“15. A neutral vessel carrying hostile dispatches, when sailing as a dispatch vessel practically in the service of the enemy, is liable to seizure; but not when she is a mail packet and carries them in the regular and customary manner, either as a part of the mail in her mail bags, or separately, as a matter of accommodation and without special arrangement or remuneration. The voyages of mail steamers are not to be interfered with except on the clearest grounds of suspicion of a violation of law in respect of contraband or blockade." Instructions to United States Blockading Vessels and Cruisers, General "When a person belonging to a neutral state takes permanent civil or military service with a foreign state he identifies himself so fully with it that he becomes the enemy of its enemies for every purpose. When he merely contracts to do specific services, he becomes an enemy to the extent, and for the purposes, of those services." So a neutral may so identify himself or his property with a possible or intending belligerent that hostilities may even be opened by an attack on him or by the capture of his property. Hall, Int. Law (5th ed.), 501, 502. On July 25, 1894, about 7 a. m., a Japanese squadron, cruising off the Corean coast, before declaration of war, was attacked by Chinese warships which had been convoying reinforcements to Asan. About 9 a. m. the Kowshing, a British vessel, carrying further Chinese reinforcements for Asan, appeared on the scene. The Japanese cruiser Naniwa signaled her to stop and sent a boat aboard, and, finding that she was carrying 1,200 Chinese troops, with several generals, including the German major, von Hanneken, asked the captain to follow the Naniwa to Japan. The captain assented, but the Chinese officers by force and threats restrained him. The Naniwa, then, after some parleying, warned those on board to quit the vessel, and afterwards fired into and sank her. Most of the Europeans were picked up by the boats of the Naniwa. As soon as the facts could be fully ascertained, Professors Holland and Westlake both took the ground, in the face of much popular excitement, that at the time of the sinking of the Koushing a state of war de facto existed between China and Japan; that the Kowshing, as a neutral ship engaged in the transport service of a belligerent, was liable to be visited and taken in for adjudication, with the use of so much force as might be necessary; that, as one of a fleet of transports and men-of-war engaged in carrying reinforcements to the Chinese troops on the mainland, she was clearly part of a hostile expedition, or one which might be treated as hostile, which the Japanese were entitled by all needful force to arrest; that the force used did not appear to be excessive, either for the capture of an enemy's neutral transport or for barring the progress of a hostile expedition, and that, as the rescued officers were duly set at liberty, no apology was due to the British Government and no indemnity to any person. Holland, Studies in Int. Law, 126 et seq. 5. TRANSFER OF ENEMY SHIPS TO NEUTRALS. (1) PUBLIC SHIP. § 1187. A bona fide purchase for a commercial purpose by a neutral in his own home port, of a ship of war of a belligerent that had fled to such port in order to escape from enemy vessels in pursuit, but which was bona fide dismantled prior to the sale, and afterward fitted up for the merchant service, does not pass a title above the right of capture by the other belligerent. The Georgia, 7 Wall. 32. See, also, The Georgia, 1 Lowell, 96. (2) MERCHANT VESSELS. § 1188. It was alleged that a violation of the act of February 27, 1800, suspending commercial intercourse between the United States and France, had been committed by selling an American vessel to an innabitant of St. Thomas, with a view to its being used in trade with the French island of Guadaloupe. Marshall, C. J., delivering the opinion of the court, said that the building of vessels in the United States for sale to neutrals during war was a profitable business which, in the absence of a clear intention, it could not be supposed that Congress intended to prohibit. He further declared that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains, and, consequently, can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this country." He held that no violation of the act of Congress had been committed. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsey (1804), 2 Cranch, 64, 118. A citizen of the United States may purchase a ship of a belligerent power, at home or abroad, in a belligerent port, or on the high seas, provided the purchase be made bona fide, and the property be passed absolutely and without reserve; and the ship so purchased becomes entitled to bear the flag and receive the protection of the United States. Neutrals have a right to purchase ships of belligerents. Cushing, At. Gen., 1854, 6 Op. 638; 1855, 7 Op. 538. "The law of nations secures to neutrals unrestricted commerce with the belligerents, except in articles contraband of war, and trade with blockaded or besieged places. With these exceptions commerce is as free between neutrals and belligerents as if it were carried on solely between neutral nations; and it is difficult to conceive upon what principle an exception can be made and the neutral deprived of the rights secured in regard to the purchase of merchant vessels. "It is true a regulation of France has been referred to in support of the doctrine avowed by the Imperial Government, but it is hardly necessary to observe that a municipal law of that country can only affect persons under its control, and can have no binding force beyond its territorial limits. The parties who made the contract for the sale and purchase of the ship St. Harlampy were not under the jurisdiction of the municipal law of France; on the contrary, they were both within the jurisdiction of the United States as well as the property which formed the subject of the transaction. The validity or invalidity of the transaction can be determined only by the local or international law. It was a contract authorized by the laws of this country and the law of nations; and it was supposed to be universally conceded that such a contract would be respected everywhere. Certainly no government except that under which the contract was made could interpose to destroy or vary the obligations which its provisions impose if not contrary to the law of nations. This is the doctrine of the European publicists, and it is especially sustained by Hautefeuille, whose authority will, I doubt not, be recognized by the Emperor's Government. He says, ' It is impossible to recognize such a right as that claimed by the regulation of France.' Commerce,' he adds, is free between the neutral and belligerent nations; this liberty is unlimited except [by] the two restrictions relative to contraband of war, and to places besieged, blockaded, or invested; it extends to all kinds of provisions, merchandise, and movable objects without exception. Pacific nations can then, when they judge proper, purchase the merchant ships of one of the parties engaged in hostilities, without the other party having the right to complain, without, above all, that it should have power to censure, to annul these sales, to consider and treat as an enemy, a ship really neutral and regularly recognized by the neutral Government as belonging to its subjects. To declare null and without obligation a contract, it is indispensable that the legislator should have jurisdiction over the contracting parties. It is then necessary, in order that such a thing should take place, to suppose that the belligerent possesses the right of jurisdiction over neutral nations. That is impossible; the pretension of the belligerents is an abuse of force, an attempt against the independence of pacific nations, and consequently a violation of the duties imposed by divine law upon nations at war.' “However long may be the period during which this doctrine has formed part of the municipal code of France, it is manifestly not in harmony with her maritime policy, and it is confidently believed by this Government that France will not assert it not only against the practice of other nations but against the authority of her most enlightened writers on public law.” Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Mason, Feb. 19, 1856, MS. Inst. France, "The principle, therefore, that the neutral has a perfect right to purchase the merchant vessels of the belligerents has been maintained by England, by Russia, and by the United States, and it is inconsistent with these historical facts to say that the contrary doctrine avowed by France has had the sanction of the chief maritime nations, or that it forms a part of the whole doctrine of maritime law."" Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Mason, Feb. 19, 1856, MS. Inst. France, Mr. Marcy's position, as above stated, is in harmony with the English In 1883, during the war between France and China, many Chinese vessels were sold to citizens of the United States, and after the war was over were resold to Chinese. The validity of this transaction does not seem to have been tested by France. (See President Arthur, annual message, Dec. 1, 1884, For. Rel. 1884, Iv.) "Inquiries having been addressed to this Department as to the right of a citizen of the United States to purchase a vessel of a belligerent during the existing war in Europe, I have to inform you that a similar question arose during the late Crimean war, was deliberately and carefully investigated by the Administration for the time being, and resulted in a conviction, that a vessel so purchased, in good faith, becomes the property of the purchaser, and is entitled to the protection of the flag of the United States, though a special act of Congress would be necessary to enable her to obtain a register from the proper Department. "These views are entirely concurred in by the existing executive government of the United States, and will be maintained whenever there may be occasion therefor." Mr. Cass, Sec. of State, to U. S. consuls, circular, No. 10, June 1, 1859, See, also, Mr. Cass, Sec. of State, to Mr. Mason, June 20, 1859, 50 MS. The Consular Regulations" stated that foreign-built vessels, purchased and wholly owned by citizens of the United States, whether purchased of belligerents or neutrals, during a war to which the United States are not a party, or in peace, of foreign owners, are entitled to the protection and flag of the United States as the property of American citizens.' The same instructions, however, require that the purchase should have been in good faith. The purpose of the authority to consuls in the matter obviously was to enable citizens of the United States residing abroad to buy foreign-built vessels for lawful trade. It was not intended to sanction a simulated purchase of such vessels, to be employed in hostile operations against countries with which the United States are at peace. Although, if the purchase in this instance was a bona fide transaction, it may be that a vessel so employed by the purchaser may not have technically violated the neutrality law of the United States, still her employment in the business in which those vessels engaged, while flying the flag of this country, was contrary to the spirit of that act, and at variance with the friendship then existing between the United States and the King of the Two Sicilies. In point of fact, the examination which has been made has given rise to a doubt whether the alleged purchase of the vessels referred to was a bona fide transaction for a valuable consideration, or was only simulated in order that the flag of the United States might be used to screen them from capture by the Neapolitan navy on their way to and from Sicily. It can not be doubtful how far the authority or the countenance of this Government should be employed in behalf of a claim if it should prove to be of this latter character." Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Marsh, Jan. 29, 1877, MS. Inst. Italy, II. 11. "Can a foreign vessel be purchased by a citizen of the United States? "In reply I have to observe that the natural right to acquire property by purchase has been held by high authority to be unaffected, so far as neutrals are concerned, by the mere fact that a |