PREFATORY TREATISE

ON

POLITICAL FALLACIES.

A MAN will read to little purpose the debates of legislative assemblies, if he be not able pretty readily to detect the bad reasoning to which the members of most of those assemblies, as at present constituted, are, perhaps, more prone, than the rest of the community. In lieu, therefore, of formal preface, we shall in the following compendium, present our readers with an instrument, which will, we trust, enable them at once to discover and expose those fallacies, the prevalence of which has but too much contributed to retard political improvement; and to this instrument we shall make frequent reference in our examination of the ensuing debates.

To the inexperienced or unreflecting, two questions wil here naturally present themselves;-Is it true, that the deliberative assemblies which are said to contain "the collected wisdom of the nation," can be even more prone to bad reasoning than other portions of the community? and if so,-What are the causes of this unhappy tendency?

That the position in question is true, will but too plainly appear to arry one who may apply to the debates in the ensuing volume, the test which we are immediately about to furnish; and will be believed, à priori, by all who are acquainted with the structure of our parliamentary system.

With respect to the causes which contribute to the production and prevalence of bal reasoning, the following seem to be the principal: Weakness of intellect;

Imperfections of language; and

The sinister interest of the individual who errs :

By a sinister interest, we mean an interest attaching to an individual or a class, incompatible with the interests of the community :-for there are two sets of interests which affect every member of society; -those which are confined to himself; those which attach to him in common with others; that is to say, as a member of the community: -and we call those which are confined to himself, sinister, when they operate in a direction contrary to those which attach to him as a member of the community.

Thus, every man, as a member of the community, has an interest that taxation should be as light as possible; but if he derive an income out of taxes, and this income is proportioned to the amount of the taxes, be has an interest confined to himself, that taxation should be as heavy as possible, provided it do not extend to the destruction of the subject-matter of taxes.

B

If, out of taxes to the amount of 10 per cent. upon all property, he derives an income of 5001, a-year, but would derive 10007. a-year from taxes to the amount of 20 per cent,-supposing him to pay the respective rates of taxation out of each rate of income, he would be tempted, in the proportion of 800 to 450, to sacrifice to the interest confined to himself, the interest which attaches to him as a member of the community. Here, therefore, is an interest confined to the individual himself, which is clearly sinister to, that is, incompatible with the interest of the community.

To prevent the sinister interests of an individual or class of individuals from operating detrimentally on the interests of the rest of the community, ought to be the great object aimed at in the formation or reformation of every government.

With those who assert, that mankind are not actuated in the main with a view to their private interest, we can have no reasoning in common: still less with those, who admitting the fact in the case of ordinary individuals, claim for the ruling few an exemption from the common lot of humanity. This is not the place to enter into the proofs of the existence of a principle of action, the predominance of which is attested by the mere existence of laws;-every one who violates a law, does, by so doing, prefer his private interest to his interests as a member of the community;-but the man, who from his own observation has not ascertained the existence of this powerful principle of action, is as weak or as ignorant as he who laments its predominance. The well-being of every individual, and thereby of society at large, is produced by the preference of self: in its strict meaning, self-interest is the mainspring of human action; it is the principle which apportions exertion to the necessities for which it is required, and rescues us from a helpless dependence on other beings. Imagine that condition of things, in which, not the principle of selfinterest, but its opposite,-the preference of the public good to private, should generally obtain: the consequence is as absurd in supposition as it would be disastrous in reality. "Every man shift for all the rest, and let no man take care for himself," says the drunken sailor* in Shakspeare's Tempest. The objection ought to be, not that selfinterest exists and predominates, but that our political institutions have not been so framed as to make it conduce to the benefit of the community as well as to that of the individual, or at all events, that it has not been prevented from operating in a direction opposed to the interests of the community; for that its operation may be so directed or controlled by political institutions constructed to such an end, cannot reasonably be doubted.

With respect to imperfections of language,-that which is mainly instrumental in causing bad reasoning, is, the number of appellatives which beg the question; that is, appellatives, which in addition to the idea of the object which they profess to name, raise up also, as inseparably connected with it, some accessory idea of praise or blame. Thus, among the terms which designate the objects of moral and political science, such words as piety, generosity, prudence, improvement,―present the object, in conjunction with ideas of approbation; -these inay be called, laudatory, or eulogistic terms: such words as

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superstition, prodigality, avarice, innovation,-present the object in conjunction with ideas of disapprobation;-these may be called vituperatice, or dyslogistic terms. Such words as creed, disposition, arrangement, change,-present the object singly, unassociated with any sentiment either of approbation or disapprobation, and these may be called neutral terms. As the immediate end of reasoning is commonly to ascertain whether the thing which is the subject of discussion be good, bad, or indifferent, it is obvious that neutral terms ought alone to be employed by those who desire to arrive at the truth. They who employ terms eulogistic or dyslogistic, assume thereby the point in debate, and supersede altogether the process of reasoning. Terms of this kind are not simple, but compound: they include a proposition in themselves: the mere word affirms the quality of the thing it is used to designate, and thus, when the quality is the matter in discussion, it begs the question.

By weakness of intellect we mean, in this place, incapacity to follow logical deductions, whether that incapacity be occasioned by want of instruction, want of practice, or want of inclination.

Now, of the three causes of bad reasoning which we have just specified and explained, the sinister interest of the individual disputant is, to an incalculable degree, the most fertile and fatal source of error and delusion. Weakness of intellect may be aided by instruction, by practice, or the discovery of motives for desiring the attainment of truth; the imperfections of language may be guarded against and remedied by habits of rigid investigation;-but sinister interest opposes to the reception of truth an obstacle almost as insuperable as it is extensively-prevailing. The bias which it communicates to the intellect of the individual exposed to it, leads him, often unconsciously, to embrace and receive with disproportionate regard all arguments which tend to support this interest, and to overlook or undervalue all which make against it ;-to find a useful ally in every imperfection of language ;-to acquiesce in established opinions as in established abuses;-to deprecate enquiry, and even to sneer at any exertion of the thinking faculty.

To what extent the members of the British Parliament are exposed to the action of sinister interest, is fully understood by those who are -aware that these members conduct, subject to no immediate check, the expenditure of an immense fund raised by taxation :-subject to no immediate check, because they are neither elected nor removable by the people whom they are said virtually to represent, but in considerable numbers avowedly purchase their seats, while a majority of them, are indisputably placed in the House by about 180 powerful families, who either in possession or expectancy have a direct interest in a prodigal expenditure of the public money, and as far as possible, in appropriating it to their own purposes. We say, not elected, even by those who vote, because according to the ordinary experience of human nature, the candidate or his friend may be affirmed to have it in their power to compel a vote, so long as they have it in their power to make the voter expect evil at their hands if he votes one way, and good if he votes another; and this power they clearly have wherever

the open mode of conducting suffrage enables them to ascertain with precision which way a vote has been given

When it is affirmed by the defenders of this system, that it "works well in practice;" all that they can mean, if they mean any thing, is, not, that there are no abuses under it, no unjustifiable expenditure of the public money, no sacrifice of the interests of the many to the interests of the few, but that England enjoys a greater degree of prosperity than some other countries; as Russia, Germany, or Spain. It remains, however, for them to shew that this prosperity is the result of our Parliamentary system, and not the result of that publicity of discussion, and comparative freedom of the press, which by some lucky accident,-not by law, but contrary to law, and to the standing orders of Parliament, has always existed for us while it has been denied to the rest of Europe, and has established here, a tribunal of public opinion, to which Parliament itself is, in the long run and to a certain extent, compelled to defer.

But it is the co-existence of this unacknowledged power with a frame of Government the members of which are exposed to the action of a powerful sinister interest, that renders the use of fallacies more necessary to the British Parliament than to any other deliberative assembly. In countries where freedom of the press and public discussion do not exist, the interests of the many are openly and unhesitatingly sacrificed by force to the interests of the few: the people have it not in their power to require reasons, and no reason is given but the supreme will of the ruler. In England, on the contrary, these ends can only be attained by fraud. In consequence of long established habits of public discussion, the people are too mindful of their own interests, and too strong, to allow them to be openly violated: reasons must be given, and reasons sufficient to satisfy or deceive a majority of the persons to whom they are addressed. Now as it is impossible by fair reasoning, with reference to the avowed ends of Government, to justify the sacrifice of the interests of the many to the interests of the few, and as we have shewn that the members of the British Parliament are placed in a position which must induce them more or less to attempt this sacrifice, it follows that for effecting this purpose they must have recourse to every kind of Fallacy, and address themselves, when occasion requires it, to the passions, the prejudices, and the ignorance of mankind.

Having therefore, in tracing the causes of bad reasoning, prepared the reader to expect no small portion of it in the ensuing debates, we shall proceed at once to enumerate and expose the various Political Fallacies which are still perseveringly repeated, and still exercise but too powerful an influence on the human understanding.

For the purpose of assisting the memory, for we are not satisfied with the logic of the arrangement, we shall class these Fallacies under four heads.

Fallacies of Authority; which are advanced with the view of superseding all exercise of the reasoning faculty.

Fallacies of Danger; in which it is proposed to repress discussion by exciting apprehension.

Fallacies of Delay; the object of which is to postpone discussion, with a view of eluding it altogether.

Fallacies of Confusion; the object of which is to perplex and mislead, when discussion can no longer be avoided.

And first, of Fallacies of Authority.

Whenever a matter in debate is such, that relevant arguments on the subject in debate would be within the comprehension of the debaters, he who in lieu of relevant argument refers to authority, is chargeable with the imputation of Fallacy, and by pursuing this course, virtually admits one of the two following positions; either, That the principle of utility, i. e. the greatest happiness of the greatest number, is not the proper standard for judging of the merits of the question; or, That he does not himself possess any powers of reasoning to which he can safely trust.

Without at present entering into any analysis of authority, or specifying the few occasions on which it may be proper to appeal to it, we may assume generally, that in a legislative assembly scientific or professional opinion, upon subjects with which the debaters may excusably be found unacquainted, is the only authority entitled to serious consideration. Even here it must be ascertained, and considered to what extent the party consulted is exposed to the influence of any sinister interest which may either blind his judgment or induce him to pronounce an opinion which he does not entertain; as a lawyer when called on to give an opinion about reforms in law, or a priest about reforms in the church. The professional or scientific man, however, has always the motives, and the motives generally lead him to the means of obtaining accurate knowledge in his trade or calling; and with regard to probity, that is, the sincerity with which the opinion is delivered, it is almost ensured by the necessity he is under of sustaining his reputation. In no other instance in which an individual may be appealed to as authority, is there the same chance of meeting with an equal degree of relative intelligence and relative probity. We say, an individual, because it is obvious that the probative force of authority is not increased by the number of persons who may have professed a given opinion, unless it can be proved, that each individual of that number, possessed in the highest degree the means and motives for ensuring the correctness of the opinion. Obvious, however, as the position may appear when thus stated, mankind seem hitherto to have been strangely heedless of its truth and importance, for upon no better authority than that of numbers, have systems and opinions the most mischievous and absurd, so long and so extensively prevailed; such as the religions of Buddh, of Brama, of Foh, or of Mahomet. In truth, there seems to be no absurdity to which men may not be reconciled by idleness, ignorance, and sinister interest.

It is to the disinclination which the opulent must generally feel for encountering the toil with which alone appropriate knowledge can be obtained on any part of the field of legislation ;-it is to the facility with which the most ignorant and imbecile may cite the opinion of another; and to the sinister interest which is busied in suppressing every exercise of the reasoning faculty, lest that faculty should be directed to the removal of abuses,-that we must ascribe the extensive dominion of the