LXII.

4

5

2

8

Factions do not hinge upon slight issues, though they spring from3 slight occasions; but men embark in factions for important stakes. Even trifling quarrels1 exert great influence, when they take place among the ruling classes, as was the case, for instance, at Syracuse, in the olden times; for the constitution was changed in consequence of a quarrels between two youths, who were in office, on a love matter. We ought, therefore, to take every precaution in these cases at the outset, and to reconcile the feuds of men of power and influence; for the error is committed at the outset, which indeed is commonly said to be half of the whole; and thus9 a trifling blunder at the commencement is equivalent to all the errors committed in the sequel.10 In short, the quarrels of the great involve the whole state in their consequences, as happened in Histiæa, after the Persian war, two brothers having disagreed respecting the division12 of their patrimony; when the poorer of the two, on the ground13 that his brother gave no account of the estate,11 nor even of the treasure which his father had discovered, attached the popular party15 to himself; while the other, who possessed an ample fortune, won over the affluent. At Mitylene, too, a quarrel about heiresses became the source of many evils, and of the war with Athens, in which Paches took their city; for Timophanes, an opulent citizen, having left two daughters, Doxander, who had been repulsed,16 and had failed to secure17 them for his own sons, kindled the dissension, and spurred on the Athenians, in

2 Περὶ μικρῶν.

3 Εκ μικρών.

7

4 Στασιάζειν.

Of two youths quarreling. Περὶ ἐρωτικὴν αἰτίαν, 97. JELF, § 863. 10 Τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν. 13, with partic. gen. abs. JELF, § 701. 17 Οὐ λαβών.

Η Στάσις.

5 Οι κύριοι,

8 Partic.

12

11 Οἱ γνώριμοι.

Νομι

14 Ουσία.

15 От дниот,кол.

16 Περιωσθείς.

his capacity of Proxenus of the state. Transitions, also, take place to oligarchy, to democracy, and to a republic, 18 in consequence of some magistracy. 19 or portion of the state, having gained distinction or aggrandisement. For instance, the Areopagus, after gaining renown in the Persian war, was held to govern with too tight a rein; while, on the other hand, the populace who had served afloat,20 having been the instrument of the victory at Salamis, strengthened the democracy by means of the ascendancy acquired through their maritime power. In Argos, also, the notables, having distinguished themselves at the battle of Mantinea against the Lacedæmonians, attempted to put down the commonalty; and in Syracuse the commons, having been the instrument of the triumph gained in the war against Athens, changed the constitution from a republic to a democracy.

18 Πολιτεία.

2

19 'Αρχεῖον. 20 Ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος.

LXIII.

21 Αἴτιος.

In aristocracies commotions sometimes occur, because a few only have access to political honours—which has been stated to be a disturbing cause' in oligarchies alsofor aristocracy is, in one sense, an oligarchy; since in both the rulers are few in number; not, however, for the same reason, though some men fancy aristocracy oligarchical merely on this account. Especially must this be the result, whenever the mass is equal in merit to the haughty nobles, as in the case of the class called Partheniæ in Lacedæmon-for they were among the privileged '3-whom the Spartans despatched as colonists to Tarentum, on detecting their intrigue. Or, whenever men of great influence, and inferior to none in merit, are insulted by men of still

1 Kirir. to quanquam,

21

6

Επείγε, which in this passage is nearly equivalent 8 Οἱ ὅμοιοι. See LIDD. Lex. 'Oporos.

4

higher dignity, as in the instance of Lysander at the hands of the kings. Or, whenever a man of spirit is excluded from office, as in the case of Cinadon, who, in the days of Agesilaus, concerted the plot against the Spartans. Further, whenever some are very poor, and others very rich; and this happens especially in time of war. Indeed, it actually happened in Lacedæmon, in the Messenian war, as is clear from the poem by Tyrtæus, called Eunomia; for some who were pinched by the war, demanded a redistribution of the soil. Again, if any man becomes powerful, and is capable of becoming even more powerful, he instigates a revolution to gain a throne, just as Pausanias, who commanded during the Persian war, and Hanno at Carthage, appear to have done. But the dissolution of aristocracies, and of republics, is chiefly owing to deviations from right," in the very frame of the constitution. Its source is the disproportionate blending of democracy and of oligarchy in a republic, and of the same elements combined with merit in an aristocracy, but especially the two former; I mean democracy and oligarchy; for republics, and many of the constitutions styled aristocracies, attempt to blend them.

8

6 Επίθεσις. • Τοῦ δικαίου παρέκβασις.

4 Εντιμότεροι. 5 I read 'Αγησιλέω. 8 “Iva poval Xỹ.

accus.

LXIV.

3

7'Yo, with

As we have said, monarchy stands upon the same ground as aristocracy. For it depends on worth,2 either on personal or family excellence, or public services, or these combined with power. All who have achieved public services, or are capable of benefiting states or tribes, have usually enjoyed this honour; some for preventing a nation's 1 Τέτακται κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν· a military metaphor. 2 'Ažia. 8 Εὐεργεσία.

being enslaved, by deeds of arms, as in the case of Codrus; others for restoring a people to freedon, as in that of Cyrus; others for colonizing or acquiring a territory, as in the instances of the kings of Lacedæmon, of Macedon, and Molossus. A monarch's function is that of a guardian, shielding the owners of property in his dominions from all injustice, and the commonalty from all outrage. Tyranny, on the other hand, has no regard for the public interest, save with a view to its own advantage. Pleasure is the tyrant's, honour the monarch's aim. Consistently with this, when successes are achieved, the money goes to the tyrant, the honour to the monarch. The monarch's guard is national, the tyrant's foreign. That tyranny, then, involves evils, both those of democracy and oligarchy, is clear; those of oligarchy, inasmuch as its end is wealthfor by this means alone can its vigilance and its luxury be maintained—and it has a thorough distrust of the people, in consequence whereof tyrants resort to the well-known practice of disarming them; it is also common to oligarchy and to tyranny to illtreat the populace, to banish them from the capital, and to break them up by dispersion.1o With democracy it shares its feuds with the notables; its covert or open compassing of their destruction, or their exile as political rivals" and obstacles to absolutism; 12 for it is from these sources that intrigues flow; one party being anxious for the integrity of its rule, the other for its rescue from slavery. Hence arose the advice conveyed by Periander to Thrasybulus, when he cut off the tall stalks of wheat, implying 13 the policy of cutting off, from time to time, the more ambitious of the citizens.

4 Κωλύσαντες δουλεύειν. JELF, $ 664

8 Οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰς οὐσίας τὰς limits οὐσίας.

5 Κτίζειν, 1 aor. partic.

7 Σκοπός.

8 Διὸ καί.

'H Tapaipeσic Tùν 5πλw. On this sense of the article, see JELF, § 444, e.

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LXV.

There being four varieties of democracy, the first in order is the best: it is also the most ancient of all. I mean by first,' what comes first in classifying the people; for the agricultural population is the best; indeed, it is possible to create a democracy wherever the people subsist by agriculture or pasture. For as they are not affluent, they are busy ; and this prevents their holding many assemblies; and as they do not possess the requisites of subsistence, their time is spent in active pursuits, and they do not hanker after the property of others; on the contrary, industrious toil is pleasanter to them than political or official life, wherever large gains are not derivable from office. For the mass is more desirous of gain than of honour. And this is a proof: they used to endure the old despotisms, and at this day they endure oligarchies, o long as no one interferes either with their industry or their property; for some of them speedily acquire wealth, and others competence.10 Moreover, their capacity to elect and to call officials to account," satisfies their ambition, if they have any; since, in some democracies, the people are content with deliberative functions,12 without any share in the elections to office, which are conducted by deputies, chosen individually13 from the whole body, as at Mantinea: and this we must regard as a form1 of democracy, like that which formerly subsisted in Mantinea. On this account it is the policy 15 of the democracy we have described above, and it has been the general usage, that the elective and 8 Νομή. 4 *Ασχολος. 5 Ὥστε μη. JELF

1 Τάξις.

2

Γεωργικός.

Εκκλησιάζειν.

10 Οὐκ ἀποροῦσι.

7' Αλλά,

8 Τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν. 11 Εὐθύνειν. 12 Τὸ βουλεύεσθαι, 15 Συμφέρον.