Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Adams, min. to England, No. 83, Sept. 7, 1861, Dip. Cor. 1861, 125. In the course of this instruction, Mr. Seward said: "It is my desire that we may withdraw from the subject carrying away no feelings of passion, prejudice, or jealousy, so that in some happier time it may be resumed, and the important objects of the proposed convention may be fully secured. I believe that that propitious time is even now not distant; and I will hope that when it comes Great Britain will not only willingly and unconditionally accept the adhesion of the United States to all the benignant articles of the declaration of the congress of Paris, but will even go further, and, relinquishing her present objections, consent, as the United States have so constantly invited, that the private property, not contraband, of citizens and subjects of nations in collision shall be exempted from confiscation equally in warfare waged on the land and in warfare waged upon the seas, which are the common highways of all nations. "Regarding this negotiation as at an end, the question arises, what, then, are to be the views and policy of the United States in regard to the rights of neutrals in maritime war in the present case. My previous despatches leave no uncertainty upon this point. We regard Great Britain as a friend. Her Majesty's flag, according to our traditional principles, covers enemy's goods not contraband of war. Goods of Her Majesty's subjects, not contraband of war, are exempt from confiscation, though found under a neutral or disloyal flag. No depredation shall be committed by our naval forces or by those of any of our citizens, so far as we can prevent it, upon the vessels or property of British subjects. Our blockade, being effective, must be respected. "The unfortunate failure of our negotiations to amend the law of nations in regard to maritime war does not make us enemies, although, if they had been successful, we should have perhaps been more assured friends. "Civil war is a calamity from which certainly no people or nation that has ever existed has been always exempt. It is one which probably no nation ever will escape. Perhaps its most injurious trait is its tendency to subvert the good understanding and break up the relations existing between the distracted state and friendly nations, and to involve them, sooner or later, in war. It is the desire of the United States that the internal differences existing in this country may be confined within our own borders. I do not suffer myself for a moment to doubt that Great Britain has a desire that we may be successful in attaining that object, and that she looks with dread upon the possibility of being herself drawn into this unhappy internal controversy of our own. I do not think it can be regarded as disrespectful if you should remind Lord Russell that when, in 1838, a civil war broke out in Canada, a part of the British dominions adjacent to the United States, the Congress of the United States passed and the President executed a law which effectually prevented any intervention against the Government of Great Britain in those internal differences by American citizens, whatever might be their motives, real or pretended, whether of interest or sympathy. I send you a copy of that enactment. The British Government will judge for itself whether it is suggestive of any measures on the part of Great Britain that might tend to preserve the peace of the two countries, and, through that way, the peace of all nations." (Id. 127.) As to the signature by Mr. Cassius M. Clay and Prince Gortschakoff, in the autumn of 1861, of a treaty for the amelioration of the rigors of maritime war, and its subsequent postponement and abandonment, by mutual consent of the two Governments, see Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Clay, min. to Russia, No. 19, Oct. 23, 1861, MS. Inst. Russia, XIV. 238; same to same, Nos. 20 and 26, Nov. 9, 1861, and Jan. 8, 1862, id. 239, 244; Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Stoeckl, Rusian min., Jan. 8, 1862, MS. Notes to Russian Leg. VI. 114; Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Clay, min. to Russia, No. 32, March 6, 1862, MS. Inst. Russia, XIV. 249. H. Doc. 551-vol 7—38 1. Conclusiveness as to property. § 1242. 2. Jurisdictional limitations or defects. § 1243. 3. Inconclusiveness as to international rights. § 1244. VIII. PRIZE MONEY AND BOUNTY. 1. Claimants of prize money. § 1245. 2. Proportions awarded. § 1246. 3. Bounty. § 1247. 4. Abolition of prize money and bounty. § 1248. I. COURTS. § 1222. The court of appeals in prize causes erected by the Continental Congress had power to revise and correct the sentences of the State courts of admiralty. United States v. Judge Peters (1809), 5 Cranch, 115, 66 The papers of the Continental Congress preserved in this Department have been thoroughly examined, and the only records of the board of admiralty which have been found relate solely to the proceedings of Congress. The adjudication of prize cases does not appear to have been made the duty of the said board; and as it was left to the courts, the establishment of which was 'recommended to the several legislatures in the United Colonies' by article 4 of the resolution of Congress forming the United States Navy (November 25, 1775), it was not subject to the interference of Congress except in cases of appeal (see article 6th, same resolution).” Mr. Brown, chief clerk, Department of State, to Mr. Wing, chief clerk, District courts of the United States possess all the powers of a court of admiralty, both instance and prize, and may award restitution of property claimed as prize of war by a foreign captor. Glass v. The Sloop Betsey (1794), 3 Dall, 6. Proceedings against the ship and cargo are to be had before the district court of the United States according to the laws of Congress and the usage and practice of courts of admiralty in prize causes. Lee, At. Gen., 1798, 1 Op. 85. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States in prize cases is appellate only, and a claim can not for the first time be interposed there; but, where a case was disposed of in the district. court without proper opportunity to claimants to appear, and the decree was affirmed by the circuit court, the case was remanded to the circuit court, with directions to allow a claim to be filed. The Harrison (1816), 1 Wheat. 298. The validity of the seizure and the question of prize or no prize can only be determined in the courts upon which jurisdiction has been conferred by the sovereign under whose authority the capture was made. Neither the President nor any military officer can establish a court in a conquered country, and authorize it to decide prize cases and administer the laws of nations. Jecker v. Montgomery, 13 How. 498. See Snell v. Faussatt, 1 Wash. C. C. 271. It was within the authority of the President, as commander-inchief, to establish courts during the rebellion in portions of the insurgent territory which were occupied by the national forces. The Grapeshot, 9 Wall. 129. Neither by the law of nations nor by the French-American treaty then in force had a French consul in Charleston in 1793 jurisdiction to condemn as legal prize a British vessel captured and brought into that port by a French frigate; and such act is not only a nullity, but justifies an appeal to the French minister to "interpose efficaciously to prevent a repetition of the error." Mr. Jefferson, Sec. of State, to Mr. Ternant, French min., May 15, 1793. This view was taken by the Supreme Court in Glass v. Sloop Betsey, 3 By article 28 of the treaty between the United States and Hayti of November 3, 1863, it is provided “that in matters of prize ‘in all cases the established courts for prize causes, in the country to which the prizes may be conducted, shall alone take cognizance of them.' "The tribunal before which the Haytian Republic and her officers were brought was hastily improvised for the occasion and consisted of two commissioners specially appointed on the 21st of October, 1888, to examine the case of the Haytian Republic. It was in no sense 'an established court for prize causes,' as stipulated in the treaty, but had for its special and only authority the order of the provisional president, Légitime. Its proceedings had scarcely a feature of formality and regularity. The witnesses before it, whose statements were generally founded on hearsay and often palpably inconsistent with established facts, were not even sworn, and no opportunity was given for defense, although the reasonable delay of four days, two of which were holidays, was requested for that purpose and refused. "Such proceedings appear only the more indefensible when it is considered that the provisional president, Légitime, and his minister for foreign affairs now set up a violation of the municipal law of Hayti as the ground of the condemnation of the vessel and the imprisonment of her officers. The professed character of the commission was that of a prize court,' and it is so styled in your notes, to which I have the honor now to reply. The trial of an alleged violation of Haytian municipal law was thus wholly outside its competence. As the tribunal for the examination of such a charge its proceedings were thus not only confessedly without jurisdiction, but destitute of regularity, and also palpably violative of the provisions of the sixth article of the treaty of 1864, which guaranties to citizens of the United States access to the ordinary courts of justice, and full opportunity to defend their rights and interests before them. "A prize court is not a court of criminal jurisdiction. The condemnation of the vessel and cargo' (Bates, Attorney-General, 10 |