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ciation has maintained itself, while the logi- | mind, and some definite mental faculty, be-
cal law of substitution of similars has been yond the mere sensation, to discern these
defeated-has found no place for its exer- uniformities. I have endeavoured in the
cise. And, in point of fact, if there be no above analysis to assume no mental faculty
connection in external nature between A that would not be granted by the most
and B, their junction in consciousness, which stringently searching philosopher.
was accidentally established, will in time be If, however, the account given by Mr.
dissolved. The law of association will have Mill of the philosophical genesis of induc-
played its part, and will slowly become too tion be insufficient, it must be added that,
feeble to retain a tie unsupported from in- as in his reconciliation of the syllogism
dependent causes. But suppose that be- with induction, so in his account of the
tween any two phenomena, say A and F, different inductive processes, he is unri-
there is a connection in external nature, so valled. But these belong to a more ad-
that when A happens, F invariably or gene- vanced part of the subject than belongs to
rally follows. Then that association in this article; and it is necessary to hasten
thought between A and F, which was estab. to the improvements in the theory of logic
lished by their first appearance together or effected by the rival school.
in succession, will be strengthened by every In spite of the statement at the com-

appearance that takes place afterwards; mencement of the article, that the two phithe expectation of F, which ensues upon losophical schools came to closer quarters the observation of A, will be confirmed, in logic than in any other portion of mennot disappointed. And in this case the tal science, it is even here no easy task to logical law of the substitution of similars attain a position from which one may do will be found to hold; we shall be able to justice to them both. The truth is that the predicate of any phenomenon that includes aims of the two schools, though very cogA, that it will also include F.

nate to each other, so cognate that to a According to the above theory, the law superficial reader they appear the same, are of association of ideas is a necessary pre- yet different—not widely different, it is liminary of the logical law of the substitu- true, but so much so that the assumption tion of similars; were it not for the psycho- of entire identity of purpose serves only to Jogical law, we should never be able to mislead and irritate the disputants on either draw a logical conclusion at all. But, side. The practical mind of Mr. Mill, though a necessary condition, it is not the always looking out for some concrete use only condition—the other being a certain to which to apply his science, cannot away disposition of external nature. Were it with distinctions and definitions which, like not that nature really contains certain fixed those of Hamilton, appear to lead nosequences, we should never know that it hither; nor can much doubt that contained such sequences; but also, we Ilamilton found Mr. Mill's treatise unphishould never know that it contained such losophical, and possibly vulgar. The scisequences were it not for this principle of entific character of Mr. Mill's treatise has the association of ideas originally native to been here maintained; the greater abstruseour minds. In logic, in the attainment of ness of the German speculations will make truth, mind and nature are alike necessary : it a harder task to show their exact posithey each contribute their separate element tion; yet this may be done. to certain knowledge.

The difference, then, between Mr. Mill The above is an endeavour to give a clear and the German school (which was briefly account of the genesis of that law the na- indicated at the outset) is this. Mr. Mill ture of which has been so ably expounded tries to bring the mind of his readers into by Mr. Mill. Mr. Mill's own account of the argumentative posture: Kant and Hamthe genesis of the law can hardly be deemed ilton endeavour to make their reader sursatisfactory. He contents himself with say- vey as from an external point the arguing that we know by experience that the mentative mind, the mind in the act of reacourse of nature is uniform; that we have soning. Mr. Mill looks at the process of always observed it to be uniform ; and so reasoning, so to speak, with the naked eye;

But have we always observed the he looks at it as a calm and sober reasoner course of nature to be uniform ? No one who cared only to know the main elements has maintained more strenuously than Mr. of an argument might look at it. Kant and Mill that the course of nature possesses not Hamilton turn a microscope on the reasonmerely uniformity but infinite diversity ; ing process; the practical matter, whither the uniformities do but stretch as a shining it will lead them, they care less for; their web over a field of immense variety that object is to analyse it speculatively. Those expands far beyond our ken. It needs / who keep this difference of purpose in view

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are the most likely to do justice to both victory, without knowing how he wins it? sides. Yet the object of Kant and the ob- Mr. Mill would say simply that he had colject of Mr. Mill are not wholly alien; lected a great deal of previous experience, though diverse, they are akin to each other; and drew his conclusions from that. But and both belong to the science of logic. it is very plain that the general need not

The Germans, and Hamilton with them, consciously remember his previous experiendeavoured to analyse the reasoning mind, ence in order to reap the benefit of it; nay, and to give names to all its operations and in the crisis of a great battle, the probabilattitudes. Thus, while Mr. Mill, on all ity is that he will be far too keenly engaged ordinary occasions, speaks of a proposition, with the present to be able to turn his eyes which is the natural word that an arguer backwards on the past. What happens is would use himself when thinking of that something of this sort. In all his previous which he lays before an opponent, Hamil- battles he has accustomed himself to note ton, on the other hand, speaks of a judg- the kind of combinations that contributed ment, which is the mental attitude of the to success; these combinations, without rearguer when he is propounding anything. membering them in their entirety, without This, however, is a less striking instance giving them any name or appellation, he than some others. Here is a more peculiar has yet symbolized to himself

, in some one. Mr. Mill speaks of classes, which are manner which he himself perhaps hardly material phenomena contemplated by the recognises, but in such a way that the main arguer himself: Hamilton rather avoids the elements of the combinations shall be ready word class, but analyses the mental state of to start within him when need is. Now one who is contemplating a class, and frames this may well and accurately be expressed the word concept to express it. Now there by saying that his mind is stored with conis no word in the Hainiltonian vocabulary ceptions or concepts. For he does not rewhich irritates Mr. Mill so much as this member the whole configuration and picword concept. He cannot deny it a mean- ture of his previous experiences; but the ing; but he thinks it wholly unneeded. law of association of ideas calls back to He thinks it a “misfortune that it was ever him the principal elements of them, which, invented ; he calls it a bad and obscure however, in themselves would be but bare expression for the “ signification of a class outlines, though being applied to the conname." All this results from the fact that crete phenomena before him they prove he has never put himself in the point of themselves endowed with a power of comview of the Germans; he sympathizes too bining, ordering, and classifying these phe keenly with the argumentative temper to nomena, and furnishing their possessor with be able to analyse the argumentative process valuable contrivances for his present maleas an unengaged person; portraying it, he rial need. I do not know any English portrays it from the inside, not from the word, except concept or conception (which outside. In fact, it is rather the expression latter, however, Hamilton uses to express “ signification of a class-name” that is the process of gathering concepts), that at clumsy; the word concept (Begriff) is one all expresses the mental attitude which I much needed to express a particular, and have endeavoured to describe above. Cerquite real, mental attitude. As Hamilton tainly Mr. Mill's proposed substitute, “ sig. well defines it, it is “ the cognition or idea nification of a class-name," is very inappoof the general character or characters, point site indeed. or points, in which a plurality of objects Let us take another illustration. A percoincide.” And this too must be remem- son learns to play at chess; in the first bered : if, as is surely the case, we can and game he plays, being unaccustomed to the do reason sometimes, i.e., draw inferences, board, the men, and the different moves of without the use of language, then the word the pieces, he has continually to strain his "judgment” is wider than the word " propo- attention to remember what he may do, sition," the word “concept” wider than the and see what it is best for him to do. After word " signification of a class-name.” Let a dozen games, he finds no difficulty at any me borrow an example from Mr. Mill. A rate in the simpler matter, After a hungeneral, from long experience, knows how dred games he may be a fair player. What to arrange

his troops in a battle so as to be has happened in the interval ? This; he secure of the victory; yet he cannot ex- has seen the chessboard frequently, and a plain to another what his knowledge is, large number of individual positions, moves, how he comes to make such and such ar- and combinations,—to which, moreover,

his rangements. By what terms shall we de

attention has been more strenuously directscribe the mental attitude of the general, the ed from the fact of his being himself one turn of mind which enables him to win a / of the players. Of these positions, moves,


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and combinations, some have occurred more | Mr. Mill's proposed substitute for concept,
frequently than others, or from other rea-" signification of a class-name,” will not in-
sons have been more specially noticed by variably hold. Hamilton's distinction of
him; these he will remember most readily; conception from concept, using the former
and the very sight of the board and men to represent the mental effort, the latter the
will, by the law of association, call up some result of that effort, is not perhaps of any
of them before his mind. But this is not great consequence; but as it has been em-
all; there will be a generalizing process ployed in philosophical works, and may
going on in his mind with respect to those prove useful, there seems no reason for
images which the law of association excites. abandoning it,
For instance, a particular combination of I have dwelt at some length on the ex-
the bishop and knight occurs to his mind. planation of this word concept, because it
This combination he can set in any part of is a point in which the difference between
the board he pleases; again, he can dispose the two logical schools comes out very
the other pieces differently in relation to plainly. Mr. Mill, thinking of classes,
it; he can add a castle to his combination, speaks of classes : Hamilton, thinking of
thereby increasing its complexity, but di- the mind in the act of contemplating a
minishing the number of subsidiary combi-class, speaks of a concept. And as Mr.
nations which, from the capacity of his Mill's phraseology is better calculated to
mind, he is capable of disposing around it; assist a man in arguing himself, Hamilton's
or he can take away the bishop and substi- is more likely to furnish him with the
tute a pawn, and so on. Now these kind means for understanding the arguments of
of combinations we do, even in our com- another. That is, it will furnish him with
mon talk, call conceptions; Hamilton called a kind of blank forms for the understand-
them concepts; but whichever word we ing of an argument, just as Mr. Mill's work
use, there can be no doubt of the utility of will supply him with blank forms for argu-
some such word. Mr. Mill would perhaps ing himself

. It may justly be thought that
use the phrase "classes of combinations ; » Mr. Mill illustrates his blank forms a great
but, not to speak of the length of such an deal better than Hamilton. Yet there are
expression, there seems reason, where the one or two admirable illustrations in these
mental element comes into such prominence chapters on concepts; and the whole set of
as it does here, to employ a word that will explanations and distinctions contained in
bring it out. We might also use the word them, with hardly an exception, are excel-
“combination ” simply; but this would, Ilent. The main outline of them had, in-
think, be understood in a less general sense. deed, been given by Kant; and the greater
Thus, to recur to our former example, a number of them are taken either from him
general would, on any particular occasion, or some other German logician.
be said to have made excellent combina- One more point in these chapters is worth
tions; but if the whole class and nature of dwelling on. It is this :-The word con-
his combinations were being spoken of, it cept has been defined as indicating a general
would be said that his conceptions were ex- notion, not an individual thing: can we,
cellent. It will be observed that every con. then, correctly speak of the concept of an
ception implies a class, and every class im- individual? There is no doubt that in
plies a conception; and we should use the common language we could speak of our
one word or the other according as we do conception of Socrates; and Hamilton says
or do not wish to lay a stress on the mental himself, “ If I think of Socrates as son of
labour of apprehending the class. Thus we Sophroniscus, as Athenian, as philosopher,
should speak of the class of vertebrate ani- as pug-nosed, these are only so many char-
mals; because the labour of apprehending acters, limitations, or determinations which
the notion of a vertebrate animal is incon- I predicate of Socrates, which distinguish
siderable. But for a philosopher who wished him from all other men, and together make
to lay stress on the mental element of ap- up my notion or concept of him.” This,
prehension, there would be no inaccuracy Mr. Mill charges on him as an inconsistency.
even here in speaking of the conception or The case, however, is very simple.. I may
concept of vertebrate animals. And it is have a conception or concept of an indi-
observable that, though every conception vidual, without the individual being that
corresponds to a class, every conception has conception or concept. No one knows bet-
not a class-name, Thus any particular dis- ter than Mr. Mill that reality extends be...
position of the bishop and knight on the yond, is greater than, our conceptions; it
chessboard may be made the centre of a is a thing always to be remembered, in
class of combinations ; but yet such a dis- dealing with realities; having framed our
position has no peculiar name. So that fullest conception, we must allow for some..


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thing in nature beyond it. But, for all ) are confirmed by having names given to that, we must frame conceptions of reali- them; but this, as we have seen, does not ties. It is true that there appears a contra- always take place, even when further progdiction in terms between the definition of a ress is made by their means, though of concept as "the characters in which a plu- course it must take place if the knowledge rality of objects coincide” and an expres- thus obtained is to be communicated to sion which implies that the concept only others. indicates a single individual; but nothing But it is necessary briefly to consider the is more common, as all mathematicians main charge which Mr. Mill makes against know, than for a limiting case to be appa- Hamilton, and which he would no doubt rently not included in the definition of its make against the whole German school of class. Thus a parabola is the limiting case logicians, and especially as respects their of an ellipse; if one focus be supposed re- doctrine of judgments and reasonings; moved to an infinite distance; and proposi- namely, that in it they take no notice of tions true of an ellipse may, under this that which he affirms, and rightly affirms, condition, be at once applied to the para- to be the central object of logic, the disbola. And yet the definitions of an ellipse cernment of truth from falsehood. “A (whether taken from the sections of a cone judgment," says Kant (Logik, p. 156), " is or from the eccentricity) do in terms ex- the representation of the unity in consciousclude the parabola. In the same way, ness of diverse phenomena, or the repreconception (or concept) of an individual sentation of their mutual relation, in so far (meaning, as it does, the whole sum of the as they make up a conception." ("Ein characteristics of the individual that we Urtheil ist die Vorstellung der Einheit des know) is the limiting case of a concept in Bewusstseyns verschiedener Vorstellungen, respect to the number of individuals con- oder die Vorstellung des Verhältnisses dertained under it. There is, however, a real selben, so fern sie einen Begriff ausmachen.") error in another passage which Mr. Mill“ To judge,” says Krug,

means to think quotes, where Hamilton says, “ When the how representations are related to an object extension of a concept becomes a mini- which is to be represented by them, and mum, that is, when it contains no other consequently to determine their relation for notions under it, it is called an individual.” the unity of consciousness.” (“ Urtheilen Hamilton should have said, " it represents heisst denken, wie sich Vorstellungen in an individual to us,” for the individual ex- Bezug auf einen dadurch vorzustellenden tends beyond our conception of it. But Gegenstand verhalten, mithin ihr Verhältthis is an isolated slip on his part; for the niss zur Einheit des Bewusstseins bestimthird passage quoted by Mr. Mill as an ex- men.”) “ To judge,” says Hamilton, “ is ample of inconsistency is perfectly expli- to recognise the relation of congruence or cable, though I cannot here stop to explain of confliction, in which two concepts, two it. It is to be observed that, when we individual things, or a concept and an indispeak of our conception of Socrates, we vidual compared together, stand to each mean something quite different from our other” (Works, iii. 225). perception or sight, hearing, etc., of him; other side. "I give the name of judg. and it was the use of conception in this lat- ment,” says Reid, " to every determination ter sense that Hamilton protested against. of the mind concerning what is true or

The three great divisions into which the what is false. This, I think, is what Jogi. German school divide our thinking, are cians, from the days of Aristotle, have Concepts, Judgments, and Reasonings. Be called judgment.” “ And this,” says Mr. fore proceeding to consider these two latter Mill, " is the very element which Sir W. divisions, it may be remarked that one Hamilton's definition omits from it." The great excellence of the school is the thor- fact is, however, that Hamilton and his feloughness with which they consider, not spe- low logicians were endeavouring to contemcially reasonings, but the whole process of plate and describe from the outside the thought. The object of reasonings is to mental attitude of a judgment. Hence they obtain Judgments—to know fresh truths; laid the greatest stress, not on the affirmathese fresh truths enlarge our conceptions, tion or negation itself, but on its mental our knowledge; the conceptions thus en concomitants; but that affirmation and nelarged become the groundwork of new rea- gation of reality were necessary to a judg. sonings, new judgments, and still more en- ment they would not have denied ; indeed, larged conceptions, and so on. It is an it is implicitly contained in their words. ever-recurring circle, which no other class The clumsiness of their definitions cannot of logicians, as far as I know, have described be denied ; though that of Hamilton would so clearly. The conceptions, in most cases, I have been tolerably clear, had he written

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(as would have been far better) class instead | tions, already alluded to, of Hegel. And of concept. A cognate, though not quite here too must be named a class of probthe same, accusation of Mr. Mill against lems that remain as yet unsolved—I mean Hamilton is that his logic has for its object those which lie at the root of mathematics, to determine, not truth, but consistency. which relate to measure and number. Each Yet this, again, is not entirely correct; for, party at present has its pet formula for the however imperfectly, induction is still re- solution of these problems. The one side cognised by Kant and his followers. say, Mathematical axioms are known to us

The definitions, however, of these philoso- by experience, and the science is thence phers are the most obscure parts of those drawn by deduction: the others say, The chapters of their treatises which relate to axioms are known to us a priori, and (Kant judgments. On the whole, the excellence at any rate would add) the science is built of their analysis of the different kinds of up from them synthetically. But the probjudgments is undeniable; that of Kant is lem is considerably too difficult to be disespecially full and concise. On the subject posed of in either of these ways; and, beof reasonings there is little in them, com fore it is solved, a much more accurate paratively, that is original; and their scan- analysis must be made of the genesis of tiness in this branch may be at once gath- number and measure than has ever yet ered from the fact that they almost entirely been done. The third direction in which neglect induction. On the whole, the chief logical science may progress lies in those excellences of the German school of logi- subsidiary investigations which concern our cians lie, first, in the severity of their con- practical advance towards truth; and here ception of the science, and at the same time would come in, not merely intellectual, but the clearness of their discernment of its moral and even physical considerations. relation to the connected topics of investi

J. R. M. gation in every point, except (a very important exception in the case of the physical sciences, which are reached by inductive logic; secondly, in the comprehensiveness of their view in showing the whole connec- ART. IV.-ME. BROWNING'S LATEST Potion of thought, and not stopping at mere reasonings; thirdly, in the accuracy of their analysis of conceptions, and, in a less de- “THE Title," says Remigius on Donagree, of judgments.

tus, " is the key or porch of the work to In conclusion, what are the inquiries that which it is prefixed. And note,” adds pseuin the present state of the subject lie im- do-Aquinas upon Boethius, after quoting it, mediately before the logician? First, there that Title is so called from Titan, that is is the extension in the direction of material the Sun. For as the Sun enlighteneth the science; the development of the formulæ world, so doth the Title the book.” The tifor induction, the examination into the tle of Mr. Browning's new poem is so far topics of testimony, of chance, of analogi- from doing this, that he is obliged to set cal reasoning. Doubtless there is much to apart a book of the poem to shed light on the be discovered on these points. Here too title. At first sight it might appear that it may be mentioned the advantage that would referred to the ring or circle of cantos of ensue from laying the different sciences side which the book consists; or that it hinted at by side, with a view to comparing the evi- the poet's solicitude for proportion, and his dence by which they are severally support- care that the architecture of his poem should ed—a comparison which would probably be be as good as its masonry, and that the whole of great service to us in those not infre- should be symmetrical as a circle. These quent cases in which we know the evidence ideas may be implied; but the author's priby which a supposed fact has been support- mary meaning is something far more material ed, but hesitate as to its exact value. If, in and realistic. He presents himself to us such a case, we could immediately refer to with a ring in one hand and a book in the some known science, and find that in such other. The first, he tells us,

is Roman work and such a case less evidence than the pres- by Castellani; and be explains by what art ent had been deemed satisfactory, or on the so delicate a filigree is produced-how, in other hand greater evidence than the present order to render the thin gold capable of bearhad not been deemed satisfactory, such a ing the tools which are to emboss it, it is discovery would be no slight help to our mixed with alloy, and the composite mass judgment. But in the second place, logic may progress in the psychological direction.

* The Ring and the Book. By Robert Browning. In this quarter we touch upon the investiga- | (London : Smith, Elder, and Co.)

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