heaven; but it is impossible that every one of these can be so: therefore no one of them is a revelation from heaven. An ana→ logous syllogism runs thus: various Bank notes equally claim to be genuine; but it is certain that many are forgeries: therefore all must be forgeries-according to Volney.

6. As our unassisted reason is the sole instrument by which our duty is to be determined, so our reason, when properly and honestly used, is in itself quite sufficient for this purpose; conse quently a revelation from God is no less unnecessary in the ab stract, than the claim of any particular theological system to be received as a revelation from God is unfounded in the concrete.

Hence it is asserted by the Infidel, that the opinions of mankind should be regulated by some authentic, rational, immutable code. This were difficult, not to say impossible." All is quite clear and certain by the unassisted light of nature; we want no revelation to illuminate our pretended darkness." So speaks Volney. "All is quite dark by the unassisted light of nature; we can never attain to certain knowledge, save by a revelation from a divine teacher." So says Socrates *. Would a calm enquirer reject Christianity on this disputed ground, that human reason is alone sufficient! In the above positions are involved the principles and the systems of the Christian and the Infidel. Whether it argue a higher degree of credulity to receive, as a divine revelation, Christianity thus evidenced; or, in order to the rejection of it, contentedly to bow beneath such a mass of contradictory difficulties as the theory of the Infidel is constrained to support, the prudent enquirer is requested to judge and determine for himself.

SECTION II." The Difficulties attendant upon Deistical Infi delity, in the abstract rejection of all Revelation from God." It is the opinion of Volney and other Infidel writers, that "the law of nature, or principles of morality deduced from the physical constitution of mankind and the Universe," can teach us a religion of evidence and truth. The first answer to this is, that some of the fundamental principles on which such a scheme of natural religion is supported cannot be certainly known without the aid of revelation.

1. The Deist lays it down as the basis of natural religion, that "there is one God the creator and moderator of all things:" granting, as the Christian does, the truth of this dogma, the Deist may be asked, upon his own principles, how he knows this fact. His answer clear and decisive, as far as its principle is concerned, will be founded upon the obvious connection be→

* Plat. Alcib. ii. in Dial. Select.

tween cause and effect; evident design of necessity implying a designer. But the reasoning is inconclusive, if with the Deist, we thence infer the existence of one and only one supreme designer. The unity of the designer can only be proved by the aid of revelation. This is however by the Deist rejected; therefore, on his own principles, he cannot prove the very dogma whence he borrows his name. He may indeed argue in favour of the more simple theory of one designer in preference to many designers, but probability is not proof.

2. It is here admitted, for the sake of argument, that there is only one God: but the Deist will be still unable to demonstrate the moral attributes of that Being. Of his power and his eternity he may collect sound and rational proof, but when further proof is required respecting a tenet common to the Deist and the Christian, that God is a God of perfect justice, he is at sea upon an ocean of uncertainty and doubt. This world, with all its apparent partiality in the distribution of the gifts of mental and physical advantages, presents a mass of inextricable confusion. To bring out the result of perfect justice, their proper moral consequences, in the way of reward and punishment, ought uniformly to follow virtue and vice; but that such is actually the case in the present constitution of things, none will assert from such sources, therefore, the Deist must not attempt to demonstrate the perfect justice of God. If he seek to prove his point by calling in a future state of equitable retribution, he is still involved in difficulties: he can assert and believe, but he cannot, on his own principles, prove the existence of a future state. His reasoning may assume the form of a circulating syllogism, but it is not therefore sound.

"Thus he may argue," says Mr. Faber, "Unless there be a future state of retribution, God is not a God of perfect justice; but God is a God of perfect justice, therefore there is a future state of retribution. Here a future state of retribution is demonstrated through the medium of God's perfect justice; but it has been shewn that the perfect justice has not yet been demonstrated. For this purpose he must invert the terms of the syllogism, or in other words, reason in a circle: thus, ‘if there be no future state of retribution, then God is not a God of perfect justice; but there is a state of future retribution, therefore God is a God of perfect justice. Here God's perfect justice is demonstrated through the medium of a future state of retribution.'" P. 30.

The Deist and the Christian alike maintain that God is a God of mercy as well as of justice. Here again the proof must be a difficulty with the Deist, for in this world the Deity frequently permits a prolongation of pain and misery, (e. g. a man suffering under grievous bodily pain,) but the Deist nevertheless

pronounces the Deity permitting this to be a Being of infinite mercy. But, upon his own principles, he can know nothing of the moral attributes of God, save from what he can collect from their divine and visible operation: why then does he call him a God of mercy, when yet he is observed to perform the identical actions which procure for a human being the character of cruelty? The Christian may answer that the cruelty of an action depends upon its intent: a skilful practitioner may inflict acute pain for the good of his patient, and deserves not the accusation of cruelty: and God for wise purposes may permit suffering as an instrument of moral discipline. But the argument is untenable in the mouth of a Deist who discards revelation, and must prove the existence of a future state of retribution before he makes it the foundation of his argument.

The Deist, again, and the Christian equally maintain that God is a God of goodness; but still as before, by nearly the same process of reasoning the former will be found to fail, reaching not, in any of his positions, beyond the grounds of probability.

3. Thus unable to demonstrate the moral attributes of God, the Deist is of necessity ignorant with regard to what service will be pleasing to him: for if, as has been shewn, he cannot know with certainty any thing of the justice of God, how can he be certain that he will please God by acting justly, or the like? For what he knows, there may be many Gods concurring indeed in the creation of the world, but widely differing in their moral attributes. There may be two equal and independent powers of good and evil:-which is he to serve? If he be virtuous he may please the one, but he will offend the other. He can in fact have no certainty that the very actions which gratify one God will not displease another. He may assert as the more probable belief, that there is but one God of infinite justice, mercy, and goodness; what is this, however, but to confess that the sole religion which Deism can produce is a creed of mere probabilities; and such being the case, it is clear, that a creed of probabilities may be very differently estimated by different persons. However the Deist may be pleased to modify what is called the religion of nature, he can never know whether his religion, with his adopted line of conduct grafted upon it, be a delight or an abomination to the divinity whom he wishes to honour.

4. All these difficulties in the deistical scheme draw after them the crowning difficulty, that God, whose works evince his wisdom, yet acted so unwisely as to place his creature man in this lower world without giving him the least instruction relative to his duty. He gave him reason; but by affording him no fixed

data he made his reasoning faculty, in regard to its employment on the noblest subjects, altogether useless. He gave him the power of discerning good from evil; but he gave him no means of discerning their moral difference by any sure reference to the will and nature of the Creator. God may be good, but the world in which we are placed must be to the Deist an enigma and a paradox, a tissue of jarring contradictions. Yet in that world man is born to run his course, the offspring of consummate wisdom which in every other instance carefully and effectually adapts the means to the end. To take up, with a full conviction of its truth, this extraordinary and paradoxical supposition, is an insuperable difficulty in the deistical scheme; and many, perhaps, will think it a greater mark of credulity to believe that an all-wise God has placed in the world his rational creature man without giving him the slightest instruction as to those points in which his welfare is immediately concerned, than to believe that an all-wise God has authoritatively communicated to his rational creature man that knowledge and information which may best and most certainly fit him to answer the moral ends of his creation.

SECTION III." The difficulties attendant upon Deistical Infidelity in regard to historical matter-of-fact."

The historical fact of the general deluge is taken to illustrate this part of the subject, namely, the alternative to which a Deist must be reduced, either of denying the fact itself, or of admitting that a revelation from God to man must have taken place, for if he deny the fact, then he unsettles the whole rationale of historical evidence: and if he admits it, then must he also admit the necessary concomitant fact of a divine revelation. The various proofs, historical, physiological, and moral, are then produced by Mr. Faber at some length, all ingenious and convincing. The historical, derived from traditions prevalent among all nations, and embodied in the national mythology of every people. The physiological, founded upon the existing phenomena of the globe we inhabit. The moral, built upon the progress of civilization, which shews the population of the world to be comparatively recent.

This fact of the universal deluge, thus demonstrated, the author takes as a medium to prove the additional fact of a direct intercourse between man and his Creator, or in other words, of a revelation of God's purposes to his creature man. It being proved, by the previous reasoning, that this event occurred about five or six thousand years ago, and that only a few individuals escaped; the question is how they effected that escape. Universal tradition speaks of the pious head of some pious fa

mily constructing a sort of ship. If so-it must have been constructed under an idea of some approaching disaster, some prescience, some information which could only be derived from a prescient and omniscient being. If it be argued, that the few saved themselves on the summits of lofty mountains; it is answered that no tradition alludes to any other mode of escape than by a ship. From the preservation of the various animals the same conclusion is drawn by a process of reasoning nearly similar, tending to prove that some communication (and what other than a divine one could it have been?) must have taken place.

SECTION IV." The difficulties attendant upon Deistical Infidelity in regard to actually accomplished Prophecy."

The prediction selected as a specimen of the argument, is that of Moses, respecting the future destinies and prospects of the Jews. See Deut. chapters 28, and 29. Of this prophecy it is well observed, that its minute accomplishment in every particular, is not a matter of doubt, or dispute, or speculation, but a naked matter-of-fact, recorded by history, and at the present day before our eyes, meeting us familiarly wherever we direct our steps. Our author proceeds to examine its fulfilment in all the numerous particulars of which it is composed, and confirms it by quoting the sentiments of the Jews themselves respecting their depressed state, extracted from an appeal to the justice of kings and nations, cited in the transactions of the Parisian Sanhedrim.

The train of reasoning which obviously and naturally springs from the prophecy and its minute accomplishment, leads to a consideration of the insufficiency of the deistical solution, namely, the political foresight and sagacity of Moses; and its being a lucky accident. With respect to the first it is asked, what causes could be so plainly and palpably in operation fifteen centuries before the desolation of the Jews, as to enable the most sagacious politician to deduce from them the effects which stand developed in the prophecy of Moses. With respect to the second, the infidel argues that singular coincidences at times occur: for example, if Moses predicted the dispersion of the Jews, Seneca, it should be recollected, foretold the discovery of America. Hence, if in the one case the completion of the prophecy demonstrate the inspiration of the prophet, it must equally do so in the other case. It is answered that the characteristics of the two prophecies differ essentially; that of Moses comprising a very considerable number of distinct particulars,

*Seneca. Med. ver. 375. 380.