tures, and to the territorial legislatures, and that the prohibition extends "every where within the dominion of the United States," applicable equally to states and territories, as well as to the United States. If this sweeping prohibition-this just but inexorable restriction upon the powers of government-federal, state, and territorial-shall ever be held to include the slavery question, thus negativing the right of the people of the states and territories, as well as the federal government, to control it by law (and it will be observed that in the opinion of the Court "the citizens of a territory, so far as these rights are concerned, are on the same footing with the citizens of the states"), then, indeed, will the doctrine become firmly established that the principles of law applicable to African slavery are uniform throughout the dominion of the United States, and that there " is an irrepressible conflict between opposing and enduring forces, which means that the United States must and will, sooner or later, become either entirely a slaveholding nation or entirely a free-labor nation." Notwithstanding the disastrous consequences which would inevitably result from the authorative recognition and practical operation of such a doctrine, there are those who maintain that the Court referred to and included the slavery question within that class of forbidden powers which (although the same in the territories as in the states) could not be exercised by the people of the territories. If this proposition were true, which fortunately for the peace and welfare of the whole country it is not, the conclusion would inevitably result, which they logically deduce from the premises that the Constitution by the recognition of slavery establishes it in the territories beyond the power of the people to control it by law, and guarantees to every citizen the right to go there and be protected in the enjoyment of his slave property; and when all other remedies fail for the protection of such rights of property, it becomes the imperative duty of Congress (to the performance of which every member is bound by his conscience and his oath, and from which no consideration of political policy or expediency can release him) to provide by law such adequate and complete protection as is essential to the full enjoyment of an important right secured by the Constitution. If the proposition be true, that the Constitution establishes slavery in the territories beyond the power of the people legally to control it, another result, no less startling, and from which there is no escape, must inevitably follow. The Constitution is uniform "every where within the dominions of the United States" is the same in Pennsylvania as in Kansas-and if it be true, as stated by the President in a special message to Congress, "that slavery exists in Kansas by virtue of the Constitution of the United States," and that "Kansas is therefore at this moment as much a slave state as Georgia or South Carolina," why does it not exist in Pennsylvania by virtue of the same Constitution? If it be said that Pennsylvania is a Sovereign State, and therefore has a right to regulate the slavery question within her own limits to suit herself, it must be borne in mind that the sovereignty of Pennsylvania, like that of every other state, is limited by the Constitution, which provides that: "This Constitution, and all laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." Hence, the State of Pennsylvania, with her Constitution and laws, and domestic institutions, and internal policy, is subordinate to the Constitution of the United States, in the same manner, and to the same extent, as the Territory of Kansas. The Kansas-Nebraska Act says that the Territory of Kansas shall exercise legislative power over, "all rightful subjects of legislation consistent with the Constitution," and that the people of said territory shall be left "perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States." The provisions of this act are believed to be in entire harmony with the Constitution, and under them the people of Kansas possess every right, privilege, and immunity, in respect to their internal polity and domestic relations which the people of Pennsylvania can exercise under their Constitution and laws. Each is invested with full, complete, and exclusive powers in this respect, "subject only to the Constitution of the United States." The question recurs then, if the Constitution does establish slavery in Kansas or any other territory beyond the power of the people to control it by law, how can the conclusion be resisted that slavery is established in like manner and by the same authority in all the states of the Union? And if it be the imperative duty of Congress to provide by law for the protection of slave property in the territories upon the ground that "slavery exists in Kansas” (and consequently in every other territory), "by virtue of the Constitution of the United States," why is it not also the duty of Congress, for the same reason, to provide similar protection to slave property in all the states of the Union, when the Legislatures fail to furnish such protection? Without confessing or attempting to avoid the inevitable consequences of their own doctrine, its advocates endeavor to fortify their position by citing the Dred Scott decision to prove that the Constitution recognizes property in slaves-that there is no legal distinction between this and every other description of property-that slave property and every other kind of property stand on an equal footing-that Congress has no more power over the one than over the other-and, consequently, can not discriminate between them. Upon this point the Court say: "Now as we have already said in an earlier part of this opinion, upon a different point, the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution. And if the Constitution recognizes the right of property of the master in a slave, and makes no distinction between that description of property and other property owned by a citizen, no tribunal acting under the authority of the United States, whether it be legislative, executive, or judicial, has a right to draw such a distinction, or deny to it the benefit of the provisions and guarantees which have been provided for the protection of private property against the encroachments of the government. And the government in express terms is pledged to protect it in all future time, if the slave escapes from his owner. This is done in plain words-too plain to be misunderstood. And no word can be found in the Constitution which gives Congress a greater power over slave property, or which entitles property of that kind to less protection than property of any other description. The only power conferred is the power coupled with the duty of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights." The rights of the owner which it is thus made the duty of the Federal government to guard and protect are those expressly provided for in the Constitution, and defined in clear and explicit language by the Court-that "the government, in express terms, is pledged to protect it (slave property) in all future time, if the slave escapes from his owner." This is the only contingency, according to the plain reading of the Constitution as authoritatively interpreted by the Supreme Court, in which the Federal government is authorized, required, or permitted to interfere with slavery in the states or territories; and in that case only for the purpose "of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights" to reclaim his slave property. In all other respects slaves stand on the same footing with all other property-" the Constitution makes no distinction between that description of property and other property owned by a citizen;" and "no word can be found in the Constitution which gives Congress a greater power over slave property, or which entitles property of that kind to less protection than property of any other description." This is the basis upon which all rights pertaining to slave property, either in the states or the territories, stand under the Constitution as expounded by the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case. Inasmuch as the Constitution has delegated no power to the Federal government in respect to any other kind of property belonging to the citizenneither introducing, establishing, prohibiting, nor excluding it any where within the dominion of the United States, but leaves the owner thereof perfectly free to remove into any state or territory and carry his property with him, and hold the same subject to the local law, and relying upon the local authorities for protection, it follows, according to the decision of the Court, that slave property stands on the same footing, is entitled to the same rights and immunities, and in like manner is dependent upon the local authorities and laws for protection. The Court refer to that clause of the Constitution which provides for the rendition of fugitive slaves as their authority for saying that the "right of property in slaves is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution." By reference to that provision it will be seen that, while the word "slaves" is not used, still the Constitution not only recognizes the right of property in slaves, as stated by the Court, but explicitly states what class of persons shall be deemed slaves, and under what laws or authority they may be held to servitude, and under what circumstances fugitive slaves shall be restored to their owners, all in the same section, as follows: "No person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." Thus it will be seen that a slave, within the meaning of the Constitution, is a "person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof " not under the Constitution of the United States, nor by the laws thereof, nor by virtue of any Federal authority whatsoever, but under the laws of the particular state where such service or labor may be due. It was necessary to give this exact definition of slavery in the Constitution in order to satisfy the people of the South as well as of the North. The slaveholding states would never consent for a moment that their domestic relations and especially their right of property in their slaves-should be dependent upon Federal authority, or that Congress should have any power over the subject either to extend, confine, or restrain it; much less to protect or regulate it-lest, under the pretense of protection and regulation, the Federal government, under the influence of the strong and increasing antislavery sentiment which prevailed at that period, might destroy the institution, and divest those rights of property in slaves which were sacred under the laws and Constitutions of their respective states so long as the Federal government had no power to interfere with the subject. In like manner the non-slaveholding states, while they were entirely willing to provide for the surrender of all fugitive slaves-as is conclusively shown by the unanimous vote of all the states in the Convention for the provision now under consideration-and to leave each state perfectly free to hold slaves under its own laws, and by virtue of its own separate and exclusive authority, so long as it pleased, and to abolish it when it chose, were unwilling to become responsible for its existence by incorporating it into the Constitution as a national institution, to be protected and regulated, extended and controlled by Federal authority, regardless of the wishes of the people, and in defiance of the local laws of the several states and territories. For these opposite reasons the southern and northern states united in giving a unanimous vote in the Convention for that provision of the Constitution which recognizes slavery as a local institution in the several states where it exists, "under the laws thereof," and provides for the surrender of fugitive slaves. It will be observed that the term "state" is used in this provision, as well as in various other parts of the Constitution, in the same sense in which it was used by Mr. Jefferson in his plan for establishing governments for the new states in the territory ceded and to be ceded to the United states, and by Mr. Madison in his proposition to confer on Congress power " to institute temporary governments for the new states arising in the unappropriated lands of the United States," to designate the political communities, territories as well as states, within the dominion of the United States. The word "states" is used in the same sense in the ordinance of the 13th July, 1787, for the government of the territory northwest of the River Ohio, which was passed by the remnant of the Congress of the Confederation, sitting in New York while its most eminent members were at Philadelphia, as delegates to the Federal Convention, aiding in the formation of the Constitution of the United States. In this sense the word "states" is used in the clause providing for the rendition of fugitive slaves, applicable to all political communities under the authority of the United States, including the territories as well as the several states of the Union. Under any other construction the right of the owner to recover his slave would be restricted to the states of the Union, leaving the territories a secure place of refuge for all fugitives. The same remark is applicable to the clause of the Constitution which provides that "a person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall, on the demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime." Unless the term state, as used in these provisions of the Constitution, shall be construed to include every distinct political community under the jurisdiction of the United States, and to apply to territories as well as to the states of the Union, the territories must become a sanctuary for all the fugitives from service and justice, for all the felons and criminals who shall escape from the several states and seek refuge and immunity in the territories. If any other illustration were necessary to show that the political communities which we now call territories (but which, during the whole period of the Confederation and the formation of the Constitution, were always referred to as "states" or "new states"), are recognized as "states" in some of the provisions of the Constitution, they may be found in those clauses which declare that "no state" shall enter into any "treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing but gold and silver and coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility." It must be borne in mind that in each of these cases where the power is not expressly delegated to Congress the prohibition is not imposed upon the Federal government, but upon the states. There was no necessity for any such prohibition upon Congress or the Federal government, for the reason that the omission to delegate any such powers in the Constitution was of itself a prohibition, and so declared in express terms by the tenth amendment, which declares that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." Hence it would certainly be competent for the states and territories to ex-ercise these powers but for the prohibition contained in those provisions of the Constitution; and inasmuch as the prohibition only extends to the "states," the people of the "territories" are still at liberty to exercise them, unless the territories are included within the term states, within the meaning of these provisions of the Constitution of the United States. It only remains to be shown that the Compromise measures of 1850 and the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 are in perfect harmony with, and a faithful embodiment of the principles herein enforced. A brief history of these measures will disclose the principles upon which they are founded. On the 29th of January, 1850, Mr. Clay introduced into the Senate a series of resolutions upon the slavery question which were intended to form the basis of the subsequent legislation upon that subject. Pending the discussion of these resolutions the chairman of the Committee on Territories prepared and reported to the Senate, on the 25th of March, two bills-one for the admission of California into the Union of states, and the other for the organization of the territories of Utah and New Mexico, and for the adjustment of the disputed boundary of the State of Texas, which were read twice and printed for the use of the Senate. On the 19th of April a select committee of thirteen was appointed, on motion of Mr. Foote, of Mississippi, of which Mr. Clay was made chairman, and to which were referred all pending propositions relating to the slavery question. On the 8th of May, Mr. Clay, from the select committee of thirteen, submitted to the Senate an elaborate report covering all the points in controversy, accompanied by a bill, which is usually known as the "Omnibus Bill." By reference to the provisions of of this bill, as it appears on the files of the Senate, it will be seen that it is composed of the two printed bills which had been reported by the Committee on Territories on the 25th of March previous; and that the only material change in its provisions, involving an important and essential principle, is to be found in the tenth section, which prescribes and defines the powers of the territorial Legislature. In the bill, as reported by the Committee on Territories, the legislative power of the territories extended to "rightful subjects of legislation consistent with the Constitution of the United States," without excepting African slavery; while the bill, as reported by the committee of thirteen, conferred the same power on the territorial Legislature, with the exception of African slavery. This portion of the section in its original form read thus: "And be it further enacted that the legislative power of the territory shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation consistent with the Constitution of the United States and the provisions of this act; but no law shall be passed interfering with the primary disposition of the soil." To which the committee of thirteen added these words: "Nor in respect to African slavery." When the bill came up for action on the 15th of May, Mr. Davis, of Mississippi, said : "I offer the following amendment. To strike out, in the sixth line of the tenth section, the words 'in respect to African slavery, and insert the words 'with those rights of property growing out of the institution of African slavery as its exists in any of the states of the Union.' The object of the amendment is to prevent the territorial Legislature from legislating against the rights of property growing out of the institution of slavery.. It will leave to the territorial Legislatures those rights and powers which are essentially necessary, not only to the preservation of property, but to the peace of the territory. It will leave the right to make such police regulations as are necessary to prevent disorder, and which will be absolutely necessary with such property as that to secure its beneficial use to its owner. With this brief explanation I submit the amendment." Mr. Clay, in reply to Mr. Davis, said: "I am not perfectly sure that I comprehend the full meaning of the amend |