prudence, and wisdom, displeased all parties. Soon after his ascent to the throne, in 1801, he seriously occupied himself with the freedom of the peasantry; but for some time little progress was made towards the accomplishment of his purpose. A memorable circumstance in the history of Russia, which will ever endear the name of the late chancellor of that empire, Count Rumantsof, to the advocates of freedom and the friends of humanity, gave a new and a powerful impulse to Alexander's wise plans. In 1803 the Count had expressed a wish to be allowed to give some of his vassals their liberty, and to bestow upon them some portions of land, so that they might become free cultivators, a class hitherto unknown in Russia. Alexander, ever alive to the interests of the peasantry, by an ukáz of the 4th of March of the same year created this new class of subjects. By virtue of it, every landed proprietor was permitted to transfer to vassals, on giving them their liberty, assigned portions of land, to be held by them as free cultivators, either by sale or on other conditions. In 1804 the enfranchisement of the peasants steadily, though slowly, continued. The government took care that those who were made free should have sufficient means of subsistence, and that their liberty should really be a blessing. In 1805, M. Solovof, a nobleman, and a counsellor of state, presented a glorious example to his countrymen, by liberating five thousand of his vassals, who were to pay him, in nineteen years, one million and a half of rubles for the lands given up to them an example which has been followed by a few patriotic individuals; and the Emperor, from that time, constantly promoted the cause of emancipation, except during a few of the last months of his existence. Slavery was formally abolished by the nobility of Courland in 1818; and the nobles of Livonia decreed, in 1819, its gradual abolition; so that, by 1826, all the peasants of that province should be free, while all children, who were born after the publication of the ordinance of 1819, were to be free from their birth.

Thus, unlike a giddy inexperienced politician, though armed with despotic power, Alexander did not rush precipitately to work. On the contrary, his steps were dictated by an enlarged and enlightened policy. He considered the plan in all its bearings; and especially with respect to the peasants themselves, and to their aristocratic masters: he balanced many nice points; he came to a decision; and his actions demonstrated his sincerity in the great cause of humanity. He well knew that the manumission of the slaves was, with the greater number of the proprietors, the most unpopular reform which he could devise. It threatened their domineering aristocratic ascendancy with a death-blow. Their private interests and circumscribed views he knew would prevent them from comprehending, or even from wishing to comprehend, the beneficent designs of their sovereign. The deadliest of all sins, in their eyes, were measures calculated to diminish their hereditary

power over their slaves: the latter scarcely knew what liberty was, till they were in possession of it, and, with a few exceptions, were mere automatons in the transactions.

In 1815, we had an opportunity of hearing the discussions and the opinions of several of the Russian nobles, as to the liberation of the peasantry, and the result of our observations was, that the generality of them were decidedly hostile to emancipation. They denounced Alexander's measures with the greatest animation, with vehemence of gesture, and in the strongest language of reprobation at times they even forgot the respect which was due to their sovereign's name and character. The manumission of the slaves! they would exclaim. What does Alexander intend our ruin, the ruin of our posterity, the ruin of the peasantry, the overthrow of the empire? Thus on the question of emancipation a party, whose power and whose prejudices were by no means to be despised, was raised up against the Autocrat.

We believe that we may assert, without fear of contradiction, that the treaty of Tilsit also lost Alexander much of the confidence and the esteem of his nation. Many who had hitherto supposed him, though young and inexperienced, to possess considerable talents, independence of spirit, firmness of mind, and sound judgment, now looked upon him as already the dupe of the wily Napoleon, who would ultimately make him a mere tool or agent in his ambitious schemes. The readiness with which Alexander acceded to the proposal to meet Napoleon at Erfurth in the following year, as well as the results of this second interview, more and more rivetted this opinion.

The Russians are not backward in avowing that if Alexander had not been captivated by Napoleon, and had not acceded to the treaty of Tilsit, he might have formed an alliance with the powers of Europe, which would have prevented even the idea of the invasion of Russia by the French; and we have heard some of the natives declare their conviction that if Paul, the whimsical Paul, had been alive, such an event would never have happened, and consequently that the ancient capital would not have been destroyed. There is no doubt that the invasion of Russia and the burning of Moscow had created much discontent, and had even raised up some decided enemies to the monarch.

We are afraid that we must enumerate among the leading causes of discontent in Russia those very means which Alexander adopted for the purpose of enlightening it. Aware of the universal ignorance of his subjects, he at the beginning strongly patronised the dissemination of the Scriptures among them, in various languages. Further, believing that a general system of introductory education should precede, or at least accompany, the distribution of the divine truths, he instituted and encouraged universities, academies, gymnasia, and seminaries of every description for the males, while the same task for the females was chiefly left to the direction of the

Empress-mother; he likewise protected missionaries, and, in short, did every thing in his power to promote the general illumination of his people.

The success of the Bible-societies was apparently of the most rapid and permanent description; but, in truth, it was merely external, and soon betrayed the insincerity of those who affected to support those institutions. The despotic influence of the government led to the practice of the grossest deceptions. The nobles, the clergy, and the merchants, who, in order to attract the favour of His Majesty, subscribed most largely to those societies, highly disapproved, in secret, of the whole system. It was besides openly and violently opposed by a number of the Russians, and especially by those who were advanced in years, and who, therefore, were the more influential in instilling their aversion into the minds of their families, friends, and dependants. Among them were to be reckoned most of those nobles of the old creed who preferred that affairs should remain in statu quo, and who were convinced that ignorance is bliss. They viewed the Bible-societies only as one of the means of illuminating the peasantry and of civilising the empire; objects which were cherished by their monarch, but which they imagined would prove ruinous to the state. Thus a measure for which an enlightened nation would have highly praised Alexander was turned to his disadvantage. It is a striking proof of the effect of this opposition, that in the last year of his reign he ceased to patronise the circulation of the Scriptures.

Had Buonaparte conquered Russia, he could not, we apprehend, have done much for its civilisation, and probably he would have shown little inclination for its improvement: but by his invasion, his retreat, the capture of Paris, the sojourn of the Russian army of occupation in France, and, in a word, by the events of the campaigns of 1812-1815, Russia was brought into contact with enlightened Europe, to receive its wisdom, not with those minglings of doubt and error which mark the progress of enquiry, but with all the advantages of experience, and all the laborious deductions of philosophy. It so happened, that the same campaigns, while they enlightened many of the military officers, who highly approved of the plans of the Autocrat, also inspired a number of young officers, and others of maturer years, with more enlarged ideas concerning the proper relations between the governors and the governed than they had before entertained. These ideas expanded by degrees upon the return of the army to Russia, and operated very forcibly towards the formation of the late conspiracy. Other causes, however, were not wanting to produce, perhaps somewhat prematurely, the explosion, which has scarcely yet subsided. The severe punishment of a number of officers, descendants of high families, for trifling offences, caused discontent and chagrin to their relations and their friends, and roused the disgust and the indignation of the sufferers. The inflexibility of the Tsar to hearken to their petitions

engendered feelings of revenge. They deemed themselves martyrs to injustice, and they declaimed against those they deemed their oppressors, the Tsar and his favourites.

The inaction of the army, in consequence of the long peace, and, more especially, the unexpected delay of warfare with the Turks, contributed greatly to the prevailing discontent, not only by the distressing languor which it caused, but also as there was, comparatively speaking, no promotion, no avenue open to distinction or to talents. For a number of years past, the Russian army has been constantly on the tip-toe of expectation to receive a declaration of war, and an order to march to the celebrated regions of the East, and it has ardently burned for the day of battle. Again and again has a report reached the troops that at length their wishes were to be gratified, and as often have they been disappointed. That there is a general desire among the Russians to act against the infidels, and to proceed to Constantinople, cannot be questioned; whether the desire is as general or as sincere to assist the Greeks, is a point that admits discussion.

Another feature in the system of Alexander's government has, in its results, been extremely unpopular, we mean the establishment of the military colonies. These may be briefly described as consisting of an immense army, formed from among the crown peasants, who, in time of peace, were to be properly trained as soldiers, and also to be occupied in agriculture to an extent sufficient for their own support. Every thing relating to military equipage was to be supplied by government; but, in every other respect, the colonies were to sustain themselves. The plan of these colonies is said to have been suggested by Count Aracktcheëf, who rose from the ranks by the force of his talents. The whole system is generally disliked. It is held in utter abhorrence by the peasantry: it is detested by the regular army to such an extent, that the government is obliged to give the officers a higher degree of rank and additional pay, in order to induce them to attach themselves to colonised regiments; and it is highly disapproved of by all classes of the nobility. The latter regard the plan as peculiarly dangerous to the empire; for let it be supposed that a popular leader, especially in the south of Russia, should differ with the government after a few hundred thousand men were taught to obey him, what might he not effectuate?

From the vehement opposition to this system displayed by all classes of society, from the generally admitted impolicy of its plan, and from the obvious danger with which it threatens the empire, it would have been highly prudent in the new Emperor to have abandoned these colonies at once; but, on the contrary, without assigning even a specious reason, he has issued an ukáz, ordering them to be continued.

We must now touch upon another powerful cause of discontent in the Russian empire- the revolution that has lately taken place

in the civil tribunals of that country. Down to a very recent period, a system of bribery and corruption had been established throughout all the tribunals of Russia, had been consolidated by time, and rendered excessively difficult to be eradicated. Even under the most vigorous measures of reform, generations may pass away before a rooted habit of oppression and injustice, founded on the corruption of the human heart, rivetted by long custom, and countenanced by the inadequacy of the ancient salaries to support the officers of the crown, can be reduced to a tolerable state of purity.

Alexander, duly awake to the horrible state of the courts of justice of his country, began a course of improvement which will reflect eternal lustre on his memory. One of the earliest measures he took was to cause the Governor-General of Siberia, General Speranskii, to make an universal and unexpected examination of the administration of the principal towns in that remote country. Soon afterwards he proceeded to Petersburgh and delivered a report to the Emperor, who issued an ukáz, dated the 26th of January, 1822, by which six hundred and seventy-eight civil officers in Siberia were removed, and punished for usury, embezzlement, and oppression of the people. In 1823, 1824, and 1825, Alexander steadily pursued his plans of reform, with respect to the tribunals. A new mode of administration was approved by His Majesty for the Kalmucks: a new plan for the regulation of the political situation of the Krimea Tartars occupied the attention of the Minister of the Interior; and a total renovation of the laws was talked of for Georgia

In consequence of these important changes, a vast number of individuals, many of them of high rank and extensively connected with society, were openly disgraced or secretly invited to retire from office. Against justice and truth they and their parties were likely to become enemies of the great judicial improvements of the Emperor. Their passions, of course, though concealed, were ready to explode the moment an opportunity offered.

Alexander was, moreover, placed, for some time before his death, in the most painful situation imaginable: between, as it were, two powerful and contending elements. On the one hand, he was solicited by some of his officers, a few of whom had both high rank and influence, to approximate the government of Russia to that of the other more enlightened states of Europe, and to hasten the civilisation of the peasantry, by extending the plans already in activity for that purpose; on the other hand, he was assailed by the ministers of foreign courts, some of his own ministers, many of the highest, and a host of the less refined of the nobles, by the clergy, and by most of the merchants, to stop short in his career, to annul his former ukázes, to arrest many of his benevolent plans, and to commence a retrograde course towards the point from which he had started. Alexander had to balance betwixt two great opposing parties: he must either adopt the views of the army, and become dependent on its movements, or he must