FALLACIES OF AUTHORITY. The four following are those in most frequent use: Wisdom of our ancestors. Irrevocable laws. Laudatory personalities. 1. The first of these is generally contained in the hacknied expressions of-The wisdom of our ancestors,- Wisdom of ages-Venerable antiquity,-Wisdom of old times, and phrases of the like import; from which it is meant to be inferred, that the repugnancy between a proposed measure and the opinions of our ancestors on the same subject, is, in itself, a sufficient reason for rejecting the measure. Now, according to the language of all but those who are interested in resorting to this fallacy, "Experience is the mother of wisdom;" according to the fallacy, Wisdom is the offspring, not of experience, but of inexperience. As between individual and individual living at the same time and in the same situation, he who is old may have more experience than he who is young as between generation and generation, that which is the preceding generation, cannot have had so much experience as the succeeding: with respect to such of the materials or sources of wisdom as may fall under every man's individual observation, the two generations may be on a par; with respect to such of those materials as are derived from the reports of others, the later of the two possesses the indisputable advantage of adding to its own experience, the experience of the former. So long as men keep to vague generalities, and oppose their "wise progenitors" in the lump, to the "ignorant mob" of modern times, the weakness of the fallacy may escape detection: let them but contrast any determinate period of "venerable antiquity" with the present time, and the deception will instantly vanish. Unless the antecedent period be comparatively a recent one, so great will be the disparity, that in comparison with the best informed classes of those venerated ancestors, the palm of intellect must be awarded to a modern mechanic. Take, for instance, the reign of Henry VIII. At that time the House of Lords probably possessed the larger proportion of what little information the age afforded; it is doubtful, however, whether, without exception, their Lordships were able so much as to read; but supposing they could, in what book were they at that time to find any instruction on the various branches of political science? Pass on to the reign of James I., and we see that Solomon of his time, consigning men to death and torment for the misfortune of not being quite so well acquainted as he was, with the nature and composition of the Godhead. In the time of Charles II., even after Bacon had laid the foundations of a sound philosophy, we find Lord Chief Justice Hale unable to tell, (so he says himself,) what theft was, but knowing at the same time too well, what witchcraft was, and hanging men with equal complacency for both crimes, amidst the applauses of all that was wise and learned in that blessed age. Our ancestors then, considering the disadvantages under which they laboured, could not have been capable of exercising so sound a judgment on their own interests as we on ours: but as a knowledge of the facts on which a judgment is to be pronounced, is an indispensable preliminary to the arriving at just conclusions, and as the relevant facts of a later period must all of them individually, and most of them specifically, have been unknown to the man of the earlier period, it is clear, that a judgment derived from the authority of our ancestors, and applied to existing affairs, must be a judgment pronounced without evidence: and this is the judgment which the fallacy in question calls on us to abide by, to the exclusion of a judgment which might be formed on complete evidence. No one will deny that preceding ages have produced men eminently distinguished by benevolence and genius; it is to them that we owe in succession all the advances which have hitherto been made in the career of human improvement: but, as their talents could only be developed in proportion to the state of knowledge at the period in which they lived, and could only have been called into action with a view to then-existing circumstances, it is absurd to rely on their authority at a period and under a state of things altogether different. In no part of the field of knowledge, save legislation, do leading men of the present times recommend us this receipt for thinking and acting wisely. Nobody would now refer us to the wisdom of our ancestors for the best mode of marshalling armies, navigating ships, or curing, alleviating, or preventing disease. Why this difference? Only because in these parts of the field of knowledge, leading men are not affected with that sinister interest which is so unhappily combined with power in the frame of European governments. The causes of the ascendency which this fallacy has attained, seem to be, an error in language, and a prejudice in favor of the dead. The gist of the fallacy lies in the word old, for what in common language is called old time, ought in strictness to be denominated young or early time; succeeding generations, as we have before shewn, being, with reference to the accumulated experience of ages, as much older than those which have preceded, as a man is older than a child. To bestow on preceding ages the name of old time, is to transfer the appellation of old from age to infancy: the wisdom of antiquity is not the wisdom of grey hairs, but the wisdom of the cradle. The prejudice in favor of the dead is no less indefensible than pernicious. The language of reason would inform us, that the infliction of pain on those who feel, and not on those who are insensible,- that outrages on the living, and not attacks on the dead, should be stamped with the seal of reprobation. The origin of the prejudice will be found very near the surface. The dead have no rivals. They stand no longer in the way; and their survivors gain cheaply a credit for impartiality, by praises which cost nothing, and frequently enable them to gratify a more urgent malignity towards their living opponents. 2. No Precedent. This fallacy is of the same nature as the preceding, and in effect propounds, that nothing ought now to be done unless it has also been "The proposition is novel and unprecedented;done by our ancestors. the present is surely the first time that any such thing was ever heard of in this house." Such is the language in which the sophist clothes his objection, which, if it were attended to, would form a complete bar to all human improvement, and pushed to its consequences, would place us again in the savage state. The exigency which calls for the measure to which this fallacy is offered as an objection, may never before have arisen; or if it arose, they who were exposed to it, may not have had ingenuity to devise the measure. But, if the argument be an objection against a measure now proposed, so it is equally an objection against every other that ever has been proposed or adopted, and consequently against every institution that exists at present: if it prove that a thing now proposed ought not to be done, it proves equally that nothing else ought ever to have been done. 3. Irrevocable Laws. All laws and political institutions are essentially dispositions for the future, and the professed object of them is to afford a steady and permanent security to the interests of mankind: so far, therefore, they may be said to be framed with a view to perpetuity: but men are fallible, and circumstances change; laws or institutions may turn out to be defective; the causes which called them into existence may cease to operate, and other causes may call for an alteration: it is obvious, therefore, that the principle on which all laws ought to be, and the greater part of them have been established, is that of defeasible perpetuity. The ignorant and unreflecting, as well the interested, are, however, often heard to speak of certain laws as absolutely irrrevocable; carrying thereby, to the highest pitch of extravagance and absurdity, the fallacy of the Wisdom of Ancestors. To the extent of the pretended immutable law, the government is transferred from the legislator of the time being, who has the best means of information, and the liveliest interest in the matter, to the dead legislator, who could have no means of foreknowing the exigencies of the present moment, and no interest equal to that of those who are immediately concerned. The despotism of a living tyrant, be he Caligula or Nero, may be alleviated by operating on the hopes or apprehensions of the despot; but the deceased neither hears nor feels. It should be observed, that it is only when the law in question is mischievous, that an argument of this stamp will be employed in support of it: if it be good, it will be supported by reasons drawn from its own excellence. One shape which this fallacy has occasionally assumed, is the supposed existence of a kind of public contract. The sacred observance of contracts is among the most important ties that bind society together, and an argument drawn from this source, cannot fail to wear the appearance of plausibility. A contract, however, is not in itself an end, but a means to an end, and in cases where the public is a party, it is only so far as the public happiness is the end in view, that the contract is worthy to be observed. A striking application of the fallacy to the sinister purposes of a small portion of the public, may be found in the pages of Blackstone. In the articles of Union between England and Scotland, for securing the forty-five members of the latter country from being outvoted by the five hundred of the former, provision had been made in favour of the Scottish Kirk. To give the treaty a colour of reciprocity, the like provision was made in favour of the Church of England. Of this latter circumstance, Blackstone has artfully availed himself for the purpose of perpetuating whatever may be found defective in English ecclesiastical matters. He states, that the preservation of the two churches, and the maintenance of the acts of uniformity which established the Common Prayer, are expressly declared to be " fundamental and essential conditions" of the union, and, therefore, that any alteration in the constitutions of either of the churches, or, with certain exceptions, in the liturgy of the Church of England, would be an infringement of those "fundamental conditions," and "greatly endanger the Union." Hence, should it ever occur that a change in the established belief should be followed by a corresponding alteration in the articles of the church,-if, for instance, the opinion should happen to gain ground, that human beings by the mere act of being born, neither merit nor incur damnation, and a corresponding change should be made in the article which enjoins such belief,- the union, according to Blackstone, would be greatly endangered. The absurdity of this reasoning is scarcely less astonishing than its impudence. : Another shape which the fallacy assumes, is that of a vow, or promissory oath; in which case, as a sanction to the engagement, a supernatural power is introduced in the character of guarantee. Now this supernatural power is either bound or not bound. If not bound, the sanction amounts to nothing: if bound, observe the consequence the Almighty is bound; and by whom? Of all the worms that crawl upon the earth in the shape of men, there is not one who may not thus impose on the ruler of the universe any number of contradictory and incompatible observances. The offence too, which this Being is to visit with punishment, is not the act which the oath was proposed to prevent, for that act may be indifferent or even meritorious: the offence is the mere profanation of a ceremony, and an act the most beneficial to mankind may become by this doctrine the greatest crime in the estimation of the Object of Religion; whence the absurdity follows that the Being whose tenderness for the happiness of mankind is among his most estimable attributes, is nevertheless injured and offended by an act which may promote that happiness in the highest degree. The statute of 5 Ann. c. 8. art. 25. s. 8. establishes a coronation oath, by which the king vows to preserve inviolate the settlement of the church, and the doctrine, worship, discipline, and government thereof, as then by law established. The utterance of this vow was made during the late reign, the pretence for perpetuating a mischievous instance of misrule in the exclusion of the Catholics from political privileges. It is obvious that the vow can only apply to the king in his executive and not in his legislative capacity; otherwise, every curate's bill, and almost every other statute to which he gives his assent, would be an infraction of it. It is obvious that if he persists in viewing it in a different light, he has the option of resigning his kingly office. It is obvious that if he refuse to do so, and makes the observance of an oath the pretence for inflicting and perpetuating misery upon a whole people, he renders himself absolute on the easy condition of pronouncing the word conscience, and that the pretended check of the oath is in effect a licence under the appearance of a check ;-chains to the man in power; but such as he figures with on C the stage; to the spectators as imposing, to himself, as light as possible, they rattle without restraining. But whatever interpretation may be put on the oath, to oppose a beneficial measure on the score of religion, is to employ the form against the substance; the means against the end; to convert the terms employed to magnify the service of the Deity, into instruments of opposing his designs. To pronounce such a vow is criminal, to persist in it criminal and foolish. It should always be observed that this sanction is more likely to be applied to a pernicious than a beneficial purpose. Because the more manifestly the act enjoined or prohibited, is beneficial, the more likely is it to be performed or omitted independently of the sanction. 4. Laudatory Personalities. This class of fallacies is played off in two ways; By a bold assumption of superior honesty or talent, or Under the first device, when any abuse is dragged to light, any reform proposed or security demanded, men in office set up a cry of surprise, amounting almost to indignation, as if their integrity were questioned or their honour wounded; at the same time they dexterously throw in intimations that their conduct is regulated by nothing less than the most exalted patriotism, honour, and religion. The use of this fallacy is frequent in proportion to the difficulty of meeting it with specific disproof. Of the various official malefactors there is not one in whose defence this fallacy has not been urged : no matter what the delinquency or how clearly proved, up starts some friend of the accused, and roundly asserts his entire integrity and aptitude, which can no longer be disputed when it rests on such high authority. Ordinarily we judge of men's character by their conduct; this fallacy calls on us to judge of their conduct by their character: and this too, notwithstanding the indisputable principle of politics, that no possible degree of virtue in those who rule can justify us in dispensing with the safeguard of good laws and public investigation. Assertions such as those we have noticed, are not only irrelevant to any question of reform or of improved public security, but they involve assumptions opposed to the known qualities of human nature; they deny the influence of private interest in cases where it operates with the most unfailing certainty; they are as easily made by the most profligate, as by the most virtuous of mankind, and are much more likely to be resorted to by the profligate. The virtuous man, being what he is, has that chance for being esteemed as such; the profligate self-trumpeter, having no such hope of reputation, relies on the conjunct effect of his own effrontery, and the imbecility of his hearers. An equal assumption of superiority is involved in the other mode of playing off this fallacy by an unusual affectation of modesty. When a defect in our institutions is clearly pointed out, and an unobjectionable remedy proposed, up starts the man in office, and instead of giving any definite answer, meets the proposal, with, "I am not prepared" to do so and so; "I am not prepared to say," &c.; with other phrases of similar import: the meaning of which, put into plain English, is, |