withdraw from the Coalition, was the prospect held out to Austria. Imme diate war with the Middle States, if they persisted in their Frankfort policy, was the prospect held out to the latter.

The warning was lost on Austria, who voted for the project, but the threat produced its effect on the rest of Germany, and in February Prussia found herself in a majority at Frankfort.

The plans of the Confederates to force the hand of Prussia by means of Federal machinery had broken down; they resolved to play out their trump card, the mise en scène of the Congress of Sovereigns. The Prussian Government had been obstinate, and had refused to give way. The Prussian Sovereign in person should be challenged.

Diet, and to bring about an organic change | maintain the communication between her in the constitution of Germany, in direct Eastern and Western Provinces, to occupy opposition to the wishes and interests of Hesse-Cassel and Hanover. Prussia. If Austria persisted in this policy, she must be prepared to take the consequences. Prussia, thwarted in Germany by her, would become the natural ally of any non-German Power hostile to her. The year 1859 should serve as a warning. The estrangement brought about between the two Governments by Austria's German policy during the preceding eight years had made itself felt to her detriment. There was not that hearty coöperation and goodwill such as between intimate allies would have precluded all idea of misunderstanding. That Prussia had, nevertheless, not availed herself of the opportunity to advance her own interests, but had armed with a view to assist Austria, was owing to the lingering traditions of the former good understanding. Were similar circumstances to occur again, however, Austria's German policy remaining the same, the alliance of Prussia with the enemies of Austria was a contingency that should not be lost sight of. As to the results of a hostile vote at Frankfort, M. de Bismarck's explanations were yet more explicit. Prussia, he said, would regard the acceptation by a majority of the Diet of the proposal to convoke an Assembly of Delegates as an illegal proceeding, and therefore as a formal breach of the contract by which the States of the Confederation were bound to each other, and would at once withdraw her Minister from Frankfort, and cease to consider herself as a member of the Confederation. The immediate consequence of this step, M. de Bismarck observed, would be that the Prussian garrisons in Mayence, and other Federal fortresses, would no longer be Federal troops under Federal orders, but remain where they were in the capacity of soldiers of His Majesty the King of Prussia.

Such was the burden of this eventful conversation, as recorded by the Prussian Prime Minister in a circular despatch addressed to the Plenipotentiaries of Prussia at the Courts of Germany. But a version current at the time, and undoubtedly authentic, added several important particulars, amongst others that the Prussian Premier had very plainly told the Austrian Minister that Austria was an Eastern, and not a Western Power, that her capital was Pesth, not Vienna, and that the sooner she seceded from Germany the better for herself and Germany. Also, that in the event of Prussia being forced by an adverse vote at Frankfort to quit the Confederation, it would be necessary for her, in order to

On the 2d of August, 1863, the Emperor of Austria had an interview with the King of Prussia, then at Gastein, and left with him a memorandum on the German question. It was a strange document, when we consider out of whose hands the King of Prussia received it. The entire fabric of 1815 was condemned as utterly rotten and worthless. Germany was described as in a state of chaos, the several members of the Confederation as practically no longer united by any common ties, but as merely living on beside each other, awaiting the moment when some tremendous revolution should bring down the tottering walls about their heads. Under these circumstances Austria had resolved boldly to take the initiative into her own hands, and to propose a searching plan of reform.

The same evening an aide-de-camp brought an invitation to the King to attend a Congress of the Sovereigns of Germany, to meet at Frankfort on the 16th of the month (i. e., a fortnight from that date), and to which his Imperial Majesty in person would submit his programme of reform. The King was taken altogether by surprise, as profound secrecy had been ob served in regard to the preparations for this last coup. He replied by an autograph letter to the Emperor, in which he expressed his readiness to take into consideration any scheme that might be submitted to him by his Imperial Majesty for a reform of Germany, but in which he declined to at tend a Congress of Sovereigns before he had been made acquainted with the meas ures proposed to be discussed, and had

submitted them to that mature examination | superadded the positive attributes of a body and careful deliberation to which it was with an international position to assert, and usual in Prussia to submit grave matters of therefore ready to embark upon an indeState before coming to a decision respecting pendent policy of its own. them. His Majesty proposed that the Congress should be postponed to the 1st October, and that the interval should be employed in ministerial conferences, in which the scheme should be examined by professional statesmen.