of these movements, quitted Prussia to suppress them. Crossing the Vistula on the ice, he defeated with great loss near Golumbo a Polish force of 12,000 men under Stephen Czarnecki (Feb. 8th). He then overran the Palatinates of Lublin, Belz, and Sandomier. But he soon discovered that his resources were unequal to the enterprise he had undertaken. As fast as he left a conquered province the inhabitants again rose against him; large numbers of the Polish troops called Quartians deserted his standards; while many of his Swedish troops perished of hunger and cold, or at the hands of the peasantry. Under these circumstances, Charles was compelled, towards the middle of March, to commence a retreat to Warsaw, during which he experienced the greatest difficulties and dangers from the state of the roads, and especially from having to cross the river Sau in the face of the enemy. His brother-in-law, the Margrave Frederick of Baden, who was bringing some reinforcements to his aid, was defeated by the Poles near Warka on the Pilsa, March 28th. Charles reached Warsaw April 5th; and leaving that city under the command of Wittenberg, he returned into Prussia with the view of taking Dantzic, which city, however, resisted all his attempts for that purpose.

The ill-success of the Swedish King determined him to draw closer his alliance with the Elector of Brandenburg, with the view of reducing Poland by their joint arms. Charles now contemplated a partition of that country something similar to what took place about a century later. By the treaty of Marienburg, June 15th 1656, the two sovereigns entered into an offensive and defensive alliance, by which Frederick William agreed to assist Charles then with all his forces, and at other times with 4000 men; while Charles undertook to defend the Elector's territories with 6000 men. By another secret treaty, signed on the same day, the King ceded to Frederick William in full sovereignty the four Palatinates of Posen, Kalisch, Siradia, and Lencicia. The rest of Poland was abandoned to the Russians, the Cossacks, and George Rakoczi, Prince of Transylvania; Charles reserving for himself only Prussia, the real object of the war.

After this treaty had been signed, the King, the Elector, and the Margrave of Baden, who had arrived from Pomerania with fresh troops, marched to the relief of Warsaw, where Wittenberg had been six weeks besieged by a large Polish and Tartar force, animated by the presence of John Casimir; but before the allies could reach that city, Wittenberg had been compelled to capitulate (June 21st). So weak was the authority of John Casimir over these barbarous hordes, that he could not prevent the capitulation from

50 ALLIANCE OF CHARLES X. AND THE ELECTOR.

[Book V.

being violated; and though the garrison had stipulated for an unmolested retreat to Thorn, Wittenberg and several other Swedish generals were made prisoners, and numbers of their soldiers were killed or maltreated. It was not till towards the end of July that the King of Sweden and the Elector had formed a junction at Nowydwor, near the confluence of the Bug and Vistula. Hence they marched on Praga-a suburb of Warsaw on the right bank of the Vistula-where John Casimir, with his Poles and Tartars, offered them battle. A desperate struggle ensued, which lasted three days; when at length the Polish troops, though twice as numerous as their opponents, were compelled to yield to the superior science and bravery of the Swedes and Germans. Warsaw was now again recovered and occupied by the Swedes, while John Casimir retired to Lublin. But Charles was prevented from pursuing the enemy and reaping all the fruits of his victory by the politic remissness of Frederick William; who pleaded the incursions of the Poles into Prussia as an excuse for leading back his army thither, leaving only 4000 men with the King of Sweden, as he was bound to do by treaty; and after his return, he began to negociate in a very suspicious manner with the Poles, the Danes, and the Emperor. He seems to have perceived that Charles had entered on an enterprise too vast for his strength, and to have resolved to turn his indiscretion to advantage. It was at first thought that John Casimir would have come to some terms after his defeat; but the invasion by the Russians of the Swedish province of Livonia, and the hope held out to him of some support from the Emperor, caused him to alter his mind.

The peace of Stolbova 17 between the Swedes and Russians, in 1617, had been so disadvantageous to the latter, that it was not unnatural they should wish to break it. By this treaty, Ingria and part of Carelia were ceded to Sweden; and as this Power had previously obtained Livonia by the treaty of Teusin, in 1595, the Russians were thus entirely excluded from the Baltic, sequestered as it were from European commerce, and reduced almost to the condition of an Asiatic Power. It was a conviction that the Czar would endeavour to escape from such a state of things and regain a footing on the Baltic,18 that had induced Charles X., before he invaded Poland, and with the view of conciliating the Russian sovereign, to despatch to him an embassy. But the vanity and presumption which characterised the Russian Court before it had been civilised by European intercourse, rendered this embassy one of the causes of the war which it was intended to 17 See Vol. II. p. 521, 18 Puffendorf, De Rebus Carol. Gust., lib. i. § 53.

avert. Alexis, after his conquests in Poland, had not only added the names of the subdued provinces to his titles, but had also assumed that of "Lord of many lands to the North, East, and West, and heir of his ancestors and predecessors." As it was plain that by this oriental bombast he indicated his pretensions to Livonia, Ingria, and Carelia, Charles refused to acknowledge these titles, which implied a claim on his own dominions; a want of condescension which gave great offence to the Czar, who seized and imprisoned the Swedish ambassadors. Alexis, though himself at war with Poland, was also displeased at the invasion of that country by the Swedes, which seemed to rob him of part of his destined booty; and several acts of hostility had occurred between the Russian and Swedish troops, intent on occupying the same places in Lithuania.

If Alexis could have agreed with the King of Sweden and the Elector of Brandenburg, the partition of Poland might perhaps then have been effected, instead of being postponed till the following century. But the Czar was jealous of the occupation of Lithuania by the Swedes, and his ministers urged him to seize the pretext of Charles's refusal to acknowledge his titles to declare war against Sweden, and to recover the provinces which had formerly been lost. Their representations were seconded by the Dutch merchants; while the Court of Vienna offered its mediation to procure for the Czar a truce with Poland, so that he might direct all his efforts against the Swedes. Without awaiting the result of these negociations, Alexis, in June 1656, ordered his troops to enter Ingria and Carelia; whence, after ravaging those provinces, they penetrated to the extremity of Finland. Alexis himself, at the head of 100,000 men, invaded Livonia, seized Dunaburg and Kokenhausen, the garrisons of which places were put to the sword, and invested Riga. From the last place, defended by De la Gardie, he was repulsed with great loss; but Dorpat having capitulated October 26th, the Russians were enabled to penetrate into the country and devastate everything with fire and sword.

The Emperor Ferdinand III. had viewed with uneasiness the progress of the Swedes, which not only threatened the Roman Catholic religion in Poland, but even endangered his own hereditary dominions. The desire to divert their arms had led him to incite the Czar to enter Livonia. He was not himself prepared to declare war against Charles; but he accorded to John Casimir an asylum, where he might prepare the means of re-entering his kingdom. He even made an alliance with that prince, and

52

32

TREATY OF LABIAU.

[Book V. engaged to use his good offices with the Elector, as well as with the Cossacks, in his favour. A truce was also concluded through Ferdinand's mediation between the Poles and Russians at Wilna, November 3rd 1656. The Czar, jealous of the victories of the Swedes, readily listened to the proposals of John Casimir, especially as hopes were held out to him of succeeding to the Polish throne. 19

The Elector of Brandenburg skilfully availed himself of the embarrassment occasioned to Charles by the Russian war to obtain the secret object of his policy, the sovereignty of Prussia. Charles was very averse to accede to an arrangement by which the contiguity of his provinces on the Baltic was for ever broken: but at length (November 20th 1656) he signed the TREATY OF LABIAU, which may be said to have laid the first stone of the Prussian monarchy. By this treaty, Frederick William and his heirs male were recognised as legitimate and independent sovereigns of Prussia and Ermeland. In any future peace, the Elector was to use his endeavours that West, or Royal, Prussia, Pomerelia and part of Cassubia, together with Semigallia, Samogitia, Livonia and Courland, should be assigned to Sweden. The Elector renounced his pretensions to the four Polish palatinates, and agreed to afford to the King of Sweden the same aid as stipulated by the treaty of Marienburg.20

Charles had also turned to other quarters for assistance, and among them to England, perhaps the only Power that viewed his progress without displeasure or alarm. But though Cromwell had said that the Swedes, for aught he cared, might extend their conquests to the Caspian Sea, he was not disposed to give them any active assistance; and all that they obtained by a treaty concluded at London in July 1656, was permission to recruit in Great Britain. With George Ragoczi, Prince of Transylvania, Charles was more successful. Ragoczi, who wished to obtain a share of the Polish provinces, if not the crown of Poland itself, which had been offered to him by a party of the malcontents, had sent an embassy to Charles early in 1656, with the view of making an alliance. The ill turn which Charles's affairs subsequently took, and especially the Russian war, having rendered such an ally very desirable, a treaty was concluded in December, in which nearly all the terms demanded by Ragoczi were granted. He was to have Red Russia, Podolia, Volhynia and all the southern provinces of Poland as far as the Narew and the Bug, with the titles of King of Little Poland, or Eastern Poland, and Grand Duke of Lithuania. His allies the Cossacks were to be maintained in possession of the 19 Hermann, Gesch, Russland, B. iii. S. 636. 20 Dumont, t. vi. pt. ii. p. 148.

Ukraine. Such was the eagerness of Ragoczi to secure these acquisitions, that before the treaty had been ratified he began his march with 18,000 horse and 5000 foot; to which were added 20,000 Cossacks and 6000 Moldavians and Wallachians. Charles

set out from Prussia to meet his new ally. The junction was effected near Sandomier, April 2nd 1657, and the united forces proceeded to lay siege to Brzesc in Lithuania, which surrendered May 13th. But during the siege Charles received intelligence that the Danes were preparing to make war upon him; an event which entirely altered his plans.

He

Frederick III. of Denmark was well aware that chance alone had prevented his dominions, instead of Poland, being attacked by the Swedes. He knew that he was destined to be the next prey of their rapacity; he had therefore fortified himself with alliances, and awaited a favourable opportunity to strike the first blow. was continually complaining of the toll established by the Swedes at the mouth of the Vistula, as annoying the navigation of the Baltic and prejudicial to Danish interests in the Sound dues. The toll was still more hurtful to the Dutch, on account of their valuable commerce with Prussia; and in June 1656 a Dutch fleet had appeared in Dantzic roads, and compelled the raising of the blockade. Frederick III. sent ten vessels to join this fleet, and concluded a treaty with the States-General for the defence of the Baltic navigation. Charles, however, soon afterwards found means to pacify the Dutch by a treaty in which he granted them very favourable terms. At this epoch the Danish finances were in a terrible state; the fortresses were dilapidated, and there was scarcely any regular army. Such had been the sad result of the Danish oligarchical constitution. The nobles diverted to their own use the money that should have been applied to maintain the defences of the kingdom, and refused to keep on foot any numerous force lest it should be employed to annul the capitulation which they had imposed upon the King. Nevertheless the aspect of affairs in the spring of 1657, and especially the accession of a new sovereign of the House of Habsburg, who seemed disposed to take a more active part against the Swedes, induced the Danish monarch to declare war against Charles. The invasion of Poland by Ragoczi had determined Leopold, who (as before related) had recently succeeded to the Austrian hereditary dominions, to enter into the Polish war. In May 1657, he concluded at Vienna an alliance with John Casimir and the Republic of Poland, and undertook to send 12,000 men into the field. The King of

21 Dumont, t. vi. pt. ii. p. 179.