chines are constructed for each, is a minor matter. Though if machines could engender, the adaptive method would be most economical; and economy is said to be a paramount law in nature. The origination of the improvements, and the successive adaptations to meet new conditions or subserve other ends, are what answer to the supernatural, and therefore remain inexplicable. As to bringing them into use, though wisdom foresees the result, the circumstances and the natural competition will take care of that, in the long run. The old ones will go out of use fast enough, except where an old and simple machine remains still best adapted to a particular purpose or condition,-as, for instance, the old Newcomen engine for pumping out coal-pits. If there's a Divinity that shapes these ends, the whole is intelligible and reasonable; otherwise, not.

We regret that the necessity of discussing philosophical questions has prevented a fuller examination of the theory itself, and of the interesting scientific points which are brought to bear in its favor. One of its neatest points, certainly a very strong one for the local origination of species, and their gradual diffusion under natural agencies, we must reserve for some other convenient opportunity.

The work is a scientific one, rigidly restricted to its direct object; and by its science it must stand or fall. Its aim is, probably not to deny creative intervention in nature, for the admission of the independent origination of certain types does away with all antecedent improbability of as much intervention as may be required,-but to maintain that Natural Selection in explaining the facts, explains also many classes of facts which thousand-fold repeated independent acts of creation do not explain, but leave more mysterious than ever. How far the author has succeeded, the scientific world will in due time be able to pronounce.

As these sheets are passing through the press a copy of the second edition has reached us. We notice with pleasure the insertion of an additional motto on the reverse of the title-page, directly claiming the theistic view which we have vindicated for the doctrine. Indeed these pertinent words of the eminently wise Bishop Butler, comprise, in their simplest expression, the whole substance of our latter pages:

"The only distinct meaning of the word 'natural' is stated, fixed, or settled; since what is natural as much requires and presupposes an intelligent mind to render it so, i. e., to effect it continually or at stated times, as what is supernatural or miraculous does to effect it for once.'

A. G.

ART. XVI.-Forces; by THEODORE LYMAN.

THE first article in this Journal for November last* brings to mind the singular part which "force" now plays in science. The theory set forth in that article may be stated as follows: the world, and everything on it, may be considered as matter; this matter is not the same throughout, but consists of a certain number of ultimate species called elements; these elements are not always isolated, but are found joined to form, 1st, simple compounds, known sometimes as minerals; 2d, compounds of a nature higher, more complicated, and differently characterized, known as vegetables; 3d, compounds still higher and more complicated, and again differently characterized, known as animals. As the elements do not remain isolated, so also their compounds continually change their mutual relations; and the result of these changes is that continual falling down and building up which may be seen in the material world. To move these elements and their compounds there is a fund of force, constant in quantity and in quality; if ever it seems to be less in quantity, some of it is latent; if ever it seems different in quality, it is but changed in appearance, from being connected with some peculiar compound. Here is Cosmos at a glance!-there is the force, the mover, a; and these are the elements, the things moved, b, c, d, e, &c.-a may be a' (mechanical force), or a" (chemical force), or a" (vegetable force), &c., but still it remains α. a may act on b, c, d, e, and there may result such compounds as be, ceb, dec, &c. When a joins b to c, a part of a becomes latent, and the result may be called bc+a; but, when this compound is decomposed by a different form of a (e. g. a""" or light) then a latent is set free, and immediately takes b and joins it to d, e, making the higher compound bde, while c is set free as an element. To give an instance, if b is carbon, c hydrogen, and d oxygen, and a"" is vegetable force, then b, c, and d, joined by the action of a", would be the compound bed, and might be a turnip. This theory looks simple, but its very roundness is suspicious.

The human mind, craving something more than mere fact, has tried to get at the reason. The fact is the law, the reason is the cause. It is in the search for the latter that scientific men have fallen on that unfortunate word, that shadow of a shadow, that last resort of ignorance-Force! It is safe to say that no

* The instructive and ingenious essay, by Prof. Joseph LeConte, is quoted in no invidious spirit, but simply as a fair sample of a philosophy now very common. Prof. LeConte may contend that he uses the word "force" only as a convenient supposition, on which to build a theory; if this be the case, it should be remembered that a form of expression which is sure to mislead ninety-nine readers in every hundred, should not be used in scientific writing.

SECOND SERIES, VOL. XXIX, No. 86.--MARCH, 1860.

word in the English language has created so much ambiguity, so much meaningless discussion, and so much wrong-headed philosophy, as this ill begotten monosyllable. It is a gag for inquisitive people. What keeps the world from flying off in space? The force of attraction. What keeps it from rushing towards the sun? The centrifugal force. What makes oxyd of lead join acetic acid? The chemical force. What makes oxyd of lead leave acetic acid and go to sulphuric acid? The chemical force again. What makes a fish with a ventral fin? The vital force. What makes a fish without a ventral fin? The vital force again. Mark this! These forces are blind and they are the same always, yet they make different things, on the one hand, while on the other, they repeat the same thing over and over again. How is this? Can a round auger bore a square hole? Or, can it bore any hole at all without intellect to guide it? If several forces are not enough to account for the phenomena of the world, what can we expect of one force? Yet to this Prof. LeConte would reduce us. His "correlation of forces" is one force; and his "conservation of forces" is the amount of this force. The amount of force, acting on the sum of the material elements, produces all motion and all being. The force is spoken of as latent," "set free," "liberated," and "developed," and as being "furnished" and "supplied," by decomposition.

Force is either something or nothing, if it be nothing, it is not worthy a place in science; if it be something it may be considered like any other fact of philosophy. What, then, is force and whence comes our idea of it? To answer these questions it is necessary to define, 1st, true causation; 2d, variable sequences; 3d, invariable sequences. The operations of my own will are the only instances of true causation of which I am conscious. The will, itself immaterial, works either on the material body, or on the immaterial mind. When the body is free and healthy the will has direct control over the voluntary muscles, but none over the involuntary. On the other hand, when the mind is free and healthy, the will has direct control over the whole of it. Whenever I will to do an act, mental or physical, I am conscious of using power. Causation, then, is the act of x, using power to produce y.

We may, in the outer world, see one thing happen immediately after another; yet, in a little while, we may see the first thing again, but this time not followed by the second. In such a case we say that the fact, that one thing followed another, was an accident. For instance, twelve mines of powder may explode, one after another, but probably this will not happen so again. A variable sequence, then, is the fact that y has followed x, but will not, of necessity, do so again.

We may, in the outer world, see a particular thing, which, as far as our experience goes, is always followed by another par

ticular thing; for example, the twelve mines above mentioned are fired by electricity, and, as far as we know, a certain amount of electric heat in contact with gunpowder is followed by an explosion. An invariable sequence, then, is the fact, that y always follows x. To sum up; a man, by conscious exercise of will, discharged the battery (efficient causation); the electric spark was followed by an explosion of gunpowder (invariable sequence); certain other mines happened to explode, after this one, in quick succession (variable sequence).

The admission of universal, invariable sequence (i. e., every x is invariably followed by its peculiar y) is the ground-principle of the theory of necessity, which leads directly to pantheistic atheism, with its idealistic and materialistic branches. The sole object of science thus becomes, to find out all the xs in the universe and all the ys, and to give to each x its proper y. All these, when tabulated so as to show their fixed relations to each other, make up the course of nature, and human knowledge has then done its utmost and has nothing left to work on. This course of nature, if admitted as entirely true, may still be looked at in two ways: 1st, it may be said that this course is such as it is by reason of an essence which exists in matter; or, 2d, it may be stated, that the course is such as it is, and that no reason therefor can be given, or ought to be given. Such views as these might be allowable if all our knowledge were got from observations on the outer world, and without reference to our own consciousness of the structure of our minds; for we could not prove the existence of power, in the phenomena of the outer world; and, if we suspected it, we might still set it down as an inherent property of matter. But the moment consciousness of self is brought into the question, a new element is introduced, namely, intelligence. Consciousness is fundamental, and cannot be denied; consciousness of thought, that is intelligence, cannot be denied; consciousness of power has been denied, and with what truth? I am fully conscious, that I turn my mind to a given thought, and I sharply distinguish this act of causation from any sequence; here then is the immaterial will exercising power over the immaterial mind. If there is no such thing as power, whence comes the word, and whence the general idea of it? Again, I will to move some part of my body, and do move it, and I compare this power with that used in mental action, and I find them the same. There is this difference between the cases: in the first instance I move what is strictly myself, the unit, the immaterial; in the second instance I move what is only a frame, over which I have limited control; the compound, the material. And observe this; there is a difference between merely wishing and the act of exerting power consciously. I may wish that my legs would, all at once, walk off with my body;

but, if this should take place, I should be conscious that I was not exerting the power. Again, if, at my mere wish, a great rock should come to me, I should be conscious that something else moved it, and not myself. And, if my power of will was so extended, that I could thereby move rocks, I should be just as conscious of that power as I now am of the power to move my own body. A wish, followed by the thing wished for, is a sequence; a command, followed by the thing commanded, is power or causation. It is therefore wrong to say, that such sequences, if observed many times, would give me the idea that I exercised the power. When ignorant people attribute true causation to material bodies, (e. g., in the case of electricity,) they do so because they have the consciousness of power in themselves, and they attribute the same property to a body, which has in itself no power, but which shows signs of being acted upon by a power. If now it be said that matter has a certain essence, property, or what not, which makes it to do certain things at certain times, what is this essence or property but power? From our very idea of the word, anything that produces motion in another thing, either has or uses power. Still, though there may be power, is it intelligent? or do there exist a number of unintelligent powers, which so limit the scope of each other's action as to make a balance in the course of nature? (e. g., the power of centrifugal force balanced by the power of gravitation; the power of oxygen, produced by plants, balanced by the carbon, produced by animals; the power of insects, balanced by the birds that feed on them; the power of fruits, balanced by the parasitic fungi that grow on them.) To such a query, science is able to make this answer: "The phenomena observed in the outer world (non-ego) correspond to the phenomena of self (ego), which are produced by intellect."* This is a sound induction; if it be not good, then no induction is good; and, if induction cannot stand, science must fall. To sum up, if it be admitted that there is an essence, inherent in matter, which necessitates its actions, then, 1st, this essence is power; and 2d, this power is intelligent; for, to deny that the essence was power would be to stultify our understanding, and, to deny this power to be intelligent, would be to ignore induction and to destroy science. It may be well also to take notice of the fact, that most theories, savoring of materialism, speak of some ultimate essence (force) which is at the bottom of all motion and action, as if such essence were fundamental and satisfactory; but this, after all, does not help the theory, for, if this essence is true matter, it moves, first itself, and then other matter, and, if it is a property, then this property moves first itself and then matter.

*For a full consideration of intellect, as shown in nature, see Essay on Classification, by Louis Agassiz.