Изображения страниц
PDF
EPUB

The court having ordered in The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S. 677, that the proceeds of the vessels and cargoes should be restored to the claimants with compensatory and not punitive damages and costs, and it appearing that the damages allowed were excessive, the cases were remanded to the district court for further proceedings. It was also ordered that, under the circumstances of the case, the decree should be entered against the United States and not against the captors individually.

The Paquete Habana (1903), 189 U. S. 453.

(2) MEASURE.

$1227.

In a suit by the owners of captured property, lost through the fault and negligence of the captors, the value of the captured vessel, and the prime cost of the cargo, with all charges, and the premium of insurance, were allowed in ascertaining the damages.

The Anna Maria, 2 Wheat. 327.

A vessel and cargo having been condemned under the nonimportation laws, and a question having arisen as to whether damages should be computed from the date of the bond given for the appraised value of the cargo, or from the decree of condemnation of the district court, it was held" that the damages should be computed at the rate of six per centum on the amount of the appraised value of the cargo, including interest from the date of the decree of condemnation in the district court."

The Diana (1818), 3 Wheat. 58.

On an illegal capture the original wrongdoers may be made responsible beyond the loss actually sustained in case of gross and wanton outrage; but the owners of the offending privateer, who are only constructively liable, are not liable for punitive damages.

The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. 546.

See Talbot v. Three Brigs, 1 Dali. 95.

If property has been wrongfully brought into the United States, and the duty paid by a wrongful captor, and a decree of restitution is made after a sale, the captor is liable on such a decree only for the balance, without interest, after deducting the amount paid as duties. The Santa Maria, 10 Wheat. 431.

[blocks in formation]

Prize courts properly deny damages or costs where there has been probable cause for seizure. Probable cause exists where there are circumstances sufficient to warrant suspicion, though not sufficient to warrant condemnation.

The Thompson, 3 Wall. 155.

See, also, The Dashing Wave, 5 Wall. 170; Lushington, Prize Law, § § 25, 94.

A Spanish vessel seized as a prize on April 22, 1898, when there was probable cause for the seizure, but which was exempted from seizure and condemnation by the subsequent proclamation of April 26, is not entitled to damages or costs on restitution. Decree (D. C. 1898) 87 Fed. Rep. 927, reversed.

The Buena Ventura v. United States, 175 U. S. 384.

"In all prize cases where claims for indemnity were presented to the Department of State by foreign governments on behalf of their subjects for seizures made by our war vessels [during the war with Spain], the rule adopted was to reject claims for indemnity in cases where the prize court had found probable cause, and to refer to the Court of Claims all claims for indemnity in cases where probable cause may not be found."

Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Attorney-General, Jan. 5, 1900, 242 MS. Dom.
Let. 133.

III. JURISPRUDENCE.

1. PRINCIPLES OBSERVED.

§ 1229.

On questions of belligerent and neutral rights the Supreme Court will recognize the decisions of the courts of every country, so far as they are founded on a law common to every country, not as authorities, but with respect. The decisions of the courts of every foreign civilized land show in a given case how the law of nations is understood in such lands, and will be considered in adopting the rule which is to prevail in the United States.

Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 9 Cranch, 191.

"Without taking a comparative view of the justice or fairness of the rules established in the British courts, and of those established in the courts of other nations, there are circumstances not to be excluded

from consideration, which give to those rules a claim to our attention that we can not entirely disregard. The United States having, at one time, formed a component part of the British Empire, their prize law was our prize law. When we separated, it continued to be our prize law, so far as it was adapted to our circumstances and was not varied by the power which was capable of changing it.

"It will not be advanced, in consequence of this former relation between the two countries, that any obvious misconstruction of public law made by the British courts, will be considered as forming a rule for the American courts, or that any recent rule of the British courts is entitled to more respect than the recent rules of other countries. But a case professing to be decided on ancient principles will not be entirely disregarded, unless it be very unreasonable, or be founded on a construction rejected by other nations."

Marshall, C. J., Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle (1815), 9 Cranch, 191, 198.

"I remember with pleasure that I once heard you assert this principle [free ships free goods], but in Congress and in the Supreme Court I am sorry to say that it was almost friendless. Such is the influence of England. We read none but English books, adopt none but English ideas of law and politics."

Mr. Ingersoll to Mr. Madison, July, 1814, Meigs's Life of Charles Jared
Ingersoll, 325.

The court of prize is emphatically a court of the law of nations; and it takes neither its character nor its rules from the mere municipal regulations of any country. By this law the definition of prize goods is that they are goods taken on the high seas, jure belli, out of the hands of the enemy.

Schooner Adeline, 9 Cranch, 244.

In 5 Wheat., App. p. 52, Wheaton gives a note on prize law, which embraces:

1. Extract from the Consolato del Mare. Chap. CCLXXIII., CCLXXXVII. P. 54.

2. Extracts from the Code des Prises. Articles relatifs aux prises, Extraits de l'Ordonnance de Charles VI. sur le faict de l'Admiraulté, of Dec. 7, 1400. P. 62. Articles Extraits de l'Edit. concernant la Jurisdiction de Admirauté de France, March, 1584. P. 65.

3. Sur la Navigation, Ordonnance du Roi de Suede. Feb. 19, 1715. P. 72. 4. Ordinance of the King of Denmark, Norway, the Vandals, the Goths, etc., Sept. 23, 1659. P. 75.

5. Extracts from the French Ordinance of 1681. Liv. III., Tit. IX., § 2, Des Prises. P. 80.

6. Réglement du 17 Février 1694, concernant les passeports accordés aux vaisseaux ennemis par les Puissances neutres. P. 85.

7. Ordonnance du 12 Mai 1696, touchant la manière de juger les vaisseaux qui échouent, ou qui sont portés aux côtes de France par tempête ou autrement. P. 86.

H. Doc. 551-vol 7——39

8. Extrait du Règlement du 21 Octobre 1744, concernant les prises faites sur mer, et la navigation des vaisseaux neutres pendant la guerre. P. 87.

9. Règlement du 26 Juillet 1778, concernant la navgation des bâtimens neutres en temps de guerre. P. 88.

10. Danish Prize Instructions of 1810. P. 91.

11. Ordinances of Congress, Nov. 25, 1775, p. 103; Dec. 5, 1775, p. 104; Jan. 6, 1776, p. 105; March 23, 1776, p. 106; April 2, 1776, p. 106; April 3, 1776, p. 107; Nov. 15, 1776, p. 108; May 2, 1780, p. 109, and other ordinances to p. 128.

12. British Statutes and Prize Instructions. P. 129.

Prize courts are subject to the instructions of their own sovereign. In the absence of such instructions their jurisdiction and rules of decision are to be ascertained by reference to the known powers of such tribunals and the principles by which they are governed under the public law and the practice of nations.

The Amy Warwick, 2 Sprague, 123.

Prize courts are tribunals of the law of nations, and the jurisprudence they administer is a part of that law. They deal with cases of capture as distinguished from seizures; their decrees are decrees of condemnation, not of forfeiture; they judge the character and relations of the vessel and cargo, and not the acts of persons.

Speed, At. Gen., 1866, 11 Op. 445.

The equitable principle of prescription is applied by prize courts.

66

Sir W. Scott, The Mentor, 1 C. Rob. 179.

"All law is resolvable into general principles: The cases which may arise under new combinations of circumstances, leading to an extended application of principles, ancient and recognized, by just corollaries, may be infinite; but so long as the continuity of the original and established principles is preserved pure and unbroken, the practice is not new, nor is it justly chargeable with being an innovation on the ancient law; when, in fact, the court does nothing more than apply old principles to new circumstances."

Lord Stowell, The Atalanta (1808), 6 C. Rob. 440, 458.

2. LIENS.

§ 1230.

A claim was made by an American merchant to certain goods which were libeled as enemy's property, and which were shipped by British merchants on their own account and risk. The claimant set up a lien (1) on some of the

Prize-Lien on goods.

goods on the ground of an advance made to the shippers by his agent in Great Britain in consideration of the consignment; and (2) on other goods on the ground that they were shipped to him in virtue of a general balance of account due to him as the shippers' factor. The court, Washington, J., said that the doctrine of a factor's lien for a balance of account, or of a consignee's lien for advances, was unknown in the prize courts, unless in special cases where the lien was imposed by a general law of the mercantile world, independently of any contract between the parties, as, for example, in the case of freight allowed on an enemy's goods seized in the vessel of a friend. The court therefore refused to allow further proof of the claimant's allegations.

Marshall, C. J., was absent. Livingston, J., dissented, saying that he could concur in the condemnation of the property only as subject to the claimant's lien.

The Frances (1814), 8 Cranch, 418.

That capture, jure belli, overrides previous liens; see, also, The Hampton, 5 Wall. 372; The Battle, 6 Wall. 498.

Under the principles of international law, mortgages on vessels captured jure belli are to be treated only as liens subject to be overridden by the capture. The act of March 3, 1863, "to protect the liens upon vessels in certain cases," does not refer to captures jure belli, or modify the law of prize in any respect.

The Hampton, 5 Wall. 372.

The right of capture acts on the proprietary interest of the thing captured at the time of capture, and is not affected by the secret liens or private engagements of the parties.

The Carlos F. Roses, 177 U. S. 655.

3. FREIGHT.

$1231.

A vessel sailed from London to Amelia Island under a charter party by which she was to carry the outward cargo free, but was to receive freight for the return cargo at a rate greater than would have been paid if the return voyage had had no connection with the outward. On her outward voyage she was captured by a United States armed vessel, and her cargo was condemned as enemy property; but an allowance was made for freight to Amelia Island, as on a quantum meruit. The claimant of the cargo and the master of the ship having appealed, the latter contended that the outward and return voyage should be treated as one, and freight allowed as stipulated in the charter party. Marshall, C. J., delivering the opinion of the court,

« ПредыдущаяПродолжить »