usual hospitality, and to procure the necessary refreshments, the President directs that you will be careful in preventing any augmentation of her force and her making any repairs not warranted by law. With respect to the latter article, the reparation of damages which she may have experienced from the sea is allowable, but the reparation of those which may have been inflicted in the action is inadmissible."

Mr. Clay, Sec. of State, to Mr. McCulloch, April 7, 1828, 22 MS. Dom.
Let. 177.

See, to the same effect, Mr. Clay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Thompson, col-
lector at New York, April 9, 1828, 22 MS. Dom. Let. 178.

See, also, Sec. of State to At. Gen., April 22, 1828, 22 MS. Dom. Let. 187;
Wirt, At. Gen., May 3, 1828, 2 Op. 86.

June 3, 1905, three Russian men-of-war, the Aurora, the Oleg, and the Zemtchug, after an engagement with the Japanese, sought asylum at Manila. The commander of the squadron, Admiral Enquist, stated that the Aurora and the Oleg were seriously damaged, and that the Zemtchug was in bad condition; and he requested permission to make repairs and to fill up with provisions and coal. On board the ships there were a hundred and thirty wounded men. Permission was at once granted by the local authorities for the landing of a number of these; and an examination was made by a United States naval board of the condition of the ships. It was found that the Aurora and the Oleg, which were seriously injured near the water line, would require, respectively, thirty and fifty days to repair, while the Zemtchug would require seven; and that none of them had coal enough to steam. Admiral Enquist desired three thousand tons of coal. The facts were immediately reported by the authorities in the Philippines to the War Department and the Navy Department, by which they were in turn communicated to the Department of State.

In a memorandum of June 5, 1905, Mr. W. L. Penfield, then solicitor of the Department of State, after referring (1) to Art. VI. of the treaty of Washington of May 8, 1871, by which it is declared that a neutral government is bound not to permit either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other or for the purpose of renewal or augmentation of supplies of arms and munitions of war or the recruitment of men; (2) to the clause in the President's neutrality proclamation of Feb. 11, 1904, limiting the stay of belligerent men-of-war to twenty-four hours, except in certain cases; (3) to the similar clause in the British neutrality proclamation issued during the Spanish-American war; and (4) to the clause in the neutrality rules promulgated by the Italian Government in 1864, and again in 1898, forbidding the increase, under pretext of repairs, of warlike force by belligerent ships, or the

execution, under such pretext, of any work that could in any way add to their fighting strength, expressed the opinion that the President's proclamation of February 11, 1904, in what it said concerning repairs of belligerent ships, referred only to damage caused by the sea and not to damage caused by war, and that, if the Russian ships were permitted to renew their fighting strength, either by the restoration of their guns or of their armor plate, or to repair any other damage caused by the guns of the Japanese fleet, the neutral port in which such things were allowed would become a naval arsenal for the belligerent and a base of his hostile operations. He adverted to the internment of the Russian cruiser Lena at San Francisco, in the summer of 1904, on the ground that the repairs which she required were so extensive as to amount to a renovation of the ship, although in that case there was no war damage to be repaired.

In conformity with the view taken in this memorandum, the Secretary of the Navy on the same day telegraphed to Admiral Train, commanding the United States Asiatic Fleet, then at Cavite, that the Russian vessels could not be allowed to repair war damages unless interned, it being the policy of the United States to restrict all belligerent operations in its ports. Admiral Train was instructed to confer with Mr. Wright, governor-general of the Philippines, and if he approved to take charge of the vessels.

On the next day, June 6, the War Department instructed Governor Wright to advise Admiral Enquist that as his ships were suffering from damage due to battle and as it was the policy of the United States to restrict all operations of belligerents in neutral ports, the President could not consent to any repairs unless the ships were interned at Manila till the close of hostilities. Governor Wright was further directed, after notifying Admiral Enquist of this conclusion, to turn over the execution of the order to Admiral Train.

In reporting on June 6 the execution of these orders, Governor Wright stated that Admiral Enquist, on being advised of the ruling as to repairs, had expressed a wish to cable his government on the subject, and had asked whether he would be required to put to sea within twenty-four hours or would be allowed to obtain coal and provisions sufficient to take him to his nearest port. The ships, said Governor Wright, had been allowed to take only 150 tons of coal for use in the harbor, and enough food supplies to last from day to day. Governor Wright also stated that he had just received a communication from the Japanese consul at Manila calling attention to the fact that three Russian war ships had been in the harbor since the night of June 3, and asking whether the 24-hour limit would be enforced. He had replied that, in view of the condition of the ships and of their request for coal and repairs, he was awaiting instructions.

With reference to this report the War Department, on the same day, instructed Governor Wright that the President directed that the 24-hour limit must be strictly enforced, and that the necessary supplies and coal must be taken within that time.

On June 9 Admiral Train reported that, as the Russian ships had not left the harbor within the required 24 hours, he had notified Admiral Enquist that the force under his command must be considered as interned after June 8 at noon. Admiral Train stated that disarmament was going on by removing the breech plugs, and that the engines were sufficiently disabled for the purpose of internment by limiting the coal supply. He added that Admiral Enquist, in accordance with instructions of his government, had expressed his willingness to give his parole and the paroles of his officers and men not to take any further part in the war.

June 19, 1905, the Russian ambassador at Washington inquired whether the hospital ship Kostroma, which had been ordered from Shanghai to Manila, would be allowed to take wounded or sick officers and sailors from Admiral Enquist's vessels back to Russia on their giving their paroles to take no further part in the war. A similar inquiry was received from Admiral Train. The matter was on June 20 brought to the attention of the Japanese legation, but on the next day, before its answer was received, the Kostroma arrived at Manila, and the President deemed it proper and humane to direct a compliance with the Russian request, upon the officers and men giving their parole, in accordance with the assurance given in the Russian ambassador's note. Meanwhile, the Japanese Government instructed its legation to state that it would not object to any disposition which the United States might see fit to make of the subject.

June 20 Admiral Enquist, through the French consul, asked permission to bring from Shanghai material other than munitions of war for repairing his vessel, such as cordage, sail cloth, waste, and oil for machinery, and other articles. Permission was granted by the War Department, with the understanding that the vessels were still to remain in internment.

June 24 Admiral Train inquired whether the hauling down of the flag of the Russian ships was regarded as a necessary condition of internment. The Department of State, on being consulted, advised, June 28, that the internment of the ships did not take from them their nationality, and that, although the hospitality which the Russian ships enjoyed at Manila was limited by the exigencies of war and the duties of the United States as a neutral, yet their internment would not seem to deprive them of the mere privilege of flying their national colors. Admiral Train was accordingly instructed that the hauling down of the flag was "not considered a necessary condition of internment."

July 26, 1905, the Russian ambassador at Washington asked that Sublieutenant Bertenson, of the Aurora, be allowed to return to Russia, on his parole not to take further part in the war. The request, which appeared to be made as for a favor, was, with the concurrence of the Japanese Government, granted. It soon appeared, however, by a cable from Manila, that Sublieutenant Bertenson was ill, and that Admiral Enquist had asked permission not only for him, but for certain other officers, who also were ill, to return to Russia, their physical condition requiring that they leave the climate of Manila. Permission was, with the concurrence of the Japanese Government, granted for their return to Russia on parole, it appearing by the examination and report of the United States naval authorities at Manila that they were ill. The permission embraced two lieutenants and two sublieutenants.

Toward the end of July, 1905, the Russian Government announced that it would detail Commander Bartsch to take command of the Aurora, in place of Captain Iegorieff, deceased. The naval authorities at Manila were instructed to permit him, on his arrival, to take command of the ship, and to obtain his parole under the same conditions as were required of the officers of the other interned vessels.

October 7, 1905, the commander of the United States naval forces in the Philippines cabled that Admiral Enquist had asked permission for Shipbuilder Lohvitzky to return to Russia on parole for urgent and satisfactory personal reasons. Under the conditions then existing, it being assumed that a " shipbuilder" was not an active combatant, permission was granted without obtaining the consent of the Japanese Government.

October 18, 1905, Mr. Root, Secretary of State, referring to his letter of the 14th of the month to the Secretary of the Navy advising the latter that the Government of the United States had been officially notified of the ratification of the treaty of peace between Russia and Japan by both Governments and that the Lena and her complement at San Francisco might be released, wrote to the Secretary of the Navy that the same treatment might be accorded to the Russian war vessels and their complements at Manila or in Philippine waters. Instructions were accordingly given to the United States naval authorities in the Philippines, and within a few days the vessels departed.

Mr. Morton, Sec. of Navy, to Sec. of State, June 5, 1905; Memorandum of Mr. Penfield, Solicitor of Department of State, June 5, 1905; Mr. Morton, Sec. of Navy, to Sec. of State, June 5, 1905; Mr. Taft, Sec. of War, to Sec. of State, June 5, 1905; Mr. Oliver, Act. Sec. of War, to Sec. of State, June 6, 1905; same to same, June 6, 1905; same to same, confid., June 6, 1905; Mr. Darling, Act. Sec. of Navy, June 9. 1905; Mr. Taft, Sec. of War, to Sec. of State, June 9, 1905; Count Cassini, Russian ambass., to Mr. Loomis, Act. Sec. of State, June 19,

1905; Mr. Darling, Act. Sec. of Navy, to Sec. of State, June 19, 1905; Mr. Loomis, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Takahira, Japanese min., No. 203, June 20, 1905; Mr. Loomis, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Hioki, Jap. chargé, June 21, 1905; Mr. Hioki, Jap. chargé, to Mr. Loomis, June 22, 1905; Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Count Cassini, Russ. amb., No. 267, June 23, 1905; Mr. Peirce, Act. Sec. of State, to Sec. of Navy, June 24, 1905; same to same, June 24, 1905; Mr. Darling, Act. Sec. of Navy, to Sec. of State, confid., June 24, 1905; Mr. Taft, Sec. of War, to Sec. of State, June 20, 1905; same to same, June 24, 1905; Mr. Darling, Sec. of Navy, to Sec. of State, confid., June 24, 1905; Mr. Pierce, Act. Sec. of State, to Sec. of Navy, June 28, 1905; Mr. Bonaparte, Sec. of Navy, to Sec. of State, July 1, 1905; Baron Rosen, Russ. amb., to Mr. Adee, Act. Sec. of State, July 26, 1905; Mr. Adee, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Hioki, Jap. chargé, July 27, 1905; Mr. Hioki to Mr. Adee, July 28, 1905; Mr. Adee, Act. Sec. of State, to Sec. of Navy, July 29, 1905; Mr. Adee, Act. Sec. of State, to Baron Rosen, Russ, amb., No. 5, July 29, 1905; Mr. Bonaparte, Sec. of Navy, to Sec. of State, Aug. 2, 1905; same to same, Aug. 4, 1905; same to same, July 28, 1905; Mr. Adee, Act. Sec. of State, to Sec. of Navy, July 29, 1905; Mr. Adee, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Hioki, Jap. chargé, July 29, 1905; Mr. Hioki to Mr. Adee, July 31, 1905; Mr. Adee, Act. Sec. of State, to Sec. of Navy, Aug. 2, 1905; Mr. Adee, Act. Sec. of State, to Baron Rosen, Russ. amb., Aug. 2, 1905; Mr. Bonaparte, Sec. of Navy, to Sec. of State, Aug. 3, 1905; Mr. Adee to Jap. chargé, Aug. 8, 1905; Mr. Darling, Act. Sec. of Navy, to Sec. of State, Sept. 19, 1905; Mr. Adee, Act. Sec. of State, to Baron Rosen, Sept. 21, 1905; Mr. Adee, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Takahira, Jap. min., Sept. 21, 1905; Mr. Adee, Act. Sec. of State, to Sec. of Navy, Sept. 21, 1905; Baron Rosen, Russ. amb., to Dept. of State. July 27, 1905; Mr. Adee, Act. Sec. of State, to Sec. of Navy, July 31, 1905; Mr. Adee, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Hioki, Jap. chargé, No. 211, July 31, 1905; Mr. Bonaparte, Sec. of Navy, to Sec. of State, Aug. 2, 1905; Mr. Adee, Act. Sec. of State, to Sec. of Navy, Aug. 7. 1905; Mr. Darling, Act. Sec. of Navy, to Sec. of State, Aug. 9, 1905; Mr. Bonaparte, Sec. of Navy, to Sec. of State, Oct. 7, 1905; Mr. Bacon, Act. Sec. of State, to Sec. of Navy, Oct. 11, 1905; Mr. Bonaparte, Sec. of Navy, to Sec. of State, Oct. 13, 1905; Mr. Root, Sec. of State, to Sec. of Navy, Oct. 18, 1905; Mr. Bonaparte, Sec. of Navy, to Sec. of State, Oct. 20, 1905; Mr. Darling, Act. Sec. of Navy, to Sec. of State, Oct. 28, 1905; Mr. Root, Sec. of State, to Sec. of Navy, Nov. 2, 1905; Mr. Root, Sec. of State, to Baron Rosen, Russ. amb., Nov. 2, 1905; MS. Dept. of State.

As to the case of the Lena, see infra, § 1317.

(2) ORDINARY DAMAGE: LIMITATIONS; INTERNMENT.

§ 1317.

The Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer Temerario, which was reported to have been sent down the coast of South America to intercept the U. S. S. Oregon on her way around Cape Horn to Cuba, was permitted by the Paraguayan Government to lie up during the war at Asuncion, in a condition of disability unfitting her for service.