similarly divided. The case in which both parties have competitors will here be first and principally considered.

The simplest type of this distributive exchange would be of a kind which is effected once for all, without reference to a series of future productions and exchanges. For example, to adapt an illustration used by Mr. Henry George,1 let it be supposed that on a particular occasion each out of a number of white men hires one or more black men to assist in catching seals, on the agreement that each white man shall give his black assistants a certain proportion of the take, the terms having been settled in an open market in which any one white is free to bid against any other white and any one black against any other black. A conception more appropriate to existing industry is that each white agrees to pay in exchange for a certain amount of service a definite quantity of produce, not in general limited to the result of a particular operation. On a particular day less seal may be taken than the employer has agreed to give the employee for the day. In this case, even if payment is not made till the end of the day, the employer must pay for help on a particular day in part with seal caught on a previous day. He must pay altogether out of past accumulations when payment is made before the work is done. When the employer agrees to pay a definite amount, he cannot expect to gain on each day's transaction, but on an average of days.

This example is suited to illustrate some general properties of Exchange which attach to Distribution as a species of Exchange. Such are the laws which connect a change in the supply or demand upon one side of the market with a change in the advantage resulting from the transaction to the parties on either side. Thus, competition on both sides being presupposed, a decrease of supply in a technical sense of the term on the one side is, ceteris paribus, universally attended with detriment to the other side, but is not universally attended with detriment to the side on which the supply is decreased.2 Accordingly, a limitation of supply on one side may be advantageous to that side, though not to both sides. The case of Distribution compared with Exchange in general in respect to such limitation of supply has only this peculiarity,-that the danger of this policy defeating itself is in the case of Distribution specially visible and threatening. There is an evident limit to what the black man dealing with the white man can get in exchange for a certain amount of his service;

1 Progress and Poverty, Book I. chap. iii.

2 See II. 8, 35.

namely, the total product which that service utilised by the white man will on an average produce. To be sure, there is here but a case of the general principle that no one will give more for a thing, whether article of consumption or factor of production, than the equivalent of its total utility to him, which total diminishes as the quantity of the commodity is reduced. But this limit is less liable to escape attention when it is fixed by the material conditions of production rather than by the desires of consumers. Conspicuous warning is given to parties in the position of our black men not to attempt to benefit themselves by a considerable reduction in their supply of service; for, though they might possibly obtain a larger proportion, they would probably obtain a smaller portion, of the average product. The laws which have been stated and other general laws of Exchange are equally true in more complicated cases of Distribution.

So far, we have supposed only a single factor—the service of the black man, or, more generally, the factor ß-offered by the competitors, say, B1, B2, etc., in exchange for some of the produce a offered by the competitors, say, A1, A2, etc. Let us now introduce other kinds of factors, 7, 8, etc. And let us no longer suppose payment to be made by parties of the type A, in the kind of commodity which is produced, namely, a. A more concrete conception is that, besides the group A, B, C, D, there is another and another group,-A′, B′, C', D′; A", B", C", D" ;where each capital letter typifies a set of competing individuals. It may be supposed that each A purchases out of the finished product that he turns out-namely, a-portions of the products a', a", etc., which he distributes according to the law of supply and demand among parties of the type B, C, D. In fine, each A may pay for the factors of production altogether in some one product, a"",-" numéraire," as happily conceived by M. Walras, or, less generally, money,-which the purveyors of the factors can exchange for the articles which they want. These articles need not be all commodities ready for consumption: some of the parties may care to purchase factors of production wherewith to play the rôle which has been assigned to A.

Having now obtained a general idea of the machinery by which distribution in a regime of competition is effected, let us go on to consider in more detail the parts of the mechanism. And, first, of the party that takes factors of production in exchange for products or the means of purchasing the same, the party above represented by the white man and labelled A. The

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functions of this party may be investigated by an ancient method which Sidgwick has proposed to rehabilitate 1 for the purposes of modern economics,-the search for a definition. What is an entrepreneur? Amid the diversified combinations of attributes which the industrial world presents-innumerable as the varieties in which vegetable nature riots-we ought to fix certain characters agreeably to the rule laid down by Mill under the head of Definition by Type. "Our conception of the class" should be "the image in our minds which is that of a specimen complete in all the characteristics." 2 Four such type-specimens may be distinguished, ranged in a descending order according to the extent of functions ascribed to the entrepreneur. There is, first, the party whom the classical writers designate as the Capitalist, who from funds in his possession pays the wages of the labourers, or supports them during the work; who supplies the requisite buildings, materials, and tools, or machinery; and to whom, by the usual terms of the contract, the produce belongs to be disposed of at his pleasure." This party will here be considered as devoting his care and savings to a single business. There is, second, the entrepreneur as portrayed by the late President Walker, "not an employer because he is a capitalist, or in pro-portion as he is a capitalist." 4 There is, third, the party to whom Mr. Hawley would wish to restrict the term "entrepreneur, "5 the man who undertakes risks, of which class the most prominent, though not the only, species is the investor in joint stock companies. Fourth, at the extreme degree of tenuity, is the entrepreneur who makes no profit. It might seem, indeed, as if this class did not call for special treatment, as differing only in the amount, not in the kind of remuneration. A fig tree which bears no fruit is not therefore a tree of a distinct species.

3

1 Political Economy, Book I. chap. ii. § 1.

2 Logic, Book III. chap. vii.

3 Mill, Political Economy, Book II. chap. xv. § 1.

The Wages Question, p. 228.

• Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. VI. (1892) p. 283; VII. p. 459 et seq.; XV. p. 77 et seq.

6 Compare Mangoldt, Unternehmergewinn, pp. 41-43. A person who does not work, wie der stille Gesellschafter, hört darum nicht auf, wahrer Unternehmer zu sein." This type is the limiting case, short of which the trouble of management in various degrees is combined with what Mr. Hawley calls "the irksomeness of risk." As Professor Taussig says, "The corporation of modern times presents all possible varieties of the relation between active manager and idle investor. Nominally, the stockholders are a group of associated active capitalists. Practically, they range from shrewd managers to the most helpless of inactive investors." Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. X. (1895) p. 83. Cp. Marshall, Principles of Economics, Book IV. chap. xii. §§ 8 and 9.

The horse which the Scotchman its owner had just trained to live upon a minimum, when the animal unfortunately died, was not therefore a new variety of the equine genus, requiring mention in a treatise on Natural History. However, as imposing theories have been connected with this last category, it comes within the scope of the present inquiry.

As our aim in comparing definitions should be, as Sidgwick says, "far less to decide which we ought to adopt than to apprehend the grounds on which each has commended itself to reflective minds," the hunt for a definition being followed not so much for the sake of the quarry as of the views which are incidentally presented, let us go on to consider the principal propositions which the several conceptions are adapted to bring under our notice. In this inquiry much assistance will be obtained from a series of articles on cognate subjects in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, which forms a sort of economic symposium.

1

The first definition is particularly suited to inquiries in which the parties who are in the habit of saving are contrasted as to their actions and interests with the parties who do not save,approximately, the working classes. Specimens of such inquiry may be found in the fifth chapter of Mill's first book, and in Professor Taussig's important article on "The Employer's Place in Distribution." 2 It sounds paradoxical to add that the classical conception is not particularly adapted to illustrate the Ricardian theory of rent. But the definition of the capitalist above given is not easily reconciled with the received representation, that the capitalist's remuneration is equal to the number of doses which he lays out, multiplied by the remuneration of the last dose, the ordinary rate of profit. For, as Sidgwick argues, there is no adequate reason for expecting that "remuneration for management" as well as interest should tend to be at the same rate for capitals of different sizes.3 Doubtless, the proposition is accurate enough to support the practical consequences which have been deduced from it. But, while fully admitting this, one may still agree with Sidgwick that "even Mill's exposition" is "highly puzzling." For the idea of an economic person laying out doses up to the margin and obtaining the remuneration equal to the number of doses multiplied by the marginal productivity of each dose is only proper to the case in which the doses are for sale. 1 References to the series up to November, 1900, are given in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. XV. p. 75.

2 Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. X. p. 72.

› Political Economy, 3d edition, Book II. chap. ix. § 3. Cp. chap. ii. § 8; and below, p. 21.

i

But it is only in the conditions proper to our third definition that doses of capital are put on a market in exchange for profit. Perhaps the classical writers, having an eye to practice and not restricted by a sharp definition, often tacitly introduce the supposition that it is open to the "capitalist " to take part in some other business besides his own.1

The classical formula for surplus may be employed along with our second definition if we use the phrase " amount of outlay multiplied by average rate of return" to designate the amount which the entrepreneur of the Walker type pays in the way of interest from year to year to those who have lent him the means of carrying on his business. The surplus, according to this conception, will include not only the landlord's rent, but also the entrepreneur's net income. The portion of this surplus which accrues to the entrepreneur is not given by any simple formula. The conditions by which it is determined may be considered under two heads, corresponding to Cairnes's categories,-commercial and industrial competition. This distinction becomes clearest when, in conformity with the division of employments, we conceive different occupations to be separated by great gulfs, so that they who would pass from one to the other must make a complete, or at least a considerable, change in their business arrangements. In virtue of the first kind of competition the entrepreneur endeavours to make the best possible arrangements within the occupation which he has chosen. In virtue of the second kind of competition he endeavours to choose the occupation which will afford to him the greatest net advantage.

His motive under the first head may be understood by likening

1 Cp. Mill on various employments of capital, Political Economy, Book II. chap. xv. § 1, par. 4.

2 See note to the present writer's Address to the British Association, Section F, 1889 (a, vol. ii.), which, written before the publication of Marshall's Principles of Economics, does not sufficiently emphasise the " principle of continuity." It may be observed that the two kinds of competition involve respectively two mathema. tical operations, the determination of a maximum, and of the greatest among 7 maxima. There is the distinction between finding the top of a hill and finding the highest hill-top. The demarcations between the two species of competition and between the two mathematical operations are not coincident, so far as an entrepreneur, without leaving his business, may introduce considerable and, so to speak, integral changes in its organisation, in accordance with the principle of substitution" (Marshall). This principle seems to cover both the species of competition and both the mathematical operations. Doubtless, it is convenient to have a term applicable to every method by which maximum advantage is sought. Among such methods ought, perhaps, to be placed the calculus of variations, where the "margin of profitableness" is considered as a sort of boundary line, cutting one after another every possible line of business organisation.” Principles of Economics, Book VI. chap. vii. § 7, 4th edition.

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