394 HOSTILITIES BETWEEN FRANCE AND ENGLAND. [Book VI. by a chain of forts stretching from Louisiana to Canada. Commissaries were appointed to settle these questions, who held their conferences at Paris between the years 1750 and 1755. Disputes also arose respecting the occupation by the French of the islands of St. Lucia, Dominica, St. Vincent, and Tobago, which had been declared neutral by former treaties. Before the Commissaries could terminate their labours, mutual aggressions had rendered a war inevitable. As is usual in such cases, it is difficult to say who was the first aggressor. Each nation laid the blame on the other. Some French writers assert that the English resorted to hostilities out of jealousy at the increase of the French navy. According to the plans of Rouillé, the French Minister of Marine, 111 ships of the line, fifty-four frigates, and smaller vessels in proportion, were to be built in the course of ten years. The question of boundaries was, however, undoubtedly the occasion, if not also the true cause of the war. A series of desultory conflicts had taken place along the Ohio, and on the frontiers of Nova Scotia, in 1754, without being avowed by the mother countries. A French writer, who flourished about this time, the Abbé Raynal, ascribes this clandestine warfare to the policy of the Court of Versailles, which was seeking gradually to recover what it had lost by treaties.3 Orders were now issued to the English fleet to attack French vessels wherever found. This act has been censured as piratical, because it had not been preceded by a formal declaration of war; but it was subsequently defended by Pitt, on the ground that the right of hostile operations results not from any such declaration, but from the previous hostilities of an aggressor; nor is this principle contested in the reply of the French minister. It being known that a considerable French fleet was preparing to sail from Brest and Rochefort for America, Admiral Boscawen was despatched thither, and captured two French men-of-war off Cape Race in Newfoundland, June 1755. Hostilities were also transferred to the shores of Europe. Sir Edward Hawke was instructed to destroy every French ship he could find between Cape Ortegal and Cape Clear; and the English privateers made numerous prizes. A naval war between England and France was now unavoidable; but, as in the case of the Austrian Succession, this was also to be mixed up with a European war. The complicated relations of the European system again caused these two wars to run into one, though their origin had nothing in common. France and England, 3 Hist. des établissemens des Européens dans les deux Indes (vol. v. p. 82, Eng. Tr.). • See Pitt's instructions to Mr. Stanley, July 29th 1761, ap. Garden, Hist. des whose quarrel lay in the New World, appeared as the leading Powers in a European contest in which they had only a secondary interest, and decided the fate of Canada on the plains of Germany. The war in Europe, commonly called the SEVEN YEARS' WAR, was chiefly caused by the pride of one Empress, the vanity of another, and the subserviency of a royal courtezan, who became the tool of these passions. Maria Theresa could not digest the loss of Silesia, especially as it had been inflicted on her by an unequal adversary whom she despised. Her plans of vengeance were aided by Elizabeth of Russia, whose vanity had been hurt by the impolitic sarcasms of the King of Prussia. But the Empress-Queen would never have been able to execute her projects against Frederick II. unless she had been assisted by France. The manner in which she obtained the aid of that Power forms a masterpiece of diplomatic skill. We have already alluded to the reluctance with which Maria Theresa signed the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. Although England had been her most powerful ally, she had begun to regard that Power with aversion, as being, through its counsels, one of the chief causes of her losing Silesia. She was also offended by the high tone assumed by the English Cabinet, and she manifested her discontent to the English Ambassador when he offered to congratulate her on the Peace, by remarking that condolence would be more appropriate. She was aware, however, that a rupture with Great Britain must be made good by an alliance with France, in short, by an inversion of the whole political system of Europe, and the extinction of that hereditary rivalry which had prevailed during two centuries between France and Austria. Such a task presented no ordinary difficulties; yet it was accomplished by the talents and perseverance of Count Kaunitz, one of the most remarkable statesmen of that age, and the greatest minister that Austria ever possessed. Kaunitz was now in the prime of life, having been born in 1711. He had been destined for the Church, but having, through the death of his elder brothers, become heir to the family title and estates, his vocation was altered. After a careful education, completed by foreign travel, he entered the service of Charles VI., and after the death of that Emperor was employed by Maria Theresa in various missions to Rome, Florence, Turin, and London, in the discharge of which his abilities procured for him her entire confidence. His success was, perhaps, in no small degree owing to the singular combination of qualities in his character. Under the easy exterior of a man of the world— 5 Stenzel, Gesch. des Preuss. Staats, B. iv. S. 374. 390 COUNT KAUNITZ. [Book VI. we might even say of a fop and a voluptuary6-were concealed acute penetration, deep reflection, impenetrable reserve, indomitable perseverance. Even his bitter adversary, Frederick II., was forced to acknowledge the depth and power of his intellect. His political principles, like those of most statesmen of the age, were despotic; his residence at Paris had imbued him with the philosophical ideas then current, hence he was indifferent to religion, and regarded the Church only as the servant of the State. The energies of this remarkable man were directed during forty years to one object— the aggrandisement of the House of Austria. While the negociations at Aix-la-Chapelle were still pending, he had already, as we have said, conceived the seemingly impracticable project of uniting France and Austria against Prussia. The scheme was a profound secret between himself and Maria Theresa. Even the Queen's husband, Francis I., was ignorant of it till it was ripe for execution. The same thing happened at the French Court. Louis XV. and his mistress, the Marquise de Pompadour, formed a sort of interior and secret cabinet, which often acted contrary to the views of the ministers. Kaunitz, who, for the purpose of forwarding his plans, filled the post of Austrian Ambassador at Paris from the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle till the year 1753, had observed this peculiarity of the French Court, and availed himself of the facilities which it afforded. To gain Madame de Pompadour was no difficult task. She, too, like the Empress of Russia, had been railleries of Frederick's respecting herself and her royal lover. Kaunitz artfully kept this feeling alive, and at the same time soothed the vanity of the royal favourite by the marks of favour and friendship which he persuaded his mistress to bestow upon her. He even prevailed upon the reluctant Maria Theresa, the proud descendant of the House of Habsburg, the chaste mother of a new line of Emperors, to write an autograph letter, in which the Empress-Queen addressed the low-born mistress of Louis as "Ma Cousine!" After the conquest of Pompadour it was not difficult to gain Louis. That monarch felt a natural antipathy for Frederick. He envied the Prussian King's splendid talents and achievements; nay, though himself sunk in all the abominations and ordures of the Parc aux Cerfs, he affected to abhor Frederick as a Protestant, or rather a freethinker. It irritated by some Thus he could not bear death to be named in his presence. The decease of any of his acquaintance was communicated to him by a circumlocution, as "he will not come again," &c. Marmontel informs us (Mém. t. i. p. 339), that he surprised the Count with his face smeared with the yolk of an egg, to remove the effects of the sun after hunting! 7 Martin, t. xv. p. 492. was necessary, however, that an alliance between France and Austria should be justified in the eyes of the French nation by some ostensible political object. To provide this, Kaunitz was prepared to sacrifice the Austrian Netherlands. Austria felt that she had been placed there by Great Britain and Holland, two Powers for whom she had no great affection, merely as a stop-gap, and to render those countries a barrier against France; but for that very reason, as well as from their distance, they were felt to be rather a burthen than an advantage. Even during the negociations for the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, Kaunitz had proposed to cede Brabant and Flanders to France if that Power would compel Frederick to restore Silesia. But France was then exhausted by the recent war, and cared not to enter into the project. It was not till after many years of patient expectation that the breaking out of hostilities between France and England at length promised to crown Kaunitz's labours with success. The counterpart of that minister's policy to conciliate France was of course to provoke a quarrel with England. Austria refused to pay the half million crowns which formed her share of the expense of the Dutch garrisons in Austrian Flanders, and abolished the commercial privileges which the English enjoyed in that country. When the British Cabinet remonstrated, the EmpressQueen petulantly replied that she was Sovereign in the Netherlands, and would not be dictated to. Matters grew worse in 1755. France was evidently meditating an invasion of Hanover, and with that view was negociating with the Elector of Cologne to form magazines in Westphalia. George II. now required of Maria Theresa, as he was entitled to do as guarantor of the Pragmatic Sanction, that she should increase her army in Flanders by 20,000 or 30,000 men. But the Court of Vienna, forgetful of the services which it had received from Great Britain, refused, on the plea that such a step would offend France; alleging also the unfounded excuse that Austria was threatened with invasion by Prussia. In vain the English Government assured her that Russia, with whom they had just concluded a treaty, would protect her against any attempt, if such was to be feared, on the part of Frederick. The treaty alluded to, executed September 30th 1755, was but a renewal of the alliance already subsisting between Great Britain and Russia since 1742. The Empress Elizabeth agreed to hold 55,000 men in readiness at the command of England on the frontiers of For these negociations see Euvres de Fréd. II, t. iv. p. 16; Mémoires de Richelieu, t. vii. p. 241; Duclos, Mém. Secrets (Coll. Michaud et Poujoulat, 3 sér. t. x. p. 635). 398 BAD FAITH OF THE EUROPEAN COURTS. [Book VI. Livonia, and forty or fifty galleys on the coast, that Power paying 100,000l. per annum while the army remained within the Russian boundaries, and 500,000l. when it marched beyond them. The invasion of Hanover, to be a casus fœderis. But the real politics of the Court of St. Petersburg were better known at Vienna than at London. Elizabeth, as the event proved, had only signed this treaty in order to pocket the subsidy which it stipulated, and immediately hostilities broke out she joined Maria Theresa against Great Britain. In fact, a defensive alliance had been concluded at Warsaw between Austria and Russia in June 1746, and therefore, after the Peace of Breslau, in a secret article of which Maria Theresa declared that if the King of Prussia should attack either her dominions or those of Russia or Poland, she would revive her rights to Silesia. 10 In her negociations with Great Britain the Empress-Queen had already begun to throw off the mask. Instead of being defended against Prussia, she openly talked of attacking that kingdom in order to restore the European balance. Mutual recriminations and reproaches ensued; but George II. declared that he would enter into no paper war, and turned to seek an ally in his nephew, Frederick, who had formerly accused him of deserving the gallows for stealing his father's will! It was an anxious time for the Prussian King. He wished for nothing more than to preserve what he had already obtained, and was therefore sincerely desirous of peace. But he clearly saw that the state of things precluded its maintenance. He was aware that his boldness and bad faith had made him an object of universal suspicion, that Maria Theresa was the centre of all the intrigues against him, and he strongly suspected that one of her trustiest allies might be the Russian Empress Elizabeth. At that period none of the European Courts was honest either to friend or foe. It was a contest of knavery, of bribery of one another's undersecretaries and other officers; each knew the most secret plans of his neighbour. Frederick had long been acquainted with the secret article of the Austrian and Russian Treaty of Warsaw, and he felt that it was high time to fortify himself with an alliance. But he was addressed at once by France and England-which should he choose? His treaty with France was just expiring: the Court of Versailles, not yet thoroughly resolved on the grand stroke of an Austrian alliance, wished him to renew it, and to aid in an attack upon Hanover. But the French negociations were unskilfully managed. Frederick's pride revolted at the haughty Wenck, Corp. jur. g. rec. t. iii. p. 75. 10 Adelung, B. v. Beil. ii, |