Venus (8 Cranch, 253), dissenting in this respect from the majority of the court, who held to the English view. Chancellor Kent (Com. i. 79) and Mr. Duer (Ins. i. 498), vindicate the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice; Chancellor Kent saying 'there is no doubt of its superior solidity and justice.' And even by the English courts a person doing business in a land in which he is not naturalized is allowed, on the breaking out of war, a reasonable time to leave such land, and dissolve his business relations. The Gerasimo, 11 Moore, P. C. 88; The Ariel, id. 119; see, for parallel cases in this country, The William Bagaley, 5 Wall. 377; The Gray Jacket, 5 Wall. 342. But where a merchant elects to put his goods in a country engaged in war, he impresses such goods, according to the English view, with the political character of such country; and this allows a merchant to act in two characters, so as to protect his property connected with his house in a neutral country, and to subject to seizure and forfeiture his effects belonging to the establishment in the belligerent country." Wharton, Int. Law Digest, III, 344. 2. IMMATERIALITY OF PERSONAL DISPOSITION. § 1190. "It is said, that though remaining in rebel territory, Mrs. Alexander has no personal sympathy with the rebel cause, and that her property therefore can not be regarded as enemy property; but this court can not inquire into the personal character and dispositions of individual inhabitants of enemy territory. We must be governed by the principle of public law, so often announced from this bench as applicable alike to civil and international wars, that all the people of each State or district in insurrection against the United States, must be regarded as enemies, until, by the action of the legislature and the executive, or otherwise, that relation is thoroughly and permanently changed." Chase, C. J., Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wall. 404, 419. acter. An attempt was made to prevent the condemnation of a vessel, captured by an American cruiser in June, 1898, as Prize-enemy char- enemy's property, on the ground that the alleged owner, one de Messa, though a Spanish subject, should not be treated as an enemy of the United States. It was argued that the vessel when captured was engaged in a voyage in behalf of the local Cuban junta at Kingston, Jamaica, allies of the United States, and was thus captured in the service of the United States in the performance of friendly offices to the United States forces in Cuba. There was "evidence tending to show that Messa sympathized with the Cuban insurgents, but no proof that he was himself a Cuban rebel 6 "According to Chancellor Kent, the principle that ' for all commercial purposes the domicil of the party, without reference to the place of birth, becomes the test of national character, has been repeatedly and explicitly admitted in the courts of the United States.' 'If he resides (here domicil' and residence' are treated as convertible by Chancellor Kent, which, if the latter term be regarded as defining the rule, would largely extend belligerent rights) in a belligerent country, his property is liable to capture as enemy's property, and if he resides in a neutral country, he enjoys all the privileges, and is subject to all the inconveniences, of the neutral trade.' (1 Kent Com. 75; The Chester, 2 Dall. 41; Maley . Shattuck, 3 Cranch, 458; The Venus, 8 id. 253. To the same effect, see The William Bagaley, 5 Wall. 377; The Cheshire, 3 Wall. 231.) Sir Robert Phillimore, on the other hand, evidently accepts this position with reluctance (4 Phill. 169), though it is reaffirmed by Mr. Dicey, who states the distinction to be as follows: 'A commercial domicil is such a residence in a country for the purpose of trading there as makes a person's trade or business contribute to or form part of the resources of such country, and renders it, therefore, reasonable that his hostile, friendly, or neutral character should be determined by reference to the character of such country. When a person's civil domicil is in question, the matter to be determined is whether he has or has not so settled in a given country as to have made it his home. When a person's commercial domicil is in question, the matter to be determined is whether he is or is not residing in a given country with the intention of continuing to trade there.' (Dicey on Domicil, 345; see further Whart. Confl. of Laws, § 70.) This is clearly put; and if we accept the position that an enemy's goods may be seized at sea wherever found, gives us at least a line of demarkation readily understood and easily applied. It is, however, to be regretted that the term 'domicil' should be adapted to conditions so different as residence with intention to establish a permanent home, and residence with intention to engage in business. The rejection of this distinction renders still more objectionable the claim of belligerents to seize an enemy's goods at sea. If by an enemy' is to be considered any one who by his business contributes to the resources of an enemy's country, it would be hard for any goods on the high seas, in any way related to a belligerent country, to escape the meshes of the net of the other belligerent. And even were we to holds that a commercial domicil' of this kind stamps the party accepting it with the political character of the country in which he does business, the more reasonable view is that if he engage in such business in time of peace, this domicil,' if not adopted as final, ceases when the sovereign of such country enters into a war which could not have been contemplated by the party when he engaged in the business. This is the position taken by Marshall, C. J., in The Venus (8 Cranch, 253), dissenting in this respect from the majority of the court, who held to the English view. Chancellor Kent (Com. i. 79) and Mr. Duer (Ins. i. 498), vindicate the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice; Chancellor Kent saying 'there is no doubt of its superior solidity and justice.' And even by the English courts a person doing business in a land in which he is not naturalized is allowed, on the breaking out of war, a reasonable time to leave such land, and dissolve his business relations. The Gerasimo, 11 Moore, P. C. 88; The Ariel, id. 119; see, for parallel cases in this country, The William Bagaley, 5 Wall. 377; The Gray Jacket, 5 Wall. 342. But where a merchant elects to put his goods in a country engaged in war, he impresses such goods, according to the English view, with the political character of such country; and this allows a merchant to act in two characters, so as to protect his property connected with his house in a neutral country, and to subject to seizure and forfeiture his effects belonging to the establishment in the belligerent country." Wharton, Int. Law Digest, III. 344. 2. IMMATERIALITY OF PERSONAL DISPOSITION. § 1190. "It is said, that though remaining in rebel territory, Mrs. Alexander has no personal sympathy with the rebel cause, and that her property therefore can not be regarded as enemy property; but this court can not inquire into the personal character and dispositions of individual inhabitants of enemy territory. We must be governed by the principle of public law, so often announced from this bench as applicable alike to civil and international wars, that all the people of each State or district in insurrection against the United States, must be regarded as enemies, until, by the action of the legislature and the executive, or otherwise, that relation is thoroughly and permanently changed." Chase, C. J., Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wall. 404, 419. An attempt was made to prevent the condemnation of a vessel, captured by an American cruiser in June, 1898, as Prize-enemy char- enemy's property, on the ground that the alleged owner, one de Messa, though a Spanish subject, acter. should not be treated as an enemy of the United States. It was argued that the vessel when captured was engaged in a voyage in behalf of the local Cuban junta at Kingston, Jamaica, allies of the United States, and was thus captured in the service of the United States in the performance of friendly offices to the United States forces in Cuba. There was "evidence tending to show that Messa sympathized with the Cuban insurgents, but no proof that he was himself a Cuban rebel or that he had renounced his allegiance to Spain." The cargo of the vessel when captured consisted chiefly of flour, and there was evidence to show that this flour, when landed at Manzanillo, was immediately transferred to the Spanish Government warehouse. The court referred to Manzanillo as a "Spanish stronghold," and observed that the delivery of the provisions to the Spanish Government constituted, under the laws of war, illicit intercourse with the enemy. It was alleged, however, that de Messa had rendered important service to the United States; that he was the friend and not the enemy of the United States, and that there was an agreement between him and the United States consul which operated to protect the vessel from capture. It appeared that de Messa had endeavored to cultivate friendly relations with the United States consul at Kingston, and had given him an old government plan of the province of Santiago, and an especially prepared chart of the harbor, in return for which he endeavored to obtain from the consul a letter of protection for the voyage which he was about to undertake. The consul declined to furnish the letter, but on June 23 wrote to Admiral Sampson that de Messa offered to give certain information that might be valuable, and proposed to be off Cape Cruz on June 30, adding: "You quite understand that in dealing with those people, one is always more or less liable to imposition. I therefore make no recommendation of Messa to you." The claimant asserted, while the consul denied, that protection was given to the voyage by his letter. With reference to this contention, the court said that there was nothing to show that the voyage was undertaken on the strength of the letter, or that it in any way contributed to the capture; nor that the admiral intended to avail himself of the suggestion made in it; "but," said the court, "we do not go at length into this matter because we think that no engagement with the United States nor any particular service to the United States was made out in that connection, and so far as appears the vessel was captured in the ordinary course of cruising duty at a time and under circumstances when her liability was not to be denied. Moreover, a United States consul has no authority by virtue of his official station to grant any license or permit the exemption of a vessel of an enemy from capture and confiscation." Referring to the same subject in another place, the court said: "Messa's status was that of an enemy, as already stated, and this must be held to be so notwithstanding individual acts of friendship, certainly since there was no open adherence to the Cuban cause, and allegiance could have been shifted with the accidents of war." The Benito Estenger, 176 U. S. 568. 3. CONSULS. 1191. The ship Indian Chief, belonging to Mr. Johnson, a citizen of the United States, who had lately been American consul in London, was seized at Cowes, and libeled as a droit of the admiralty. Her cargo, which was taken at Batavia, belonged to Mr. Millar, American consul at Calcutta, and she had called at Cowes to receive orders concerning its delivery. The question of condemnation depended upon whether Messrs. Johnson and Millar were to be regarded as having a commercial domicil in British territory. In the case of the former, it was found that he had taken steps to regain his American character, and the ship was restored. As to Mr. Millar, is was held that he was, in spite of his consular character, to be considered as a British (domiciled) merchant, and the cargo was condemned. The Indian Chief (1801), 3 C. Rob. 12. "As connected with this subject, it is proper that I should inform you that a ship belonging to Mr. Johnson, late our consul here, laden with a cargo belonging to Mr. Miller, our consul at Calcutta, and bound from Batavia to Hamburgh, touched a few weeks since at Cowes, where she was detained and has since been libelled as a droit of Admiralty. Upon my application for her release, I have been answered that it is thought proper to make this case the subject of a judicial decision; that Johnson and Miller were both domiciled as alien merchants within the British dominions, that being so domiciled they no longer possessed the commercial rights of the citizens of the nation to which they belonged, but were subject to the laws of Great Britain, which prohibit every person settled within the British dominions from trading with any nation with whom Great Britain is at war. I have on a former occasion stated to you the law as it is here interpreted concerning the consuls of neutral nations residing and carry ing on trade in belligerent nations. In this case I observed among other things to Sir Wm. Scott that both Johnson and Miller were in their consular commissions named as American citizens and their exequatur must be considered as an admission thereof on the part of the Crown; that it therefore seemed unreasonable to confound the case of consuls who, for the benefit of the commerce of their nation, are sent to reside within the British dominions with that of other foreigners who for the mere sake of trade might come to settle there. The Advocate-General replied that the recognition of a consul was relative merely to his consular or official character, and could not be intended to grant any commercial privileges to the person named as consul; that the contrary doctrine would be introductory of great mischief, and that the law upon this subject has been long settled. I have recommended to the gentlemen who represent Mr. Johnson and Mr. Miller to contest this law, tho' Doctor Nicholl gives me little encouragement to hope that the decision of the court will be in our favour. Perhaps the circumstance that Johnson had quitted London and probably was in America at the time of the seizure may operate |