74 PEACE OF BREDA. [BOOK V. but the Dutch had been defeated in a subsequent action, July 25th, and the English appeared to be masters of the seas. These advantages, however, had not been purchased without severe losses, which were aggravated by the hand of fortune or Providence. London, after being ravaged by a dreadful pestilence, had been almost destroyed by the Great Fire. Under these circumstances, the English Cabinet was disposed to peace. In February 1667 an envoy was despatched to Paris to discuss the preliminaries of a conference; and in the following April a secret agreement was concluded between the French and English Courts, by which Louis engaged to withdraw his assistance from the Dutch. This agreement, in itself a breach of faith towards the Dutch Republic, was however accompanied with a perfidy that was highly disastrous to England. Whilst Louis assured the English Cabinet that the Dutch would have no fleet at sea that summer, he pressed the latter to fit out their ships, and encouraged them by promising to join them with his own,13 though he had not the smallest intention of executing that promise. The fatal effects to England are well known. Relying on Louis's word, as well as on the negociations for a peace already begun at Breda, under the mediation of the King of Sweden, no preparations were made for defence; in June 1667 the Dutch sailed up the Thames without opposition, took Sheerness, destroyed our ships in the Medway, infested our coasts, and threatened the safety of the capital itself. While these disasters accelerated the conclusion of the PEACE OF BREDA on the part of the English, the unexpected march of Louis XIV. into the Spanish Netherlands, in May 1667, had the same effect on the Dutch. On the 31st of July three treaties of peace were signed between England on the one side, and Holland, France, and Denmark on the other. The basis adopted in the Dutch treaty was the status quo from the 10th to the 20th May 1667. Hence the English retained New York and New Jersey, while Surinam, and the Isle of Polerone in the Moluccas, remained to the Dutch. The Navigation Act was so far modified, that all merchandise coming down the Rhine was allowed to be imported into England in Dutch vessels; a measure which rendered the Dutch masters of great part of the commerce of Germany. In the treaty with France, this Power restored to England the Isle of St. Christopher's, which she had seized, and ceded Antigua and Montserrat, while she recovered Acadia and Cayenne. The chief difficulty with Denmark was the Sound dues. By a clause 13 Mignet, Succession d'Espagne, in the Documens inédits sur l'Hist. de France, t. ii. p. 40 sqq.; Harris, Life of Charles II., vol. in the treaty, Denmark reserved her right to the Orkney Isles, anciently pledged by the Kings of Norway to the Kings of Scotland.14 By the invasion of the Spanish Netherlands, Louis took all parties by surprise. He had fortified himself for that step by a new offensive alliance with Portugal (March 31st 1667), by which he engaged to pay to that Power a subsidy of 1,800,000 livres annually, till he should himself declare war against Spain.15 The death of Louis's mother, Anne of Austria, who expired January 20th 1666, had removed one obstacle to his enterprise. Anne's political influence in her later years was not very great; but she had exerted what she had to prevent a war between her son and the house from which she sprang. Louis had succeeded in blinding the Regent of Spain and her incompetent minister and confessor. Up to the 1st of May he had given them the most pacific assurances; on the 8th he announced to the Regent his intention of marching in person into the Netherlands to possess himself of what belonged to him in right of his consort. The Dutch were equally taken by surprise. As late as the 27th of April Louis had assured De Witt that nothing should be undertaken without his knowledge. It was indeed a question of vital importance to the United Netherlands, which might next be swallowed up if the barrier between them and France were removed. Long and anxious negociations on the subject had been going on between the two countries, but without result. At first a plan had been discussed to erect the Spanish Netherlands into a republic under the joint protection of France and the States, and this had been succeeded by another, to divide them between these two Powers, which, however, could not agree, either as to the method or the time of the division. Louis XIV. had accompanied his announcement to the Spanish Regent with a little treatise, in which were set forth his pretensions not only to the Burgundian provinces, but also eventually to the whole Spanish monarchy. This treatise, which was in fact a sort of manifesto, was also forwarded to all the European GovernThe claim to the Spanish Netherlands was not rested on the law of devolution alone. By confounding the Kingdom of France with that of the Franks, it was asserted that the people of the Netherlands were Louis's natural subjects.16 This was only another form of those claims which France had so often urged, ments. 14 The treaties are in Dumont, t. vii. pt. i. p. 40 sqq. 16 See Mignet, Succession d'Espagne, t. ii. p. 58 sqq. 15 Ibid. p. 17. 76 FRANCHE COMTÉ REDUCED. [Book V. sometimes on the ground of natural boundaries, sometimes of nationalities. It was plain that she meant to seize the Spanish provinces, and would always be able to find a justification. Louis placed himself at the head of his army on May 20th. He had announced his invasion of the Netherlands to the European Powers simply as a "journey," as if he were going to occupy possessions that were his undisputed own. Armentières, Binch, Charleroi, Ath, Bergues, Furnes, Tournai, Douai, Courtrai, Oudenarde, Alost were occupied without resistance, or capitulated after a short siege; Lille made a better defence, but surrendered on August 28th. The united French army now appeared before Ghent. But the rainy season had set in; it was doubtful whether the Flemish towns would surrender so readily as the Walloon, which were better inclined to the French, and spoke their language; Louis, too, was desirous of avoiding a breach with the Dutch; and for all these reasons he determined to do no more this year. He had accompanied Turenne's division of the army, and had taken a personal share in some of the sieges, where he had displayed no lack of courage. Louis had, however, determined to strike a blow in another direction. Franche Comté, though nominally a Spanish province, was in fact almost an independent state. Being completely isolated from the Spanish possessions, the Government of Spain found it necessary to accord great privileges to the inhabitants, lest they should transfer their allegiance elsewhere. Although ostensibly subject to the Governor of the Netherlands, the real authority lay with the Governor of the province, who was elected from among its nobles, and with the Parliament .of Dôle, which enjoyed the chief share in the administration. Franche Comté yielded but a trifling revenue to Spain, and little care had consequently been taken for its defence. Its reduction was intrusted to the Prince of Condé, who, as Governor of Burgundy, was advantageously situated for that purpose. A considerable body of troops was secretly assembled; the attention of the Swiss was diverted, who, like the Dutch, did not wish to have the French for their neighbours; and on February 3rd 1668, Condé's forces invaded Franche Comté. Louis hastened from Paris to the scene of action, and joined Condé before Dôle February 9th. That capital surrendered on the 13th, and in a fortnight the whole province was reduced. Louis now placed the two re-united Burgundies under the government of Condé. These rapid conquests inspired not only Spain, but all Europe with alarm. To give any efficient aid to the Netherlands was totally out of the power of the Spanish Government. It was impossible to raise fresh taxes in Spain; the galleons which brought the American tribute were not due till the end of the year; a national subscription was tried, but failed; 17 and to add to these embarrassments, the Portuguese, at the instigation of the French King, invaded Estremadura. Spain declared war against France July 14th 1667, but without the means to carry it on. She appealed to all Europe for assistance, but nobody was inclined to give her any active succour. She had recently concluded a commercial treaty with England, on terms favourable to this country, but she was not permitted to levy soldiers in Great Britain. The Elector of Brandenburg resolved to maintain a neutral position. The Emperor Leopold, to whom Spain might have looked with more confidence, was actually negociating with France, as we shall explain further on. The Marquis of Castel Rodrigo, the Governor of the Spanish Netherlands, in vain invoked the aid of the Dutch States, and offered to give up the tolls on the Maes and Scheldt for a loan of two million gilders. The Spanish ambassador, Gamarra, proposed still more tempting conditions, and engaged to place Bruges, Ostend, Damme, and the forts of St. Isabella and St. Donas in the hands of the Dutch, in return for a loan of one million gilders, and the aid of 12,000 men. These negociations form a turning point in the career of De Witt. They affect not only his fame as a statesman, but may even be said to have been the cause of his death. His situation, no doubt, was one of extreme difficulty. He knew that a league with Spain would be considered by France as a declaration of war; nor did the weakness of Spain, and the lukewarmness of her Belgian subjects, offer much encouragement to embark with her in such a contest. On the other hand, it should be considered that a war with France would have been popular with the Dutch, who for the most part detested the French; and that to allow the latter to fix themselves in the Spanish Netherlands was only to facilitate a future attack on the United Provinces themselves. In these circumstances De Witt adopted the dangerous expedient of a compromise. He resolved to avoid an immediate breach with France, and yet to force her to set a bound to her conquests, though he could not but have been aware how offensive such a course would be to a young and ambitious monarch like Louis XIV. Such was the policy he followed in the alliance with England and Sweden, which we have now to relate. After the Peace of Breda Louis had endeavoured to conciliate England by enticing offers. He held out the baits of a treaty of 17 Mignet, Succession d'Espagne, t. ii. p. 121 sqq. 78 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE. [Book V. commerce, subsidies, the cession of a Flemish port, the abandonment of Spanish America to the English arms, provided he might be allowed to occupy the Spanish Netherlands without opposition. Charles himself was lured with the offer of aid in case of need against his rebellious subjects. 18 But, though Clarendon had been disgraced, the time was not yet ripe for so intimate a connection between the French and English Crowns. The English Cabinet listened in preference to the envoys of the United Provinces, who were continually pressing Charles to join them in interposing between France and Spain. In December 1667, Sir William Temple, the British resident at Brussels, received instructions to proceed to the Hague and negociate a treaty with the States. In his conferences with De Witt, Temple urged him to conclude an offensive alliance, by which France should be compelled to relinquish all her recent conquests. But the policy of De Witt was, as we have said, more temporising. He dreaded an open breach with France, and wished to have Louis for a friend, though not for a neighbour. Temple yielded to his representations, and after a few days' negociations an alliance was concluded at the Hague, January 23rd 1668, which, from the accession to it of Sweden, has been called the TRIPLE ALLIANCE. There were two treaties: 19 one established a defensive alliance between Great Britain and the States; the other, with a reservation for the accession of Sweden, erected those two Powers into mediators between the belligerent Crowns. France was to be persuaded to an armistice; Spain was to be forced to accept one of the alternatives already offered by Louis: namely, that he should be left in possession of all the places he had conquered in 1667; or that he should have instead of them either the Duchy of Luxembourg or Franche Comté; and together with either of these provinces, the Cambrésis, Douai, Aire, St. Omer, and Furnes. There were also three secret Articles: 1. That no question should be raised about the renunciation of Maria Theresa; 2. That if the war should continue between Spain and Portugal, France should respect the neutrality of the States; 3. That if France rejected a Peace on these conditions, England and the States should assist Spain till matters were restored to the footing established by the Peace of the Pyrenees. This last clause, which came to the knowledge of Louis, occasioned him great irritation. Dohna, the Swedish envoy, acceded to the treaty on the day of its execution; but the object of it was attained before it was formally ratified by Sweden. The key to this change of policy on the part of the Swedish Court, after an alliance of nearly half a Mignet, t. ii. p. 509. 19 Dumont, t. vii. pt. i. p. 66 sqq. 18 |