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speculation needs always to be controlled by a pervading instinct of truth, in order that

it may not pass the line which separates sub

tilty from extravagance. This controlling instinct, which in its lowest manifestation is called "plain common sense," is a natural gift, not to be acquired by the use of the mere reason. In its highest manifestation it is what an illustrious living thinker has styled a large view of truth." The absence of it leads to different results in different minds. Paltry understandings fall into a puling sentimentalism: the acute and subtile are liable to metaphysical lunacy. And the disease, though not incurable, cannot be cured by appeals to the mere reason. Hence the force of the common remark that, though the final judgment of delicate questions must be left to the competent few, the attention of the ordinary public is a valuable check upon the judges. And so the obstinate refusal of the public to acquiesce in the practical deduction from a speculative conclusion is, by itself, enough to throw grave suspicion upon the premisses from which the conclusion is drawn. And therefore it may plausibly be maintained, that the utmost unanimous refusal of mankind to give up their belief in the reality of the vulgar notion of moral desert is, by itself, enough to suggest a doubt whether speculative Determinism may not be in error. This result will seem absurd enough to those who hold by the famous brocard of Malebranche; but Malebranche has been weighed and found wanting. He had metaphysical genius without common sense, and fell into extravagance. The practical impotence of reason will be sufficiently shown by surveying the progress of the present controversy. The Determinists have always remained in possession of the field of battle: the Libertarians have always reaped the fruits of the victory.

I. The importance of the vulgar notion of moral desert, as a practical influence in the world, cannot be estimated at too high a rate; and it is abundantly evident that the Determinists do not know the size of the adversary which they treat with such contemptuous coolness. When we consider what the vulgar notion has done for mankind, we seem to find it bound up since the beginning of the world with all that is noblest in word and deed. Let us ask ourselves, what would have been the difference if that notion had never prevailed. Let us ask, what would now be the result if for the vulgar notion of moral desert there should universally be substituted that notion which is allowed by Determinism. I believe that any Determinist who fairly considers these questions would

despair of getting any extensive footing in the world for his doctrine. Perhaps he would consider the present line of argument an unfair attempt to create a sentimental prejudice against the conclusions of reason. But it cannot be unfair to speak the truth; and it is the truth that, in spite of cogent arguments, the common sense of mankind at large has rejected, does reject, and probably will continue to reject, Determinism. Now there must be "some reason" for this fact; and it cannot be unfair to recommend it to the consideration of Determinists, by way of enabling them to arrive at some better understanding than they now have of the position of the Libertarians.

If anything more be needed to show the extreme tenacity of the vulgar notion, the following fact may suffice, which I consider to be one of the most remarkable in the history of philosophy. So deeply are the minds of the Libertarians impressed by the reality of the vulgar notion of moral desert, that they never fairly grasp the fact that the reality of this notion is the very point in dispute. Hence we find them assuming the reality of the vulgar notion, merely in order that they may deduce from it such a theory of the facts of volition as that quoted above from Hartley and Dean Mansel. The common form of this proceeding is well given by Cudworth, in a posthumous work not published till the year 1838. He argues as follows:-A bad clock is blamed in a different sense to that in which a bad man is blamed, and so also is a bad horse or dog; thus there are three separate kinds of blame, according as the object of blame is (1.) automatic, (2.) conscious, but not responsible, (3.) morally responsible. Now it is evident that so soon as this third notion of Moral Responsibility is allowed to differ in kind from the motives for beating a horse or dog, we shall also have allowed that the merely retributive view of the function of punishment is a sound and true view; that is, in other words, that the vulgar notion of moral desert is a real notion. Thus Cudworth begins by assuming the reality of the vulgar notion of moral desert; and he then proceeds to use it as an argument in favour of Freewill as a statement of the facts of volition-an illustrious example of petitio principii, which was repeated by Copleston under a much more elaborate disguise. Now this is a fallacy; but the strength of the feeling upon which it rests is an impressive argument. We know that the conclusion of a syllogism is inadequate to deal with a strong feeling; and here is a feeling which has so long defied attack that we may well doubt whether any analysis of the facts

of volition will ever root it up. But this analysis is the most trenchant weapon in the whole armoury; and no other will succeed if that should fail. Even though the force of the arguments in favour of Determinism were fully brought home to the minds of all men, it might well be that the Determinists would remain then as now a scattered few among the many. So much stronger, a Libertarian may be permitted to say, are facts than reasonings.

tarians are evidence of the cogency of the
Determinist analysis, we find also, on the
other hand, evidence of the deep hold which
the vulgar notion of moral desert has upon
the minds of men, in the excesses to which
Determinism has been hastily carried by
those who have been forced unwillingly to
embrace it. Unable to rest in the mere
doctrine of the Mechanism of Human Ac-
tions, their perturbed minds ran on into va-
rious conclusions which were not entailed
upon them by strict logic.
Hence is ex-

II. The analysis of the facts of volition to which the Determinist appeals has been as-plained the proceeding of the Modified certained with great exactness, and is well Fatalists. And by similar considerations we known. The result is briefly as follows. It may account for the indignant exclamations is contended that whenever we review the of others, who, while refusing to embrace actual operation of the will, we are com- Determinism, saw that it got rid of the vulpelled to pronounce the following judg- gar notion of moral desert. They charged ment:-that in each case our action is de- it with all sorts of horrible consequences to termined by a balance of the motives actu- which it is not justly liable; as, for example, ally present; that it is impossible to imagine that it delivers us over to a blind fate, and the will acting without a motive; and that, so forth. But, not to cavil at their choice when we have decided upon certain of words, it is plain that they had forgotten course, we do not swerve from it unless some the part which, in the scheme of Determinew motive is presented, or, which is the nism, a man's own desires contribute towards same thing, unless an old motive is present- what is certain to befall him. There is all ed in a new light. Hence it is concluded, in the difference in the world between somethe language of Hartley, that "each action thing which is made sure to befall a man by results from the previous circumstances of the fact that he wishes it, and something the body and mind, in the same manner, which is sure to befall him whether he and with the same certainty, as other effects wishes it or no. do from their mechanical causes."

This appeal to the facts of volition is the strength of Determinism, just as the tenacity of the vulgar notion of moral desert is the strength of Freewill; and the difficulty of meeting it is shown by the struggles of the Libertarians. "By the Liberty of a Moral Agent," says Reid, "I understand a power over the determinations of his own will." "That is to say," observes his editor in a note, "moral liberty does not merely consist in the power of doing what we will, but, though Reid" elsewhere "seems to deny it, in the power of willing what we will" There is no evading this criticism; and the other side accordingly replies that, if the phrase power of willing what we will has any meaning, it means that a second will is needed to secure the freedom of the first, and of course a third to secure the freedom of the second, and so on for ever which hardly needs to be seriously discussed. This argument, it should be observed, is a reductio ad absurdum drawn from the terms of the Libertarian statement of the analysis of the facts of volition, which the Libertarians were compelled to bring forward in order to meet the Determinist statement. But if the painful straits of the Liber

*Works, ed. by Hamilton, p. 599.

But such is often the result of disturbing a deeply-seated conviction-the effect of the disturbing cause is not limited by logic. Such is the position held in the minds of most men by the conviction of the reality of the vulgar notion of moral desert, that, if it be shaken by an appeal to other fixed beliefs, their minds are unable to take up and keep to any consistent position. Fundamental beliefs like this are the only barrier between a man and Universal Scepticism; and any process of sifting and purifying them from error, though not an impossible undertaking to the man of exact and candid mind, requires gifts which are possessed by few. Hence the common remark, that it is dangerous to undermine settled convictions, because the process cannot be regulated with certainty when it is begun. We often see the master vainly striving to keep his disciples within those limits which he has marked out for himself.

That the Determinist is obliged to deny the reality of the vulgar notion of moral desert, is almost too obvious to need proof; and this is expressly admitted by the most eminent Determinists, both old and new. Under the scheme of Determinism, it is impossible, without inconsistency, to blame a bad man in any sense in which we may not blame a bad dog. This is among the un

pleasant consequences which the Determi- | we are often spared much that is objectionnist has to face; for it cannot, I think, be able-flippancy or frigid attempts at decodoubted that, in the eyes of the vulgar, guilt | rum on the one hand, and unctuous feeblehas lost all its moral terrors so soon as the reality of the vulgar notion of moral desert is denied. This is well illustrated by the talk of the knaves and fops of the court of Charles II., who adopted a sort of Determinist cant and fancied that they were Hobbists.

ness on the other. But in a case like the present it embarrasses the discussion by throwing an air of constraint and unreality over the statement of arguments which have exercised so great an influence in the world that it is impossible to pass them by without notice.

In taking account of the antagonism between Prescience and Liberty, I am not touching upon the theological aspect of the question. The Prescience of God has always been considered a part of Natural Religion; and Natural Religion professes to appeal for its proofs to reason and fact. Therefore Prescience, so far as it bears upon the question of volition, properly comes under the philosophical treatment of the question, not under the theological. The corresponding antagonism which appears in the theological treatment is the antagonism, not between Prescience and Liberty, but between Omnipotence and Liberty; nor is this latter antagonism introduced directly, but mediately, as concerned with the action of Divine Grace. Indeed, it is evident that the Omnipotence of God is no less an idea of Natural Religion than the Prescience of God; and therefore the two antagonisms should be placed together under the philosophical heading. And we accordingly find that the difficulty implied in the coexistence of Omnipotence with Liberty has not been. entirely neglected by philosophers; though, being less obvious than the antagonism between Prescience and Liberty, it has attract

As to the admission by the Determinists that their doctrine has no place for the vulgar notion of moral desert, it will be enough to quote Mr. Mill. "There are two ends," he says, แ "which, on the Necessitarian theory, are sufficient to justify punishment: the benefit of the offender himself, and the protection of others. If, indeed," he afterwards continues, " punishment is inflicted for any other reason than in order to operate on the will; if its purpose be other than that of improving the culprit himself, or securing the just rights of others against unjust violation, then, I admit, the case is totally altered. If any one thinks that there is justice in the infliction of purposeless suffering; that there is a natural affinity between the two ideas of guilt and punishment, which makes it intrinsically fitting that wherever there has been guilt, pain should be inflicted by way of retribution; I acknowledge that I can find no argument to justify punishment inflicted on this principle."* But there is no doubt at all that nearly everybody thinks these very things. Who will say that he desires the punishment of Colonel Kirke only in the hope of effecting a reformation in his character, or by way of a salutary example to future ill-ed less attention. Both the antagonisms are doers? Perhaps not even Mr. Mill himself; though he would be quite ready, of course, to explain the origin of the illusion in accordance with his own principles.

III. The treatment of the third point, the antagonism between Prescience and Liberty, is embarrassed by the fact that the philosophical world has no longer any common dogmatic ground. Not that the philosophers do, as a body, exactly disbelieve the existence of God; but theological belief has become so manifold in its forms, and so vague in its significance, that men shrink from recognising in speculation the fact that there is such a thing as religion left in the world. It has come to be agreed somehow that good taste requires such subjects to be avoided, or, if that is impossible, to be introduced on the understanding that the religious opinions of one man are not shared by anybody else. By this general exclusion,

* Examination, etc., pp. 510, 512.

only different aspects of the same masterproblem, the coexistence of the Infinite with the Finite. The common argument runs somewhat to the following purpose:—If it can be certainly foreseen that a man will do a particular thing, in what sense can it be said that he is free not to do it? According to the common sentiment, freedom not to do a thing implies in its terms some chance or other that the thing may not be done; but this is plainly incompatible with perfect foresight, which implies in its terms that there is no chance that the thing may not be done.

This statement of the argument precludes by anticipation the common attempts to meet it; for these turn upon the proposition that foresight does not coerce, which is nothing to the point. What is wanted is something quite different, namely, that foresight should not oblige us to look upon the action foreseen as being coerced. The attitude which the mind seems to take up is

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not the assertion that foresight coerces; and therefore it is useless to deny that foresight coerces. But we seem to be able to figure to ourselves foresight as being possible only as the result of coercion, though we need not regard the person who foresees as being the person who coerces. In short, the foresight is looked upon as the result of the coercion; and therefore it is useless to deny that it is its cause. Whether or no this is the true analysis of the feeling, it at all events is the common and prompt judgment of men in general, that they cannot help regarding the will as being somehow coerced, when they regard its action as being forescen. Even in the case of ordinary human foresight, or guessing at future actions, although men know for certain that their prediction has no tendency to coerce, yet they cannot help looking upon what they foresee as being somehow coerced; and this is proved by the disposition which they often show to excuse the malice of a bad action in proportion as they have been able before the event to predict with confidence that it will be done. And, in general, it is felt that any great and cruel temptation, though it is not enough to justify, does yet go some way towards excusing a bad action.

I have seen a very ingenious attempt to grapple more closely with this difficulty, made by an anonymous author in a contemporary periodical publication, which deserves notice, because it seems to prove that all such attempts are hopeless. The author imagines the case of a man, about to be married to one whom he passionately loves; they are before the altar, and the marriage ceremony is begun; the man is asked whether he will take the woman for his wife; thereupon the author demands to be told whether we cannot be certain that he will assent, and also whether we must not allow that he is acting by his free will in so doing. The author here thinks that he has produced a palmary example of certain prediction, and also a palmary example of the exertion of free will; but he is mistaken as to the latter point. The sort of will which the bridegroom is supposed to exert is by no means a palmary example of the sort of will required, viz. that sort of will which is commonly reckoned indispensable to the reality of the vulgar notion of moral desert. On the contrary, it is a very bad example indeed; and this only escapes notice because the action supposed to be done is innocent. Let us imagine a man tempted to sin by inducements as strong as those which incline the bridegroom to receive his bride; and we shall at once become aware of our disposition to excuse and palliate the malice of the

bad action. Therefore, though it would sound absurd to speak of the bridegroom as being in any way coerced, yet it is impossible to hold him up as an illustrious example of that sort of free will which is to the present purpose. But unless this may be done the author's argument goes for nothing. He has only proved that a very high degree of certainty in a prediction is compatible with a very low degree of that sort of free will about which we are speaking. To deny this is to confuse will in the sense apposite to this inquiry with some other sense of the word, to obliterate, in short, that distinction between Freewill and Determinism which is the very point in dispute.

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So far we have been considering only the argument from Prescience. But it is susceptible of additional complication by introducing the further idea of Omnipotence, which is contemplated in God along with Prescience. For our foresight does not at all oblige us to regard ourselves as in any sense the sources of coercion; but the Omnipotence of God is the very link needed in order to enable us to infer that He who foresees is also He who coerces. And Hobbes accordingly decided that God is the cause of all human actions.* Priestley made the same doctrine the foundation of his Optimism. Also," he says, " "the persuasion that nothing can come to pass without the knowledge and express appointment of the greatest and best of beings, must tend to diffuse a joyful serenity over the mind, producing a conviction that, notwithstanding all present unfavourable appearances, whatever is, is right; and that even all evils respecting individuals or societies, any part, or the whole of the human race, will terminate in good; and that the greatest sum of good could not, in the nature of things, be attained by any other means." Hartley had spoken to the like purpose; but, as his manner is, in more guarded language.

Here, then, we have before us the insoluble problem of the co-existence of the Infinite with the Finite, in its bearings on the question of volition, as manifested in (1.) the Prescience, (2.) the Omnipotence, of God. It would not be difficult to lay down a view of the matter both more extended and more systematic; but enough has been said to serve the present purpose. A new and highly ingenious turn was given to the second topic, the bearing of Omnipotence upon Freewill, by Mr. J. S. Mill, which deserves. to be noticed.

Works, ed. by Molesworth, vol. v. p. 115. The Doctrine, etc., p. 121.

However, the reader should not omit to notice the following conditions which limit its application. The argument is pointless if urged against the Atheist, because "God" is not to him a positive idea. And it cannot be urged by the Atheist, without becoming a mere argumentum ad hominem. It follows, therefore, that it can only be fairly urged by the Determinist Theist against the Libertarian Theist. . But the man who urges it must also be prepared to affirm that God is the cause, and the efficient cause, of all things-evil, of course, included. This has been done, as we have seen, by some Theists, on the ground that evil is properly to be regarded as a phenomenal form of good. Priestley, indeed, with characteristic hasty obtuseness, confuses together the two positions, (1.) that evil is a phenomenal form of good, (2.) that evil, though really evil, cannot be helped; which latter proposition, though he seems to regard it as an evidence of Theism, really makes for Atheism so far as it goes.

Hamilton had urged that the analytical | causation, and so the argument is made to conditions both of Freewill and Determi- hold good. nism on the one hand, an uncaused commencement of action, and, on the other hand, an infinite regression of causes-equally transcend our powers of conception; and from this he sought to infer that no statement of difficulties in conception could be in itself conclusive against Freewill, because an equal balance of difficulty lies against the opposite doctrine. "But," replies Mr. Mill, "this choice of inconceivabilities is not of fered to us in the case of volitions only. We are held, as he not only admits but contends, to the same alternative in all cases of causation whatsoever. But we find our way out of the difficulty in other cases in quite a different manner. In the case of every other kind of fact, we do not elect the hypothesis that the event took place without a cause: we accept the supposition, that of a regress, not indeed to infinity, but either generally into the region of the unknowable, or back to an Universal Cause, regarding which, as we are only concerned with it in relation to what it preceded, and not as in itself preceded by anything, we can afford to make a plain avowal of our ignorance."*

The aim, or at least the force, of this retort, is to lower the difficulty of conception alleged against Determinism, by showing that it is only one aspect of a common difficulty which crops up under many other forms, and which, by common consent, is to be put aside as insoluble. But it will not at all suffice for Mr. Mill to carry his regress generally into the region of the unknowable. That would not be to find a way out of the difficulty in the case of volitions by the same method as in all other cases. It would be, on the contrary, to deny that there is one method out of the difficulty common to all cases; for to refer a thing generally to the region of the unknowable, is only another phrase for having nowhere whither to refer it. Therefore a general reference to the region of the unknowable only serves to put Determinism, in point of preliminary difficulty, on a level with Freewill; which is the very thing that Hamilton desired. Mr. Mill must adopt the other branch of his alternative, if he wishes to touch Hamiltou's position; that is, he must refer the commencement of the train of action to a postulated universal cause, called "God" by Theists. Then, since it is an express article in the creed of all Theists, that "God" is a positive idea, and not, like the general region of the unknowable, merely negative, there will be a common bond between this reference of the regress and all other references of original

* Examination, etc., p. 499.

in

As regards the general question, I agree with Hamilton that it is impossible to effect any direct reconciliation between Liberty and Prescience. "The conviction of this impossibility," he goes on to say, "has led men (1.) to give up the prescience of God in respect of future contingents; or (2.) to bring down the impossibility to a lower [stage], and this by one of two means— either, 1st, to annihilate the futurity in respect of God, or, 2d, to annihilate the contingency." "* But he is evidently wrong speaking of the annihilation of the contingency as a means of bringing the difficulty down to a lower stage, since it is a getting rid of the difficulty altogether. The difficulty lies in reconciling the contingency implied in Liberty with the absence of contingency implied in Prescience; and if the contingency be annihilated there is no longer any thing needing reconciliation. In fact, this is the natural proceeding of the Determinist; and it is to this that he owes the cogency of the present argument against his antagonist, who is obliged by his notion of liberty to maintain that future acts are in some sense contingent.

The second course proposed by Hamilton, the annihilation of the futurity of events in respect of God, is the common doctrine of theologians. They teach that the Being and (so to speak) the Consciousness of God are in some sense out of all relation to time, so that there is no succession of events in them, and neither a past nor a future. Thus God foresees as He sees; and so fore

* Dissertations on Reid, p. 976.

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