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CHAP. I.] ALLIANCE OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE.

299

and still no more than an abbé; so that no time was to be lost in pushing his fortune. In person he was slender, light complexioned, with a sly and fox-like expression of countenance.

Dubois took a rapid and correct view of the state of Europe, in the interest of his master. This interest was two-fold: to assure the possession of the Regency, and to secure the French throne in the line of Orléans, instead of that of Philip V., in case of the death of Louis XV. In order to accomplish this, an alliance was to be made with England; the interest of that country in excluding the King of Spain from the French succession being identical with that of the Regent. George I. had need of such an alliance. France was the only Power that could lend any material aid to the Pretender, the so-called James III.; while, on the other hand, without the assistance of England, Philip V. stood no chance of prevailing against the Duke of Orléans. The policy of the French and English alliance was therefore founded principally on views of family interest; but this interest fortunately coincided with that of the two nations, and indeed of all Europe, for which peace was a necessity.

The return of the Whigs to power on the accession of George I. had drawn closer the relations between England and the Dutch Republic, and thus promised to facilitate the accession of the StatesGeneral to the contemplated alliance. Holland had become almost a satellite of Great Britain, to which she looked for the maintenance of her barrier. The ancient alliance between the two countries was renewed by the Treaty of Westminster, Feb. 17th 1716, by which former treaties were confirmed. George I., with an eye to his newly acquired duchies of Bremen and Verden, had also concluded. a defensive alliance with the Emperor, Charles VI. (May 25th 1716).5

On the other hand, the Whigs, as well as George I. himself, had always loudly expressed their dissatisfaction at the Treaty of Utrecht; they had denounced the Tories as the authors of it, and it was a delicate task to require them to turn round and support it. The clamours, too, against France had been increased by the aid recently afforded to the Pretender and by the continuation of the works at Mardyck. Thus many difficulties stood in the way of Dubois's project; but they were at length surmounted by his skill and perseverance. Finding that Lord Stanhope was to pass through Holland in July 1716 with George I., on his way to Hanover, Dubois repaired to the Hague on pretence of collecting books and

4 Martin, t. xv. p. 80.

• Dumont, t. viii. pt. i. p. 477.

300

TRIPLE ALLIANCE.

[BOOK VI. objects of virtù; where, as if by chance, he contrived to have an interview with his old acquaintance, the English minister. He availed himself of the opportunity to open and recommend his plans; matters were prepared for a treaty, and in the following August Dubois went to Hanover, where the alliance was finally arranged. The States-General, fearful of offending the Emperor, manifested at first great reluctance to accede to the treaty; but these scruples being at length overcome, the TRIPLE ALLIANCE was signed at the Hague, Jan. 4th 1717. By this treaty the provisions contained in the Treaty of Utrecht were renewed; Louis XV. promised never to aid the Pretender, and to induce him to cross the Alps; fresh stipulations were made respecting the destruction of the works at Dunkirk and Mardyck; and it was agreed that English commissaries should be appointed to see that this article was faithfully executed."

Although this treaty was favourable to England, it experienced much opposition from the Whigs. The Regent conciliated Pitt, the leader of that party and father of the celebrated Lord Chatham, by the present of a magnificent diamond. The alliance was also most unwelcome to the Emperor, although there appears to have been an understanding among the parties to it that he should obtain Sicily in exchange for Sardinia. On receipt of the news he wrote to the States-General that the Barrier Treaty was at an end; but this was a mere menace. Nobody, however, was so vexed and surprised as the King of Spain. Relying on his treaty with England, Philip deemed himself secure of that Power, and when the Regent communicated to him the project of the Triple Alliance, he had replied with indifference. Alberoni, however, persuaded him at present to digest his anger. That minister was not yet prepared to act, and wished to postpone a war till he should have accumulated the necessary resources to conduct it with vigour. For this purpose, he had obtained the Pope's permission to levy a tax on the Spanish clergy under the pretence of assisting the Venetians in the war which they were then waging with the Turks; and indeed he actually despatched a force of 8000 men to assist in the defence of Corfû. But before his preparations were complete he was hurried into a war with the Emperor by a comparatively trivial incident. In May 1717, the Grand Inquisitor of Spain, in returning from Rome, ventured to traverse the Milanese without an imperial passport, and was arrested as a rebellious subject of Charles III. of Spain! Exasperated by this insult, Philip V.

• Dumont, t. viii. pt. i. p. 484; Lamberty, Mém. t. x. p. 1.

CHAP. I.]

TURKISH HISTORY.

301

declared that he would immediately vindicate the honour of his crown. In vain did Alberoni remonstrate and represent to Philip that he had but the rudiments of a fleet and army; Philip was inflexible, and all that the minister could obtain was that hostilities should first be directed against the Island of Sardinia, instead of Naples and Sicily. Alberoni, finding himself thus prematurely driven into a war by the hastiness of his sovereign, resolved to surprise Europe by the boldness of his measures. But first of all,

to secure himself a retreat in case of failure, he extorted from the Pope a cardinal's hat, partly by threats, and partly by representations of the services which he had rendered to the Venetians in their struggle with the Turks. Matters being thus arranged, an armament was despatched for the conquest of Sardinia. Nine thousand Spaniards were landed there towards the end of August 1717; and, with the aid of the discontented inhabitants, got possession of the whole island in less than three months."

One of the first effects of this attack on the Emperor's western possessions was to hamper him in his wars and negociations with the Ottoman Porte. But to explain this matter, it will be necessary to take a short retrospective view of Turkish history.

We have already recorded the peace concluded between the Sultan and the Czar, and how Charles XII. of Sweden was subsequently compelled to quit the Turkish dominions. One of the chief motives with the Porte for assuring tranquillity on this side was that it might turn its arms elsewhere. Great activity was observed in the Turkish arsenals, but the object of it was long uncertain. The Emperor, then engaged in the war of the Spanish Succession, assembled in 1714 an army of observation of 50,000 men in Hungary and Transylvania. It appeared at last that the mighty preparations of the Turks were directed against Venice, with the view of recovering the Morea, a loss which the Porte had never been able to digest. In Dec. 1714 the Venetian Bailo at Constantinople was informed in the grossest terms by the Grand Vizier Damad Ali Pasha that it was the intention of his master not to rest till he had recovered the Morea: he was directed to leave Constantinople in three days, and, together with all other Venetians, the Turkish territories in three weeks; but before that time had expired, he was imprisoned in the castle of the Dardanelles, and his suite of forty-two persons in the Seven Towers, as hostages for the security of Turkish subjects in the Venetian dominions. The

'Alberoni was very generally accused by his contemporaries of having been the author of this war; but it is now acknow

ledged that it was undertaken against his
will. See Coxe, Spanish Bourbons, vol. ii.
p. 275 sq.
* Above, p. 245.

302

AUSTRO-VENETIAN AND TURKISH WAR. [BOOK VI.

Signoria, relying on a peace guaranteed by the Emperor, had made but small preparations for defence. Their rule in the Morea had been highly unpopular. The inhabitants preferred the Turkish government as both cheaper and less oppressive, and were not, therefore, disposed to fight in the cause of their Venetian masters. Hence, when the Turks entered the Morea in the summer of 1715 with overwhelming numbers, the inhabitants in many places hastened to submit; and as the Venetians were neither strong enough to cope with the Turks in the open field, nor the fortresses of the peninsula in a state to resist a lengthened siege, the whole of the Morea was wrested from them in the course of a few months. For not defending some of these towns, rendered defenceless by their own neglect, the Signoria threw the commandants into prison for life.

The Emperor was alarmed at the sudden and decisive success of the Turks; and as Louis XIV. had died during the campaign, he was the more disposed to listen to the prayers of the Venetians for assistance. He was strongly exhorted to this step by Prince Eugene, who represented to him the danger that would accrue to his Italian, and even to his German, states, if the Turks should get possession of the Ionian Islands. An alliance was accordingly signed with the Signoria, April 13th 1716. It purported to be a renewal of the Holy League of 1684, and the casus belli against the Porte was, therefore, the violation of the Peace of Carlowitz; but instead of being merely directed against that Power, it was extended to a general defensive alliance with the Venetian Republic. Under the energetic superintendence of Eugene, the preparations for war were soon completed. In the course of April three Austrian divisions entered Hungary, Eugene himself being at the head of the largest, of 70,000 men. On the other hand, the Grand Vizier, with 100,000 men, marched towards Belgrade; while the agents of the Porte incited to insurrection the malcontent Hungarians, and their leader Ragoczy, who aimed at obtaining the principality of Transylvania, and even the title of King of Hungary. The Vizier having attacked Eugene in his fortified camp before Peterwarde in on August 3rd, that commander offered him battle on the 5th, in which the Vizier himself was slain, and the Turks utterly defeated. This victory is principally ascribed to the use of heavy cavalry, with which the Turks were as yet unacquainted. The fruits of it were the surrender of Temesvar; and even Wallachia declared for the

De La Motraye, Voyages, t. i. p. 462. On the Venetian government of the Morea (1685-1715), see Ranke, Hist. u.

Pol. Zeitschrift, B. ii. S. 405 ff.; Finlay,
Greece under Othoman and Venetian
Domination.

CHAP. I.]

PEACE OF PASSAROWITZ.

303

Emperor; a manifestation, however, which led to no result. In the same year an attempt of the Turks upon Corfû was repulsed, chiefly through the military talents of Baron Schulenburg, whom we have already met with in the Polish war, and whose services the Venetians had procured.

The Porte, discouraged by these reverses, made proposals to the Emperor for a peace early in 1717; and Sir Wortley Montague and Count Colyer, the English and Dutch residents at Constantinople, endeavoured to forward this object by their mediation.10 But their offers were not listened to. In the spring, Eugene took the command of 140,000 men, and many princes and nobles flocked to his standards as volunteers, desirous of sharing the renown of so distinguished a commander. He now directed his march on Belgrade, near which place he was attacked, on August 16th, by a much superior Turkish force, which, however, he entirely defeated. Belgrade capitulated on the 18th. The Porte now renewed its offers of peace. Eugene declined to treat except on the basis of uti possidetis; and the Cabinet of Vienna insisted that Venice should be included in the treaty. As the Porte had obtained some advantages over the Venetians in the course of the year, it was at first unwilling to concede this point. In the spring of 1718 Eugene increased his demands by requiring the cession of Bosnia, Servia, and Wallachia. But the hostile attitude assumed by Spain, induced the Emperor to lower his terms. He abandoned his pretensions to Wallachia and the other provinces, but insisted on the basis of uti possidetis, which the Turks at last agreed to accept, as well as to abandon the cause of Ragoczy. A congress was now assembled at Passarowitz, which was opened by a speech of Sir Robert Sutton, as English mediator, June 5th. Although the Emperor had pretended to enter into the war on account of the Venetians, they were made the scape-goats of the peace, as the uti possidetis of course deprived them of the Morea, while Charles VI. retained all his conquests. Thus the PEACE OF PASSAROWITZ (July 21st 1718) gave a mortal blow to the power of Venice in the East."1 But to return to the affairs of Western Europe.

Although victor at Peterwardein and Belgrade, some time must elapse before the Emperor could freely wield all his forces against Spain, and he therefore appealed to the Triple Alliance against the violators of Italian neutrality. Alberoni, on the other hand, sought to propitiate England by some commercial advantages, and strained

10 This is the period of the well-known Letters of Lady Montague, the wife of the English envoy.

11 The treaty is in Katona, t. xxxviii. p. 371 sqq.

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