The inference is both obvious and satisfactory it is, that every nation derives the greatest benefit by the separate exercise of those facilities which art or accident have bestowed upon her. 1 It may, however, be objected that France might possess superior facilities of production in every article. Would that exclude the inter-national traffic? By no means. For it is not necessary to the existence of a trade between two countries, that each should possess over the other an absolute facility in the production of the commodity which it exports, but only a relative facility as compared with its power of producing the article which it imports. Thus, for instance, suppose England to be desirous of importing French silk, which she would pay for in manufactured cotton; now although both silks and cottons could be manufactured with less labour in France than in England, it does not follow that it would not be the interest of France to confine herself wholly to the manufacture of silk, and to import her cottons from England. If in France a bale of silk could be manufactured by 50 days' labour, and a bale of cotton by 60 days' labour, whilst in England a bale of cotton required 70 days' and a bale of silk 80 days', it would be advantageous to both parties that a French bale of silk should be exchanged for an English bale of cotton; because France would thus receive in exchange for a bale of silk which had cost her 50 days' labour, a bale of cotton which would have cost her 60 days', whilst England would also gain by giving a bale of cotton which had cost her 70 days', for a bale of silk which would have cost her 80 days'. Thus each party would save 10 days' labour by the exchange. It is manifest, then, that so long as different countries possess a different relative facility in the production of the various articles of consumption, commerce will continue to exist, and every nation will be able to find some commodities on which it may profitably employ its labour, with the view of exchanging them for the production of its neighbours, But even putting the extreme case, in which England should not possess the means of producing a single commodity for which a demand existed in France; a commercial intercourse might still be carried on between them, through the inter vention of a third country. Could we suppose a country so neglected by nature, and so destitute of artificial superiority, as to find itself outdone, by all the other countries of the globe, in every single branch of industry, in a degree, too, exactly proportionate to the cost of production of each, and absolutely in want of some one commodity, as, for instance, gold,—an extravagant case, indeed, but necessary for demonstrating the perfect truth of the hypothesis; such a country would not fail to trade with its more fortunate neighbours: its commerce would be carried on through the medium of the precious metal; at any rate it would pur chase gold, though at a greater comparative cost, with such commodities as were in request in the countries exporting that metal. In consequence of the abundance of its gold, the value of that metal would sink, and so afford an inlet for importation from all other countries, who would find their gain in purchasing its gold, though not its raw produce or manufactures. By successive operations of this sort, its trade would be long retained and constantly reproduced. So difficult is it even to conceive a case where national interchange shall not exist; and imagina tion cannot suggest an instance, in which, if left to its natural course, it can exist without reciprocal benefit to the parties between whom it is carried on. It is clear then, that, as the interest of every country will incline it to those branches of production for which it is best qualified; so it is impossible to divert its industry from that channel by compulsory means, without diminishing the aggregate of its revenue, and impeding its prosperity. What a country is forced to consume or produce, it consumes or produces at a loss; at least to itself. But a forced production or consumption is the end, and has always been the effect, of most commercial regulations; which are accordingly useless, at best, and, for the most part, merely mischievous. The mischief, however, is not confined to the actual operation of such regulations as we speak of: when once imposed, they create a mass of artificial interests, whose existence depends on the system from which they sprang, and which are swept away, whenever a change of circumstances or the prevalence of the general interest over that of the few, gives birth to a change in the commercial system. Here, then, is a second source of evil from the forcible interference with sumer and the monopolist, each interested the natural course of trade. To revert in the other's loss; a system, which bolto our former supposition; if the French sters up a bad principle with an infinitely silks, after a long prohibition, were sud-vexatious detail of duties, drawbacks, and denly admitted, without restriction in re- prohibitions, and, what is worst of all, spect to quantity, it is clear that British which is established to the advantage of capital of the value of 1,000,000l. would nobody, and the disadvantage of almost be rendered temporarily useless, and must all the world. Bad as this system is, it be transferred to other employments, be- has hitherto prevailed in almost every defore it could be rendered serviceable for partment of British commerce; it has emithe purposes of production. But a sud- nently governed the colonial policy of our den transfer of a large amount of capital country, and in our opinion, as well as in is attended with great and inevitable loss the opinion of almost all who are compe to the proprietors: the persons employed tent judges, its effects on that branch of by it are unable at a short notice to ap- trade have corresponded with the badness ply their labour to other trades; they of its principle. It has now, more espe may want the requisite skill, and oppor- cially with respect to the West Indies, tunities may not occur. 'This effect of struck root so deeply, the sinister intethe repeal of injurious systems of prohi- rests it has given birth to are so firmbition has been urged by many as con- ly established, that, however obvious its clusive, with regard to all attempts at abo- bad effects may be, there is no departlishing them; the evil it has been said is ment of our commerce, with the single excertain, the advantage doubtful. But the ception of the corn trade, in which every objection is pushed too far: the evil con- proposition for reform is encountered by tingent on a sudden abrogation of such a more strenuous opposition. systems is no proof that they should never be changed; it only proves the necessity of caution in effecting the alteration, a necessity not more obvious in this, than in other instances, wherever established interests are submitted to the hand of reform. The species of caution which is called for in commercial reforms relates chiefly to the time allowed for their accomplishment. We have been taught by such multiplied experience, that a gradual change is commonly meant by politicians to cloak the design of no change at all, that the phrase has justly grown into disrepute; but a gradual reform, in commerce, is, for the most part, the reform to be desired. An interval must be secured for the parties, the labourer and the capi- | talist: for the labourer, that he may turn his hand to a new employment; for the capitalist, that he may choose an opportunity for transferring his stock. Time, however, is all that can be demanded; every thing beyond is a boon granted to the individual, at the expense of the community. Such, then, are the consequences of a restrictive system of trade: a system which prevents those countries, which are subinitted to its influence, from enjoying the full measure of productiveness, which their separate advantages might be made to yield; which divides the community of each country into two classes, the con But, however vehement the struggles of the West India interest for the preservation of their exclusive privileges; there is perhaps no instance of monopoly of less utility to those, for whose protection it is supposed to exist, or more susceptible of speedy and uninjurious alteration. We propose to shew the truth of this remark, by a rapid review of the extent and nature of the protection afforded to their principal export. The West India interest demands, and has long enjoyed, the right of supplying the home market with their peculiar produce; to the exclusion, if necessary, of the produce of all other countries. This privilege has been secured to them by an absolute prohibition of the produce of many parts of the world, and by the imposition of higher duties on that of others, and more particularly of the East Indies, than are levied on their own. In consequence of their carrying trade being limited to British shipping, they have been further favoured with certain drawbacks on such of their produce as is re-exported from the ports of Great Britain. West India sugar the duty is 27%. per cwt.; on East India 37s.: the duty on West India coffee is 6d. per !b.; on East India 9d.* But this is not all: on the exportation of West India refined sugar not On * Vide Hume's Custom Laws, pp. 248, 281. zation of prices between the growths of all the sugar countries; and thus, beginning with the East Indies, we might end, by a succession of similar measures, by throwing open our market to the world. It has, however, been objected that the present equality of price arises from the demand for sugar exceeding the supply, and that the increasing produce of the East Indies, will shortly enable them to undersell the West India planter. Should this objection be grounded, still we cannot recede from the opinion, that the present is eminently the favourable opportunity for opening the trade: at this time, prices are nearly balanced; the accumulation and investment of capital is a slow process; and before the increased produce of the East Indies can be brought into the market, the West India planter will have had time and opportunity for the gradual transfer of his capital, should that be necessary, to the cultivation of coffee and wheat. If this be deemed a hardship, it is one which cannot be relieved by Government, without inflicting a greater injury on the community, than would be averted from the planter. He complains of being gradually reduced to employ his only is the duty returned, but an actual bounty is paid, amounting to 3s. per cwt.* As these bounties are not merely nominal, since large quantities of sugar (the staple production of those colonies) are annually re-exported, exceeding one million sterling in value according to the official rate of valuationt, it will be readily perceived that the present consideration is one of paramount importance. The West India sugar re-exported for the foreign market is exposed to the competition of the East India growers, and is nevertheless disposed of to the great amount we have mentioned. Hence it appears that West India sugar, though charged with the additional expense of its transit through this country, is enabled, by a bounty of only 3s. per cwt., to compete with the produce of the East Indies. Whether this 3s. more than covers the cost of the extra transit through the ports of this country, or not, we cannot venture to determine; that question will be practically settled by the operation of Mr. Huskisson's bill, by which, under certain restrictions, a direct traffic is permitted to be carried on between our West India colonies and the continent. But the fact is amply sufficient to prove that the present inequality between the cost of grow-capital in a less profitable species of proing sugar in the East and West Indies is not so greatly in favour of the former, if, indeed, it be in their favour at all, as the terror of the West India proprietors has induced them to believe. Precisely the same reasons may be urged, to shew that the dread of competition from the same quarter, in the British market, is no less unfounded; and, pushing our conclusions onward another step, we feel no difficulty in deciding, that the duties on East and West India sugar should be equalized at the present moment-a moment peculiarly auspicious, since justice may be done to the community, and, in the long run, advantage conferred on the West India proprietor, without inflicting any instant evil, which seems worthy to be taken into account. A great step might thus be made towards opening the colonial trade: by widening the field of supply, a greater tendency would arise towards the equali duction; but when it is considered that the higher profit is obtained from a forced overcharge on the consumer, it seems to us that the legitimate objects of commerce are obtained, and justice satisfied, if all possible facilities be afforded, whether by granting time, or otherwise, for effecting the transfer. We may here stop to observe that, in the midst of this outcry in defence of the West India interest against the growers in the East, and the consumers at home, the interests of the inhabitants of our East India possessions are scarcely noticed. Injustice and inconsiderateness of the Government and the British people are spoken of as being solely exercised to the injury of the West India colonist. But is all the injustice on one side? Have the East Indians undergone no hardships, and are their interests of no account in the detail of our commercial policy? Have they suffered from no transfer of capital? and have they been deprived of no favourite branch of commerce? What has become of their cotton manufacture? The machinery of Great Britain has enabled her to arrive at the extraordinary result of competing with the East India manu to admit a free intercourse between all our colonies and other countries, for the importation of every produce or manufacture of such countries, and the exportation of all colonial produce in return. The principle of this measure, we shall not attempt to question; it cannot be questioned by any man, who admits the theory of free trade. But the principle is clogged with a proviso "that the importation of foreign goods into the colonies shall be made subject to such mo"derate duties," in the West India ports, as may be found sufficient for the "fair protection of British productions of "like nature." facturer in his own market, and in his To return to the West India colonies. 66 The latter part of this proviso is so incongruous with the plan of a free intercourse, that we no longer recognize the principle on which the measure appeared to be grounded. The system seems to be built on the mongrel idea of combining protection to the home trade with the liberty of importing foreign goods into the colonies. Whether this be possible at all, or at any rate in the manner proposed, will appear from an analysis of the effect of a duty on the importation of foreign commodities. The operation of such a duty must be, 1st, either wholly to exclude the foreign commodity; or, 2nd, to admit it, to the exclusion of the home produce; or, 3d, to admit both, on terms of equal competition. We will begin with the last of these cases. Supposing the duty to be so accurately adjusted as exactly to balance the superior facilities possessed by the foreign trader in the production of his article, that it shall come into the market at the same price as the commodity produced at home; it may appear, at first sight, that the foreign and home trader would exactly divide the market: since it would be indifferent to the consumer from which of the two he purchased, when both sold at the same price. That, however, would not be the fact. A duty so imposed, is tantamount to an entire prohibition of the foreign article. If, under these circumstances, the foreigner should divide the market, it must be at the expense of the home trader's custom, who would, in consequence, be compelled to withdraw half his capital from the trade. This, however, would not The career of free trade with the colo-occur; since the only reason which nies is begun by an act of concession. could induce the home trader to withIt is proposed (with certain exceptions) draw any portion of his capital, must be Hitherto our views have been confined to the principle (for we readily give him credit for acting on one) of Mr. Huskisson's measures;-the leading idea which has guided his past policy, aud which should direct his future operations with respect to our colonial trade. We are now to consider the practical specimen of his system, exhibited in the act of last session, and its probable results. the occurrence of a glut in the market, | must relinquish his business; if he do in consequence of which, the price of the not, he will not enter the market at all. commodity would fall below the cost of production, and the average profits of stock would no longer be obtained in that branch of trade. But this occurrence is excluded by the supposition. By the imposition of the importation duty, the total charges on the foreign trader in producing his commodity are equalized with those of the home producer. He cannot, therefore, sell at a lower price; he is prevented from glutting the market: the same motives, in short, which would alone induce the home trader to withdraw any portion of his capital from the particular employment in question, would prevent the foreigner from entering into a competition, which could only be injurious to both. Such a duty, then, though a duty in name, is in fact a prohibition. There is no difference in the result between such a duty and one conceived in the terms of the first case;-a duty, that is to say, imposed with a view to the direct exclusion of foreign produce. To apply this principle to the present case-Mr. Huskisson, by his proviso, must intend one of three things in crease of revenue; protection to English manufactures; or relief to the colonies. Increase of the revenue is professedly no part of the present plan. We have shewn that protection to the British manufacturer, is, in fact, exclusion of foreign goods; and that is precisely the reverse of Mr. Huskisson's avowed intentions. The oper ation of this part of the measure will depend, therefore, on the amount of duties imposed on the importation of foreign goods into the West India ports. If the duties protect the British manufac turer, the measure will be nugatory; if not, it will effectually relieve the colonies to the extent of its provisions. We trust, however, that the majority of the duties will not have the effect of protecting the British manufacturer: this, being a pure matter of detail, it is not within our competency to determine; but we hope, with Mr. Huskisson, that his regulations will prove beneficial to the West India planters, and we shall not fail to ask in return, their consent to a more equal apportionment of duty on East and West India produce, for the benefit of the British nation. We will now take the remaining casethat in which the duty on the foreign article is so diminished as to enable the foreigner to compete with the home trader, by underselling him; the only mode in which such a competition can exist. What is the consequence? The imported article will forthwith be brought We are willing to make large allow into the market, and sold at a perma- ances for the difficulty of Mr. Huskisson's nently diminished price; and as there situation; we would not, to use the cannot exist two prices for the same good-humoured remark of the Chancellor commodity in the same market, the home of the Exchequer, "ride the willing horse producer will be altogether excluded, and too hard." With so many of the great must transfer his capital to some other interests of this country, all pressing for trade, unless he can afford to take lower exemption from imaginary dangers, on profits than before. That, however, will his arm, we doubt not that Mr. Huskisson not be in his power, unless he were pre- has a difficult game to play. To these viously obtaining more than the ordinary embarrassments we readily attribute much rate of profit; a circumstance which can of the apparent inconsistency of his meano where occur for any length of time, sures: but we lament that such should and which assuredly has not been the be the influence of the manufacturers, case in our mercantile traffic with the or the weakness of the administration, West Indies. The conclusion is (and it that this measure for colonial relief, admits but of little qualification), that should be enervated or encumbered with with respect to the trade in manufactured the schedule of protecting duties; more produce for we must except the produce especially in the face of considerations of the soil, which is regulated by different which could only be overlooked or unlaws there is only a choice of alter-appreciated in the panic engendered by natives; a choice between absolute free- sinister interests. dom and absolute prohibition. Either Granting even that certain foreign the foreigner will undersell the home goods may be justly excluded from the trader, or he will not: if he under-ell him, ports of the United Kingdom, for the it matters not how much, the home trader | protection of domestic manufactures; |