October, 1823. No answer having been returned from Umerapoora by the beginning of March, 1824, a formal manifesto and declaration of war was then published in the gazette. But hostilities had already commenced on the Kachar frontier, and Shahpooree proving too unhe thy for a post, our troops had been withdrawn, when the Burmese re-hoisted their flag there with much parade; in fact there had been war since January, and in the delay of the proclamation, the season for military operations was allowed to draw to a close. War, however, being thus declared in the beginning of March, it is by the measures then taken, that Lord Amherst's fitness for his station must be judged. Information was sought in all quarters, and an officer was summoned to Calcutta, who had been twice to Umerapoora, and twice to Rangoon. This was Major Canning, who gave his counsel some time in the beginning of March. Up to this date the Supreme Government had no thought of an expedition to Rangoon; the Major however had no sooner reached the presidency, than without consultation with the commander in chief, who was on a tour of inspection to the west, expresses were sent to Madras, to urge the instant embarkation of 10,000 men thence, for Rangoon, while 3,000 were immediately put on shipboard for the same destination, from Bengal. The hurry with which this expedition was determined upon, is a peculiar feature of the case. The resolution was even more sudden than that before adopted and abandoned, in regard to Arracan. The reins of government seem to have been abandoned to Major Canning, and the nation has been led into a set of measures which, so far as we see at present, can only end in a war of extermination and conquest. But how were matters conducted in the field? The expense of this expedition, from the union of land and naval armaments, and the large proportion of European troops, was beyond any thing before known in India, and demanded at least some deliberation. This expense was absolutely thrown away during six months of rainy season, and it was known before hand, that this season would commence about the time the expedition would reach Rangoon. It was known too, that while the troops lay inactive account of the rains, all supplies on were to be furnished from Bengal, and that their transmission (from the monsoon being adverse) must be difficult, irregular, and inordinately expensive. Then the rain, the bad quarters, and insufficient supplies, produced extreme unhealthiness, and a great mortality ensued. The very means of defence at home being crippled, in order to send out this expedition, the enemy were invited to attempt our frontier, where a disaster was experienced, most alarming to the safety of our Indian empire. All these consequences ensued from the unfortunate time chosen for fitting out this expedition to Rangoon : all these consequences might have been foreseen; and it was not too much to expect of the Supreme Director. of the affairs of the nation in India, that he should have had the knowledge and good sense to anticipate them. The undivided responsibility for the Rangoon expedition lies now on Lord Amherst. The Major, who advised it, is dead; the only member of council who participated in the determination, is out by rotation; and the Commander-in-chief of Bengal, who was absent from Calcutta at the time of the expedition, has evi dently never concurred in the measure, if he did not oppose it. The operations against Assam, and for the expulsion of the Burmese from Kachar, were indispensable for security and self-defence, and need no comment. The expedition sent in the following season against Arracan, was likewise a necessary effort to redeem the loss of character sustained on that frontier; but the bulk of this force should have been withdrawn upon its success before the commencement of the rains. Of the expedition to Rangoon, however, with all its consequences, the reduction of Martaban and Mirgui, with the places on the Tenasserim coast, and the subsequent advance and establishment of the force at Prome, we see but one issue a war of extermination with the Burmese nation, and the aggrandizement of our empire india, by the retention of every inch o. e territory. The end with a view to which the war should have been undertaken, has thus been quite lost sight of for operations, which, though at the lowest estimate they have cost several millions sterling, were not necessary for the mere purpose of producing such an impression on the enemy as should prevent a repetition of made common cause with the freebooters, insult. II. THE next subject which engaged the attention of the House with regard to Indian affairs, was the distribution of the Deccan prize-money. We have been at some pains to ascertain the merits of this question, and the following is the result of our inquiry. When the Marquis of Hastings planned the operations for suppressing the Pindarees, and other predatory hordes of Central India, he had to keep in view,First, the character of the enemy's force, which, like quicksilver, would divide upon collision, and re-unite in various directions; secondly, the probability that the Mahratta powers, or some of them, would make common cause with the depredators. In this state of things, it seemed expedient to form as many separate armies as possible; some, to beset the avowed enemy; others, to watch the conduct of suspected friends. This was the plan adopted, and for its execution, the whole disposable force of the three presidencies was ordered into the field. Lord Hastings placed himself in a central position in Hindostan, to superintend the operations, and prescribed the formation of every separate force, and the line on which it should act. In order, however, to bring up the resources of Madras, and give consistency to the movements on that side, Sir Thomas Hislop, the commander-in-chief of that presidency, was ordered into the field by his lordship, and the several armies formed to the south of the Nerbudda, made up partly of Bengal troops, but chiefly of those of Madras and Bombay, together with the reformed troops of our allies, were constituted into divisions of the army of the Deccan. All these Sir Thomas was nominally to command in subordinate cooperation with the divisions of the grand army of Hindostan, of which Lord Hastings was the commander-in-chief. Thus commenced the campaign entirely under his lordship's personal direction. While, however, the armies brought up from the south, were, with those from the west and from Hindostan, sweeping the tract where the Pindarees lay, the two Mahratta powers most strictly in alliance with us, viz. the Peshwa and Bhoosia broke out into hostility behind the line of our operations. A third, the Holkur Durbar, and met our advancing armies in the field. All were ultimately overpowered; the Pindarees, however, with Holkur, soonest; so much so, that the operations for sweeping the Pindaree country, being finally concluded in January and Fe bruary 1818, an entirely new distribution of all the forces was then made under Lord Hastings' orders, and the nominal distinction of army of the Deccan was done away. This occurred in the midst of the operations against the Peshwa and Bhoosla, which were not finally concluded till the capture of Aseergurh in April 1819. Though delayed somewhat beyond the occasion, the final orders for dissolving the army of the Deccan were published by Sir Thomas Hislop himself, on the 31st of March 1818, and Sir Thomas, immediately after, returned by sea to Madras. It appears, that in the conjoint operations against the Pindarees, very little booty was taken; whereas, the forces left originally to watch, and afterwards employed against the Peshwa and Bhoosla, and those sent to help them, took a great deal, some before, but most, after the dissolution of the army of the Deccan, of which, while the name lasted, some, though not all, were nominal divisions. Sundry questions arose as to the distribution of this booty, and as all booty in theory belongs to the crown, it was for His Majesty with the advice of his Lords of the Treasury to decide. Lord Hastings seeing the impossibility of determining in all cases to whom the booty should belong, recommended that the whole should be formed into a fund for the benefit of all the troops employed in any way in the different operations, and a claim was preferred on his part, in England, to share as commander-in-chief. This was resisted by Sir Thomas Hislop and his staff, who claimed to be commander-in-chief and general staff for the army of the Deccan, and who desired such a distribution as would exclude the Hindostan troops, and their commander. The pretensions of all parties having been fully argued before the Lords of the Treasury, the majority of these lords deter mined (against, it is said, the opinion of their chief,) that the booty should not be formed into a general fund, and that the claim of Lord Hastings, as commanderin-chief of all the armies, should be dis allowed. The principle of actual cap ture was to be adhered to as far as possible, with an exception in favour of one detachment of the Hindostan army, sent down to assist in the operations against Nagpoor and with the addition, that the East India Company should have none of the booty. The Duke of Wellington and Mr. Arbuthnot, of the Treasury, were, on the 22d of March, 1823, made trustees to collect the booty, and prepare a scheme of distribution on the principles so declared. Mr. Atcheson was solicitor for Sir Thomas Hislop and the staff and army of the Deccan. Having carried his point with the Lords of the Treasury, he proceeded to lay before the trustees, statements of the booty claimed for his constituents. The trustees took his information as long as he had any to give, but refused altogether to place themselves on confidential terms of intercourse, or to lend themselves to his views in contesting with the East India Company various extensive claims set up by him. The trustees seem, indeed, to have considered him as preferring claims on behalf of the Deccan army, such as no officer would ever have thought of advancing. Mr. Atcheson's statements are before the public, and the principle on which he proceeds seems to be, that all the advantage obtained by the East India Company from the war, is to be considered as military booty, and that the Company should therefore not only refund all it had obtained in cash, but, further, purchase of the army all prospective advantages, all palaces and public buildings, and even all additions to the revenue that have resulted from the war. Dismayed at these pretensions, the trustees sought to cut off all further communication with Mr. Atcheson, by opening a direct correspondence with Sir Thomas Hislop and the military men sent home as prize-agents. Mr. Atcheson continued to address letters to the trustees, enclosing the opinions of counsel, and insisting that the trustees should communicate with him as sole law-agent for the Deccan army. The principal matter in which Mr. Atcheson required to be dealt with thus confidentially, was this: the trustees had received his statements of booty, and had submitted the statements to the law-officers of the Crown, by whose opinion they and the Treasury were resolved to be guided. Mr. Atcheson in sisted that the opinions so given by the crown-lawyers should be communicated to him, that he might submit them to other counsel on the part of the Deccan army. The trustees refused Mr. Atcheson's request. They further expressed their opinion, that there was too much disposition shown to go to law; but offered to submit all the proceedings to Sir Thomas Hislop's inspection, or that of any number of officers of his army. A petition was next presented to parliament from Colonel Fitz-Simon, of the Deccan army, complaining of the delays tarown in the way of the distribution, and attributing them, in plain terms, to the trustees, and their refusal to admit Mr. Atcheson to their confidence. Dr. Lushington then declared the parties to have been insulted, in a letter from the Duke of Wellington, and imputed the opposition. Mr. Atcheson had experienced to his refusal to allow a son of Mr. Arbuthnot to be nominated a joint prize-agent. The fact is undoubted, that such a nomination was in agitation, and. was given up after, if not in consequence of, the opposition made to it by the existing prize and law agent. The matter might have ended here, but for the anxiety of the military friends of the noble Duke to stand forth as his defenders. On the third day only, after the reading of Colonel Fitz-Simon's petition, another petition was produced, asserting the perfect satisfaction of the Madras army at the conduct of the trustees, and bearing the signature of Sir J. Malcolm, with that of three other officers, in respect to whom it came out, that one being in Scotland, a friend had taken upon himself to sign his name. Mr. Atcheson's bill was stated in parliament to amount, at that time, to about 17,000l.; at present, we hear it amounts to about 25 or 30,0001. And it was against proceedings calculated to increase this bill, that the trustees set their faces. A third and a fourth petition were presented to the House of Commons on the same subject, one from Sir Evan John Murray M'Gregor, a sharer, disavowing the declaration of general satisfaction put into the mouth of the army by Sir John Malcolm; and the other from Mr. Atcheson, exculpating himself from the charge of desiring to promote litigation, and complaining of the treatment he had experienced at the hands of the trustees. The trustees have since continued their endeavours to realize and divide the | to two other items claimed for the Deccan booty according to the principle laid down army, viz.; first, a sum of money depoby the majority of the Lords of the Trea- sited by Bajee Rao, with a native banker sury. A difficulty, however, has now of Bombay, and recovered from him by been started, which will probably operate proceedings in the Recorder's court, conto deprive Sir Thomas Hislop and the ducted by the Company's Advocate-Gearmy of the Deccan, of much which they neral there; and, secondly, a large quanhave long looked upon as their own. tity of jewels sent from Nagpoor for In so far as the booty captured from deposit at Bunares, with a merchant of the Peshwa or Bhoosla was taken in forts that city, and for the recovery of which or camps which fell before the conquer- suits have been instituted in the native ing armies, the principle of actual capture courts. of Bengal, which so far as we are might well be applied; and if the capture informed, are still undetermined. Who, were made before the dissolution of the we would ask, are the actual captors in army of the Deccan, Sir Thomas His- these two instances? And yet these items, lop and his staff might claim the usual as state-prize, which the Company is not proportions of commander-in-chief and staff entitled to, will probably be awarded to over the divisions which made the cap- the army. The last-mentioned jewels it ture. But much, indeed the bulk, of was intended by the Bengal government, the amount claimed on the part of the to restore to the Raja, by whom Apa army, was state-prize, which fell to the Saheb has been succeeded at Nagpoor, civil officers of the government that suc- but the award of the Treasury Lords bas ceeded the Peshwa and Bhoosla; and deprived the Company of all power of how was it possible to apply the principle disposing of them, and if they be now of actual capture to such booty? Thus restored, it must be after re-purchase Baja Row Peshwa had sent the bulk of from the army. These difficulties were his state-jewels to be concealed in a pri- inherent in the case from the beginning, vate house in the open town of Nâsik. and suggested the recommendation of Information of the hoard was given to the Marquis of Hastings, that all the Mr. Elphinstone, the civil commissioner, booty should be thrown into a general some time after the dissolution of the fund. They must have been fully argued army of the Deccan, and when a few ope- by the counsel employed in support of rations against the Arabs of Kandês were that side, and yet, it appears, that the all that remained to complete the reduc- majority of the Treasury Lords were not tion of the country. Mr. Elphinstone convinced until the trustees, finding the sent immediate orders to his civil deputy difficulty of applying the principle of in that part of the country, who hap- actual capture to their award, reported pered to be a military man (Captain the same for further judgment. The arBriggs), and he proceeded with a small guments of both sides on this part of the personal escort, borrowed from the force of case were again heard by the Treasury, Colonel M'Dowall, to take possession of on the 7th of January 1826, and the these jewels. Had the crown been the go-case now awaits the decision of that verning authority of India, the prize would tribunal. probably have been deemed a droit, so as not to fall to the army: but the governing authority happening to be the Company, which is precluded from any right or interest in booty resulting from war, the crown has ordered the Nâsik jewels to go to the army. Upon the principle of actual capture, however, Mr. Elphinstone, who directed the operation, must be the commander-in-chief, and Captain Briggs, his civil assistant, the actual captor. Neither Sir Thomas Hislop nor bis staff can have a better claim than any other indifferent person. But if there be absurdity in the principle of actual capture, as applied to these jewels, there is still greater in respect III. A SHORT discussion took place, before the close of the session, on the Sutters, or burning of Indian widows on the funerai pile of their deceased husbands. This rite, which is a form of publie suicide, seems so strongly sanctioned among the Hindoos by religion and custom, that it would be difficult, if not impossible to suppress it by direct legisla tive interference, The Hindoos maintain, that the true Suttee need not burn publicly, but even if prohibited, will pine away and die, for the sake of joining her husband in paradise.. The presence of the police-officers | never voted in favour of any tax. Taxunder the system now pursued on these ation is, in fact, the price which we pay occasions in India, may tend to assure us, for government; and our object in this, that the suffering, or at any rate the going as in all other purchases, should be, to forth to suffer, is not the result of any obtain the best article we can at the lowother compulsion than that which is occa- est price. For this purpose it is necessioned by superstition and family pride. sary not only that the affairs of governIf this be so, it seems hopeless to expect ment should be conducted with the greatany alteration, except in the progress of est wisdom and economy, but also that truth, and the decay of superstition; and the revenue which is required should be it may fairly be asked, whether those levied in such a manner as to occasion members of the House whose imagina- the smallest possible loss of enjoyment tions seem so deeply affected, by this to the contributors. It is on this subject distant, irremediable, and comparatively alone that it is our province at present small amount of suffering, might not to treat. We have nothing fo do with employ their time and faculties better, by the amount of the sinking fund, the attempting to remove the causes of misery standing army, and other like objects, prevailing to an enormous extent in their which have found their way into the deown country, and for the removal of bates on taxation. In this place we which little more is requisite than a moderate portion of disinterestedness. FINANCE AND TRADE. I. The Budget-Assessed TaxesSpirit Duties-Beer Duties, &c. &c.-II. Foreign Trade, &c. &c. In order to simplify, as much as possible, the subject of which we are about to treat, we shall divide it into two parts. We shall consider, in the first place, those taxes and duties which are imposed for the sake of raising a revenue to defray the expenses of government; and secondly, those of which the objects are of a different nature, as, for instance, the protection of manufactures, the encouragement of shipping, or the formation of advantageous political connexions with other countries. must assume that a certain revenue is necessary, and we have only to inquire how it may be raised in the most advantagcous manner. A striking alteration has taken place, during the last four years, in the management of this department of our government, by the resignation of the late Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Vansittart, now Lord Bexley; a minister who repeatedly proved himself to be ignorant of some of the simplest of those principles which ought to have guided his conduct, and who, in several instances, systematically persevered, year after year, in increasing duties, when he might have learned from the returns, that the only effect of such increase was the rapid reduction of the revenue *. Mr. Robinson has, therefore, had the peculiar good fortune, on entering into office, to be enabled at the same time to reduce taxation and to increase the revenue. As it may be useful to ascertain how and in what cases these desirable objects may be effected; and as it is a sub very fully explained; we shall not apologize for enlarging on this topic. We do so with the less hesitation, as by laying down some of the general principles of taxation in the first instance, we shall facilitate our subsequent inquiries. I. IN entering upon the first of these subjects, we may observe, that whilst, on the one hand, we disagree with those me-ject which we believe has been never taphorical reasoners who would persuade us that the money which is taken in taxes is not really taken from the people-a proposition which has been proved by a simile, in which taxes are made to resemble the moisture which, being first drawn up from the earth, is sent back to it in refreshing showers; neither on the other, can we coincide in opinion with a certain worthy county mem-. ber, who is reported to have made it a subject of self-congratulation, at a meeting of his constituents, that he had We may of course assume that the whole annual revenue of the inhabitants of every country, whether they be productive or unproductive consumers, is expended on the various articles produced *Sec Edinb. Rev. vol. xxxvi. p. 534. |