The Jeune Nelly, a French vessel, ran the blockade of Vera Cruz, Mexico, by the United States forces without interference by the blockading squadron. On coming out, however, she was captured by the U. S. S. Hunter, but, being almost immediately afterwards wrecked, was not brought in for adjudication. The French Government presented a claim for damages on the ground that, as the vessel was permitted to enter the port, she was exempt from capture on going out unless previously warned by entry on her papers or other mode of actual notice. The United States declined to admit this contention, and maintained that nothing short of an intentional assent (of which there was no evidence) on the part of the blockading force to the entrance of the vessel would have sufficed to give her immunity from the operation of the blockade. "When the blockade," said the Department of State, "is actually maintained by a sufficient force, and when the captured vessel, with full knowledge of its existence, and without the consent of the blockading squadron, enters the port, the question how far the entry might have been prevented by greater activity or different measures on the part of the blockaders, is not material and is never examined. The vessel being thus in port, in breach of the blockade, was of course liable to capture in attempting to pass out." Mr. Hunter, Act. Sec. of State, to M. de Sartiges, French min., July 29, See, also, Mr. Buchanan, Sec. of State, to M. Poussin, Jan. 17, 1849, MS. 7. CAPTURE AND PENALTY. "11. Blockade running is a distinct offense, and subjects the vessel attempting, or sailing with the intent, to commit it, to seizure without regard to the nature of her cargo. The presence of contraband of war in the cargo becomes a distinct cause of seizure of the vessel, where she is bound to a port of the enemy not blockaded, and to which, contraband of war excepted, she is free to trade." Instructions to United States Blockading Vessels and Cruisers, General The capture of a vessel for violation of blockade may be lawful, if made by a national vessel, though the latter be not part of the blockading force. The Memphis, Blatchf. Prize Cases, 260. The penalty for breach of blockade is the confiscation of the ship, and, as a general rule, of the cargo. But if it be clearly established by the proofs found on board at the time of the capture, that, at the inception of the voyage the owners of the cargo stood clear, even from a possible intention of fraud, their property will be excepted from the penal consequences of the breach of blockade. Halleck, Int. Law (3d ed., by Baker), II. 208-209, citing Duer on Insurance, I. 683-685. "In the absence of rules in relation to blockades in time of peace, those applicable to blockades in time of war are the only ones according to which the case of the Lone is to be considered. Whether seized in consequence of the one or the other description of blockade, the duties of the captors are the same, both with reference to the captured vessel, which they are bound so to secure as to insure their continued possession of it, and to her crew, who are to be treated with all the humanity and kindness which are consistent with the security of the prize, and which, it is gratifying to perceive from your note, have been extended to citizens of the United States detained by naval forces of France. It would be to the President a cause of sincere regret if anything connected with the case under consideration should lead to a change in the conduct of the officers commanding those forces towards American citizens falling into their hands of which the United States would have just cause to complain." Mr. Vail, Act. Sec. of State, to M. Pontois, Oct. 23, 1838, MS. Notes to "The Department has been informally apprised that Commander Woodhull, of the United States steamer Connecticut recently exacted, as a condition of the release of members of the crew of the British schooner Adeline, captured for a breach of the blockade, that they should enter into an engagement not to be employed in a similar proceeding, in future. It occurs to this Department that, as the requirement referred to is not warranted by public law, the commanders of blockading vessels should be instructed not to exact any similar condition for the release of persons found on board of vessels charged with a breach of the blockade. "It may be lawful to detain such persons as witnesses, when their testimony may be indispensable to the administration of justice, but, when captured in a neutral ship, they can not be considered and ought not to be treated as prisoners of war. Angus Smith, John Mooney and John H. McHenry, the alleged British subjects above referred to, are consequently to be considered as absolved from the obligation represented to have been required of them by Commander Woodhull." Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Welles, Sec. of Navy, Dec. 31, 1861, 56 8. DEPOSIT OF OFFENSE. § 1279. Where an American vessel had entered and cleared from a port under blockade, and, while returning to New Orleans, was captured by a vessel belonging to the French blockading squadron, from which the captain of the former rescued her and brought her to her destination, the port of New Orleans; and demand subsequently being made of the Executive to deliver up the vessel and cargo, both on account of the said breach of blockade and rescue, it was advised that the captors had no right of property in said vessel and cargo, and that the liability of the vessel to condemnation, if it ever existed, had ceased by the termination of her voyage at the port of her destination. It was also advised that the case called for a judicial decision settling certain questions of fact concerning the legality of the blockade, capture, etc., before the Executive could act, and that, as independently of this, there was no constitutional right vested in the Executive to deliver up the property of an American citizen, claimed by him as his own, and in his actual possession, and not condemned, nor legally adjudged to belong to another. Grundy, At. Gen., 1838, 3 Op. 377. The offense of breach of blockade "can not travel onwards with the vessel beyond the termination of the return voyage. If captured, or recaptured, at any stage of that voyage, she is taken in delicto and liable to be condemned; but if, as in the present case, she terminates it in safety, that liability is viewed as having ended.” Mr. Vail, Act. Sec. of State, to M. Pontois, French min., Oct. 19, 1838, MS. See Mr. Vail, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Cass, min. to France, No. 32, Nov. A cargo taken from a port in violation of a blockade, with the intent to transship it at an intermediate port for its port of ultimate destination, remains liable to capture and condemnation after the transshipment. The Thompson, 3 Wall. 155. The liability of a vessel to capture and condemnation for breach of blockade ceases at the end of her return voyage. The Wren, 6 Wall. 582. "The liability of a blockade runner to capture and condemnation begins and terminates with her voyage. If there is good evidence that she sailed with intent to evade the blockade, she is good prize H. Doc. 551-vol 7-54 from the moment she appears upon the high seas. Similarly, if she has succeeded in escaping from a blockaded port she is liable to capture at any time before she reaches her home port. But with the termination of the voyage the offense ends." Instructions to United States Blockading Vessels and Cruisers, General V. CESSATION OF BLOCKADE. 1. TERMINATION. § 1280. The blockade of the coast of Louisiana, as established on the coast of the Southern States generally, by the President's proclamation of April 19, 1861, was not terminated by the capture of the forts below New Orleans by Commodore Farragut and the occupation of the city by General Butler, and the proclamation of the President of the 12th of May, 1862, declaring that after June 1 the blockade of the port of New Orleans should cease. It therefore remained in force at Calcasieu, on the western extremity of the coast of Louisiana. The Baigorry, 2 Wall. 474; The Josephine, 3 Wall. 83. The fact that the master and mate saw no blockading ships off the port where their vessel was loaded, and from which she sailed, is not enough to show that a blockade, once established and notified, had been discontinued. The Baigorry, 2 Wall. 474. A public blockade, that is to say, a blockade regularly notified to neutral governments, and as such distinguished from a simple blockade or such as may be established by a naval officer acting on his own discretion or under direction of his superiors, must, in the absence of clear proof to the contrary, be presumed to continue until notification is given by the blockading government of its discontinuance, The Circassian, 2 Wall. 135; The Baigorry, id. 474. The occupation of a city by a blockading belligerent does not terminate a public blockade of it previously existing, the city itself being hostile, the opposing enemy in the neighborhood, and the occupation limited, recent, and subject to the vicissitudes of war. Still less does such occupation terminate such a blockade proclaimed and maintained not only against the city, but against the port and district commercially dependent upon it and blockaded by its blockade, The Circassian, 2 Wall, 135, Wharton, in his International Law Digest, III. 364, following Hall (3rd ed.), 656, says: "This ruling conflicts with Thirty Hogsheads v. Boyle, 9 Cranch, 191. Damages were afterwards given by the mixed commission to the owners of the Circassian.” He also quotes Lorimer, Law of Nations, 145, who says: "A British ship, the Circassian, was actually seized and confiscated by the American prize court for attempting to run the blockade at New Orleans after New Orleans had been retaken and was in possession of the North, and she was restored only under the mixed commission appointed by the treaty of Washington at the close of the war." There is nothing in these comments to indicate that the decision had been carefully examined, and it is obvious that Lorimer, since he speaks of the ship having been "restored" by the mixed commission, was not acquainted either with the powers or the proceedings of that body. It may be accepted as self-evident, as a general proposition, that the capture of a blockaded port by the blockading belligerent terminates his blockade of such port, since he could hardly blockade himself; nor does it necessarily appear that this proposition was denied in the case of the Circassian. The facts were that the Government of the United States, by a formal proclamation, assumed to continue the blockade of the port of New Orleans till July 1, 1862, though the occupation of the city of New Orleans was effected by the United States troops on the 2d of May. The port of New Orleans and the city of New Orleans were not the same; and the court drew a sharp distinction between the two things. "It may be well enough conceded." said the court, "that a continuous and complete possession of the city and the port, and of the approaches from the Gulf, would make a blockade unnecessary, and would supercede it. But, at the time of the capture of the Circassian there had been no such possession. Only the city was occupied, not the port, much less the district of country commercially dependent upon it, and blockaded by its blockade." Mr. Justice Nelson, however, in his dissenting opinion, contended that at the time when the vessel was seized both "the city and port of New Orleans were reduced, and full authority of the United States extended and held over them." (2 Wall. 150, 156.) The same difference of opinion as to the facts apparently existed in the mixed commission, which, by a majority of votes, awarded compensation to the owners of the vessel. Although the award does not disclose the reasons on which it was founded, the dissenting opinion of Mr. Frazer, the American commissioner, indicates that they were the same as those maintained by Mr. Justice Nelson. Mr. Frazer's dissent was based solely upon the facts. At the close of an extended opinion, he said: “Comments and criticisms upon the judgment of the court had fallen under my eye; trusting to which, I confess, I had been somewhat impressed with serious doubts (to say the least) of the legality of the condemnation. But a very careful study of the case shows that, in making such criticisms, no account has been taken of the important fact that the possession of the United States forces at New Orleans did not extend to the whole port when the ship was seized; no such entire possession being anywhere directly asserted. That the error is one of inference, resulting from the fact, doubtless, that the wider area of the port, is contradistinguished from |