Europe to England was necessary in order to obtain money to pay the ship's debts at St. Petersburg, where the master had been unable to sell her cargo, and that the master consulted the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg, who advised him that such a course would be lawful, and who sent despatches by the vessel to the United States. Held, citing the cases of the Rapid and Alexander, that the allegations of the claimant, though they presented, if true, a case of "peculiar hardship," afforded no "legal excuse" for trading with the enemy. The Saint Lawrence, 9 Cranch, 120. If, upon the breaking out of a war with this country, our citizens have a right to withdraw their property from the enemy's country, it must be done within a reasonable time. Eleven months after the declaration of war is too late. The St. Lawrence, 9 Cranch, 120. A detention in the enemy's country by perils of the sea, or an act of the enemy, does not render unlawful a voyage lawful in its inception. The Mary, 9 Cranch, 126. "The language of Mr. Justice Story in the cases of the Rapid and the Mary, in the circuit court, amounts to a clear denial of the existence of the right in question [withdrawal of property of one belligerent from the territory of the other], under any circumstances; although in the case of the St. Lawrence, subsequently decided in the Supreme Court, where the opinion of the court was given by the same distinguished judge, any direct decision of this question was studiously avoided, and that case was decided on the ground that the property had not been withdrawn from the enemy's country within reasonable time after the knowledge of the war. This exact question, as already remarked, has never been determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, nor is its decision involved, as a necessary consequence, in the cases which have been adjudicated before that tribunal. In a case decided in the supreme court of the State of New York, it was held that a citizen of one belligerent may withdraw his property from the country of the other belligerent, provided he does it within a reasonable time after the declaration of the war, and does not himself go to the enemy's country for that purpose. In delivering the opinion of the court in this case (Amory v. McGregor) Chief Justice Thompson remarks, that, from the guarded and cautious manner in which the Supreme Court of the United States had reserved itself upon this particular question, there was reason to conclude that when it should be distinctly presented, it would be considered as not coming within the policy of the rule that renders all trading or intercourse with the enemy illegal." Halleck, Int. Law (3d. ed., by Baker), II. 131. When a vessel sails, with colorable papers, as a pretended neutral, from a port in a belligerent country, of which her true owner is a citizen and inhabitant, to a port in the enemy country, the offense of trading with the enemy is complete at the moment of sailing. The Rugen (1816), 1 Wheat. 62. The rule is inflexible that trade between citizens or subjects of nations at war is forbidden, and property on the high seas, intended for an enemy's port, is lawful prize. Jecker v. Montgomery, 13 How. 498; 18 id. 110. The sending to a stronghold of the enemy, of an enemy vessel carrying provisions, constitutes, under the laws of war, illicit intercourse with the enemy, subjecting the property to capture as a prize. The Benito Estenger, 176 U. S. 568. A declaration of war does not dissolve a shipping contract between domestic ports. Nor does the voluntary placing of a vessel at the disposal of the government dissolve such contract. Graves v. Miami S. S. Co., 61 N. Y. S. 115, 29 Misc. 645. 4. ACCEPTANCE OF ENEMY'S LICENSE OR PROTECTION. § 1182. As to goods on an armed enemy vessel, see Visit and Search, infra, § 1203. "A license is a kind of safe-conduct, granted by a belligerent state to its own subjects, to those of its enemy, or to neutrals, to carry on a trade which is interdicted by the laws of war, and it operates as a dispensation from the penalties of those laws, with respect to the state granting it, and so far as its terms can be fairly construed to extend. The officers and tribunals of the state under whose authority they are issued, are bound to respect such documents as lawful relaxations of the ordinary state of war; but the adverse belligerent may justly consider them as per se a ground of capture and confiscation. Licenses are necessarily stricti juris, and cannot be carried beyond the evident intention of those by whom they are granted; nevertheless, they are not construed with pedantic accuracy, nor will their fair effect be vitiated by every slight deviation from their terms and conditions. Much, however, will depend upon the nature of the terms which are not complied with. Thus a variation in the quality or character of the goods will often lead to more dangerous consequences than an excess of quantity. Again, a license to trade, though safe in the hands of one person, might become dangerous in those of another; so, also, with respect to the limitations of time and place specified in a license. Such restrictions are often of material importance, and cannot be deviated from with safety. In the United States, as a general rule, licenses are issued under the authority of an act of Congress, but in special cases and for purposes immediately connected with the prosecution of a war, they may be granted by the authority of the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the military and naval forces of the United States." Halleck Int. Law (3d. ed., by Baker), II. 343. The sailing on a voyage under the license and passport of protection of the enemy, in furtherance of his views and interests, subjects the ship and cargo to confiscation as prize of war. The Julia, 8 Cranch, 181; The Aurora, 8 Cranch, 203. For a very full note by Wheaton on the subject of licenses, see 3 Wheaton, 207. The objections to the accepting of licenses from an enemy are thus stated by Judge Story in the Julia (1 Gall. 233; 8 Cranch, 181, 193, 197). The principle, he states, is that "in war all intercourse between the subjects and citizens of the billigerent countries is illegal, unless sanctioned by the authority of the Government, or in the exercise of the rights of humanity." He insists that a license from an enemy must be regarded as an agreement with such enemy that the licensee will conduct himself in a neutral manner, and avoid any hostile acts toward such enemy, and he holds, therefore, that acting under such a license is a violation of the laws of war, and of a citizen's duties to his own government. "Can an American citizen," he asks, "be permitted in this manner to carve out for himself a neutrality on the ocean, when his country is at war? Can he justify himself in refusing to aid his countrymen, who have fallen into the hands of the enemy on the ocean, or decline their rescue? Can he withdraw his personal services, when the necessities of the nation require them? Can an engagement be legal, which imposes upon him the temptation or necessity of deeming his personal interest at variance with the legitimate objects of his Government?" He declares that incompleteness of a voyage, under license from the enemy, is no defense, for the vessel is liable to capture at the instant the voyage under such license is commenced. Wherever the object of the voyage is prohibited, its inception with the illegal intent completes the offense to which the legal penalty attaches. This case of illegal trading, under a license from the wemy, is only a particular application of a universal rule. Nor can it be a defense that the trade is not subservient to the enemy's interest, as the condemnation of such licensed vessel and cargo rests upon the broad ground of the illegality of such voyage. See Halleck Int. Law (3d. ed. by Baker), II. 138 et seq. It is not necessary, in order to subject the property to condemnation, that the person granting the license should be duly authorized to grant it, provided the person receiving it takes it with the expectation that it will protect his property from the enemy. The Aurora, 8 Cranch, 203. On August 5, 1812, Admiral Sawyer addressed to the British consul at Boston a letter stating that, it being important to insure a constant supply of flour and other dry provisions to Spain and Portugal and to the West Indies, he (the Admiral) had been instructed to direct the officers under his command not to molest American vessels unarmed and so laden, bona fide bound to Portugese and Spanish ports, whose papers should be accompanied by a certified copy of a letter under the consul's official seal. The consul then addressed a similar communication to the commanders of British ships of war and privateers, accompanied with a certified copy of the Admiral's letter. American vessels thus licensed naturally threw themselves, as soon as possible, into the hands of British cruisers for the purpose of obtaining protection against American capture for sailing under the enemy's license. Such vessels, when captured by American cruisers, were condemned. The Hiram, 8 Cranch, 444; The Hiram, 1 Wheaton, 440. See Upton's Maritime Warfare and Prize (2d ed.), 137. The sailing under the enemy's license constitutes, of itself, an act of illegality, which subjects the property to confiscation, without regard to the object of the voyage or the port of destination. The Ariadne, 2 Wheat. 143. See, also, Patton v. Nicholson, 3 Wheat. 204. A vessel which has been rendered liable to capture as enemy's property by sailing under the license or pass of the enemy, or for trading with the enemy, may still be seized and condemned as prize of war after her return to the United States, by virtue of the general authority of the Government to seize all enemies' property coming into our ports during war. And as a general rule, any person may seize any property forfeited to the use of the Government, either by the municipal law or by the law of prize, for the purpose of enforcing the forfeiture; and it depends upon the Government itself whether it will act upon the seizure. If it proceeds to enforce the forfeiture by legal process, this is a sufficient confirmation of the seizure. The Caledonian, 4 Wheat. 100. The fact of a vessel having been sent into an enemy's port for adjudication, and afterwards permitted to resume her voyage, was held to raise a violent presumption that she had a license; and, the claimant having produced no evidence to repel the presumption, condemnation was pronounced. The Langdon Cheves, 4 Wheat. 103. When a ship is captured in time of war, it is not to be presumed, from the fact that she carries an enemy's license, that she intends proceeding to the port of the enemy. The license may be carried for the purpose of deceiving the enemy. The Matilda, 5 Hughes, C. C. 544. A contract made by a consul of a neutral power with a citizen of a belligerent state, that he will "protect," with his neutral name, from capture by the belligerent, merchandise which such citizen has in the enemy's lines, is against public policy and void. Coppell v. Hall, 7 Wall. 542. "A United States consul has no authority by virtue of his official station to grant any license or permit the exemption of a vessel of an enemy from capture and confiscation." The Benito Estenger, 176 U. S. 568; citing The Amodo, Newberry, 400; VII. ENEMY'S PROPERTY. 1. LIABILITY TO SEIZURE. § 1183. The Continental Congress, by a resolution of December 9, 1781, enacted that all ships, with their cargoes, which should be seized by their crews, should be deemed lawful prize to the captors, the object being to tempt the navigators of enemy vessels to bring them into American ports. Subsequently, during the war, a British ship, bound to New York, then in the possession of the British, was compelled by stress of weather to enter a port in North Carolina; and the master, with a view to save his ship from confiscation, made an agreement with the crew to seize the vessel and cargo and have them condemned, |