tone in which he was treated. He seemed to be regarded almost as a vassal of France; nay, some of the French proposals were positively insulting. Thus, for instance, the French minister, Rouillé, told the Prussian Ambassador to write to his master that an attack upon Hanover would afford a good opportunity for plunder, as the King of England's treasury was well provided! Frederick, naturally touchy after his somewhat equivocal, exploits, indignantly replied to this home-thrust, that he hoped M. Rouillé would learn to distinguish between persons-that such proposals fitted only a contrabandist." The Duke of Nivernais, who was sent on a special embassy to Berlin, tried to tempt Frederick by the offer of Tobago, one of the islands in dispute between France and England. Frederick requested him to find a more fitting governor "of Barataria." It is probable, however, that in choosing the English alliance, Frederick was guided by policy alone. From a due appreciation of the mercenary motives of the Russian Court, he was of opinion that after all it would adhere to England for the sake of her money; least of all did he expect an event so portentous as an alliance between Austria and France. He therefore entered into a Treaty of Neutrality with England, January 16th 1756, the only object of which professed to be to preserve the peace of Germany, and to prevent foreign troops from entering the Empire. By a secret article, the Netherlands were excluded from the operation of the treaty.12

This treaty, apparently so harmless, was followed by important consequences. Kaunitz employed it as his strongest argument to persuade the Cabinet of Versailles to a close alliance with Austria. His plans embraced the partition of Prussia among various Powers; to make the Polish crown hereditary in the Saxon family; to give the Austrian Netherlands to Don Philip in exchange for Parma and Piacenza; and to assign the ports of Nieuport and Ostend to France. These propositions occasioned violent discussions in the French Cabinet. The greater part of the ministry was for adhering to the old French anti-Austrian policy; but Louis and his mistress were for Maria Theresa. This momentous question was debated at a little house belonging to Madame de Pompadour, called Babiole. Madame de Pompadour, and her confidant the Abbé Bernis, without the intervention of any of the French ministers, arranged this momentous business with Count Stahremberg, who had succeeded Kaunitz as Austrian ambassador at Paris. The fate of France-nay, of Europe-lay at the discretion of a vain

11 Euvres, t. iv. p. 28.

12 Wenck, t. iii. p. 84.

400

ALLIANCE BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND FRANCE.

[BOOK VI.

courtezan. The Austrian alliance was resolved on. On May 1st 1756 two treaties were executed by France and Austria, one of which stipulated the entire neutrality of the Empress-Queen in the impending war between France and England; by the other, a defensive alliance, the two Powers mutually guaranteed their possessions in Europe, and promised each other a succour of 24,000 men' in case of attack, the war with England always excepted on the part of Austria; while France claimed no exceptions, not even in the case of a war between Austria and the Porte. The virtual effect of the treaties, therefore, was that Austria only engaged not to aid England against France, while France engaged to succour Austria with 24,000 men against Prussia, in case of need. But by secret articles the obligation of aid became reciprocal if other Powers, even in alliance with England, should attack the European possessions either of France or Austria. 13 Russia subsequently acceded to these treaties.

The wedge was thus got in, and Kaunitz hoped soon to drive it further, and induce the French Court to take a more active part in this project. The negociations had been concluded without the knowledge of the other Austrian ministers, or even of the Emperor Francis I., who detested France as the hereditary enemy of the House of Lorraine. When Kaunitz communicated them to the Council, the Emperor became so excited that, striking the table with his fist, he left the room, exclaiming " that such an unnatural alliance should not take place."1 Kaunitz was so alarmed that he could not say a word; but Maria Theresa directed him to proceed, and manifested such decisive approbation that the other ministers did not venture to oppose him. The easy-tempered Francis, who, in fact, took little part in the affairs of Austria, confining himself to those of the Empire and of his grand duchy of Tuscany, was at length brought to consent to the new line of policy, and even to persuade the States of the Empire to second it.

Meanwhile hostilities had openly broken out between France and England. In December 1755 the Court of Versailles had demanded satisfaction for all vessels seized by the English; which being refused till the reopening of negociations, an embargo was placed on British vessels in French ports. Great Britain, seeing herself on the eve of a war with France, required from Holland the succours stipulated by the Treaty of 1716; but though this demand was supported by the mother and guardian of the young Stadtholder, who was George II.'s daughter, yet the anti-Orange party,

13 Wenck, t. iii. p. 139, 141; Garden, t. iv. p. 19.

ex.

14 Coxe, House of Austria, vol. iv. ch.

availing itself of the alarm occasioned by a threat of Louis XV., persuaded the States-General to declare a strict neutrality. The English Cabinet had entered into treaties for the hire of troops with the States of Hesse-Cassel, Saxe-Gotha, and Schaumburg-Lippe. These petty German princes were at that period accustomed to traffic in the blood of their subjects, whose hire went not, like that of the Swiss, into their own pockets, but contributed to support the luxury and profligacy of their sovereigns. The military force of England was in those days but small; a dislike prevailed of standing armies, and her growing colonies and commerce required that her resources should be chiefly devoted to the augmentation of the navy. Hence the nation was seized almost with a panic when it was heard that large armaments, the destination of which was unknown, were preparing at Brest and Havre. The French, to increase the alarm and conceal their real design, caused large bodies of troops to assemble in their channel ports. Troops were hastily brought to England from Hanover and Hesse. But the storm fell elsewhere. War had not yet been formally declared when these armaments, joined by others from the French Mediterranean ports, appeared off Minorca, conveying an army of 12,000 men under Marshal the Duke of Richelieu. The Duke of Newcastle's administration, now tottering to its fall, had neglected the necessary precautions; the garrison of Port Mahon had been reduced to less than 3000 men; and it was only at the last moment that a fleet of ten ships, under Admiral Byng, was despatched for the defence of Minorca. When Byng arrived, the island was virtually captured. The French had landed on April 18th; on the 21st they occupied Port Mahon. General Blakeney, who commanded in the absence of Lord Tyrawley, the governor, now retired into the fort of St. Philip, which was deemed impregnable. Byng did not appear off Minorca till May 19th, and on the following day engaged the French fleet in a distant cannonade; after which he retired to Gibraltar, leaving the island to its fate. The English garrison in St. Philip's, despairing of relief, capitulated June 28th, and was conveyed to Gibraltar. Byng was afterwards condemned by a court-martial of not having done all that lay in his power to succour the place; and as popular clamour rose very high in England at the loss of Minorca, and seemed to demand a victim, he was shot in Portsmouth harbour, March 14th 1757. After the attack on Minorca, England issued a formal declaration of war against France, May 17th 1756, which was answered by the latter country June 9th,

The continental war had not yet begun. A league was preparing

402

LEAGUE AGAINST PRUSSIA.

[Book VI.

Sweden, among which the
Silesia and the county of

between Austria, Russia, Saxony, and spoils of Prussia were to be divided. Glatz were to be restored to Austria; Prussia was to be given to Poland, Courland to Russia, Magdeburg to Saxony, Pomerania to Sweden. The Empress Elizabeth of Russia entered ardently into Maria Theresa's plans, but Kaunitz demurred to act without the consent of France. Frederick, who was acquainted with his enemies' schemes, had to determine whether he should await or anticipate the execution of them. He had learnt, to his alarm, that Russia was to begin the war; Austria was to get involved in it, and would then demand the aid of France, under her treaty with that Power. Saxony, as he discovered through Fleming, the Saxon minister at the court of Vienna, was to fall upon him when he had been a little shaken in the saddle. It is probable that Kaunitz, who wanted to drive him to some rash step, permitted him to get this secret intelligence.15 He had, however, also learnt through another channel, his friend and admirer the Grand Duke Peter, who had secretly entered Frederick's service this very year as a Prussian captain, that the Courts of St. Petersburg and Vienna had resolved to attack him, but that the execution of the project had been deferred till the spring of 1757, in order to allow time for Russia to provide the necessary recruits, sailors, and maga zines.16 Frederick armed, and resolved on an immediate invasion of Saxony. First of all, however, by the advice of the English ambassador Mitchell, he demanded in a friendly manner, through his ambassador at Vienna, the object of the Austrian preparations; and as Maria Theresa gave an ambiguous reply to this question, as well as to a demand for a more explicit answer repeated towards the end of August 1756, Frederick, after having first published at Berlin a declaration of his motives, set his troops in motion. "It

is better," he wrote to George II., " to anticipate than to be anticipated." 17

Frederick's conduct on this occasion has been much canvassed. It has been observed that the projects of his enemies were only eventual, depending on the condition whether the King of Prussia should give occasion to a war, and consequently on his own conduct; that it was very possible their schemes would never have been executed, and problematical whether to await them would have been more dangerous than to anticipate them.18 Such specu

15 Stenzel, B. iv.

1 Hermann, Gesch. Russlands, B. v. S. 131.

17 Lord Dover, Life of Frederick II. vol. ii. ch. 1.

18 These reasons were given in a paper read before the Berlin Academy of Sciences by M. von Hertzberg, a few months after Frederick's death. The bad taste of this paper has been remarked upon by Menzel,

lations it is impossible to answer, but it may be observed that the course pursued by Frederick proved ultimately successful; and that, by attacking his enemies before they were prepared, he not only deprived Saxony of the power to injure him, but even pressed the resources of that State into his own service. It must also be remembered that the scanty means of Prussia, in comparison with those of her enemies, did not permit Frederick to keep a large force in the field for a long period of time, and it was therefore a point of the most vital importance for him to bring the war to the speediest possible conclusion. The morality of his proceeding may, in this instance, be justified by the necessity of self-defence; for there can be no doubt that a most formidable league had been organised against him.

The Prussians entered Saxony in three columns towards the end of August 1756. Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick marched with one by way of Halle, Leipsic, and Freiberg, towards Bohemia; the King himself, with Marshal Keith, led another by Torgau and Dresden; the third, under the Prince of Brunswick-Bevern, marched through Lusatia.19 When Frederick entered Dresden, Sept. 7th, he seized the Saxon archives, and caused the despatches which proved the design of the Powers allied against him to invade and divide Prussia to be published, with the celebrated Mémoire of M. von Hertzberg before mentioned.20

The Prussians at first pretended to enter Saxony in a friendly manner. They declared that they were only on their way to Bohemia, and should speedily evacuate the country; but they soon began to levy contributions. The King even established a so-called Directory at Torgau, which was to collect the revenues of the

Neuere Gesch. der Deutschen, B. v. S. 425 Anm.; as M. Hertzberg was the very person employed by Frederick thirty years before to draw up the Mémoire raisonné, in justification of the step he had taken." See further on this subject, Raumer, Friedrich II. und seine Zeit. Abschnitt 28 ff. It may be observed that Frederick's proceeding with regard to Saxony bears a strong analogy to the seizure of the Danish fleet by England in 1807.

19 It is impossible, in a work like the present, to enter into the details of the Seven Years' War. The principal authorities on the subject are the Hist. de la guerre de sept ans, in Frederick's Euvres Posthumes; the History of the Seven Years' War, by General Lloyd, with plans (3 vols. 4to.). This work has been trans

lated into German by Tempelhoff, with additions that make it quite a new work (6 vols. 4to.). Archenholz, Gesch. des siebenjährigen Kriegs (2 vols. 8vo.); Stuhr, Forschungen und Erläuterungen über Hauptpunkte der Gesch. des siebenjährigen Kriegs, Hamburg, 1842. Jomini's Traité des grandes opérations militaires contains a critical account of the King of Prussia's campaigns. Napoleon has also criticised all Frederick's military operations in his Mémoires.

20 Mémoire raisonné sur les desseins dangereux des cours de Vienne et de Dresde. The papers, however, do not appear to have afforded any proof against Saxony. See Schlosser, Gesch. des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts, B. ii. S. 306.